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Abstract: This dissertation focuses on neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda and its role 
in defining social boundaries.  Frame analysis was used to gain a deeper understanding of 
how neo-Nazis and violent jihadis construct propaganda to neutralize objections and 
promote drift.  Specifically, diagnostic and prognostic frames were analyzed for 10 
―effective‖ propagandists and two ―ineffective‖ propagandists in a comparative 
framework.  This research uses a social psychological perspective, paying particular 
attention to the emotion of shame and advances the ―violence as communication‖ model 
into ―terrorism as criminogenic propaganda.‖  Qualitative and quantitative methods were 
used to analyze how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists incorporate diagnostic and 
prognostic frames as techniques of neutralization. Specifically, I analyzed: 1) frame 
typologies, 2) relationships between frames, 3) location of frames, and 4) frame 
prevalence.  The results provide a better understanding of the link between terrorist 
propaganda and radicalization and can be used to inform future research and policy 
decisions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 Cohen (1955) conceptualizes that when individuals collectively experience social 
problems, they develop an alternative frame of reference. This frame of reference 
provides individuals with a subcultural identity.  The purpose of this study is to use frame 
analysis to gain a better understanding of how ideas and emotions are integrated within 
terrorist propaganda to outline a subcultural identity for a terrorist subculture. By frames, 
I refer specifically to ―diagnostic‖ and ―prognostic‖ frames that outline problems and 
solutions in emotionally laden communication defined as propaganda (Snow & Benford, 
1988). Diagnostic frames identify grievances and injustices, while prognostic frames 
outline how a social movement provides a solution to counter and overcome these 
injustices (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007). In particular, I focus on two 
social movements, neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propaganda?  
2. What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propaganda?  
3. What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent 
jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?  
a. Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propaganda?  
 
 Frames organize individual and collective experience (Goffman, 1974); therefore, 
emotions are central to frames and framing. This study seeks to understand how frames 
are integrated with emotion in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda. I accomplish this 
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by operationalizing the presence of emotion in diagnostic and prognostic frames, 
analyzing the connections between each type of frame, and examining where a 
propagandist embeds these frames in text. Operationalization is accomplished through the 
use of an ontology to identify diagnostic and prognostic frames in text.  I also analyze the 
connections between violent frames as solutions to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi problems 
through the use of network text analysis (NTA).   
 This study is grounded in a social psychological perspective supported by the 
―violence as communication‖ (VAC) analytical model (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982).  At 
the intersection between sociology and political science, ―violence as communication‖ is 
a model conducive to studying how meaning and interpretation impacts target audiences.  
VAC provides an analytical starting point from which to answer research questions that 
address the relationship between emotions, framing, and terrorism.   
 This chapter outlines the VAC framework and TCP or ―terrorism as criminogenic 
propaganda,‖ a related concept I have improved to more precisely analyze the emotional 
dimensions of extremist movement frames. 
Defining Terrorism 
 
 Terrorism is not a contemporary concept or term. Terrorism has existed in the 
realm of political violence for thousands of years (Bjorgo, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Mazarr, 
2007).  The modern understanding of the term ―terrorism‖ is grounded in French political 
violence during the 18
th
 century (Hoffman, 2006).  Terrorism in France was an effective 
tactic which led to a complete revolution.  Interestingly, the term terrorism, during the 
French Revolution, was actually seen as a positive form of political violence because it 
ended an oppressive aristocracy (Laqueur, 2001). 
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 However, the need to define terrorism has increased over the past 50 years.  This 
is due in part to the proliferation of using terrorism as a tactic and the importance placed 
on legalized operationalization of human behavior (Ranstorp, 2007; Karmon, 2005).  
Along with an increase of terrorist incidents during the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, 
have come definitional problems that have made ―terrorism‖ difficult to define (Schmid 
& Jongman, 1988; 2005; Hoffman, 2006, Gibbs, 1989). Because the term terrorism is so 
widely used in the national media, it erroneously appears that what constitutes terrorism 
is clear to the general public (Nacos, 1994; 2003; 2007). However, definitions become 
more convoluted across cultural or religious contexts and what is apparently clear in one 
culture can have an opposite interpretation in another (Yonah, 1990; Crenshaw, 1995; 
Ruthven, 2005; Ganor, 2007). Divergent interpretive paradigms, which are reflected by 
myriad official definitions, mean that actual terror incidents are not interpreted 
consistently (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; 2005). 
 Part of the definitional problem is that target audiences can interpret the same act 
of terror differently (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982; Roy, 2004). The same incident can be 
perceived as ―heroic,‖ ―cowardly,‖ or ―inhumane.‖  In this case, the majority or party in 
power sets the dominant perspective and outlines who and what is terrorism.  Commonly 
summarized as the ―terrorist or freedom fighter paradigm,‖ this philosophical debate is 
represented in the United Nation‘s inability to arrive at an official definition of terrorism 
because its international membership cannot agree on who is a terrorist and who is a 
freedom fighter (Hoffman, 2006). 
 Scholars have also confronted the terrorism definitional challenge.  Terrorism is a 
complex phenomenon that incorporates attributes from politics, religion, and history 
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(Schmid & Jongman, 2005).  Terrorism scholars have generated various definitions only 
to note the variation between them. Despite differences among terrorism definitions, 
Laqueur (2001) notes two central threads among all definitions of terrorism: 1) 
noncombatants are the focus of aggression and/or, 2) violence and the action labeled as 
terrorism is expected to influence a target audience by advancing the ideological interests 
of a terrorist or terrorist group.  Bruce Hoffman (2006; 25) adds that terrorism is also 
―conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or 
conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or 
by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or 
inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or 
its leaders; and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.‖ I define terrorism 
in this study as:  
Terrorism is symbolic violence (or threats of violence) either by word or deed that 
intends to incite further violence.  Individuals, groups or state actors carry out or threaten 
violence for ideological reasons against targets that serve as message generators to 
emotionally manipulate target audiences. Terrorists use violence or the threat of violence 
to produce emotional ‗terror‘ or ‗pride‘ in their target audience to leverage, intimidate, 
coerce, inspire or mandate a revolution of ideas into action. Terrorism is method of 
propaganda that uses violence as its symbolic medium to bring about active or passive 
alignment in a target audience. 
 
Criminology and terrorism: a review 
 
 The study of terrorism now occupies a solid position within criminology and 
criminal justice (Rice, 2009; LaFree, 2002; 2010; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2009; 
Rosenfeld, 2002; 2004; Black, 2004; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005;Hamm, 2004; 
Smith & Damphousse, 2002; Smith, Damphousse, & Karlson, 2002; Simi, 2010; Simi & 
Futrell; 2010; Deflem, 2005; Barak, 2004). Prior to 9/11, criminologists who studied 
terrorism were few in number (Smith & Damphousse, 1998; Smith, 1994, Deflem, 1997; 
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Turk, 1982; Della Porta, 1995); however, since 9/11, the number of criminologists 
studying terrorism has increased substantially. Terrorism became a popular subject of 
inquiry for criminologists because it was suddenly perceived as a pressing social 
problem, a promising field of inquiry, and backed by millions of dollars in federal 
funding.
1
    
 Since terrorism is relatively new to criminology, how criminologists approach and 
study the topic is still evolving. Criminology tends to emphasize either structural or 
individual levels while neglecting group processes that involve social psychological 
variables (Katz, 1988, LaFree, 2010; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2009; Black, 2004; 
Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005).
2
  The social psychological perspective as an area of 
criminological inquiry for terrorism compliments structural and individual approaches 
(Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Rice, 2009).   
 Stephen Rice (2009) Addressing the limitations of ignoring a social psychological 
approach to terrorism within criminology, Rice (2009) suggests that existing 
criminological scholarship on emotions and generic violence is a good starting point for 
applying a social psychological lens to terrorism.  He postulates that the results would be 
similar to how emotions and generic crime have advanced new criminological methods, 
different data sources, and new theories. Seminal scholarship includes Katz‘s (1997; 
                                                          
1
 Criminologists have emerged as pace setters in the study of terrorism. Criminologists now direct some of 
the nation‘s leading research terrorism institutes.  Criminologist and criminal justice scholars are now 
engaged in applying their criminological perspective to terrorism (Black, 2004; Rice, 2009; LaFree, 2002; 
Rosenfeld, 2002; Barak, 2005) Gary LaFree‘s National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) and Dick Ward‘s Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) have emerged as 
the most comprehensive collection of data on terrorism incidents and terrorist groups.  Criminologists have 
also partnered with scholars outside of criminology resulting in a surge of scholarship that adds a much 
needed criminological perspective.  Further examples include a steady increase of research, discussion 
groups, and panels devoted to terrorism at the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of 
Criminal Justice Sciences‘ annual meetings since 2001.   
2
 Prevailing models tend to emphasize either the rational actor model of individual choices, while 
minimizing or dismissing emotions as irrational or irrelevant, or structural approaches which deemphasize 
the importance of human actors.  Although there are exceptions for example (Short and Strodtbeck 1965). 
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1999) research on violence, Sherman‘s (1993) study on defiance, Kahan‘s (1998) work 
on disgust, Tyler‘s (1990) study on deference, Hale‘s (1996) study on fear, and 
Braithwaite‘s (1989) examination of shaming.   
 Despite Rice‘s (2009) rationale for expanding the role of emotions within 
criminology and terrorism, specifics of research design, operationalization, and analysis 
remain vague.  Since neither terrorism nor emotions have a long scientific tradition 
within criminology, it seems logical to borrow analytical frameworks from other 
disciplines with existing theoretical and methodological grounding.   
 Violence as communication (VAC) focuses on terroristic violence as a kind of 
violent language (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982).
3
  VAC holds significant potential for 
expanding a social psychological framework of analysis in criminology because it 
emphasizes the role of propaganda, symbolic interpretation, and constructed meaning for 
a target audience. However, the VAC model was developed three decades ago and is in 
need of modification and specificity for four reasons: 1) VAC was developed before 
Snow and Benford‘s (1988) work on diagnostic/prognostic frames; 2) news media has 
changed drastically; 3) VAC did not address emotions; and 4) VAC doesn‘t attend to 
social processes that are generated, disseminated, and sustained through individuals and 
groups. This study advances and updates the ―violence as communication‖ perspective by 
drawing directly from a criminological perspective.   
The analytical framework of violence as communication  
 Violence as communication (VAC) emphasizes two primary areas: First, a violent 
incident is a communicative process that involves a message, a messenger, a frame for 
                                                          
3
 Developed by Alex Schmidt, a historian and leading terrorism scholar, with Janny de Graaf, a sociologist 
who worked for the Center for the Study of Social Conflict during the 1980‘s. 
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the message, and an interpretation of that message.  In the case of VAC, the violent 
incident itself is the message, the media is the messenger, and the target/communiqué 
creates a frame that is symbolically interpreted by a target audience.  Second, a violent 
incident itself generates a message to three separate target audiences. Each target 
audience is equally important, but the objective varies.  Ideological supporters are 
sympathetic to the terrorist‘s message and interpret the incident as heroic or just. A 
neutral audience is defined as the target audience observing the incident in order to form 
an opinion. A neutral audience is engaged in an interpretative process of trying to 
determine which parties are ―terrorists‖ and which are ―freedom fighters.‖  The third 
audience is the target or victims of terror. The victim/target is defined as the audience 
under assault by the terrorists.  Terrorists select their targets/victims because killing, 
assassinating, wounding, or threatening their victims communicates a message that is 
connected to their ideology.  Terrorist victims are either the source of terrorists‘ 
grievances, symbolically related to the source of their grievance, or provide a mechanism 
for gaining the attention of the source of their grievance. 
Schmid and DeGraff provide further detail on VAC as an analytical model (see figure 1): 
 ―Instead of treating acts of terrorism as ‗senseless violence‘, we see them as a 
kind of violent language. Terrorism does not murder to kill somebody, but to obtain a 
certain  effect upon others than the victim. Terrorism, by using violence against one 
victim, seeks to persuade others.  The immediate victim is merely instrumental, the skin 
on a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience.  As such, an act of 
terrorism is in reality an act of communication.  For the terrorist the message matters, not 
the victim.‖ (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 1,14) 
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Figure 1 The Violence as Communication Concept 
 
 
 
 What separates VAC from other perspectives is its emphasis on how audiences 
are impacted differently by communicative interpretation. Interpretation of meaning and 
symbols is an essential component of VAC as a frame of analysis. Interpretation brings 
meaning to each event, symbol, action, self and ―other‖ (Charon, 1998; Moghaddam, 
2006).  VAC emphasizes that acts of terror are ―message generators‖ that communicate 
meaning in symbols to three separate target audiences. VAC emphasizes deep 
understanding of how meaning and symbols are interpreted via media outlets (Schmid & 
de Graaf, 1982).  
VAC and Frames 
 Framing is an ideal starting point for how to analyze VAC.  Framing is defined as 
―a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a 
point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a 
particular manner.  Frames operate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose 
causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies‖ (Kuypers, 2009: 8). How an event, 
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grievance, or a violent incident is framed is significant because frames are the means by 
which to communicate the terrorist‘s ideology.  
 Social movements ―package‖ ideas for a specific interpretation in order to shape 
attitudes and solidify social ties (Gamson et al 1982; Snow et al 1986; Benford & Snow, 
2000; Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 1998).  
Interpretation aligns with Snow and Benford‘s (1988:198) notion of describing the 
―production of meaning.‖ Snow and Benford (2005:3-4) describe this process as one ―to 
specify the interactive process by which frames are socially constructed, sustained, 
contested and altered, the phenomenological and infrastructural constraints on those 
processes, and the consequences of these processes for aspects of mobilization.‖ 
Effective framing of data from economics, religion, and politics is used to catalyze a 
small group into a movement (Snow & Byrd, 2007). 
 Snow and Benford‘s (1988) core framing tasks are significant contributions to 
VAC because they provide a model of how to analyze construction of ideas. Snow and 
Benford‘s core framing tasks accomplish distinct objectives. First, a framework is 
selected to specify the problems or ―the injustices‖ that need to be eliminated and those 
who are responsible (Snow & Benford, 1988).  Snow and Byrd (2007) later identified this 
―problem‖ as diagnostic framing. Second, in prognostic framing, solutions are presented 
to counter injustices, provide strategies, and foster a sense of justice in resolving the 
problems (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007).  Diagnostic and prognostic 
frames places priority on the production of meaning that is going on inside people‘s 
heads (intellect) and their hearts (emotions). Third, motivational framing offers a 
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concrete rationale for collective action which is required for a target audience to 
overcome fear and mobilize (Snow & Byrd, 2007; Snow & Benford, 1988).   
Refining Violence as Communication: Including Emotions and Propaganda 
 Greater attention to emotions in diagnostic and prognostic frames is needed in 
Schmid and de Graaf‘s model of analysis.  Including emotions expands Schmidt‘s and de 
Graaf‘s original VAC model because the study of emotions crosses numerous academic 
disciplines.  Since emotions involve a biological, psychological, cognitive, and 
interpretive processes, the scope of the TCP should include: 1) biological 
neurological/endocrinal studies; 2) Social construction, symbolic interaction, cultural 
construction, and framing studies; 3) Linguistic studies, specifically meaning (semantics 
and pragmatics) and psycholinguistics (the representation and functioning of language in 
the mind); 4) Physiological studies that examine the encoding of emotions expressed 
through voice, facial, and body realignment; 5) Cognition studies, the role of 
preconceived judgments/interpretations to the biological process.  Including emotions 
into VAC provides a next step toward advancing a social psychological agenda for 
terrorism in criminology. Focusing on emotions in VAC also aligns with the renaissance 
of emotions in sociology and an emerging focus in criminology (Goodwin, Jasper & 
Poletta, 2001; Sherman, 2002). 
 In particular, recent scholarship in sociology suggests that emotions are ―the glue‖ 
that connects humans to each other, to ideology, and the world around them (Goodwin, 
Jasper & Poletta, 2001). Emotions provide powerful biological, social, and psychological 
motivation to maintain social ties, form attitudes, and act as catalysts or accelerants to 
violence. An increasing number of criminologists have suggested that both criminality 
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and justice should be examined from an emotional perspective (Sherman, 2002; LaFree, 
2006; Bouffard, 2002; Jang & Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; Barblet, 
2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 2001; Katz, 
2002; Rice, 2009).  Emotions are either visible or suppressed in all social action, 
including violence and criminal associations (Katz, 1988; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 
2001; Collins, 1990; Jasper, 1998; Gilligan, 1996).   
 Including emotions as part of social interaction offers an integrated approach to 
social behavior (Karstedt, 2006; 2001; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002; LaFree, 2006; Rice, 2009). 
Terrorism ignites emotional responses that are interpreted differently by supporters, 
victims and neutral audiences.  Terrorism is a tactic that uses violence for an ideological 
advantage achieved in part through effective framing of emotion laden communication. 
From a terrorist‘s perspective, violence is a mechanism to promote a message that is 
solidified by an emotional interpretation.  Whether a target population perceives political 
violence as fear or pride, terrorism as a tactic and method of communication generates 
strong emotional responses.   
 Political, religious, geographic, or ideological variables have meaning because of 
how they are interpreted ideologically and politically (Blumer, 1969). Moreover, these 
variables are powerful because the way in which they are emotionally interpreted can 
―fuel‖ violent behavior. In other words, violence or any other behavior is not purely 
economic, political, geographic, or ideological without an accompanying interpretative 
process (Blumer, 1969; Karstedt, 2006; 2001; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002; Sherman, 2002; 
Rice, 2009). 
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Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda  
 I introduce ―terrorism as criminogenic propaganda‖ (TCP) as a concept to 
advance a social psychological perspective in criminology and to refine VAC, which 
currently ignores emotionally messaging embedded with criminal intent.   
Figure 2: Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda 
 
 TCP as a model of analysis examines the relationship between how emotions and 
ideas are framed by individuals, groups, and states (see figure 2).  The purpose of TCP as 
an analytic model is to understand how ideas and emotions are integrated by subcultures 
to incite political/religious violence. TCP is distinguished from general propaganda and 
other forms of communication because primary attention is given to criminogenic intent.  
 Criminogenic intent is defined as producing, promoting, inciting, or increasing the 
likelihood of criminal behavior.  ―Criminogenic‖ distinguishes the intent of terrorism 
propaganda from other forms of propaganda such as marketing campaigns.
4
  The goal of 
                                                          
4
 There are problems with simply using the term ―propaganda‖ instead of ―criminogenic propaganda‖ 
because not all propaganda intends to incite violence or criminality. If propaganda ensures that emotion 
dominates public discussion, how is this different from a powerful marketing campaign or impassioned 
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terrorist propaganda is to incite further violence and to catalyze audiences into fear or 
criminal activity.  Criminogenic intent is communicated via diagnostic and prognostic 
frames to produce either active or passive support in a sympathetic or neutral audience.    
 Criminogenic propaganda intends to incite intense emotional responses, in order 
to persuade neutral or supportive audiences to engage in criminal behavior.  By 
leveraging the target audiences‘ attitudes via emotional frames, beliefs and assumptions 
may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 1998). Active or passive support can result in 
increased membership and finances, and/or an ideological realignment of the population.  
Effective frames intend to ―infect‖ its audience into action (Hatfield, Caciooppo & 
Rapson, 1994).   When an emotional frame works, it produces what Sigal Barsades 
defines as emotional contagion, ―a process in which a person or group influences the 
emotions or behavior of another person through the conscious or unconscious induction 
of emotion states and behavioral attitudes‖ (Schoenewolf, 1990: 50).   
 Diagnostic and prognostic frames use political, religious, criminal, historical, or 
cultural information to communicate a single interpretation of how the social world 
should be emotionally interpreted.  Facts, current or historical events, culture and religion 
are communicated to a target audience so that they maintain the terrorists‘ interpretation 
of the world (Taylor, 2003). Meaning is emotionally framed for a target audience so that 
it dominates how they should feel about certain situations.   
 “Propaganda” over “Communication” adds specificity to VAC 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
political rhetoric associated with the democratic process?  According to these definitions, it would be easy 
to describe political campaign ―smear‖ advertisements both by Democrats and Republicans as propaganda.  
―Dirty‖ political advertisements do not intend to educate, but to generate and direct an emotional response 
against an opposing candidate.  Under current definitions of propaganda, these emotional political 
advertisements are propaganda intended to incite highly emotional reactions. 
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 I argue that another important way to refine VAC is by using the term 
―propaganda‖ instead of ―communication.‖  Propaganda is defined as a set of 
communicative methods used to generate and direct emotional responses (Ellul, 1973; 
Steuter & Willis, 2008). What makes propaganda distinct from other communicative 
methods is that it intends to incite the emotions of a target audience (Bernays, 1928).  
Emotional incitement is necessary to reach a point where a message dominates public 
discussion because attitudes/beliefs have been challenged or changed (Ellul, 1973; 
Steuter & Willis, 2008). Propaganda is used as a communication method when 
dissemination is secondary to inciting emotions. Instead of passing along information, the 
focus of propaganda is to accelerate and direct the emotions of a target audience.  
Therefore, the term ―communication‖ does not adequately describe the type of 
communication that is occurring from a terrorism incident to a target audience.   
 The term ―communication‖ implies that a messenger and receiver are involved in 
dialogue, when, in fact, dialogue is contrary to what occurs in propaganda.  Terrorist 
propaganda is unidirectional—the terrorist to the target audience.  Terroristic incidents 
are intended to be unidirectional emotional forms of communication that grab the 
attention of ideological supporters, the neutral audience, and the target/victim.  The 
violent incident is choreographed in such a way to incite emotions in all three audiences 
in order to benefit the terrorists‘ ideology.   
Using the term ―propaganda‖ instead of ―communication‖ emphasizes the role of 
emotions in frames to intentionally motivate attitude formation and incite action. In 
propaganda, because emotions are integral for motivation, prognostic and diagnostic 
frames become the motivational frames.   
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 While VAC emphasizes communication by the incident, it neglects terrorism 
communication that occurs in text (word).
5
 The propaganda that precedes and follows 
terrorist action, along with the terrorist incident itself, and propaganda after, provides the 
interpretative meaning to all three target audiences.  Incidents of terror occur because 
there is a strong connection between the terrorist ideology and how they select targets, 
justify their actions, describe their grievances, and explain their behavior. Propaganda by 
the deed is not possible without some ideological precursor or post-communication found 
in ―propaganda by the word.‖ An ideological connection is what distinguishes violence 
associated with terrorism from generic violence.  VAC‘s neglect of propaganda excludes 
a significant ideological part of the process. Examples of text-based propaganda are 
pamphlets, manifestos, speeches, music lyrics, film transcripts, blogs, communiqués, or 
books.   
 Including propaganda in text is a significant modification to VAC because 
propaganda outlines the ideology of a terrorist group both to members and potential 
converts. Propaganda is also nested in a larger political, historical, or religious element.  
Including ―propaganda by the word‖ to VAC acknowledges the symbiotic relationship 
that exists between a terrorism incident and the ideological precursors that distinguish 
terror from generic violence.  
                                                          
5
 The popular phrase in terrorism studies, ―propaganda by the deed‖ is defined as the use of an emotional 
message conveyed by actions over words.  Propaganda by the deed is similar to how Johann Most defines 
the relationship between a violent action acting as propaganda.  Most, a 19
th
 century German anarchist, 
affirmed ‗action as propaganda‘ and stated, ―What is important is not solely these actions themselves but 
also the propagandistic effect they are able to achieve. Hence, we preach not only action in and for itself, 
but also action as propaganda‖ (Laqueur & Alexander, 1987: 105).  It is the violent incident that conveys 
an emotional message via target selection, the type of weaponry, the number of deaths/injured, or how the 
aftermath of the violent incident is conveyed via the media.  What is interesting about ‗propaganda by the 
deed‘ is that it has not been applied to all forms of terrorism.  Propaganda by the deed is still used to 
describe anarchist terrorism of the early 20
th
 century, despite its application to all forms of terrorism 
incidents. 
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 “Terrorism” over “Violence” adds specificity to VAC   
 Using the term ―terrorism‖ instead of ―violence‖ in TCP increases the specificity 
needed for criminological analysis. Terrorism is a specific form of violence tied to an 
ideology, intended to incite collective and individual emotions to mobilize.  Ideology is 
manifested in frames by word or deed and distinguishes terrorism as a symbolic form of 
violence with political or religious motives (LaFree & Dugan, 2004).  Terrorism deviates 
from generic violence because the symbolic nature of terroristic violence is normally 
communicated by written and verbal communiqués, manuscripts, speeches, books, cyber 
forms of communication, or published treatises.  A death from generic violent crime or 
terrorism may have the same result, but the meaning of the death is what separates the 
two.  A death by terrorists communicates a message to powerbrokers, victims, ideological 
supporters, and a neutral audience.  Terroristic violence is meant to signal that the 
existing political or religious structure must change.     
A Path Forward 
 I suggest that identifying, examining, and analyzing how ideas, emotions and 
diagnostic/ prognostic frames are integrated in text is a tangible way to utilize TCP.  
Frames are significant because they provide a way to examine the symbolic interaction 
between emotions and ideas in terrorist propaganda. This study is significant because it 
defines how to expand TCP in two ways: operationalization and analysis. An ontology is 
used to operationalize diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda.   
The Ontology: The Key to Operationalizing Emotions in Frames  
 Operationalizing emotions is critical to determining prognostic and diagnostic 
frames.  An ontology is used to operationalize frames where meanings are rich with 
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imagery and paradigms reflect individual and collective culture (Carley, 1994). An 
ontology, defined as a coding scheme or textual boundary, operationalizes affect in order 
to detect it in text.
6
  The use of ontologies is a common practice in linguistics, natural 
language processing and sentiment analysis (Liu, Lieberman &  Selker, 2003).  An 
ontology is used because it is flexible and accounts for word context and the culture in 
which they exist.  Using an ontology places emphasis on semantic boundaries over the 
use of relying solely on emotional synonyms. An ontology also places significance on 
context, culture, semantic and history of the text (Carley, 1994).   
 In this study, I operationalize diagnostic and prognostic frames by building on 
Katz‘s (2002) ―naturalistic social ontology.‖ Katz‘s social ontology stresses that 
researchers should describe phenomena as it is experienced by people in their everyday 
lives and how social behavior is: 1) created through symbolic interaction; 2) 
operationalized as a communicative action; and 3) shaped by corporeal processes visible 
to the researcher but often beyond the actor‘s direct awareness (Katz, 2002).  
Network Text Analysis (NTA): Analyzing Emotional Frames in Criminogenic 
Propaganda 
 
 Network text analysis (NTA) provides a method for researchers to quantitatively 
analyze diagnostic and prognostic frames in TCP.  A particular strength of NTA is that 
extracted networks can be collected in a theoretical fashion (Diesner & Carley, 2005).   
The theoretical and philosophical assumptions behind NTA are: 1) that a relationship 
                                                          
6
 Using an ontology as a method to examine emotion is grounded in the philosophy of phenomenology.  
Phenomenology asserts that researchers should examine knowledge from different points of view, which 
include that of the propagandist (Macann, 2007; Heidegger, 2000).  Phenomenology coupled with symbolic 
interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Douglas, 1970; Strauss & Corbin 1990) seeks to uncover meaning behind 
action and how reality is constructed through the ongoing process of social interaction.  The use of an 
ontology in this research is used to uncover the emotional meaning of text and how emotion is constructed 
in a ongoing process between the propagandist and the reader. 
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exists between frames and language; 2) a relationship exists between words and their 
intended meaning; and 3) social knowledge or shared meaning exists between cultures 
and context (Diesner & Carley, 2004; 2005).  Carley and Palmquist (1992) assert that 
people‘s language represents an individual‘s frame of reference and these concepts can be 
represented as networks.  Researchers use NTA to construct a network of linked words 
and concepts by identifying the relationships that exists between the words in text 
(Carley, 2006; Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2000).  
 NTA involves using an ontology to code data that combines ethnographic 
knowledge with computer assisted quantitative methods associated with network analysis 
(Carley, 1994).  This is done by combining NTA, which uses algorithms derived from 
graph algebra, with ontological coding (Bonacich, 1972).  NTA is a departure from 
mainstream quantitative approaches and returns to an ecological perspective where social 
facts are embedded within the contexts of time, space and culture (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994; Simmel, 1955; Abbott, 1992).  Thus the process of using NTA in this 
study relies on the depth of analysis typically associated with qualitative approaches, 
while simultaneously benefitting from the precision and inferential strength of 
quantitative techniques (Carley, 1993; Ragin, 2000).  
Neo-Nazism and Violent Jihadism: A Current Social Movement of Ideas 
Though there are numerous terrorist ideologies that could be used to examine 
diagnostic and prognostic frames, I focus on neo-Nazis and violent jihadis for primarily 
two reasons. First, both ideologies represent significant social problems that are currently 
impacting the economy and foreign/domestic policy. Both are global subcultural 
phenomena, although neo-Nazis are more diffusely organized on a sub national level, 
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while violent jihadis are currently organized in a worldwide network (Simi, 2010; 
LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2010; Sageman, 2004; 2008). Neo-Nazism and violent 
jihadism are ―ideological umbrellas‖ for numerous subcultural groups and their ideas act 
as a franchise of violence bent on overturning democracy. Neither ideology has a central 
single organizational repository but rather any individual or group inspired by neo-
Nazism or violent jihadism can stake a claim to the ideology and promote the cause 
through either words and/or deeds.
7
  
Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis are able to bypass traditional media outlets due to 
the rise of digital communication that includes the World Wide Web (Schafer, 2002; 
Burris, Smith & Strahm, 2000; Crelinsten, 2005; Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang; Hoffman, 
2006b). This allows them to disseminate their propaganda to target audiences in a way 
that is historically unprecedented.  Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists intend to 
craft frames with enough ―charge‖ to gain supporters and mobilize their base.  Their 
objective is to frame political, religious, or cultural data in such a way that incites an 
emotional response.  
The second reason is methodological. The differences and similarities that exist 
between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis make them excellent candidates for examining 
diverse ideologies in a comparative framework.  A comparative research design is 
advantageous as a starting point because it maximizes the ability to see if a phenomenon 
is cross-cultural (LaFree, 2002; Bennett, 2004; Reichel, 1994; Lijphart, 1975; 
McMichael, 1990; Allardt, 1990; Ebbe, 1996). Comparative research emphasizes 
collecting and analyzing data from different sources in order to observe similarities and 
                                                          
7
 There is a tendency among some scholars to treat words and deeds in a dichotomous fashion sharply 
distinguishing between the two.  In this study, I challenge this dichotomy and instead view words and deeds 
as overlapping phenomenon.  In this sense, words are deeds and deeds are words.   
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differences (Durkheim, 1964; LaFree, 1998; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Barak, 2000; 
Ragin; 1987; 1998; 2000).  If parallels exist in diametrically different data sources, these 
parallels can provide a foundation for future theoretical construction and etiological 
discovery (Bennett, 2004: Ragin, 2000; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990). The stronger 
the differences and similarities between a sample in a comparative research design the 
better.  Parallels demonstrate that a phenomenon transcends variable differences. Neo-
Nazism and violent jihadism represents two different data sources from which to examine 
how subcultural ideology is fused with emotions into frames.
 8
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 Violent jihadis and neo-Nazi as terrorist groups differ in geography, history, language, religion, world 
view, politics, philosophy and tactics.    
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Chapter 2 
―Shame is already revolution of a kind; 
shame is actually the victory of the French Revolution over the German patriotism that defeated it in 
1813. 
Shame is a kind of anger which is turned inward. 
And if a whole nation really experienced a sense of shame, it would be like a lion, crouching ready to 
spring.‖ Karl Marx
9
 
 
Situational Motivation Theories: Subculture and Strain Theory 
 The concept of subculture
10
 has been used extensively by sociologists to account 
for social and violent behavior (Adler, 1985; Ball-Rokeach, 1973; Baron, 1998; Cohen, 
1955; Cohen & Short, 1958; Cao, Adams, & Jenson, 1997; Elison, 1991; Erlanger, 1974; 
Felson, Liska, South, & McNulty, 1994; Frazier, 1957; Hughes, 2007; Kennedy & Baron, 
1993; Matza, 1964; Miller, 1958; Parker, 1989; Reed, 1972; Shaw, 1930; Sutherland & 
Cressy, 1974; Thrasher, 1927; Fischer, 1975; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967).  A survey of 
the literature reveals that scholars have applied subcultural theory to gain a better 
understanding of delinquent groups, gangs, race, urbanism, economic status, and violence 
(Tittle & Paternoster, 2000).  For example, Cohen and Short (1958) define a conflict 
oriented subculture that prizes prowess in physical contact and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) 
discuss how violence is necessary for achieving higher status among adolescents. In 
criminology, the subcultural perspective has emerged into set of theories grounded in 
symbolic interactionism and context that recognizes certain subcultures are more 
conducive to crime and violence.  One of the most significant developments was 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti‘s (1967) subculture of violence theory. 
                                                          
9
 Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx to Ruge, On the canal-boat going to D., March 
1843. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_03.htm accessed June 2010. 
10
 Fischer (1975) defines a subculture as a distinctive culture within a culture where people share a defining 
trait, maintain a distinct set of values, communicate culturally, and take part in a common way of life. E. B. 
Taylor (1871:1) defines culture as: "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." 
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 Wolfgang and Ferracuti‘s (1967) subculture of violence theory proposes that 
violent behavior results from subcultural systems that support violence as normative.  
They describe a normative violent subcultural system as: ―a potent theme of violence 
current in the cluster of values that make up the life-style, the socialization process, the 
interpersonal relationships of individuals living in similar conditions" (Wolfgang & 
Ferracuti, 1967: 140). A subculture of violence is not completely isolated from 
conventional culture, nor is it is required by adherents to use violence in every situation.  
Instead, a violent subculture promotes a series of conditions where violence is expected 
or required. Subcultural norms function as boundaries to interpret specific situations 
where violence is viewed as the normative response to certain cues.  Problems and certain 
experiences are interpreted as catalysts to which violent responses are perceived as 
normative and socially rewarded.  Members who breech these norms are criticized by 
others in the subcultural group.  In fact, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) draw attention to 
how certain subcultures forbid nonviolent responses in certain situations. 
 Similar to any subculture, a subculture of violence shares numerous values and 
attitudes that align with conventional culture (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). In order to 
understand why members of a "subculture" respond with violence, it is essential to 
examine values and attitudes of the subculture in context. If members belong to a 
subculture that normalizes violence, then they conform to the conduct norms, attitudes, 
and ultimately values of that subculture. Wolfgang and Ferracutti (1967) also suggest that 
subcultural members place a greater emphasis on evaluating each other by the degree of 
conformity to the subcultural lifestyle.  
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 From a subcultural perspective, Lukenbill and Doyle (1989) suggest that violence 
is the product of three successive events.  The first, naming, involves interpreting an 
experience as injurious, where the injury is blamed on another individual.  In the second 
event, claiming, the victim must communicate their grievance and demand reparation 
from the offender. In the third, the offender must reject the victim‘s grievance.  
According to Luckenbill and Doyle (1989), it is the rejection of a claim that transforms 
the interaction into a conflict.  The victim may respond to the conflict in a number of 
ways including perseverance and the use of force.  Thus violent incidents can be viewed 
as transactions in which victims use force to settle a perceived injustice stemming from 
having their grievance rejected.  A subculture of violence, according to Luckenbill and 
Doyle (1989) promotes a process of naming, claiming, and aggressiveness to resolve 
conflict.  Individuals within a subculture of violence are more likely to persevere and use 
force after their grievance has been rejected.  Again, according to a subcultural 
perspective, responding with violence in certain situations is required because the 
situation is interpreted as an attack and the subsequent grievance has been rejected 
(Luckenbill and Doyle, 1989).
11
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 Cohen‘s (1955) theoretical subcultural statement focusing on the rejection of middle class norms by 
economically disadvantage adolescents is another way of explaining how conflict is resolved.  Cohen 
(1955) emphasizes the problems of status and self-respect that economically disadvantaged adolescents 
need to resolve by being continuously confronted by middle class values and beliefs.  When these 
adolescents reject the dominant middle class value system, they do so with a vengeance. Cohen (1955) 
asserts that they deny middle class legitimacy and assert values diametrically opposed to it. Gangs are an 
example of a subculture that pursues short term gratification, crime for entertainment and destructiveness in 
a complete repudiation of middle class values (Cohen and Short, 1958). Strang (1971:78) summarizes 
Cohen‘s view as: ―Rejection of the middle class way of life is the culmination of a process having its 
origins in an individual‘s failure to meet the conventional criteria of success. Institutions commonly 
respond to such failure by stigmatizing and ostracizing their offending members, and the offending 
members tend to react by rejecting their rejectors and becoming progressively alienated.‖ 
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 Merton‘s theory on deviance (1938) originated from analyzing the relationship 
between culture, structure, and anomie.  In his theory, Merton links anomie,
12
 with 
deviance and argues that divergences between culture and structure lead to deviance. 
Merton developed a paradigm of deviant behavior to distinguish attitudes to goals, 
attitudes to means and the modes of adaptation (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000).  Merton 
(1938) maintains that delinquency can be attributed to the disparity between the cultural 
emphasis on success and the actual opportunity for achieving it.  The modes of adaptation 
to blocked goals (conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion) describe 
how ―innovators‖ create their own way achieving goals (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000).  
Merton defined those that ―rebel‖ either fail to internalize conventional goals (or later 
reject them) because they cannot achieve them or favor other goals and means.
13
  Tittle 
(1995: 4) identifies the ―rebellion‖ adaptation of failing to internalize conventional goals 
and means ―is typical of revolutionaries.‖  
 General strain theorists hypothesize that certain members of society, largely as a 
result of structural and individual pressures, commit crime in order to achieve goals they 
are denied through legitimate channels (Merton, 1938; Cohen, 1955; Dubin, 1959; 
Agnew, 1992; Akers, 2000; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). Central to strain formulations 
are the variables associated with socioeconomic status and perception of limited 
opportunities.  Simply stated, strain theory explains criminal/deviant behavior as an 
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 Derived from Emile Durkheim and is defined as the state of normlessness (Durkheim, 1897). 
13
 Merton (1938: 676) describes rebellion as: ―This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that 
of the others.  It represents a transitional response which seeks to institutionalize new procedures oriented 
toward revamped cultural goals shared by members of the society.  It thus involves efforts to change the 
existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions within this structure, and introduces 
additional problems with which we are not at the moment concerned.‖ 
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adaptive process to structural or individual frustrations and pains caused by blocked (or 
rejected) legitimate opportunities. 
 The subculture of violence perspective emphasizes norms that define violence as 
a necessary response to actions that cause pain or frustration.  Strain theory emphasizes 
―innovations‖ to compensate for blocked goals.  Neo-Nazis or violent jihadis that 
prescribe violence as a necessary method to counter insulting situations are more likely to 
use violence as a response.  According to strain theory, if racial or religious supremacy is 
perceived to be a legitimate goal, then neo-Nazis and violent jihadis will experience 
strain at the blocking of a perceived legitimate goal and will engage in crime.  
Subcultural violent jihadi and neo-Nazi norms are backed up with rewards and 
punishments that are identified through propaganda and organizational affiliations.  
Before continuing a review of the criminological/sociological literature, it is important to 
define certain terms, provide a brief historical context for neo-Nazism and violent 
jihadism and review the terrorism literature. 
Violent Jihadism 
 Jihad literally translated from Arabic is to ―struggle in the way of Allah.‖ 
However, jihad is a controversial religious term because its meaning has been altered to 
justify the use of violence against Muslims and non-Muslims. Jihad in mainstream Islam 
has two different interpretations, distinguished as the lesser and greater jihad.  Greater 
jihad is defined as fighting against inner forces that detract morally and spiritually from 
submitting to Allah (Gregg, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; 2006).  Lesser jihad is defined as 
the right to defend Muslims under attack from non-Muslims (Sivan; 1985; Gerges, 2005).   
26 
 
 Violent jihadism is used to define individuals and groups that promote a 6
th
 pillar 
of Islam as the use of violence against the ―enemies‖ of Allah and the Prophet 
Mohammad.  Requiring lesser jihad to be a sixth pillar of Islam makes it equal to the 
other five pillars: prayer, pilgrimage, profession of monotheism, fasting, and almsgiving. 
Violent jihadists insist that holy war is an obligation for all true Muslims (Sageman, 
2008).  Violent jihadism seeks to remove the influence of materialism and other anti-
Islamic ―isms‖ from the Muslim world that they claim are a covert invasion to uproot 
Islamic culture, undermine the moral fabric of society, family, and encourage passivity 
(Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006). The few Muslims that benefit from non-Muslim 
wealth are corrupt Muslim governmental officials that serve as local ―puppets‖ to the 
West. Violent jihadis label these Muslims as apostates who are ignorant of the ―true‖ 
faith (Aaron, 2008). Violent jihadism is a call to purification through the use of violence 
against anything that attacks Islam.  Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Shabaab, Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade are examples of groups that adhere to 
violent jihadism. Leading violent jihadi figures include: Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, 
Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and Mohammad Maqdisi. Violent jihadis use their 
view of holy war to distinguish themselves from apostate and passive Muslims they 
believe have tainted Islam.   
The idea of violent jihadism in the modern era arises from a series of ideologues 
that trace their origin to the early 14
th
 century (Brachman, 2009; Sivan, 1985). One of the 
most influential ideologues was Taq ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, 1263-1328, who 
justified ―war‖ as an Islamic duty to fight against invading Mongols (Sivan, 1985).  
Taymiyyah‘s ideas are important to modern violent jihadis because he is perceived as a 
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legitimate Islamic medieval authority that justifies violence against foreign invaders.  
More importantly, it was Taymiyyah‘s argument that Mongols who converted to Islam 
were not really Muslims (Brachman, 2009).  Mongolian Muslims were not true Muslims 
because they ―polluted‖ Islam with their customs and did not adhere to all aspects of 
Muslim life and should be considered takfir, defined as apostates who follow an impure 
version of Islam (Kepel, 2005).   
The term takfir was advanced by modern violent jihadism to also label secular 
Muslims as living in a state of jahiliyyah or state of ignorance (Qutb, 1966; Kepel, 2005).  
Jahiliyyah, according to violent jihadist, refers to a state of ―backsliding‖ or ignorance 
that encompasses the majority of Muslims.  Violent jihadis assert that the majority of 
modern Muslims are not ―true‖ Muslims because they represent a polluted version of 
―true Muslim society‖ guided by secular laws and innovations (Moghaddam, 2006; Qutb, 
1966).  Mohammad ibn Adb al Wahhab, 1703-1792, advanced Taymiyyah‘s ideas to 
create Wahhabism, who supported the use of violence across the Arabian Peninsula to 
purify Islam from secular innovations (Sivan, 1985).  Almost one hundred and fifty years 
later in Egypt, Hassan al Banna, 1906-1949, also used Taymiyyah‘s ideas when he 
founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Wright, 2006).   
Al Banna describes the Muslim Brotherhood as a revivalist Muslim organization 
to ―purify‖ Egypt from foreign military intervention, economic corruption, and secular 
interventions (Kepel, 2005).  After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War One, 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, lead by Hasan al Banna, applied Taymiyyah‘s ideas to 
the modern Egyptian Islamic community (Sivan, 1985). Al Banna asserted that modern 
Egypt resembled the Mongolian Muslim community characterized by secular innovations 
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and moral pollutants (Gerges, 2005).  Al Banna identified aggressive invaders against 
―true‖ Muslim communities in the form of growing Arab nationalism, the increasing 
immigration of Jews to Palestine, promotion of secular governments, European influence 
across the Muslim world, increasing corruption by governmental officials, and the control 
of natural resources by a small majority of Muslim government officials (Kepel, 2005).  
Sayyid Qutb, 1906-1966, emerged from this time period in Egypt to become the 
most influential violent jihadi ideologue to date (Brachman, 2009).  As a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb advanced Taymiyyah and Wahhab‘s ideological work to 
apply it to the current situation in Egypt (Wright, 2006).  Qutb witnessed the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire, the creation of Arab nation states after World War I, and increasing 
European interventionism in Egypt in the form of a secular government.   The rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was in response to existing secular Islamic regimes and the 
invasion of foreign ideas, materialism, and secular innovations into Muslim lands.   Qutb 
perceived this ―invasion‖ as warfare against the Muslim community (Qutb, 1966). Sayyid 
Qutb‘s ideological work influenced the next generation of violent jihadis that expanded 
his ideas to global jihad (Wright, 2006; Brachman, 2009).   
Neo-Nazism 
Neo-Nazism is used to describe individuals and groups whose central identity is 
defined by the ―Aryan race.‖ Furthermore, each individual and group ―draws inspiration 
and symbols from Hitler and Nazi Germany Pagan ritualism, Nordic warrior myths, and 
the Judeo-Christian Bible, which they interpret from a radical, racialist point of view‖ 
(Simi & Futrell, 2010; 2).  Neo-Nazis perceive that all non-whites and homosexuals are 
out to destroy the white race and thus maintain a focused hatred of these groups 
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(Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  Neo-Nazism is based on the premise that the white race is 
supreme—the apex of evolutionary natural selection denoting intellectual and cultural 
superiority (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Kaplan, 2000).  Neo-Nazism also includes a spiritual 
dimension that parallels political ideological ambitions (Gardell, 2003).  The spiritual 
dimension epitomizes the white race as the best union between forces in the universe, 
nature, and humanity.  This union is manifested in a genetic code observable in the white 
race (Michael, 2006).  Neo-Nazi spiritualism leads to the notion that one‘s race should 
determine their religion (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001: Michael, 2006).  The 
National Alliance, Aryan Nations, National Socialist Movement are examples of groups 
that adhere to neo-Nazism. Leading neo-Nazi figures include: George Rockwell, David 
Lane, William Pierce, Ben Klassen, Richard Butler, Tom Metzger, and Matt Hale. 
Neo-Nazism emerges from an ideological tradition grounded in hundreds of years 
of perceived European racial superiority (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Feagin, Vera & 
Batur, 2001).  European imperialism expanded European ―superiority‖ to dominate 
cultures classified as non-white across the globe (Feagin, 2010).  White superiority is the 
notion that the color of one‘s race determines superior intellectual and physical abilities 
(Kaplan, 2000).  Therefore, European imperialism regularly employed slavery, racial 
genocide, and segregation as methods to justify racial superiority (Feagin, 2010).  These 
methods were used in the British colonies of America, which later would become the 
United States.   
Despite independence from England, white superiority over non-whites remained 
part of the newly formed United States (Feagin, 2010).  Over subsequent decades, slavery 
and the notion of white supremacy became an ideological debate that divided the United 
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States, contributing to the American Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln‘s 1862 
executive order, the Emancipation Proclamation, would grant freedom to all of the slaves 
in the United States.  To counter the southern defeat, the freeing of slaves by the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and racial integration, the Klu Klux Klan was formed as an 
agent of informal social control by inflicting fear in non white populations (Kaplan, 
2000).  The Klan grew in membership throughout the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 century and racial 
segregation was maintained (Feagin, 2010). 
It is the stamp of Nazi Germany that gives modern day neo-Nazism a decidedly 
different feature over white supremacy in previous generations (Feagin, 2010).  The 
Nazis mixed race and nationalism into an organized government and military (Goodrick-
Clarke, 2002).  The Nazis had also advanced white supremacy in a different direction that 
existed before World War II.  The Nazis focused white superiority against the Jews and 
built upon hundreds of years of anti-Semitism while establishing a new found science 
―proving‖ the superiority of the white race (Baird, 1974).  The Nazis advanced the use of 
racial propaganda and strategies to eliminate Jews and other races/classes that were 
deemed inferior (Baird, 1974).  The Nazis targeted the Jews because they were seen as 
the catalyst for German poverty, the creation of communism, and systematically 
weakening Germany (Welch, 1983; Zeman, 1964). When in power, the Nazis did not rely 
solely on intermitted violence, like the KKK or Russian pogroms, but engaged in a 
solution of systematic mass genocide of ―inferiors.‖   
It was almost two decades after the allies defeated Nazi Germany that white 
supremacist ideology would become more integrated with Nazi ideology in the United 
States (Schmaltz, 1998). Specifically, it was existing white supremacist sentiments that 
31 
 
would ―advance‖ Nazi Germany‘s anti-Semitic propaganda, ―research,‖ and programs in 
the United States (Simonelli, 1999). In the early 1960‘s, during the Civil Rights 
movement, the line between neo-Nazi ideology and white supremacist sentiments would 
blur (Feagin, 2010).  On a broad scale, the civil rights movement was met with formal 
and informal opposition from white supremacists that demanded that Jim Crow laws and 
racial segregation be maintained (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).   
In 1959, George Lincoln Rockwell, 1918-1967, founded the American Nazi Party 
in part to publicize that the Civil Rights movement was a Jewish strategy to weaken the 
white race (Simonelli, 1999).  According to Rockwell, Jews are more dangerous to whites 
than blacks over time (Rockwell, 1967).  Drawing from Nazi propaganda, Rockwell 
established a decidedly different strain of American white supremacy, one that blended 
European notions of racial superiority, with Nazi views of Aryan anti-Semitism and 
inferior races (Simonelli, 1999).   Also in the environment of the 1960‘s, George Lincoln 
Rockwell set into motion the idea that a racial war between whites and non-whites was 
imminent (Simonelli, 1999; Feagin, 2010). The notion of ―racial wars‖  would become an 
important distinction between white supremacy and Neo-Nazism.  After Rockwell‘s 
death in 1967, the American Nazi Party would split into different groups varying in 
appearance, location, and organizational structure (Goodrick-Clark, 2002; Simi & Futrell, 
2010).  
Differences and Similarities between neo-Nazism and Violent Jihadism 
Figure 3 illustrates some of the ideological and organizational differences and 
similarities that exist between neo-Nazism and violent jihadism.  Violent jihadis differ 
from neo-Nazis in that their ideology is grounded in religious superiority while neo-Nazis 
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emphasize racial superiority.  If either ideology were to govern a population, neo-Nazis 
would rely on racial nationalism, similar to Nazi Germany, while violent jihadis would 
emphasize dogmatic adherence to Islamic jurisprudence and a unified Muslim 
community.  The historical narratives between the two differ, as do the cultures and 
dominant languages of individual members.  Neo-Nazis are fighting for Aryan 
preservation against attacks from homosexuals, non-whites, race mixers, and Muslims 
(Simi & Futrell, 2010).  Violent jihadis are fighting to purify Islam from spiritual 
polluters whom they describe as corrupt Muslims, crusaders (the West), infidels 
(unbelievers) and blasphemers (Muslims that have converted to other faiths) (Brachman, 
2009).  Violent jihadis are currently engaged in an active global terrorism campaign that 
uses conventional weapons of war.  Neo-Nazis are engaged in more intermittent domestic 
terrorism and tend to use weapons typical to generic violence (Simi & Futrell, 2010; 
Simi, 2010). However, neo-Nazis are frequently arrested for trying to obtain or 
possessing high powered weapons, explosives, and even chemical or biological weapons 
in the United States and several European countries (De Armond, 1999; Falkenrath, 
1998; Durham, 1996). 
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Figure 3 Differences and Similarities Between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis. 
 
 Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share several similarities.  Both ideologies are 
equally opposed to societies that promote democracy.  Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism 
both assert that current democracies are controlled by a Zionist Jewish agenda, which 
unites them in sharing violent anti Semitic views (Michael, 2006a; Kuntzel, 2007). Neo-
Nazi and violent jihadis are equally engaged in a Holocaust denial campaign because of 
how ―Zionists‖ have manipulated information to gain world sympathy to use to their 
political advantage. Both ideologies embrace a historical idyllic model as an objective to 
emulate in the twenty first century (Herf, 2009). In light of a  historic ―golden‖ age, both 
neo-Nazis and violent jihadis engage in a prolific global propaganda campaign to bring 
their idyllic model into fruition.  Finally, each ideology is tied to a single charismatic 
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historical leader that serves as a model for individual and social behavior (Morse, 2003).  
Violent jihadis have all but deified the Prophet Mohammad and neo-Nazis consider Adolf 
Hitler‘s life and work to be sacred (Michael, 2006a). 
Terrorism Scholarship 
 The majority of terrorism literature has been published after 1968 (Schmid & 
Jongman, 2005; Laqueur & Alexander, 1987).
14
  The creation of academic journals 
devoted to terrorism studies spiked in the 1970‘s and 1980‘s.15  Because of the historical 
and political events of the 1970‘s, a surge in terrorism literature followed, leveling off 
until the dramatic increase of studies that occurred following September 11, 2001
 
(Reid, 
1997; 2007; Ranstorp, 2007).   Scholars who studied terrorism before September 11
th
 
formed a small group, they generally knew each other, and the majority represented the 
fields of political science, psychology, or international studies departments (Dyyesteyn, 
2007).
 
 
 Terrorism scholarship has changed drastically in the last ten years (Sageman, 
2008; Bjorgo, 2005; Brannan, Esler, & Strindberg, 2001). The study of terrorism now 
includes researchers from economics, history, religion, philosophy, criminology, criminal 
justice, sociology, and anthropology (Silke, 2007). The growth of terrorism research 
corresponds with an increasing number of disciplines that are attending to the topic. 
 There are three primary waves of terrorism scholarship that have emerged since 
the late 1960‘s (Rapoport, 2006). The first wave to dominate the field of terrorism 
                                                          
14
 J.B.S. Hardman published a piece in the 1934 edition of the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences analyzing 
the phenomenon from a social scientists perspective. Gross, Felix (1957) The Seizure of Political Power. 
New York: Philosophical Library; Roucek, J.S. (1962) Sociological Elements of A Theory of Terror and 
Violence, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 21: 2 April, pp. 165-167 and Gross, Felix (1943) 
Slavonic Encyclopedia. New York: Philosophical Library. pp. 531-532.    
15
Some Examples:  Terrorism: An International Journal founded 1977; Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency 
founded 1980;  Violence, Aggression and Terrorism founded in 1987. 
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occurred in the late 1970‘s and early 80‘s. Terrorists were categorized as ―psychopaths‖ 
and ―sociopaths.‖  The psycho/sociopath paradigm was dominant during these decades 
and research was designed to study terrorists as pathological (Rapoport, 2006).  The 
second wave, grounded in western psychology, occurring in the late 1980‘s to the late 
1990‘s, focused on individual traits and generating ‗terrorist profiles‘ (Horgan, 2005).  
The third wave of research can be described as ―behaviorist heavy,‖ emphasizing 
structural variables, and shifting towards studying terrorists groups as social networks 
and organizations (Ranstorp 2007; Bjorgo, 2005; Silke, 2007; Ruthven, 2005; Roy, 2004; 
Levitas, 2002; Sageman, 2004; 2008; Mazarr, 2007; Scheuer, 2002). 
 Jeff Victoroff (2005) divides the waves of terrorism into two general perspectives: 
a top down/macro level perspective and the bottom up/individual/micro level perspective. 
The macro level perspective emphasizes variables that create and influence the 
environment from which an individual or group resides.  Macro-level variables are drawn 
from political structure, religious ideology, poverty/wealth rates, literacy levels, cultural 
norms, modernity measurements, and measures of social equality (Krueger & Maleckova, 
2003; Sandler, 2003).  The majority of political and sociological theories explaining 
terrorism concentrate on the macro level perspective (Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Post, 
Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Schmid et al., 1988).  
 Conversely, the bottom up or individual perspective attempts to explore terrorist 
behavior from a psychological point of view. The individual perspective is divided into 
three distinct categories. First, the socio/psychopath perspective, which was dominant in 
the first research wave, classified terrorists as either a socio/psychopath incapable of 
rational thought, lacking in cognitive processing skills, and incapable of maintaining 
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healthy social ties (Post, 2005).  The terrorist as psychopath has become popularized in 
mainstream media and film industry (Victoroff, 2005).  Second, the rational actor 
perspective classifies the terrorist(s) as a logical, even an intelligent tactician, fully 
cognizant of their behavior.  The terrorist can be well educated, wealthy, successful, and 
possess the ability to develop a logical strategy to act out grievances.  A significant 
distinction is that terrorists are depicted as being devoid of psychological pathology or 
mental illness (Evans, 2005; Hoffman, 1998; Miller, 2006; Silke, 2003). Third, the 
mental disorder perspective integrates aspects of the previous two perspectives.  An 
educated, intelligent, rational, individual(s) can maintain healthy social ties and function 
in society, but a mental disorder creates the absence of a conscious or system of morality 
(Sageman, 2004). 
A Social Psychological Perspective in Terrorism Scholarship 
 A social psychological perspective emphasizes that human behavior is a 
combination of both individual and group processes (Scheff & Retzinger, 2000; Rice, 
2009; Sherman, 2003).  The social psychological perspective asserts that emotions are 
catalysts that incite, accelerate, and sustain violence (Scheff, 1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 
2000; Rice, 2009). Terrorism scholars argue for research that examines the role of 
emotions in individual and collective behavior (Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Morgan, 
2007; Victoroff, 2005; Rice, 2009; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003). 
Ethnographers assert that emotions are powerful motivators Juergensmeyer (2003), 
Gerges (2005), and Stern (2003) are three of the more widely known terrorism scholars to 
stress the role of emotions in terrorism (Masters & Deffenbaugh, 2007; Moghaddam, 
2005). Though micro and macro level perspectives are important to understanding 
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terrorism, Pynchon and Borum (1999) argue that emotions cannot be dichotomized as 
either micro or macro level—they intersect and are intertwined between individual and 
group processes. Scholars across multiple disciplines have intended to reinvigorate the 
study of emotions in the field of terrorism. However, progress is slow, and the social 
psychological perspective in terrorism studies remains slight when compared to micro or 
macro level approaches (Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Morgan, 2008; Victoroff, 2005; 
Rice, 2009; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003).   
 A social psychological perspective emphasizes that as individuals and groups 
interpret situations, these interpretations contribute to emotional responses, which can 
then result in political violence (Rice, 2009).  Separating the individual from the group or 
the group from the individual is contrary to the social psychological perspective because 
human behavior is perceived to be a combination of the two (Pynchon & Borum, 1999). 
Therefore, the social psychological approach intertwines variables that are typically 
separated when researchers examine only individual or group processes (Masters & 
Deffenbaugh, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 
2006; Morgan, 2008; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003; Haidt, 2006).   
 My research utilizes a social psychological approach to examine how terrorist 
propagandists frame ideology with emotion. I refer specifically to diagnostic and 
prognostic frames in propaganda that outline the problems of the conventional culture 
and assert the solutions are found in the terrorist subculture (Benford, 1993; Snow & 
Benford, 1988).  Diagnostic or prognostic frames in propaganda are emotionally 
constructed forms of communication that harness symbolic characteristics so that 
ideological supporters can easily identify similar situations. Diagnostic and prognostic 
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framing uses political, religious, criminal, historical, or cultural information in such a 
way that ―charges‖ the target audiences‘ emotions (McVeigh, Myers, & Sikkink, 2004).   
 Terrorist propagandists use emotions in framing to leverage a target audience‘s 
world view so that current/historical events, culture, and religion are interpreted a certain 
way (Taylor, 2003). Meaning is emotionally framed to dominate how a target audience 
should feel about a terrorist subculture.  Diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda 
are used to navigate toward a terrorist subculture over conventional subculture. Sykes & 
Matza (1957) describe techniques of neutralization as a process that assists in moving 
back and forth between a subculture of delinquency and conventional culture. 
Criminology, Techniques of Neutralization, & Framing 
 So far, criminologists‘ work on the relationship between framing, emotions, and 
ideology is far less substantial when compared to social movement scholarship.  When 
frames are examined in criminology and criminal justice, it generally refers to studies that 
have examined how the media frames crime, offenders, policies, criminal justice 
institutions, or legislation (Altheide, 1985; Barak, 1994; Best, 1990; Surrett, 1989; 2006; 
Lotz, 1991; Potter & Kappeler, 1998; Wykes, 2001).  The intersection of ideology, 
emotions, and frames of political criminals within criminology has yet to be examined. 
However, existing criminological scholarship in deviance and generic crime does 
correspond to how members in social movements use ―language as communication‖ to 
drift in and out of subcultures of deviance. 
 Sykes and Matza (1957) defined drift as the process of moving back and forth 
from conventional behavior/values to those of a subculture of delinquency. According to 
Matza (1964), drift is a gradual process where the motivation to perform delinquent 
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incidents becomes rationalized and then internalized.  Sykes and Matza (1957) argued 
that subcultures of delinquency maintain a set of values nested within conventional 
cultural values.  Juveniles appreciate conventional cultural norms, but not when they 
conflict with the norms promoted by a subculture of delinquency.  If conventional 
cultural norms are preferred over deviant subcultural norms, criticism by their peers 
serves as a form of subcultural social control to leverage a return to delinquency.  
Therefore, juveniles develop a set of ―new‖ social boundaries that serves to internalize 
and justify their behavior (Sykes & Matza, 1957).  Techniques of neutralization provide a 
mechanism to develop new social boundaries and justify subcultural values over 
conventional values (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
 Sykes and Matza‘s techniques of neutralization enable a person to shut off ―inner 
objections‖ to conventional culture that conflict with a subculture of delinquency.   Sykes 
and Matza‘s scholarship advances Mill‘s (1940) work on ―the vocabulary of motive,‖ 
where wrong-doers use linguistic techniques to present an act as culturally appropriate 
and acceptable. Techniques of neutralization include a range of behaviors experienced 
from denial, condemnation, and ―altruistic‖ beliefs (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Responses of 
denial range from relinquishing any sense of responsibility to minimizing societal or 
victim harm, while condemning behavior includes isolating members of conventional 
culture whose behavior is deemed to be far worse (Sykes & Matza, 1957).  ―Altruistic‖ 
behavior is based on appeals to maintain a sense of loyalty to their peers and members of 
a subculture.  Drift occurs because techniques of neutralization promote subcultural 
boundaries over conventional boundaries by substituting conventional cultural norms 
with those associated with subcultures of delinquency.  
40 
 
 Denial and condemnation of conventional culture can lead to delinquency or 
violence by ―framing‖ a subculture as a solution.  Sykes and Matza (1957) suggest that 
delinquency is used to solve problems for those living in environments where the loss of 
close relationships, loss of status, discriminatory action, poverty, stigma, or abuse is 
common.  Therefore, delinquents construct meaning to rationalize or ―frame‖ the 
problems and solutions that govern delinquent behavior in a way similar to how members 
of a social movement define motive and account (Mills, 1940; Orbuch, 1997; Scott & 
Lyman, 1968; Scully & Marolla, 1984). The need to rationalize problems and solutions 
does not reside solely with juveniles, but applies to all offenders, and is the reason that 
techniques of neutralization were expanded beyond the study of juveniles.  
 The impact of techniques of neutralization has been broad. Techniques of 
neutralization have been used to explain various forms of criminality (Ball, 1966; Mannle 
& Lewis, 1979; Minor, 1980; 1981; 1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes 
2003; Rosenfeld, Jacobs & Wright, 2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005).  
Techniques of neutralization has been used to better understand rape (Bohner et al. 1998), 
homicide (Levi, 1981), victimization (Ferraro & Johnson, 1983), hate crimes (Byers, 
Crider, & Biggers, 1999), violent behavior (Agnew, 2004), genocide (Alvarez, 1997), 
shoplifting (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003),  poaching (Eliason & Dodder, 1999), theft 
(Hollinger, 1991), drug use (Priest & McGrath, 1970), and white collar crime (Shover & 
Bryant, 1993; Benson, 1985; Simon & Eitzen, 1993). Techniques of neutralization have 
also promoted an interest in how other linguistic techniques are used to neutralize 
behavior. 
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 Scholars have focused on similar linguistic techniques used by actors engaged in 
criminality and problematic behavior (Scully & Marolla, 1984; Hall & Hewitt, 1970; 
1973; Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Lyman & Scott, 1970; Thurman, 
1984; Priest & McGrath, 1970; Minor, 1980; Agnew, 1994). Scott and Lyman (1968) 
illustrate how excuses, justifications, and accounts are used to neutralize conventional 
cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor‘s actions.  According to Scott and 
Lyman (1968), excuses are defined as a means of scapegoating to remove culpability 
through appealing to the nature of the incident.  Excuses often acknowledge the act was 
―wrong,‖ but appeal to the fact that the nature of the incident was either an accident, a 
biological or psychological impairment, or that they were influenced by circumstances 
beyond their control (Lyman & Scott, 1970; Scott & Lyman, 1968).  Justifications 
involve accepting responsibility for the incident, but deny their behavior was wrong 
because the actor rationalizes the necessity for their action.  Scully and Marolla (1984) 
provide an example of applying excuses and justifications to analyze criminal behavior, 
specifically how rapists explained themselves and their crimes.  
 According to Scott and Lyman (1968), accounts are defined as vocabularies that 
intend to neutralize an incident and its consequences.  Accounts are used when an actor is 
involved in trying to explain themselves and their actions as a rational outcome.  Orbuch 
(1997) summarizes accounts as a theoretical viewpoint and as a method to protect the 
actor and 1) provide greater control and understanding of the social world, 2) provide a 
method to cope with stressful and painful events, 3) establish a degree of hope in the 
future, and 4) create a method to organize relationships and experiences. Orbuch‘s 
summary can be applied directly to what techniques of neutralization, accounts, excuses, 
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justifications, and diagnostic and prognostic frames are designed to accomplish---
promoting particular types of activity in a subculture.   
 Sykes and Matza (1957) , Mills (1940), and Scott & Lyman‘s (1968) explanation 
of rationalization and interpretation is similar to how prognostic and diagnostic frames 
address problems, accounts, solutions, and motives in social movements (Hall & Hewitt, 
1970; 1973, Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968).  Influential criminological 
theories, like techniques of neutralization, take on a different meaning if political 
ideology and core framing tasks are included.  Although Sykes & Matza, Mills, or Scott 
& Lyman did not apply their work to framing terrorist ideology, their work reflects the 
fact that actors engaged in subcultural activity, which includes terrorists, need to 
rationalize their actions, cope with distress, and organize their social world.  
 Applying neutralization theory to understand terrorism follows other scholars who 
have applied the theory to crime (Ball, 1966; Mannle & Lewis, 1979; Minor, 1980; 1981; 
1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes, 2003; Rosenfeld, Jacobs & Wright, 
2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005).  Understanding attitude formation in 
political criminality acknowledges the importance of specifying subcultural norms over 
conventional norms. However, unlike common criminality or delinquency, where drift 
between conventional and unconventional culture is expected (Sykes & Matza, 1957; 
McCarthy & Stewart, 1998; Thurman, St. John & Riggs, 1984; Topalli, 2005), 
―permanent drift‖ into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture is the desired outcome 
because terrorist propagandists intend for future recruits to have a permanent neo-Nazi or 
violent jihadi identity (like themselves) in order to change conventional culture. I argue 
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that when ―drift‖ involves political/religious ideology, which distinguishes terrorism from 
delinquency, drift becomes radicalization.   
Frames & Framing 
 
 Outside criminology, the literature on frames and framing is extensive (Entman, 
1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Price et al., 1997; Valkenburg et al., 1999; Simon & Xenos, 
2000; Cable & Shriver 1995; Capek, 1993; Gamson ,1992; Gamson et al 1982; Johnston 
& Snow 1998; Kubal, 1998; Triandafyllidou & Fotiou 1998; Zdravomyslova, 1996; 
Snow et. al. 1986). Framing research can be found throughout the social and cognitive 
sciences and has generated a broad variety of research in communication studies and 
social movement theory (Goffman, 1974; Ivengar, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Bennett, 1988).  The literature also spans various subfields within political science and 
includes scholars that have studied social movements, bargaining behavior, mediation, 
impact of media, public opinion/voting, and deviance/criminality (Benford & Hunt, 1992; 
Best, 1987; Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 
1997; White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998; Cable & Shriver, 1995; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; 
Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & 
Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Marullo et al 1996; McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Nepstad, 
1997). 
 Frames function as information boundaries through the inclusion or exclusion of 
information. To Entman (1993; 52), framing is ―to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described.‖ Because frames emphasize specific information 
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while excluding other forms, frames affect individual or groups attitudes and their 
attachment to others that share similar attitudes.   
 Frames function as powerful communication agents that impact attitude 
formation.  Frames enable large amounts of information to be quickly assigned to 
―cognitive categories and to package it (information) for efficient relay to their 
audiences‖ (Giltin, 1980; 7). These cognitive categories provide target audiences with 
guidelines for ―ideas as well as interpretations and definitions of a variety of social 
phenomena‘‖ (Gans, 1979; 59).  
 Frames can impact attitude formation in individuals and groups. McAdam‘s 
(1986) expansion of Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson‘s (1980) micromoblization model 
of social movements outlines the significance of attitude formation and its link to social 
ties. McAdam‘s (1986) approach emphasizes the relationship between receptive attitudes 
and the formation or maintaining of social ties.  Receptive attitudes are a pre-requisite for 
responding favorably to existing social ties or as a motive to seek out relationships to 
foster these attitudes.  In this way, frames impact receptive attitudes or function to 
reinforce exiting attitudes and social ties (Ryan, 1991, 53). 
 Framing as a model of analysis has grown drastically over the past five decades 
and draws from the work of Erving Goffman (1974).  Goffman describes frames as 
mechanisms to understand social organization, experience, and social expression.   
Framing, Erving Goffman, and the Media 
 
 According to Goffman (1974) framing is an active process where individuals and 
groups understand, recognize, and accept or deny social boundaries.  Individuals respond 
to situations based on their understanding of how societal boundaries function in the 
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world around them.  In this way, framing defines almost all situations while providing an 
understanding of how to interpret them.  An individual's reaction to any event originates 
from understanding the experience and accepting existing social boundaries (Goffman, 
1974).  
 Goffman labeled the way in which individuals understand the world as their 
primary framework.  A primary framework can be seen in how an individual reacts and 
interprets a particular event to construct meaning. An individual‘s primary framework is 
activated when faced with circumstances that trigger the need to interpret and categorize 
the situation (Goffman, 1974). The primary frame functions as an organizational 
principle to "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of 
concrete occurrences defined in its terms‖ (Goffman, 1974; 21). Another way of 
describing Goffman‘s organizational principle is to define it as a method to organize the 
social world—officially labeled ―a cognitive organizational structuring system‖ 
(Goffman, 1974). The system guides an individual's interpretation of social reality and 
therefore determines the conscious or unconscious reaction to it. 
 Goffman organized his primary framework into two broad classes: natural and 
social. Natural frameworks are physical in nature and are defined as events and 
occurrences that occur without human interaction; examples include weather, geography, 
and natural disasters.  Social frameworks are the events and situations that result from 
human interaction.  Social frameworks can take many forms and are essential for 
providing the background, context, and the culture of a specific event (Goffman, 1974). 
An example of a social framework is a newscaster who covers a natural disaster by using 
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provocative visual images to generate emotional responses that enhance the narrative to 
capture the audience‘s attention (Fahmy, 2007). 
 Goffman's (1974) frame analysis proved to be a great benefit to communication 
and media studies because it provided an outline for understanding media and its 
construction of reality (Tuchman, 1978). Framing analysis has become an important 
model for studying mass communication and how meaning is constructed by news outlets 
(Altheide & Snow, 1979; D‘Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1993; 2007; Gamson, 1992; Gans, 
1979;  Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Iyengar, 1991; Reese, 2007; Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 
2001; Scheufele, 1999; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, 
Bliss & Ghanem, 1991; Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1985). Social movement scholars have 
strong interest in framing theory because it provides a theoretical grounding from which 
to examine how information is presented to target audiences.  Part of the benefit of 
framing theory is that it provides a theoretical model to study words and images in 
context in order to draw out meaning and interpretation (D‘Angelo, 2002). 
Framing and Social Movements 
 
 In response to the dominance of rational actor models (Olson, 1965) and resource 
mobilization theory (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988; McCarthy & Zald, 1977),  
scholars interested in the cognitive dimensions of collective behavior began utilizing 
concepts related to frame analysis (Snow et al, 1986; Benford & Hunt, 1992; Best, 1987; 
Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 1997; 
White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998; Cable & Shriver, 1995; Carroll & Ratner 1996; 
Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & 
Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997;  Marullo et al 1996; McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995; 
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Nepstad, 1997; Weed, 1997). Social movement scholars advanced Goffman‘s (1974; 21) 
work to examine how individuals and groups "locate, perceive, identify, and label" 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large. Frames from a social 
movement perspective provide meaning to events or occurrences that are organized in a 
fashion intended to guide action. The framing perspective in social movements is an 
active process of how ideas and meanings grow into social organizations and influential 
ideas.   
 Framing is a dynamic process of reality construction (Gamson et al 1982, Snow et 
al 1986, Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing in social movements involves the active 
production and maintenance of meaning for their supporters, antagonists, and neutral 
observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). Frames provide a way to interpret meaning by 
simplifying and condensing the social world in such a manner that intends to mobilize a 
target audience to action.   
 Snow and Benford (1988) defined mobilization as the intention to catalyze 
potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and to deflate 
counter frames. Therefore, frames from a social movement perspective are defined as 
action oriented beliefs and meanings that are constructed in a way that motivate, incite, 
and legitimize the actions associated with social movement organization. Frames that 
catalyze support from a neutral audience tend to be inclusive and flexible, broad in 
interpretive scope, and maintain greater social boundary appeal.  A large number of 
different types of frames have been identified (Valocchi, 1996; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; 
Cable & Shriver, 1995; Capek, 1993; Berbier, 1998; Coy & Woehrle, 1996; Blum-Kulka 
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& Liebes, 1993; Noonan, 1995).
16
   
 Snow and Benford (1988) outlined three framing tasks that are prerequisites for 
mobilization. Snow and Benford (1988) expanded Wilson's (1973) decomposition of 
ideology into three core framing tasks.  They define these core framing tasks as 
diagnostic framing or problem identification, prognostic framing or solutions, and 
motivational framing.  According to Snow and Benford (1988), diagnostic and prognostic 
framing forces agreement where motivational framing catalyzes individuals into action. 
In order to be effective, diagnostic and prognostic frames need to be constructed as 
believable by a target audience (Snow & Benford 1988; Gamson, 1992). What is 
important is how believable core framing tasks are, who is creating them, the scope of 
evidence, and how that evidence is used to increase a frame‘s broader in appeal. Frames 
become believable when they resonate with the myths, assumptions, inherent ideology, 
and worldview of a target audience. When diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames 
are more believable, the frames are more likely to resonate with a target audience, and 
therefore increase the possibility of mobilization (Zuo & Benford, 1995).  
 Scholars using frame analysis examine how groups frame their ideology into a 
message to gain political momentum and seize power (Snow & Byrd, 2000; 2007; 
Benford & Snow, 2000; Klandermas, 1997; Kuzman, 1998; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1988; 1996; Tarrow, 1991; Tilly, 1978; Zald & Berger, 1978; 
Zwerman, Steinhoff, & Della Porta, 2000). A substantial amount of literature has given 
considerable empirical attention to diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing in 
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 Frames that catalyze support from neutral audience have been rights frames (Valocchi 1996; Williams & 
Williams 1995), choice frames (Davies 1999), injustice frames (Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Gamsone, 1982), 
environmental justice frames (Cable & Shriver 1995; Capek 1993), culturally pluralist frames (Berbier 
1998, Davies 1999), oppositional frames (Coy & Woehrle 1996), hegemonic frames (Blum-Kulka& Liebes 
1993), and a return to Democracy frame ( Noonan, 1995).   
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specific movements and their social movement organizations (Benford & Hunt, 1992; 
Best, 1987; Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 
1997; White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998, Cable & Shriver 1995; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; 
Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & 
Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Marullo et al 1996, McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Nepstad, 
1997). However, analyzing the use of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames in 
terrorism studies has not received similar attention.   
Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda 
 TCP defines terrorism as a phenomenon of emotionally laden diagnostic and 
prognostic frames.
17
 Terrorism as a phenomenon of frames uses violence as its symbolic 
medium to bring about active or passive alignment in a target audience. Terrorists create 
frames of violence or the threat of violence to produce ―terror‖ or ―pride‖ in their target 
audience to leverage, coerce, or inspire a revolution of ideas into action. The framing 
process is similar to TCP because both actions and words communicate an ideological 
message to an audience via frames that produce intense emotions.  As a model of 
analysis, TCP examines how ideology is emotionally framed by individuals, groups, and 
states.  
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 TCP as part of expanding the social psychological domain in criminology is a crucial area for scientific 
and counterterrorism research.  As the effects of globalization and technology progress, social 
psychological research focusing on the role of emotions in attitude formation, decision-making, 
mobilization for action, radicalization, and recruitment grows increasingly important.  The internet is a 
means for neo-Nazis and violent jihadis to network with members, and most importantly, to spread their 
propaganda through shame laden diagnostic frames (Weimann, 2006).  The internet affords a high degree 
of anonymity that potential members and/or actual members can enjoy through limited interaction without 
any personal engagement (Rogers, 2003; Ganor, 2007).  Rogers (2003) argues that terrorist propagandists 
now have the power to franchise their form of violence to reach individuals who share in the ideological 
beliefs of the group but were uncomfortable or cannot officially join an organization.  With the perceived 
privacy of the internet, individuals can still be an ‗ideological‘ member, plan attacks, and carry out 
terrorism incidents. Therefore, determining how shame functions in neo-Nazi or violent jihadi propaganda 
confronts a pressing social problem that is currently impacting the economy, foreign/ domestic policy, and 
costing lives. 
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 Similar to Schmid and de Graaf‘s VAC, TCP is both a perspective and a model of 
analysis.  TCP advances the socio-political work of Schmid and de Graaf in the late 
1980‘s by emphasizing a criminological perspective.18  TCP as a model of analysis places 
priority on attitude formation by examining how a social movement‘s ideas are framed, 
transmitted, and received.  Specifically, TCP as a model of analysis acknowledges that 
attitude formation and social ties among supporters is influenced by the framing process 
in terrorist propaganda.   
 TCP as a perspective emphasizes a target audience‘s symbolic interpretation of 
frames.  Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is symbolic because violence itself is not 
the end state--the goal is to incite further violence ultimately leading to a revolution.  
Individual, group, or state actors carry out or threaten violence for ideological reasons 
against targets that serve as message generators to emotionally manipulate target 
audiences. Frames constructed by a terrorist group use a ―freedom fighter‖ image rather 
than a ―terrorist.‖  Target selection, ideology and strategies communicate different 
meaning to diverse target audiences.  It is how information is used in terrorist propaganda 
to communicate different meaning to diverse audiences. 
 TCP acknowledges that prognostic and diagnostic frames associated with 
violence (deeds) or threats of violence (words) are symbolic.  Therefore, TCP recognizes 
the importance of ideology expressed in actions and words to powerbrokers, victims, 
ideological supports, and neutral audiences.  The purpose of TCP is to understand how 
emotions, frames, and ideology intersect in political violence. Terrorist propaganda by 
the deed or by the word both share criminogenic intent for the victim/target, ideological 
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 TCP as a perspective draws from the fields of sociology, political science, history, criminology, 
communication, propaganda analysis, and social psychology.   
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supporter, and neutral audience.  The intention of terrorist propaganda is to incite others 
to violence or supporting violence. 
 Terrorist propaganda is criminogenic in nature, which means it intends to 
produce, promote, or increase criminal behavior.  Intent distinguishes criminogenic 
propaganda from propaganda used in politics and marketing.  Criminogenic intent for the 
victim/target, ideological supporter, and neutral audience is the common denominator in 
terrorist propaganda by the deed or by the word.  The outcome of criminogenic 
propaganda is to generate an emotional climate that increases the likelihood of violence.  
 TCP is not one dimensional, but combines how meaning and symbols from 
propaganda are interpreted by three distinct audiences: ideological supporters, a neutral 
target audience, and victims/targets.  TCP emphasizes a model of analysis to understand 
how meaning and symbols intend to inflict terror, outrage, or force compliance in their 
victims. TCP accentuates a model to analyze how terrorists construct themselves as 
heroic, altruistic, and just. TCP stresses how a terrorism incident is meant to persuade.  
Terrorists aspire to make a neutral audience aware of their cause and ideology by 
outlining the altruistic honor of their cause while framing their opponents as 
dishonorable.   
 Criminogenic intent is communicated via diagnostic and prognostic frames to 
produce either active or passive support.  Diagnostic and prognostic frames in 
criminogenic propaganda use strong emotional appeals to outline who is responsible for a 
terrorist group‘s grievances and how a group plans to overcome these grievances. The 
emphasis on persuading audiences through strong appeals in propaganda eliminates the 
need for motivational framing.   
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 Motivational frames are a third core framing task, but are unnecessary in TCP.  In 
propaganda, prognostic and diagnostic frames are the motivational frames because 
emotions are integral for motivation.  Propaganda emphasizes the role that prognostic and 
diagnostic frames have in motivation, attitude formation, and inciting action.  
 The diagnostic and prognostic frames used in TCP intend to produce either active 
or passive support in a target audience (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995).  By leveraging the 
emotions of a target audience, the terrorist propagandist targets beliefs and assumptions 
that may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 1998). Active or passive support can result in 
increased membership for the group, a surge in finances, or additional resources. An 
effective frame in TCP intends to ―infect‖ its audience into action (Hatfield, Caciooppo & 
Rapson, 1994).   One of the most effective forms of persuasive communication is 
propaganda.  
Propaganda 
 
 Propaganda is defined as a set of communicative methods used to persuade by 
generating direct emotional reactions (Ellul, 1973; Steuter & Willis, 2008; Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988). Persuasion is defined as affecting attitudes
19
 by influencing beliefs 
about the character and nature of the social world (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Page 
& Shapiro, 1992). Persuasion in propaganda occurs when a propagandist effectively 
revises the content of audience‘s beliefs about the social world, and replaces it with a 
different set of beliefs and attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Zaller, 1992). While 
persuasion captures the overt essence of all types of propaganda, attitude priming 
(Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) are subtle ways 
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 An attitude is a function or outcome of our favorable and unfavorable beliefs about an issue, person, or 
object (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Anderson 1981; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; McGuire 1985; Zaller 1992). 
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that some forms of propaganda influence attitudes and alter beliefs about the social 
world.  
 Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is distinct from attitude priming and 
agenda setting, the subtler communicative methods, because criminogenic propaganda 
―bombards‖ an audience with violence, forcing a ―heroic‖ or ―horrible‖ interpretation.  
The goal of TCP is to dominate the media and public discussion with a terrorist message. 
Terrorists desire that the attitudes and beliefs of their victims, supporters, and a neutral 
audience are challenged, bolstered, or changed (Ellul, 1982; Steuter & Willis, 2008). The 
dissemination of information takes a back seat to accelerating and directing the emotions 
of a target audience to promote violence.   
 Terrorist propagandists engage in a unidirectional communicative method—the 
terrorist to the target audience.  Violent incidents are intended to be one way emotional 
forms of communication that grab the attention of ideological supporters, the neutral 
audience, and the target/victim.  Propaganda is intended to challenge the norms of 
conventional society and dictate an understanding of the world (Cantril, 1938; Carruthers, 
1995; Jowett & O‘Donnell, 2006). The violent incident is choreographed in such a way to 
incite emotions in all three audiences in order to benefit the terrorists‘ ideology. In a 
broader context, propaganda functions to challenge the status quo and revolutionize 
social values (Crilley, 2001; Doob, 1935; Jackall, 1995). 
 Propaganda is designed to specifically form, dominate, and maintain receptive 
attitudes by using emotional appeals (Jowett & O‘Donnell, 2006; Lee, 1945; 1952; 
Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001).  Attitude formation, social ties, mobilization, and emotions 
are intertwined.  Effective propaganda intends to mobilize an audience through 
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emotionally laden diagnostic and prognostic frames.  Gaining popular support is arguably 
one of the most important functions of any political, religious, or social movement 
(Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2008).  If a social 
movement fails to gain support from the general population, the movement will likely 
remain marginalized. Therefore, a propagandist is interested in disseminating his or her 
information as rapidly and broadly as possible to move from marginalization to 
mainstream (Lee, 1952; Jowett & O‘Donnell, 2006). The propagandist‘s knowledge of 
the existing political, cultural and religious context of the mainstream population 
contributes to the effectiveness of propaganda (Jowett & O‘Donnell, 2006; Taylor, 2003).  
Lee (1952) states that ―the intelligent and experienced propagandist can serve as a 
catalyst of social change or as a temporary stumbling block to delay it‖ (Lee, 1952; 215).   
 Mobilization is a prerequisite for revolution (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Tilly, 1978).  
Revolutions can begin with a small group of ideologues attempting to master the 
propaganda craft (Carruthers, 1995).  Sometimes propaganda by word and deed is 
effective, thus turning terrorists or revolutionaries into governmental officials.  
Propagandists who are dedicated students of history know that in order to overthrow a 
powerful opponent they must gain support from certain populations (Baird, 1974).  
Propaganda works best when ―the hidden and integrated nature of the propaganda best 
convinces people that they are not being manipulated‖ (Snow, 2003; 23).  
 Propaganda relies on the incitement of emotions to persuade audiences to 
mobilize and in some case carry out a revolution (Most, 1885; Sproule, 1997; Zeman, 
1964; Wright, 1990; Welch, 1983).  Since the main objective of propaganda is to 
generate a reaction, it is critical to identify and analyze which emotions catalyze 
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supporters to violence.  Propagandists commonly use the emotion of shame in diagnostic 
frames to dominate public discussion in an attempt to persuade (Danchev, 2006; Morgan, 
2007; Shapiro, 2003; Linder, 2001; 2006).   
The Emotion of Shame  
 
Shame is a social emotion derived from seeing oneself from the perspective of 
others as detestable. Thomas Scheff, a social psychologist, defines shame as ―a class 
name for a large family of emotions and feelings that arise through seeing the self 
negatively, if even only slightly negatively, through the eyes of others, or even for only 
anticipating such a reaction‖ (Scheff, Working Class Emotions and Relationships, 
paragraph 8).
20
  For example, feeling alienated, humiliated, rejected, or devalued are 
terms that describe how one is negatively perceived by others. An example of shame can 
be observed from Hollywood films.  Until recently, Hollywood directors and producers 
have consistently cast Muslim characters in humiliating, uneducated, violent, and 
inhumane roles (Shaheen, 2003).  The emotion of shame therefore enables people to see 
themselves from the social perspective of ―the other‖ (Tangney & Fischer, 1995).   In 
Hollywood‘s case, Muslims watching American films are able to see themselves through 
Western eyes.  When watching these films, Muslims can perceive themselves as being 
depicted as uneducated, backward, violent or inhumane.  
Shame is known to be a powerfully persuasive emotion (Marx, 1843; Darwin, 
1916; O‘Neal, 1996; Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1963; Lewis, 1971; Elias, 2000; Scheff & 
Retzinger, 1991).  According to some observers, shame is the master emotion because of 
its power to influence social behavior (Marx, 1843; Scheff, 1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 
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 Scheff‘s work is an extension of the work of Darwin, Freud, Cooley, Goffman, Lewis, Elias and 
Braithwaite who also examined emotions in their research and recognized the prominent role of shame.   
56 
 
1991;2000; Gilligan, 1996; Linder, 2001; 2006; Stern, 2010).
21
  Shame functions as an 
emotional catalyst generating anger, rage and ultimately violence (Scheff, 1994; Gilligan, 
1996). Shame in propaganda is framed to produce an emotional response in a target 
audience leading to an attitudinal shift.  Moreover, using shame in propaganda is 
effective.  Shame transmits the perceived injustices, grievances, and motivation to local 
and global populations.  
When shame is framed appropriately it is a trigger emotion. Shame can motivate 
an individual, a group or both to ―reject their rejectors‖ (Schrang, 1971: 79).  Shame is 
holistic; it describes the entire self and may be evoked by failure, social insult, loss of 
status, public exposure of a private incident or scapegoating (Lewis, 1971). Shame is 
magnified when negative perceptions are perceived as unjust. Shame is not produced by a 
specific situation but rather it is the individual‘s interpretation of the situation that matters 
(Tangney& Fischer, 1995; Blumer, 1969).  It is how information is framed as shame that 
is significant because it functions as a powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into 
action (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; Berbrier, 1998).   
A propagandist uses shame in diagnostic frames to shape attitudes and beliefs 
about  the ―problem.‖ Persuading a target audience to change attitudes and beliefs is 
accomplished when shame is used to frame problems from politics, religion, crime, 
history, culture or current events. By leveraging the target audiences‘ shame, a 
propagandist focuses on beliefs and assumptions that may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 
1998). Persuading a target audience via shame can lead to active or passive support, such 
as increased membership for the group or ideological alignment.  
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 Gilligan states that ―The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether 
towards others or towards the self.‖ (Gilligan, 1996: 110) 
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Shame is often disguised to the research subject and researcher.  Goodwin, Jasper 
& Polletta (2001) conclude that shame is omitted because it is a higher order emotion and 
is often disguised or misdiagnosed.
22
 A contributing factor to omitting shame is the myth 
maintained by some western scholars that individualistic societies are not as motivated by 
shame as collective based societies (Scheff, 1994).  An unfortunate byproduct of this 
myth is how unaware most in the west are to shame and its power over individual and 
social behavior. If scholars cannot recognize shame in their own society, then their 
research is even less likely to be able to identify and analyze shame in other cultures or 
subcultures (Scheff, 2003). Scholars are less likely to identify shame, but will instead 
focus on the byproducts of shame such as anger or rage.
23
 This happens because anger 
and rage are emotions that translate across cultures easier than shame; similar to fear, joy 
and sadness (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2001). Also, anger, 
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 A recent example of misdiagnosis is evident in Marc Sageman‘s highly acclaimed research.  Marc 
Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist, holding a M.D. and PhD, analyzes Omar Sheikh in chapter 1 of 
Leaderless Jihad (2008).  Omar is the man that would use a knife to behead Daniel Pearle and later hold 
Pearle‘s severed head by the hair before a camera and shout ―God is Great.‖   Sageman (2008) describes 
how Omar Sheikh grew up in England and lived in a modest home with caring parents. Omar is described 
as being intelligent and is remembered as generally having a good character.  Sageman (2008) then lists all 
of the problems that this young man faced while growing up in England.  Omar was bullied, called a ‗dirty 
Paki,‘ his religion was called ‗crap‘ and he was constantly involved in fights.  He never really fit in.  He 
was always the outcast. Alienated by his English peers and experiencing difficulty integrating into 
European society, Omar began to feel a strong sense of inferiority.  Omar then connected with others who 
shared Omar‘s sense of alienation and rejection.  This new connection happened to be ideologically-driven 
violent jihadis and they assisted in focusing his anger.  Omar targeted those whom he held responsible for 
his painful feelings of inferiority.  His bullies at school were a metaphor for a bigger issue.  The schoolyard 
bullies were part of a larger system of beliefs that was out to make all Muslims feel inferior.  In order to 
retaliate against those that made him and others feel inferior, revenge against his bullies was not enough. 
The system was the target.  To avenge perceived wrongs, he embraced a violent jihadist ideology and 
traveled to Pakistan. Eventually, he kidnapped and murdered Daniel Pearle.  Later in his book, Sageman 
states that shame (Sageman uses the term humiliation) had nothing to do with the 19 hijackers of 
September 11
th 
(Sageman, 2008).  This is surprising since Mohammad Atta‘s personal narrative parallels 
Omar Sheikh.  Sageman does not see how Omar‘s life revolved around shame.  Sageman describes shame 
event after shame event and fails to recognize it.  He states that none in his sample demonstrates shame.  
Not only does Sageman fail to identify an emotional narrative, he confidently states that one does not exist.  
Ironically, though he is arguing against shame, Sageman presents a perfect blueprint of its existence and 
impact.   
23
 Anger and rage are deemed to be different levels of emotions.  Rage is defined as a more intense and 
controlling emotion than anger.  Both can originate from the same stimuli, but the terms ‗anger‘ and ‗rage‘ 
are used to describe the different levels of intensity and proclivity to violence (Lewis, 1971). 
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fear, joy and sadness are individual emotions whereas shame is a shared or social 
emotion.   
Violent Jihadi and neo-Nazi Shame 
Violent jihadis place the burden of shame on the shoulders of each individual 
Muslim.  If Islam is under attack and cannot overcome its opponent, then violent jihadis 
argue that Allah is displeased with their commitment and purity (Brachman, 2009).  
Violent jihadists assert that the reason for Allah‘s displeasure is that the majority of 
Muslims behave shamefully, thereby polluting their faith (Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 
2006).  Violent jihadis claim that it is shameful that the majority of Muslims do not know 
the Koran, do not pray regularly, seek after material wealth, ignore the teaching of the 
Prophet, accept immoral practices and embrace the ―isms‖ of the West (Burke, 2004).  
Violent jihadis criticize Muslims for failing to follow the ―true‖ faith and for allowing 
infidels and crusaders to dominate them.  Passive Muslims are shamed as apostates, 
infidels or cowards if they ignore the jihadist call to violence (Gerges, 2005).  This call 
requires them to first purify their hearts and respond with violence against those who 
shame Muslims (Kepel, 2005).  
Neo-Nazis claim that the white race is humanity‘s highest pinnacle of success—
the apex of evolutionary natural selection (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Kaplan, 2000; Dobratz 
& Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998). Being at the racial 
pinnacle should result in being honored by all other races, not insulted.  Any loss of status 
for the white race (e.g. the election of an African American to the office of U.S. 
President) is regarded as shameful (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Ferber, 1998; Kaplan, 2000).  
Neo-Nazis portray the Presidency of Barack Obama as undermining racial evolutionary 
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progress because it places an inferior non-white in the position of governing the 
‗superior‘ white race.24  It is shameful on a macro level because neo-Nazis contend that 
the most powerful nation on earth should be led by the ―most accomplished race‖ 
(Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  Neo-Nazis weave Aryan mysticism, white power music and 
religion into their message asserting the shame of multiculturalism, affirmative action and 
other liberal social programs for weakening the white race (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 
1997; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Futrell, Simi, & Gottschalk, 2006). At a micro level neo-
Nazis consider it shameful for members of the white race to be passive and allowing 
‗inferior‘ races to overshadow them.  Neo-Nazis are then shamed into fighting to return 
to a time where the white race was in a position of full power (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 
1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Extremism_72/5387_72.htm accessed June 2010. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
Research Design 
 This comparative study uses a mixed methodology to examine how emotions are 
integrated in terrorist propaganda with diagnostic and prognostic frames to define 
subcultural boundaries.  Mixed methods unify the strengths of human cognition and 
computer quantitative processing. Qualitative methods, specifically ontological coding, is 
used to determine the nuances, implied meaning and interpretation of the data (Katz, 
2002). Qualitative methods are used because they enable the ―deep emotional meaning‖ 
in propaganda to be coded according to substantive and theoretical knowledge (Van 
Maanen, 1979; Ragin, 2000).  Ragin (2000; 5) asserts that ―discovery must relinquish 
many of the homogenizing assumptions that undergird conventional quantitative 
analysis.‖ Additionally, qualitative methods enable cultural and contextual knowledge to 
be integrated into the coding process (Denzin, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Rubin & 
Babbie, 1993; Babbie, 1986; Ragin, 2000; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010).  Moreover, 
qualitative methods enable the researcher to code implied meaning and interpretation in 
propaganda, in contrast to an automated process, which is common in natural language 
processing.    
  Quantitative methods in this research are associated with network text analysis 
(NTA). NTA is based on algorithms associated with graph algebra. NTA is a departure 
from mainstream quantitative approaches and returns to the ecologically embedded 
perspective of social facts within contexts of time, space, and culture (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994; Simmel, 1955; Abbott, 1992; Bakker, 1987).  The ecological perspective 
is possible because NTA pairs ontological coding, a qualitative method, with the 
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analytical capabilities of computer automation.  NTA enables data to be examined with 
the depth and proximity associated with qualitative techniques combined with the 
precision and inferential strength of quantitative techniques (Carley, 1993).   
Research Questions 
 
 Using frame analysis, this study answers four research questions to gain a better 
understanding of how ideas and emotions are framed within terrorist propaganda to 
define subcultural boundaries and neutralize objections. I focus specifically on 
―diagnostic‖ and ―prognostic‖ frames that outline problems and solutions in propaganda 
(Snow & Benford, 1988). Diagnostic frames identify grievances and injustices, while 
prognostic frames outline how a social movement provides the solution to counter and 
overcome these injustices (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007). I focus on two 
social movements, neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propaganda?  
2. What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propaganda?  
3. What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent 
jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?  
a. Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propaganda?  
 
 Emotions are central to frames and framing because they organize individual and 
collective experience (Goffman, 1974).  Identifying and analyzing how emotions are used 
to frame terrorist propaganda involves outlining how ideology and emotions intersect.  
The following section outlines the purpose, rationale, and procedures for each research 
question.  
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 What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
 propaganda?  
 
 The purpose of this question is to operationalize how emotions, specifically 
shame, is used by neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists in diagnostic frames.  
Procedures involve using an ontology as a coding scheme to identify the types of 
diagnostic frames via content analysis. Ontological coding generates the types of 
diagnostic frames that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use over a period of fifty 
years.  Content analysis accounts for culture and context from a symbolic understanding 
of what is contained in the text (Blumer, 1969; Krippendorf, 2004; Altheide, 1987; 2008; 
Krippendorf & Bock, 2009). Dyer (1987) and Katz (2002) assert that there is deep 
emotional meaning in text and that affect cannot be properly identified by any other 
method.   The rationale behind this question is to discover how diagnostic framing 
functions as an emotional catalyst to inciting criminogenic behavior to neutralize inner 
conflict and conventional values over violent neo-Nazi and violent jihadi subcultural 
norms.   
 What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propaganda?  
 
 The purpose of this question is to operationalize the types of prognostic frames 
used in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.  Similar to the first research question, 
procedures involve using an ontology as a coding scheme to identify prognostic frames. 
The findings will reveal the types of solutions that propagandists suggest to counter white 
or Islamic injustices over a period of fifty years.  The rationale behind this question is to 
discover how neo-Nazi and violent jihadis use prognostic frames to promote subcultural 
solutions over conventional culture solutions.  Prognostic frames enable a violent jihadi 
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or neo-Nazi to shut off ―inner objections‖ to violent or radical solutions by neutralizing 
irrationality associated with violent or radical solutions.  I examine how violent or radical 
solutions are also framed as ―altruistic‖ responses connected to ensuring the ―greater 
good‖ for whites or Muslims.   
 What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent jihadi 
and neo-Nazi propaganda?  
 The purpose of this question is to understand the relationship between diagnostic 
and prognostic frames in propaganda. I define the term ―relationship‖ in this study as the 
degree of contact that prognostic and diagnostic have in the text.  The relationship 
between diagnostic and prognostic frames is operationalized by frame prevalence, links 
between frames (closeness) and frame location. Analytic procedures are based on 
algorithms derived from graph algebra in NTA.
25
  Understanding closeness between 
prognostic and diagnostic frames reveals how propagandists construct their form of 
propaganda.  Closeness is a measure to understand where individual nodes (frames) lie 
between other nodes in the network.  Closeness reflects another way of understanding the 
relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text and over time. 
Examining the closeness between nodes takes into account the connectivity of the node‘s 
neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the shortest paths to other nodes 
in the network.  The specific algorithms, along with other measures associated with NTA, 
are outlined in Figure 10 in the appendix.  
 Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi 
propaganda?  
 
                                                          
25
 NTA reveals the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in the text, visualizes this 
relationship, and measures network properties.    
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The purpose of this supporting research question is to identify where a 
propagandist embeds diagnostic and prognostic frames in order to reveal the 
propagandist‘s communicative strategy. A propagandist communicative strategy is 
important for three reasons. First, communicative strategy is significant for policy 
reasons.  Understanding where a propagandist embeds diagnostic or prognostic frames 
makes it possible to create counter propaganda using a similar format.  Where 
information is located in any form of communication impacts comprehension and reveals 
the author‘s method of conveying intent (or in this case the propagandist‘s intent).  
Where information is placed in written forms of communication is significant and 
specific formats are required in academic articles, fiction, and non-fiction as best 
practices. Therefore determining if a similar structure exists in propaganda is equally 
important. Second, frame location reveals the anatomy of propaganda. Understanding 
where frames are located assists in determining if a propagandist maintains a consistent 
prognostic or diagnostic theme or if changes across the text. A prognostic or diagnostic 
theme reveals whether a propagandist‘s primary task is to diagnose a problem by 
spending the majority of the text ―enlightening‖ a target audience to a ―pressing‖ 
subcultural problem or is the ―problem‖ understood and the ―right‖ solution(s) is the 
central theme. Third, frame location provides another way to examine how diagnostic and 
prognostic frames are in contact across the document.  Frame location assists in 
determining whether an entire document is skewed prognostically or diagnostically or 
just certain sections. This is important because frame location provides another method of 
examining the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in text. 
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Operationalizing Diagnostic/Prognostic Frames 
 An ontology operationalizes emotions in diagnostic and prognostic frames. An 
ontology in this research is defined as a method to operationalize the symbolic interaction 
between ideology, emotions, and framing.  An ontology provides the boundaries for 
creating a coding scheme to identify emotion in diagnostic or prognostic frames. Using 
an ontology is absolutely essential when observing ―the looking glass self‖ from the 
perspective of ―the other‖ (Cooley, 1922).  Ontologies are not new, and have been used 
by cognitive sociologists (Carley, 1984; 1986; Cicourel 1974), cultural theorists 
(Namewirth & Weber, 1987) and organizational theorists (Feldman & March, 1981).  
However, using an ontology to code affect in diagnostic and prognostic frames in terrorist 
propaganda is a new application. 
 An ontology is grounded in the philosophy of phenomenology.  Phenomenology 
asserts that researchers should examine knowledge from different points of view, which 
include that of the propagandist (Macann, 2007; Heidegger, 2000).  Phenomenology 
coupled with symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969; Douglas, 1970; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990) seeks to uncover meaning behind action and how reality is constructed through the 
ongoing process of social interaction.   
 Katz (2002) emphasized the need to use a ―naturalistic social ontology‖ when 
research focuses on interpreting textual emotional symbols.  The use of symbols forms 
the basis of symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 1980; Mead, 1962; 1964). Katz 
(2002; 258) explains that the goal of an ontology is not to ―elevate any part of social 
reality above any other‖ but to define reality as it experienced by different audiences.  
Criminologists using an ontology as a coding scheme can benefit from its fluidity 
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because it highlights how emotional symbols communicate different meaning to different 
audiences.  
 Dyer (1987) asserts that because of the deep emotional meaning in the text, affect 
cannot be properly identified by any other method.   Automated computer processing of 
emotions in text cannot compete with human cognition in identifying context or culture 
(Krippendorf, 2004).
26
 The word ―black‖ could be used metaphorically or literally and 
presently a computer cannot distinguish between the two (Altheide, 1987; 2008).
 27
 
Coding according to an ontology requires an analyst to become thoroughly familiar with 
the research subject (Lofland, 1976) and allows hypotheses to emerge throughout the data 
collection process (Rubin & Babbie, 1993; Babbie, 1986; Krippendorf, 2004).      
 Criminologists using an ontology are able to operationalize emotions to 
deconstruct the social, cultural, and historical setting that sheds light on how the subject 
interprets, understands, and communicates emotion (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Blumer, 
                                                          
26
 Liu and Lieberman and Selker (2003) identify a model to account for context and culture for affect in 
text. They combine key word spotting with a large database, the Common Sense Database, to establish a 
degree of context when mining text for emotions.  The ‗Common Sense Database‘ enables machines or 
automated scanning to examine emotions in context and within some rudimentary form of context. The 
purpose of their model is to account for context/culture while trying to keep the process fully automated.  In 
other words, this methodology uses lexicon spotting but with an additional resource that attempts to 
provide the proper context.  Again, the limitation with this method is the inability to account for deep 
meaning, sentences, paragraphs, or sub group culture.  Though promising, machines cannot compete with 
human cognition in identifying affect beyond key words, lexical identifiers or markers.  
27
 Key word in context (KWIC) denotes the process of using ‗markers‘ to identify affect with computers.  
KWIC or key word spotting is widely used to scan the internet or volumes of documents because it is time 
efficient, reliable, fully automated and systematic. However a significant limitation to KWIC is the reliance 
of a single word to ‗mark‘ shame. Examining shame through a single word marker excludes sentences or 
paragraphs that do not use any of the key words identified as shame. For example, shame communicated in 
propaganda that does not use a key word but stories, metaphors, allegories and humor is missed by the 
KWIC method.  For example, when violent jihadis reference Israel‘s defeat of Egypt in 1967 it is done so 
to illustrate  a shameful event, but the word ‗shame‘ is not necessarily used.  Neo-Nazis bemoan the fact 
that having an African American President is a shameful event for the white race, though a key shame word 
is not used, Obama‘s presidency is seen a shameful event for the United States (Wright, 2006; Simi & 
Futrell, 2010).  Egypt‘s defeat or having an African American President would not be marked as a shame 
because a ‗marker‘ or key shame word was not used.  Moreover, a second limitation is a machine‘s 
inability to distinguish context or culture in propaganda.   
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1969).
28
  Since writing texts is what propagandists do, observing the entire piece of 
propaganda, rather than excerpts, is the natural setting in which a propagandist‘s mental 
and emotional frames can be observed. Therefore, an ontology integrates corporeal 
process because it accounts for culture and context and a symbolic understanding of the 
emotional content contained in the text (Blumer, 1969; Krippendorf, 2004; Altheide, 
1987; 2008; Katz, 2002).  
 Outside of criminology, an ontology is defined as a coding scheme or textual 
boundary, to operationalize emotions in text.  The use of ontologies is a common practice 
in linguistics, natural language processing, and sentiment analysis (Liu, Lieberman &  
Selker, 2003).  Ontologies are flexible because they account for the context of how words 
are used and the culture in which they exist.  When identifying emotions in text, 
ontologies emphasize semantic boundaries over the more common practice of relying on 
synonyms.   
 For example, the emotion of shame, which is considered a higher order emotion, 
is often disguised to the both the research subject and researcher (Lewis, 1971; Jasper, 
Goodwin, & Poletta, 2001).   Developing an ontology assists not only in detection, but 
operationalization. Tissari‘s (2006) analysis of the word ―shame‖ in the English language 
provides an example of what is meant by an emotional ontology. Kovecses (1986) based 
the ontological boundaries (see figure 4) of shame from written documents ranging from 
                                                          
28
 The goal is to observe affect in textual context (Van Maanen, 1979). This allows the analyst to view the 
‗natural setting‘ in which the emotion of emotion is framed. 
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the years 1418-1998.
29
  Tissari‘s (2006) shame ontology was intended for the mainstream 
use of language and can be adapted to be used for terrorist emotional frames.  
Figure 4: Tissari (2006) Emotion Ontology Boundaries 
Boundary Boundary Defined 
Failure Individual or collective non-achievement 
Poverty Economic 
Undesired Social Status Not belonging to a prestigious group, or 
belonging to a non-prestigious group 
Flawed deficient physical appearance, lack of 
physical or mental capabilities, skills, or 
properties 
Morally Defective Deficient moral qualities 
State of Weakness powerlessness, coward, inaction 
 
Ontologies are used in this research to identify emotions embedded in neo-Nazi 
and violent jihadi prognostic and diagnostic frames. How a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi 
propagandists integrates emotion, ideology, and frames varies; therefore, different 
ontologies are needed. The boundaries for each diagnostic ontology are based on 
Tissari‘s (2006) analysis of the word ―shame‖ in the English language from the year 1418 
– 1998 and Kovecses (1986) scholarship on emotional lexical structures.30  However, 
because Tissari‘s (2006) shame ontology was intended for mainstream use of language, 
                                                          
29
 Linguistic scholars examined several word corpuses to identify the context and how the term has been 
used historically. Linguists use word corpuses or databases to store natural language in order to examine 
how the meaning and use of words change over time.  
30
 Linguistic scholars examined several word corpuses to identify the context and how the term has been 
used historically. Linguists use word corpuses or databases to store natural language in order to examine 
how the meaning and use of words change over time.  
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rather than terrorist ideology, a modified version of the ontology was used for this 
study.
31
 
Network Text Analysis (NTA) 
 Network text analysis (NTA) provides a method to analyze the integration of 
emotions, ideology, and frames in terrorist propaganda.  NTA has existed for over 50 
years and is a subset of social network analysis (SNA)---a widely used research technique 
in sociology and criminology (McGloin, 2005; Fleisher, 2005; Papachristos, 2006; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Berkowitz, 1982; Borgatti, 2005; Wellman,1998; Burt, 1992; 
Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006).   SNA, which relies on measuring relational ties between 
nodes, has become an interdisciplinary method (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Berkowitz, 
1982; Borgatti, 2005; Wellman, 1999; Burt, 1992; Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006; Scott, 
2000).  Applications of SNA include examining the spread of disease, hiring applications, 
organizational structure, and family/friends associations. The goal of SNA is to identify, 
graph, and then visualize all of the relevant ties that exist between individuals, 
organizations or other nodes.
32
  In the case of SNA, nodes are typically defined as 
individuals with relationships with other individuals or organizations, and the links 
between them are the focal point of examination.  As compared to SNA, nodes in NTA 
can be ideas, concepts, or emotions specifically derived from text. There are currently six 
NTA methods
33
 used to examine textual relationships.
34
  
                                                          
31
 See figures 11, 12, 13 & 14 in the appendices for ontologies and definitions. 
32
 The theoretical grounding of social networks has long history in scholarship. (Durkheim; 1893 Tonnies, 
1887; Simmel, 1955; Nadel, 1957; Tilly, 2005; Wasserman, 1994; Berkowitz, 1982;  Borgatti, 2005; 
Wellman, 1998;  Burt, 1992; Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006). 
33
 Centering Resonace Analysis (Corman et al. 2002), Functional Depiction (Roberts, 1997), Knowledge 
Graphing (Bakker, 1987; James, 1992; Popping, 2003), Map Analysis (Carley, 1988, 1977, Carley & 
Palmquist,1992) Network Evaluation (Kleinninjenhuuis, Ridder & Reitber, 1996), and World Network 
Analysis (Danowski, 1982).  Each approach varies in the focus of nouns/verbs, the degree of generalization 
of the concepts, the degree of automation and the visual output.  However, they all share the similar belief 
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A particular strength of NTA is that extracted networks can be collected in a 
theoretical fashion (Diesner & Carley, 2005).   The theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions behind NTA are: 1) a relationship exists between frames and language, 2) a 
relationship exists between words and their intended meaning and 3) social knowledge or 
shared meaning exists between cultures and context (Diesner & Carley, 2004; 2005).  
Carley and Palmquist (1992) assert that people‘s language represents an individual‘s 
frame and these concepts can be represented as semantic networks.  NTA constructs a 
network of linked words and concepts by identifying the relationships that exist between 
the words in text (Carley, 2006; Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2000).    
NTA generates consistent analytic decisions, providing a systematic method to 
examine how diagnostic and prognostic frames are used in terrorist propaganda.
35
  
Consistent analytic decisions are derived from a systematic process of data entry, coding, 
and computational analysis providing a reliable method of analyzing frames in 
propaganda (Diesner &Carley, 2005; Popping, 2000; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994).
 36
 NTA enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be generated as semantic 
networks for visualization and analysis (Diesner and Carley, 2004; 2005). Semantic 
networks are important because they link the relationship between emotional words and 
concepts that exists in propaganda (Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2003).  These 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that NTA is used as a window to reveal the structure of the text, extract overt and hidden concepts and 
reveal the author‘s various ‗frames.‘   
34
 NTA in its present form, is derived from an earlier format of hand crafted techniques used by intelligence 
agencies during the Second World War.  NTA, in its current form is a fully automated or semi-automated 
and continues to  
evolve with advances in computing (Eden, Jones & Sims, 1979; Roberts, 1997; Stubbs, 1983; Popping, 
2003).    
 
36
 NTA as a standardized process involves a minimum of four steps: 1) identify concepts; 2) define the type 
of relationships that exist between those concepts; 3) a semi-automated data cleaning process; and 4) 
display coded texts visually graphically and/or statistically (Carley and Palmquist, 1992). 
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links provide the analytic capability for NTA to determine how nodes interact with each 
other in text. 
 NTA enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be mapped and analyzed 
(Diesner and Carley, 2004; 2005).  Using NTA in this manner enables closeness 
measures to be analyzed between diagnostic and prognostic nodes by creating semantic 
networks via graph algebra (Diesner &Carley, 2005; Popping, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994).    
Analytical Procedures 
NTA relies on graph algebra, a mathematical system developed to understand the 
relationship between points (Wasserman, 1994; Bonacich, 1972).  Unlike linear 
modeling, semantic networks are generated by the relationships that exist semantically, 
proximally, or linguistically between words or concepts (Carley, 1986; Danowski, 1993; 
Roberts, 1989; Dyer, 1983).  Semantic networks are then generated to visually depict the 
relationships between the nodes in the text.  Semantic networks focus on the relationships 
between concepts and the web of meaning embedded in the text (Fauconnier, 1985; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Genter & Stevens, 1983; Bobrow & Collins, 1976; Sowa, 1984; 
Kaufer & Carley, 1993; Cicourel, 1974). 
Generating semantic networks involves computational modeling of socio-
technical systems and link analysis by using Automap and ORA (Organizational Risk 
Analyzer) developed by CASOS (Computation Analysis of Social and Organizational 
Systems).
37
 A semantic network allows network measures of each node to be 
quantitatively analyzed.   
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 Automap and ORA (Organizational Risk Analyzer) are the software packages used for this research.  
Automap, a semi automated natural language processing software developed by CASOS (computational 
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Research Sample 
 Rationale 
 I used purposive sampling in this study to collect data for frame analysis.  The 
objective of purposive sampling is to obtain data from very distinct populations for in-
depth analysis (Patton, 1990; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010).  If a population‘s 
characteristics are too narrow or specialized, probabilistic sampling strategies are not 
conducive to selecting an adequate sample (Patton, 1990; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010).  
In contrast to probabilistic sampling, it is the characteristics of the population that 
determines how a purposive sample is constructed. In other words, research parameters 
define who should be in the sample, (e.g., terrorists with Ph.D.‘s, terrorists who have won 
the Nobel Peace Prize or terrorists who have attempted to construct biological weapons). 
In similar fashion, a population of ―effective‖ terrorist propagandists is based on a narrow 
set of research parameters.  The first parameter involved selecting ideologies associated 
with two different terrorism movements, which resulted in identifying neo-Nazism and 
violent jihadism. 
Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism were selected for two primary reasons. First, 
both ideologies are significant global social problems. Neo-Nazis tend to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analysis for social and organizational systems), assists researchers in cleaning text data and generating 
semantic networks (Diesner & Carley, 2005). This software was selected because it can process large-scale 
textual data, and because it can convert raw text into a semantic network that can be cross-indexed and 
analyzed with other software packages (Diesner & Carley, 2004, 2005). Automap is intended to be used 
with ORA or another software package to enable network visualization and analysis. This research uses 
ORA for visualization and analysis.   
 ORA was initially designed as a network analysis tool to detect risks in an organizational design 
structure.  ORA use has evolved into having various applications because of its ability to examine over 100 
measures in meta matrixes and semantic networks.  ORA‘s input and output requirements are organized 
according to which measure is queried.  The reports are formatted and viewable in log files, on screen and 
other formats that can be operated by other network analysis software programs.  ORA also consists of 
graphical software for visualizing and editing meta-matrix and semantic data.  Data networks can be 
visualized into network structures and analytical reports can be queried from these networks.  ORA also has 
a Java interface and a C++ computational backend (Carley & Reminga, 2004). 
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violence on a sub-national level, while violent jihadis are currently engaged in a 
campaign of worldwide violence (Potok, 2010; Simi, 2010; LaFree, 2009; Rice, 2009; 
Sageman, 2008; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Neo-Nazism violence includes the 1995 
Oklahoma City Bombing, armored car hijackings, assassinations, counterfeit 
operations, organized military training camps, and detonated bombs (Simi & Futrell, 
2010; Kaplan, 2000; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 
1998). Violent jihadi violence includes the attacks on the world trade center in 1993 
and 2001 (9/11), the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, 
the 2004 Khobar massacre, and the 2005 London transport bombings (Hoffman, 
2006).  
 Neo-Nazis claim that the white race is humanity‘s highest pinnacle of success and 
responsible for the utmost intellectual and cultural progress (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 
1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998; Whitsell, 1995;1998). Neo-Nazi 
propaganda emphasizes that the white race is a type of religion, the apex of natural 
selection, responsible for social progress, and is under attack from race mixers, Jews, and 
non whites (Michael, 2006; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000).   
Neo-Nazi ideology perceives that groups are needed to protect the white race and 
by doing so, racial violence would eventually move from an insurgency to open war.  
Neo-Nazis believe a race-specific ideology grounded in a white religion sets the perfect 
stage for white preservation (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Michael, 2006). If whites associate 
their race to a religion, it is more likely to inspire reverence, loyalty, and activism in 
segments of the white population.  Neo-Nazis argue that the white race is a sacred 
element; therefore, protecting white children and women is considered a duty for racial 
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preservation (Whitsell, 1995;1998; Griffin, 2001). Since the white race is sacred and 
threatened, whites who reproduce with non whites are deemed race traitors (Whitsell, 
1995; 1998; Simi & Futrell, 2010).  In an increasing effort to preserve the white race, 
some neo-Nazis forecast a future racial holy war, where racial cleansing ensures white 
racial salvation (Zeskind, 2009).   
 Violent jihadis profess that their ideology is the pure manifestation of Islam, an 
ideology adhering to Sharia or Islamic sacred law, and the teachings of the Prophet 
(Scheuer, 2002; Aaron, 2008). Violent jihadis use propaganda to prove that all Muslims 
are under attack economically, militarily, religiously, and culturally, and that it is the 
defensive obligation of every true Muslim to fight against attacking forces (Kepel, 2006; 
Qutb, 1988).  Violent jihadis cite victory in battle as a sign from Allah of his divine favor 
(Scheuer, 2002). For example, violent jihadis cite their victory in Afghanistan against the 
Soviets as evidence regarding the power of their version of jihad (Aaron, 2008).  
 Violent jihadis assert that the Islamic world has entered a period of occupation 
and division (Burke, 2004).  Propaganda is then used to prove that all Muslims are under 
attack economically, militarily, religiously, and culturally, and that it is the defensive 
obligation of every true Muslim to fight against attacking forces (Calvert, 2000; 2007).  
Using propaganda, violent jihadis claim that non-Muslim forces are occupying and 
dividing Islam through covert and overt tactics (Aaron, 2008).  Violent jihadis rage in 
their propaganda that ―true‖ Muslims cannot remain passive or indifferent in the midst of 
a non-Muslim invasion (Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006). 
Violent jihadis argue that Islam has become impure because other Muslims have 
allowed apostasies and religious ignorance to dominate conventional culture (.  Violent 
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jihadi propaganda claims that ―impure Islam‖ is the reason that Israel continues to exist 
and non-Muslim soldiers remain in Muslim lands (Brachman, 2009). Violent jihadis seek 
full submission to the Quran by all Muslims in order to regain the spiritual, economic, 
and political supremacy that Islam maintained in the past.  Full submission to the Quran 
is implemented by establishing a socio-cultural religious system that acts as a strong form 
of social control. Violent jihadis assert that secularism, ―manmade‖ laws, and immoral 
lifestyles are valued by the majority of Muslims over Sharia law (Kepel, 2005).  Their 
version of Islam dictates that any social innovation, such as secular law, is blasphemous 
and counter to the teaching of the prophet.   
The second reason is methodological. A comparative research design emphasizes 
collecting and analyzing data from different sources to determine if a phenomenon is 
cross-cultural (Barak, 2000; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Durkheim, 1964; LaFree, 2007; 
Bennett, 2004; Reichel, 1994; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990; Ragin; 1987; 1998; 
2000). Comparative research is advantageous to examine frames in criminogenic 
propaganda because parallels suggest the discovery of a general principle (Bennett, 2004: 
Ragin, 2000; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990).   
Effective Propaganda 
―Effective‖ neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is another purposive 
characteristic for my sample. By effective propaganda, I mean propaganda that has a 
documented influence on a target audience.  Effective propaganda is defined as having a 
proven track record of resonating with target audiences in a way that changes attitudes 
and beliefs. Theoretically, studying effective propaganda supports McAdam‘s (1986) 
emphasis on attitude formation because effective propaganda can contribute to forming 
76 
 
receptive attitudes.  Analytically, examining effective propaganda also reveals a 
propagandist‘s ―best practices‖ in how to construct propaganda.   
I use a continuum to determine varying degrees of effectiveness.  Using a 
systematic method based on four measures (citation analysis, bibliometrics, frequencies 
of downloads, and influence), I determined what could be labeled as ―effective‖ 
propaganda.  I created a population of effective neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists 
from these measures. Propaganda that did not rank high on the continuum was labeled 
ineffective. From the ―effective‖ propaganda population, purposive sampling was used to 
determine which propagandists and their published propaganda to include in this study. 
This systematic method created a sample of 5 neo-Nazi propagandists and 5 violent jihadi 
propagandist and 10 samples of their written propaganda (see figure 5).
38
 Conversely, as 
a control measure, two ineffective propagandists,--a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi-- and 
their published work are also included for analysis.   
Figure 5: Research Sample 
Violent Jihadi and Neo-Nazi 
Propagandist 
Published Propaganda 
Sayyid Qutb Milestones 
Abdullah Azzam Join the Caravan 
Ayman al-Zawahiri Knights Under the Prophets Banner 
Osama bin Laden Declaration of War: Jihad Communiqués 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi This is our Aqeedah 
CONTROL-Abd al-Bari  The Slicing Sword 
George Rockwell White Power 
                                                          
38
 The sample spans from the 1960‘s until 2009. 
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William Pierce The Turner Diaries 
Ben Klassen The White Man’s Bible 
David Lane The 88 Precepts 
David Duke  Jewish Supremacism 
CONTROL-Thomas Chittim Civil War 2 
  
Constructing a population of effective propagandists begins with examining who 
is popular in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi online libraries. Constructing a population of 
violent jihadi propagandists, McCants and Brachman (2006), leading scholars at West 
Point‘s Combating Terrorism Centers (CTC), determined whose violent jihadi 
propaganda was being read and referenced.  Using the frequency of downloads, citation 
analysis, and bibliometrics from Al Taweed, the Al Qaeda virtual library, McCants and 
Brachman (2006) documented which pieces of propaganda and which propagandists were 
influential among violent jihadis.
39
  McCants and Brachman‘s analysis (2006) created a 
list of ―who‘s who‖ among effective violent jihadi propagandists. Generating an effective 
list of neo-Nazis propagandists involved the same process. EBooks proved useful for this 
task.  EBooks, ―the world‘s leading publishers for the racially aware,‖ 40 records the 
highest frequency of neo-Nazi propaganda downloads.   In the same fashion, EBooks 
records the frequency of which effective neo-Nazi propagandists form the population 
baseline. However, there are limitations to relying solely on on-line libraries to generate a 
population and sample.                                                                                                       
                                                          
39
 www.tawhed.ws accessed Jan. 19 2011. 
40
 http://wn-pdfs.tk/ accessed Jan. 18 2011. 
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A primary limitation is that the ―degree of influence‖ of a propagandist is not 
always measured in the number of times a document is downloaded or cited.  McCants 
and Brachman (2006) acknowledge this limitation.  Other factors must also be taken into 
account, such as a propagandist‘s degree of influence is partly a function of one or more 
of the following: 1) being a founder of a separate group in the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi 
movement, 2)  being an influential leader in their movement, 2) being imprisoned or 
tortured for their ideology, 3) dying as a martyr, 4) demonstrating unwavering 
commitment to the cause, 5) serving as a role model to members in the group, or 6) 
making a significant contribution to ideology. Accounting for degree of influence from 
this perspective incorporates substantive knowledge absent from online libraries.  A 
propagandist‘s ―degree of influence‖ renders certain credibility to their propaganda, thus 
effectively leveraging a target audience to be persuaded.   
  Finally, I use face validity to determine degree of influence.  To demonstrate 
face validity, a short biographical sketch outlines each propagandist‘s degree of influence 
either as a neo-Nazi or violent jihadist (see appendices).  In purposive sampling, a 
propagandist‘s biography can serve as a measure of face validity to confirm that 
―effectiveness‖ parameters are met by my sample of neo-Nazi and violent jihadist 
propagandists. Biographical sketches highlight the following criteria: 1) founded a 
separate group in the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi movement, 2) leadership, 2) 
imprisonment or torture, 3) martyrdom, 4) unwavering racial or religious loyalty, 5) a 
mentoring role model, or 6) ideological contributions. 
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CHAPTER 4: Findings-Diagnostic Frames   
 
Introduction  
 Chapters one and two outline the context and conceptual background for three 
central research questions. Chapter three examines the data, research design and 
qualitative/quantitative procedures employed in investigating these research questions.  
This chapter answers the following research question: What types of diagnostic frames 
are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?  
 The first section of this chapter reviews the conceptual role of frames and the 
emotion of shame in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.  The next section identifies 
the types of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames and their prevalence. The 
chapter concludes by examining the similarities and differences in the way neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames. 
How diagnostic frames organize experience can be divided in three central tasks. 
First, diagnostic frames are selected by a propagandist to specify the problems or what I 
label as ―blame targets.‖ Blame targets in propaganda function to outline those 
responsible for racial or religious problems.  Second, diagnostic frames contribute in 
forming attitudes and social ties because they function as powerful communication agents 
(Ryan, 1991).  Third, diagnostic frames assist in drift. Drift is defined as the process of 
moving back and forth from conventional norms to those of a subculture of violence 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). Drift occurs because diagnostic frames function as a technique to 
neutralize conflicting ―inner voices‖ and conventional culture, by substituting 
conventional cultural norms with those associated with subcultures of violence.  
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However, unlike drift described by Sykes & Matza (1957), drift into a terrorist subculture 
of violence is meant to be permanent. 
 Directing a target audience to violence begins by shaping attitudes that are 
receptive towards violent jihadi and neo-Nazi ideology.  Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propagandists seek to construct reality and organize experience through their point of 
view. Diagnostic frames enable ideologues to channel the source of injustices, 
humiliation, and oppression into a series of scapegoats or ―blame targets.‖   
Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames to 
shape attitudes and beliefs by casting white or Islamic ―problems‖ as the way to organize 
experience. Similar to how diagnostic frames function in other social movements (Jasper, 
1998), neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists also use shame in diagnostic frames to 
persuade whites or Muslims to support their cause. Persuasion occurs when a target 
audience begins to organize how they experience the social world through a violent jihadi 
or neo-Nazi lens.  
 Figure 6 illustrates the diagnostic typology developed in this research for both 
neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.  A diagnostic typology organizes the ninety-
three violent jihadi/neo-Nazi diagnostic frames discovered in this research into six central 
categories.
 41
  
Figure 6 A neo-Nazi/Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Typology 
Category Category Defined 
Out-Group Failures Individual or collective non-achievement influenced by non-
whites/non-Muslims. 
Out-Group Generates 
Economic Hardship for In-
Group 
Economic disadvantages produced by non-whites/non-Muslims. 
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 Tables 17 and 18 (see appendix) shows the forty-seven neo-Nazi and forty-six violent jihadi diagnostic 
frame types identified during analysis. 
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Out-Group humiliates In-
group 
Inferior ―out-group‖ unjustly targets whites/non-Muslims to 
humiliate. 
Out-group Flaws Inferior non-Muslims/non-whites possesses deficient physical 
qualities, substandard mental capabilities, ideas, or properties. 
Out-Group Immorality ―Non-whites/non-Muslims possesses and/or contributes 
immoral qualities to the white race or Islam. 
In-Group Weakness Whites/Muslims are powerlessness, cowards, or passive. 
 
 Diagnostic frames are divided into six categories that focus on in-group or out-
group conflict.  In-group/out-groups is a concept social scientists use to understand how 
individuals perceive and organize the social world (Simmel, 1955; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; 
Sherif, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961; Bass & Dunteman, 1963; Johnson, 1967; Park, Ryan 
& Judd, 1992; Sherman, 1993).  The six categories defined in figure 6 explain how 
information is constructed to generate shame by using out-group or in-group conflict.   
Propagandists maximize out-group/in-group conflict by framing racial or religious 
problems according to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi ideology.  The purpose of each 
category, from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, is to validate and rationalize the 
―wrongness‖ of the out-group, outline how an inferior out-group (non-whites and non-
Muslims) is unjustly treating the in-group, (whites and ―true‖ Muslims) and describe how 
whites or Muslims are shamefully weak in responding to out-group injustices. 
Typologies and Types of Diagnostic Frames  
 A Typology of Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames 
 A neo-Nazi diagnostic typology specifies the categories or ―blame targets‖ that 
promote moving into a permanent neo-Nazi subculture from conventional culture. Each 
―blame target‖ identified in table 4, serves as a form of subcultural social control to 
leverage neo-Nazis from organizing experience through conventional culture to a neo-
Nazi interpretation.  Therefore, neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as a set of ―new‖ 
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social boundaries that serves to internalize and justify neo-Nazi behavior because of their 
―validity.‖  If interpreted from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, emotive 
responses are the outcome, specifically shame, which assists in internalizing why neo-
Nazism is needed to save the white race from extinction. 
Table 1 Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Typological Categories over Time 
 
Out-
Group 
Failures 
Out-Group 
Generates 
Economic 
Hardship for 
In-Group 
Out-Group 
humiliates 
In-Group 
 
Out-
Group 
Flaws 
Out-Group 
Immorality 
In-Group 
Weakness 
Propagandist       
Rockwell 
(1967) 
15% 2% 5% 48% 16% 14% 
Pierce 
(1978) 
35% 1% 6% 25% 10% 23% 
Klassen 
(1981) 
25% 2% 3% 38% 19% 13% 
Lane 
(1994) 
40% 9% 0% 22% 12% 17% 
Duke 
(2003) 
5% 1% 16% 52% 17% 9% 
Chittum 
(1997) 
24% 1% 3% 43% 1% 28% 
       
Summary 24% 3% 6% 37% 13% 17% 
 
 The most prevalent neo-Nazi emotive triggers used to internalize and justify neo-
Nazi behavior are out-group failures and flaws.  Table 1 illustrates the prevalence of each 
type of diagnostic frame when diagnostic frames are divided into typological categories.
42
 
An interesting finding is frame consistency over time.  Frame consistency implies that the 
method of how information, specifically blame targets, is framed remains constant over 
time. Though the exact type of frame may vary, when organized in typological 
categories, neo-Nazi propagandists show little variation in how they construct 
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Table 17 (see appendix) illustrates the forty seven types of neo-Nazi diagnostic frames identified from the 
data.   
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propaganda.  Though the same pattern is reflected in Chittum‘s text, (Chittum is a lesser 
known neo-Nazi propagandist), the finding suggests that replicating ―effective‖ formats 
or repeating the same diagnostic frames does not always ensure ―success.‖ This finding 
also indicates that factors (i.e., degree of influence, leadership, mentorship, demonstrated 
racial loyalty) other than how propaganda is constructed are mitigating factors in 
determining a propagandist‘s effectiveness. 
 The diagnostic frames discovered in neo-Nazi propaganda reflect a shared world 
view over time.  A neo-Nazi world view argues that white civilization and culture are on 
the verge of extinction, blacks are inherently inferior and Jews dominate world affairs 
through a relatively small ―cabal‖ that controls the media and economy across the globe.  
Neo-Nazis assert that current democracies are controlled by a Zionist Jewish agenda, 
which unites them in sharing violent anti-Semitic views. Neo-Nazis also argue that 
―Zionists‖ have manipulated information to gain world sympathy to use to their political 
advantage. The following excerpts from Rockwell and Duke capture this world view. 
 Communism - largely Jewish. Zionism - all Jewish. The Black Revolution - 
largely Jewish. 99.9% Jew-financed. Commercial degeneracy and pornography largely 
Jewish. Commercial racketeering in "religion", with their "K's" and "U's" Jewish, as in 
Christ's time. Movies, TV, press, books, magazines - strictly kosher. (Rockwell, 1966: 
88) 
 
 When I learned of the Jewish role in the slave trade, it seemed to me that it could 
have certainly added to the resentment against the Jews felt by their host populations. 
Being known as the greatest perpetrators of the slave trade is not the best of public 
relations for Jews. It is no wonder that the Jewish-dominated media have avoided the 
issue. Only Jewish scholars, who faithfully record Jewish history, primarily for Jewish 
readers, are allowed to travel on to such forbidden historical ground. (Duke, 2003: 372) 
 Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as information boundaries through the 
inclusion or exclusion of information. Meaning is emotionally framed to dominate how 
neo-Nazis should feel about themselves and non-whites in conventional culture.  The 
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diagnostic frames examined in this research form the ―ideological foundation stones‖ for 
neo-Nazism and continue to be used despite changes in the social world that have 
occurred over the past 50 years.  Therefore, each neo-Nazi diagnostic frame, from a 
social movement perspective, can be defined as an action oriented belief constructed in a 
way to motivate, incite, and legitimize neo-Nazi attitudes and actions. 
 Diagnostic frames are action oriented because diagnostic frames are intended be 
inclusive and flexible, broad in interpretive scope, and maintain greater social/racial 
boundary appeal.  Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are emotionally constructed forms of 
communication that harness symbolic characteristics so that whites can identify with a 
neo-Nazi way of organizing their experience. The intended outcome is to convey to all 
whites the necessity of neo-Nazism in order to mobilize and revolutionize the current 
racial climate. The following example illustrates how diagnostically framing modern 
immorality is broad in scope and intended to resonate with members of the white race 
who find the shift in conventional culture problematic. 
 Nor have the girls remained entirely passive. Sexual debauchery of every sort on 
the part of young White men and women-and even children in their pre-teens-has reached 
a level which would have been unimaginable only two or three years ago. The queers, the 
fetishists, the mixed-race couples, the sadists, and the exhibitionists-urged on by the mass 
media- are parading their perversions in public, and the public is joining them. (Pierce, 
1978: 58) 
 Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as powerful communication agents that 
impact attitude formation.
43
  Maintaining receptive neo-Nazi attitudes is a pre-requisite 
for responding favorably to existing neo-Nazi ties or as a motive to seek out relationships 
to reinforce these attitudes.  Frames emphasize specific information, while excluding 
                                                          
43
 McAdam‘s (1986) expanded Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson‘s (1980) micromoblization model of 
social movements to outline the significance of attitude formation and its link in maintaining or establishing 
social ties. McAdam‘s approach emphasizes the relationship between receptive attitudes and the formation 
or maintenance of social ties (McAdam, 1986).   
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other forms, impacting individual neo-Nazis or group attitudes because of the 
significance attached to others who share similar attitudes.   
 Rockwell reasoned that corrupt Jewish influence catalyzed the Civil Rights 
Movement, the rising threat of communism in the United States and the decline of 
American morality.  The diagnostic frames used by Rockwell argued that whites being 
humiliated and oppressed by non-whites to the brink of racial extinction could be 
attributed to Jewish influence in the government, media and masterminding the Civil 
Rights Movement.  Rockwell also rails against the weakened condition of whites who 
remain passive despite crime, violence, taxation and all forms of racial pollution 
occurring around them. Rockwell intends the following excerpts to function as powerful 
communication agents to impact white attitudes and organize how whites ―should‖ be 
interpreting their experiences.    
 A trial of Oswald would have driven into the consciousness of America the 
unspeakable treason of these people who keep pulling off the same old Communist trick 
of calling violent Communist terrorists "reformers" until these murderers have seized 
control of pro-American, Christian governments as Castro did to Batista and Mao Tse 
Tung did to Chiang Kai-shek - after which the filthy Red fakers in America moan and 
wring their hands at their "betrayal" by these hard-core Communists who always seem to 
"fool‖ these trusting ―lovers of "civil liberties" and "civil rights." (Rockwell, 1966: 52) 
 And such daily exposures would have inevitably and finally aroused the 
American people to the deadly facts about Communism and the "civil rights" Black 
Horror which we of the right wing have been trying so hard to warn America. (Rockwell, 
1966: 55) 
 It would have been utterly impossible for Martin Luther King, Queer James 
Baldwin, A. Philip Randolph, Queer Bayard Rustin and the rest of the "liberal" and "civil 
rights" Jew and Negro leaders who have infiltrated even our churches to continue their 
deadly but creeping Communist revolution in America. (Rockwell, 1966: 53) 
 
 According to Goffman (1974) framing is an active process where individuals and 
groups understand, recognize, and accept or deny social boundaries.  Propagandists 
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construct frames throughout their texts to accomplish these tasks. To illustrate, 
throughout The Turner Diaries, Pierce frames that white men and women are 
increasingly being victimized and oppressed by non-whites.  Pierce diagnostically frames 
that the greatest threat to the white race is the federal government, followed by blacks.  
The Turner Diaries delineates the shameful problems faced by the white race as the 
federal government employs white race traitors and non-whites to disarm, violate, kill, 
and ultimately destroy all whites.   
 The most interesting development is that the Human Relations Councils have also 
been given emergency police powers, and they are "deputizing" large numbers of Blacks 
from the welfare rolls, the way they did for the Gun Raids. In the District and in 
Alexandria some of these deputized Blacks are already swaggering around and stopping 
Whites on the streets. (Pierce, 1978: 38) 
 Klassen intends to impact white attitudes by arguing that Jews created 
Christianity to weaken and eventually destroy the white race.  As evidence, he points to 
the fact that few Jews converted to Christianity and how Christianity teaches to ―turn the 
other cheek.‖ Klassen asserts that Jews created Christianity as a method to pacify whites 
and was strategically developed to prevent the stronger white race from destroying 
inferior Jews. The following example illustrates how Klassen frames Christianity as a 
shameful Jewish invention to devastate the white race. 
 We have already explored the devastating havoc on the White Race wrought by 
Jewish influences such as Christianity, race-mixing, mongrelization and hundreds of 
other programs being promoted by our deadly enemies. (Klassen, 1981: 98) 
 
 Framing helps define almost all situations while providing an understanding of 
how individuals and groups should interpret them.  Individuals respond to situations 
based on their understanding of how societal boundaries function in the world around 
them.  How Pierce and Klassen frame ―white problems‖ and ―white victimization‖ is part 
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of an active neo-Nazi process that enables individuals and groups to recognize, 
understand and accept social boundaries according to a neo-Nazi lens. 
 Table 2 outlines the three primary diagnostic frames that function as the leading 
organizational principle to identify and validate how a neo-Nazi should interpret the 
greatest threat to the white race.
44
 Frame prevalence, determined by overall frequency of 
use, is a way of interpreting the leading primary diagnostic frame for each neo-Nazi 
propagandist.
45
  For example, Rockwell and Klassen reason that ―Jewish influence‖ has 
become the greatest threat to the preservation of the white race.   The power of whites has 
been weakened in the United States by Jewish control of the media, material wealth, 
promoting communism and liberalism. Lane and Pierce reason that the existing federal 
government represents one of the greatest threats to the white race, while Duke contends 
that the greatest threat to the white race is the mere existence of Jews and their 
―corrupting‖ influence.   
Table 2 Primary neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandists 
Rank Rockwell 
(1967) 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Lane 
(1994) 
Duke 
(2003) 
Chittum 
(1997) 
       
1 Jewish 
Influence 
Federal 
Government 
Jewish 
Influence 
Modern Morality Jews Federal 
Government 
2 Communism Blacks Blacks Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 
Jewish 
Influence 
Whites 
Oppressed 
3 Modern 
Morality 
Whites 
Oppressed 
Jews Federal Government Whites 
Humiliated 
Modern 
Morality 
 
 All neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and behavior into forms 
that are criminogenic in nature.
46
  Whether the outcome is explicit violence outlined by 
                                                          
44
 Goffman (1974) labeled the way in which individuals understand the world as their primary framework.   
45
 Table 18 (see appendix)  illustrates a comprehensive list of each frame by text. 
46
 Frames provide meaning to events or occurrences that are organized in a particular fashion intended to 
guide action (Snow & Byrd, 2000; 2007, Benford & Snow, 2000; Klandermas, 1997; Kuzman, 1998; 
McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988; 1996; Tarrow, 1991; Tilly; 1978). 
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violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races into blame targets, the goal is to 
foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into neo-Nazism over conventional culture.  
Table 17 in the appendix illustrates which diagnostic frames are the most prevalent to 
each neo Nazis propagandist, the total number of diagnostic frames used in the text and 
how the use of certain diagnostic frames compares between each text. Each of the frames 
listed in table 17 is intended organize experiences for whites through a neo-Nazi grid to 
influence attitudes as a precursor to mobilization. 
 Mobilization on a large scale is more likely to occur when neo-Nazi core framing 
tasks are believable, the evidence used is perceived as credible, and diagnostic frames tap 
into macro level grievances.
47
 Rockwell explains that the Civil Rights Movement and the 
Vietnam War should be attributed to the Jews.  The Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam 
are broad in scope and Rockwell uses ―evidence‖ to argue Jewish culpability in both 
events to mobilize whites.  Also using broad appeal, Pierce explains that liberalism, 
materialism, feminism, taxation, and civil rights are benchmarks reflecting a decline of 
modern social morality and the white race. Klassen intends to mobilize whites by 
describing violent incidents against white men and women, portraying how non-whites 
have humiliated whites and how racial natural law has been violated.  He argues that 
these ―white atrocities‖ have occurred all under the guise of broad ideological appeals of 
racial equality and racial integration.   Lane‘s broad themes are centered on the failures of 
modern morality, the violation of racial natural law, and federal government failures.  
Duke uses information to diagnostically frame how Jews have humiliated whites for 
                                                          
47
 Snow and Benford (1988) outlined that framing tasks are prerequisites for mobilization. They defined 
mobilization as the intention to catalyze potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral 
audience, and deflate counter frames. Zuo and Benford (1995) assert that when diagnostic frames are more 
believable, the frames are more likely to resonate with a target audience and therefore increase the 
possibility of mobilization. 
89 
 
generations through Zionism, the Jewish version of the Holocaust, and Communist 
ideology.  The following excerpts by Rockwell, Pierce and Lane illustrate how 
information is crafted to resonate with macro level grievances. 
 All we got were headaches, responsibilities, and more little spit-in-the-eye wars, 
anti-American hate, Berlin Walls, "Foreign Aid" handouts, Koreas, Vietnams, Cubas, and 
endless riots and crime at home. That is the standard pattern of our "wars" today-mutual 
suicide of White against White, followed by the handing over to Communists, Jews, and 
Negroes of more and more of our territory, wealth, rights, and power, and the disarming 
of any real opposition to Jewish-led scum as a form of treason to the "American 
dream."(Rockwell, 1966: 266) 
 I understand that the two girls were with the Blacks only because they had been 
infected with the disease of liberalism by the schools and the churches and the plastic pop 
culture the System churns out for young people these days. Presumably, if they had been 
raised in a healthy society they would have had some racial pride. (Pierce, 1978: 77) 
 No government can give anything to anybody without first taking it from another. 
Government is, by its very nature, legalized taking. A limited amount of government is a 
necessary burden for national defense and internal order. Anything more is 
counterproductive to freedom and liberty. (Lane, 1999: 6) 
 The significance of developing a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi typology leads to a 
deeper understanding of how neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are organized as criminogenic 
catalysts. Each neo-Nazi diagnostic frame is intended to be believable.  However, which 
diagnostic frames are interpreted as such by supporters is beyond the scope of this study, 
but what is understood is that each neo-Nazi propagandist in this sample has contributed 
to the evolution of neo-Nazism.  Including Chittum‘s text as a control measure, which is 
also fiction and shares similar primary diagnostic frames with Pierce, suggest that future 
research is needed to determine what other factors are significant for a neo-Nazis to 
internalize propaganda.  
A Typology of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames 
 A violent jihadi diagnostic typology specifies the categories or ―blame targets‖ 
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that are intended to assert a violent jihadi subculture over conventional Muslim behavior 
or values. Each ―blame target‖ identified in table 3, serves as a form of subcultural social 
control to leverage violent jihadis from organizing experience through conventional 
culture instead of a violent jihadi interpretation.
48
  Violent jihadi diagnostic frames 
outline subcultural social boundaries that are meant to internalize and justify ―pure‖ 
Muslim behavior. Shame is used as an emotional mechanism to rationalize why violent 
jihadism is necessary to cleanse ―true‖ Islam from pollution. 
Table 3 Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Typological Categories over Time 
 
Out-
Group 
Failures 
Out-Group Generates 
Economic Hardship for 
In-Group 
Out-Group 
humiliates 
In-group 
Out-
group 
Flaws 
Out-Group 
Immorality 
In-Group 
Weakness 
Propagandist       
Qutb 
(1966) 
13% 1% 0% 57% 23% 6% 
Azzam 
(1984) 
9% 1% 3% 8% 22% 56% 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
29% 5% 4% 9% 18% 35% 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
35% 0% 7% 5% 19% 34% 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
27% 0% 0% 16% 56% 1% 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
4% 1% 1% 17% 69% 8% 
       
Summary 20% 1% 3% 19% 34% 23% 
 
 Out-group immorality and failures are the most prevalent violent jihadi emotive 
triggers used to internalize and justify violent jihadi behavior.  Table 3 illustrates the 
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 Table 19 (see appendix) displays the total types diagnostic frames or blame targets derived from the 
sample of violent jihadi propaganda from 1967 to 2009. Blame targets are similar to how Orbuch (1997) 
summarized accounts because diagnostic frames are crafted to catalyze potential ideological adherents, 
increase support from a neutral audience, and deflate counter frames. Forty-seven total violent jihadi 
diagnostic frames were identified from the data.  These forty-seven violent jihadi frames function as 
emotive ―buttons‖ intended to neutralize any questions of culpability toward ―blame targets‖ and prime the 
reader for violent jihadi solutions.  Blame targets are used when violent jihadi propagandists are trying to 
explain themselves and their actions as a rational outcome.  The goal of each diagnostic frame is to 
emphasize a blame target and align the reader‘s attitudes and emotions to a violent jihadi cause. 
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prevalence of each type of diagnostic frame when they are divided into typological 
categories.
49
  In contrast to neo-Nazis diagnostic frames, violent jihadi typological 
categories are not consistent over time.
50
  Frame inconsistency implies that the method of 
how information, specifically blame targets, is framed varies over time, yet still remains 
―effective.‖ Though al Bari‘s propaganda reflects a different pattern, his use of out-group 
immorality is more prevalent than any other typological category across the sample and 
his lack of not being ―known‖ or influential among violent jihadists may be attributed to 
ineffective construction. This finding suggests that placing primary emphasis on out-
group morality over all other grievances may not resonate with current Muslim 
populations.  
 The violent jihadists in this sample argue that the West shamefully perceives 
Muslims as ―inferior‖ and powerless, therefore ―crusaders‖ and ―infidels‖ are killing 
Muslims.   Violent jihadi propagandists cite instances in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, 
Bosnia, Philippines and Palestine as evidence of a ―crusader‘s‖ campaign.  An unjust 
―inferior‖ status is shameful because violent jihadis assert that Muslims are Allah‘s 
standard bearers and therefore they should be honored, yet they are treated with contempt 
by the ―great and little Satan.‖  Violent jihadis assert that Muslims across the globe are 
being killed, wounded or persecuted while Muslims remain passive or indifferent.  
Violent jihadi communiqués assault Muslims with shame for their ignorance, indifference 
or passivity to the plight of fellow Muslims under siege by crusaders.  What matters from 
a violent jihadist point of view is that all Muslims perceive the modern Islam as 
―polluted‖ and are energized to their cause.  The following examples by Qutb and Bin 
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 Whereas the prevalence of each violent jihadi diagnostic frame (n=46) is outlined in Table 17.    
50
 When not organized into typological categories, see Table 18, violent jihadi propagandists show even 
more variation in how they construct propaganda.   
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Laden illustrate both external and internal culpability for the current state of Islamic 
affairs. 
 External: It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered 
from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders 
alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became the cheapest 
and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine 
and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon are still fresh in 
our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Cashmere, Assam, Philippine, Fatani, 
Ogadin, Somalia, Eretria, Chechnya and in Bosnia-Herzegovina took place, massacres 
that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch 
and hear, and not only didn‘t respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy 
between the USA and its‘ allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the 
dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. (Bin 
Laden, 1996: 2) 
 Internal: We are also surrounded by Jahiliyyah today, which is of the same nature 
as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, 
people‘s beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws-is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent 
that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and 
Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyyah! (Qutb, 1966: 15) 
 Neutralizing blame targets creates the perception that violence or any other action 
by violent jihadis is ―altruistic.‖ For example, Qutb reasoned that Muslims were ignorant 
of the Quran, were following secular innovations and a failed Islamic government 
influenced by Jews, flawed ―isms‖ and Satan.  Qutb reasoned that any Muslim who 
claimed to be a Muslim, yet was loyal to the Egyptian government, supported 
communism, materialism, liberalism, socialism, or oppressed other ―true‖ Muslims, was 
in fact not a true Muslim.  Muslims that exhibited any trace of these behaviors were not 
really Muslims, but were living in a state of ignorance or Jahiliyyah. Azzam was trying to 
catalyze Muslim populations from a state of passivity to action.  Azzam defined action as 
financially supporting the Mujahedin in Afghanistan or going there to join them. Bin 
Laden asserts that Muslims are being attacked and oppressed across the Muslim world by 
Israelis and the United States. Bin Laden blames Islamic governments, kafirs, Zionists 
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and the United States for the current state of Islamic pollution. Zawahiri frames violence 
against ―true‖ Muslims by non-Muslims and secular Muslims as emotive ―buttons‖ 
intended to neutralize any question of culpability.  Maqdisi diagnostically frames that 
kafirs, secular innovations, jahiliyyah and democracy are the lead polluters of the Muslim 
world.  The purpose of each diagnostic frame is to use information to catalyze potential 
ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and to deflate counter 
frames. The following excerpts from Qutb, Azzam and Zawahiri provide examples of 
how ignorant Muslims, the United States and Jews are polluting the Islamic world. 
 If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes 
clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah, [Ignorance of the Divine guidance] 
and all the marvelous material comforts and high level inventions do not diminish this 
ignorance. (Qutb, 1967: 15) 
 Those of the believers who sit back, except for those who are incapacitated, are 
not equal with those who strive in the way of Allah with their wealth and their selves. 
Allah has granted a higher rank to those who strive with their possessions and selves, 
over those who sit back. And to all of them has Allah promised good. But Allah has 
favored the Mujahedeen with a tremendous reward, by levels from Him, and with 
forgiveness and mercy, over those who sit back. (Azzam, 1987:16) 
 
 The United States, and the global Jewish government that is behind it, have 
realized that government by Islam is the popular demand of the nations of this 
region, which is considered the heart of the Islamic world. They have realized that it is 
impossible to compromise on these issues. Hence the United States has decided to dictate 
its wishes by force, repression, forgery, and misinformation.  Finally it has added direct 
military intervention to all the foregoing methods. (Zawahiri, 2001: 52) 
 
 Violent jihadi diagnostic frames are information boundaries that define 
subcultural norms through carefully including or excluding information. Information is 
emotionally framed to establish cognitive and behavior boundaries while also dominating 
how a target audience should feel about a terrorist subculture.  Therefore, each violent 
jihadi diagnostic frame, from a social movement perspective, can be defined as a way to 
motivate, incite, and legitimize violent-jihadi attitudes and actions. The following excerpt 
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from Maqdisi illustrates how theological information is included to define violent jihadi 
attitudes and actions.   
 So we take that as an example until we meet Allah, hence, we declare Barâ 
[disavowal, freedom] from the Mushrikûn, their helpers, and their allies. We hate them 
and we declare our Barâ from what they worship besides Allah, and we disbelieve in their 
methodologies, their religions, and their false paths that oppose Allah. We manifest and 
announce and make clear our enmity to those who oppose Allah, those who wage war 
against the truth, and those who openly proclaim their falsehood - and that does not 
prevent us from giving Da‘wah to them and clarifying the truth from the ones of them 
that want to hear, and we hope for their guidance. (Maqdisi, 2009: 17) 
 An excerpt from Bin Laden shows how Muslims should interpret the ―polluted‖ 
concept of human rights and the presence of non-Muslim soldiers on the Arabian 
Peninsula.  
 The people of Islam awakened and realized that they are the main target for the 
aggression of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance. All false claims and propaganda about 
"Human Rights" were hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place 
against the Muslims in every part of the world. The latest and the greatest of these 
aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet (ALLAH‘S 
BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two 
Holy Places -the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source 
of the message and the place of the noble Ka‘ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims- by the armies 
of the American Crusaders and their allies. (Bin Laden, 1996: 1-2) 
 Violent jihadi diagnostic frames also illustrate how linguistic techniques and 
excuses are used to scapegoat culpability to out-groups. Violent jihadi propagandists use 
diagnostic frames as excuses to rationalize violence in a similar way that Scully and 
Marolla (1984) apply excuses and justifications to analyze how rapists explained 
themselves and their crimes. Similar to how Sykes & Matza (1957), Mills (1940), and 
Scott & Lyman (1968) focus on rationalization, each violent jihadi frame reflects the 
need to rationalize the problems confronting Islam from a subcultural perspective. The 
following excerpts from Bin Laden and Azzam show how excuses are used to justify the 
need for violent jihadism. 
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 It is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the 
crusaders is necessity and only a temporary measures to protect the land of the two Holy 
Places. Especially when the civil and the military infrastructures of Iraq were savagely 
destroyed showing the depth of the Zionist-Crusaders hatred to the Muslims and their 
children, and the rejection of the idea of replacing the crusaders forces by an Islamic 
force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people. (Bin Laden, 1996: 
20) 
 
 Anybody who looks into the state of the Muslims today will find that their 
greatest misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad (due to love of this world and 
abhorrence of death). Because of that, the tyrants have gained dominance over the 
Muslims in every aspect and in every land. The reason for this is that the Disbelievers 
only stand in awe of fighting. (Azzam, 1987: 16) 
 
 Qutb and Zawahiri also use excuses to rationalize the necessity of a violent 
subculture. Qutb cites that the United States, democracy, capitalism and modern science 
are disastrous imports from the west that are assaulting the core theological and moral 
foundations of Islam.  Zawahiri asserts that the Jews and the United States are polluting 
Islam with materialism, modern science, democracy, crime, immorality, Christianity and 
Zionism.  Zawahiri writes that the Islamic government and the majority of Muslims are 
also living in a state of ignorance where Sharia is ignored and secular innovations replace 
God‘s law. Because the majority of Muslims are ignorant of their faith, they have become 
inundated by innumerable ―problems‖ from the west and of their own doing.  Qutb uses 
modernity, secular innovations and Christianity as excuses to rationalize the need for 
violent jihadism in the following way: 
  I, on the other hand, took the position of attacking the Western Jahiliyyah, its 
shaky religious beliefs, its social and economic modes, and its immoralities: "Look at 
these concepts of the Trinity, Original Sin, Sacrifice and Redemption, which are 
agreeable neither to reason nor to conscience. Look at this capitalism with its 
monopolies, its usury and whatever else is unjust in it; at this individual freedom, devoid 
of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under the force of law;  at this 
materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior, like animals, which you 
call ―Free mixing of the sexes; at this vulgarity which you call ―emancipation of women,‖ 
at these unfair and cumbersome laws of marriage and divorce, which are contrary to the 
demands of practical life; and at Islam, with its logic, beauty, humanity and happiness, 
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which reaches the horizons to which man strives but does not reach. It is a practical way 
of life and its solutions are based on the foundation of the wholesome nature of man.‖ 
(Qutb, 1967:15) 
Whether the diagnostic frame is ―Zionism‖ or the ―United States,‖ each violent jihadi 
propagandist attempts to excuse or validate the need for violence against certain blame 
targets. 
 Table 4 illustrates violent jihadi primary diagnostic frames.  Violent jihadi 
primary frames function as leading organizational principles to identify and validate how 
violent jihadis should interpret Islam‘s greatest threat. In Milestones, Qutb states that the 
leading ―injustice‖ against Islam is the current state of jahiliyyah maintained by the 
majority of Muslims. This twist of doctrine is of critical importance because Qutb‘s 
doctrines provided theological justification for violent jihadis to target and kill other 
Muslims. According to Azzam, the central problem during the 1980‘s was that Muslims 
across the globe were passively observing the Soviets attack Muslim men and women in 
Afghanistan. Zawahiri argues that the United States is the greatest threat confronting 
Islam and violent jihadis, while also asserting that Islamic governments and Israel also 
pose significant threats to every ―true‖ Muslim.  Maqdisi surmises that the majority of 
Muslims are not even aware that Islam is polluted and justifies this claim as evidence to 
prove that Muslims are living in jahiliyyah. Maqdisi‘s diagnostic frames reveal that he 
believes the central problems of the true Islamic ummah can be traced to theological 
issues, which differs from how the other propagandists have identified a nation or group 
responsible in their top seven diagnostic frames. Although Al Bari shares a similar 
primary frame with Maqdisi, he focuses on two other primary frames that are do not 
receive similar attention from the other violent jihadi propagandists.  This finding 
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suggests that Al Bari emphasis on the moral pollution of Islam and Christianity do not 
share equal appeal to current violent jihadis. 
Table 4 Primary Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandists 
Rank Qutb 
Milestones 
(1966) 
Azzam 
Defense 
(1984) 
Bin Laden 
Declaration of War 
(1996) 
Zawahiri 
Knights 
(2001) 
Maqdisi 
Aqeedah 
(2009) 
Al Bari 
Swords 
(1850) 
       
1 Jahiliyyah Muslim Passivity Islamic Government United States Kafir Kafir 
2 Paganism Muslim Women 
Victimized 
Non Muslims attack 
Muslims 
Islamic 
Government 
Secular 
Innovations 
Islam is 
Polluted 
3 Jews Kafir Muslim Oppression Israel Jahiliyyah Christianity 
 
Techniques of Neutralization  
Similarities & Differences between neo-Nazi & Violent Jihadi Neutralization 
 Techniques 
 Figure 7 illustrates the differences and similarities between how violent jihadis 
and neo-Nazis use diagnostic frames to neutralize blame targets.  The figure shows how 
diagnostic frames are used in propaganda to promote permanent drift into subcultures of 
violence.  Although differences exist between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi frames and the 
styles/format used by their propagandists, a common goal is shared—to gain recruits and 
catalyze followers.   
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Figure 7- Similarities and Differences between neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Neutralization 
Techniques 
 
 Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames function to neutralize conventional 
values. Neutralizing conventional values enables a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi to shut off 
―inner objections‖ to conventional culture that conflict with violent subcultures.   Klassen 
and Qutb intend to neutralize aspects of conventional culture by rationalizing the 
injustices committed by those outside of their ideology as shameful. Klassen rationalizes 
that whites suffering from guilt attributed to historical injustices against non-whites, 
grants racial leverage to non-whites.  ―White guilt,‖ according to Klassen, is a shameful 
tactic used by non-whites and race traitors to target the white race.  ―White guilt‖ is 
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similar to how the Jews created Christianity to ―brain wash‖ whites by ―turning the other 
cheek,‖ creating white passivity and ultimately the extinction of the white race. The 
following excerpt illustrates how Klassen compares ―white guilt‖ to the creation of 
Christianity. 
 Emphasized by Christianity. The major influence in exacerbating the guilt-
complex in the White Man has been his religion, Christianity. The Jews in their mortal 
war against the Romans recognized the chink in the armor of the Romans, and gave the 
Romans a religion that drove a powerful wedge into that crack to split it wide open. The 
Christian religion, invented by the  Jews in order to destroy the Romans, placed heavy 
emphasis on guilt. (Klassen, 1981: 330) 
 
 Qutb rails against conventional systems by outlining how Islam is being polluted 
by false Muslims, who embrace ideas and lifestyles counter to the true faith.  Qutb cannot 
comprehend how ―true‖ Muslims could remain shamefully passive while watching the 
erosion of Islamic values and fellow Muslims come under assault. Qutb reasons that 
because Islam has become populated by kafirs living in a state of jahiliyyah, passivity is a 
logical outcome.  
 This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God‘s sovereignty on earth. It 
transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes 
some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient 
Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules 
of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to 
what God has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of God is the 
oppression of His creatures. Thus the humiliation of the common man under the 
communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for 
wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion 
against God‘s authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by God. (Qutb, 
1967: 15) 
 Diagnostic frames rationalize and thus neutralize conventional cultural norms by 
removing responsibility from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi.  However, how this task is 
accomplished differs between violent jihadis and neo-Nazis. Violent jihadi diagnostic 
frames center on divine infractions that are reflected in the violation of Sharia, the 
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prominent role of Satan, blasphemy against God & his Prophet, and activity that is 
defined as secular (i.e., modern science and secular laws).  Violent jihadis also scapegoat 
those who do not belong to their version of Islam.  This includes Muslims living in a state 
of ignorance, apostates and those who belong to secondary faiths (Judaism, Christianity) 
and pagan or polytheistic faiths.  Frames that are based on divine violations against a 
divine being, his messenger and holy book (Allah, his prophet Mohammad and the 
Quran) do not share an equal presence in neo-Nazi propaganda. 
 What these people want is that Islam change its character, its method and its 
history and be reduced to the level of ordinary human theories and laws. They want a 
short-cut solution to satisfy their immediate desires, which are simply a product of the 
defeatist mentality in their spirits in the face of valueless, man-made laws. They want 
Islam to become a mere collection of abstractions and theories, the subject of whose 
application is nonexistent conditions. But the course prescribed by God for this religion is 
the same as it was earlier. First, belief ought to be imprinted on hearts and rule over 
consciences - that belief which demands that people should not bow before anyone 
except God or derive laws from any other source. Then, when such a group of people is 
ready and also gains practical control of society, various laws will be legislated according 
to the practical needs of that society. (Qutb, 1967: 21) 
 Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames do not want to abolish secular laws and systems, but 
rather target ―flawed‖ groups and ideas that they perceive threaten the white race.  Neo-
Nazi propagandists rail against federal taxation, immigration laws, race mixers, the 
Holocaust and crime.  Neo-Nazis scapegoat along racial boundaries; therefore, all non-
whites, civil rights, racial equality or integration function as white race ―pollutants.‖ The 
diagnostic frame ―white extinction‖ is used as a trigger to catalyze whites out of a state of 
shameful passivity to fight those who are threatening the white race.  The ―extinction‖ 
frame is used by all the neo-Nazi propagandists in this sample and there is not a 
corresponding violent jihadi ―Muslim extinction‖ frame. 
 Their evolutionary strategy has been perfected to the point that Europeans and all 
other races now suffer under Jewish hegemony on a global scale. We must acknowledge 
their present political and social power, but we also know that their power has come at 
101 
 
the cost of the devolution of our civilization. Failure to defy this power can only lead to 
our eventual extinction, and this looming genocide gives our task the importance of a life 
or death struggle — one that has urgency for our people and truly all peoples and nations 
upon the earth. (Duke, 2003: 339) 
 Forced integration is deliberate and malicious genocide, particularly for a People 
like the White race, who are now a small minority in the world. (Lane, 1999: 3) 
 Diagnostic frames are a means of collective scapegoating that removes individual 
culpability from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi because they transform the need for violence 
into altruism. Central to both diagnostic typologies is how violent jihadis and neo-Nazis 
are being attacked, humiliated, and oppressed by members of the ―out-group‖ using 
―victimization‖ frames. Propagandists from each ideology use examples from history, 
current events, poetry and fiction to demonstrate that their race or religion is under 
assault.  The purpose of this type of diagnostic frame is to reveal the shameful weak 
status of whites and Muslims permitting these injustices to occur.  In other words, if 
whites or Muslims were in positions of power, these assaults would decrease or be 
absent.  Yet these injustices will continue to occur because of existing passivity and the 
state of weakness of both whites and Muslims.  The ideal is that both Muslims and whites 
are in positions of power and able to reverse the current violence, oppression, and 
humiliation taken against their members is reversed.  Diagnostic frames are intended to 
enrage the reader because of attacks carried out against whites or Muslims. 
 Just as Scott and Lyman (1968) illustrated how accounts are used to neutralize 
conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor‘s actions, neo-Nazis 
and violent jihadis share the same need to remove individual culpability.  In order to 
illustrate collective failure, propagandists from both ideologies frame current 
governments as failed.  
102 
 
 One gets the impression that except for the Jews, who are really burning the 
midnight oil in their efforts against us, the rest of the System (Federal government) is a 
bunch of clock-watchers. Thank "equal opportunity"-and all those niggers in the FBI and 
in the Army-for that! The System has become so corrupt and so mongrelized that only the 
Jews feel at home in it, and no one feels any loyalty toward it. (Pierce, 1978: 76) 
 For this reason the United States chose to begin by crushing the Chechens by 
providing Western financing for the Russian Army so that when this brutal 
campaign against the Chechen mujahedeen is  completed,  the c a m p a i g n  c a n  
m o v e  s o u t h w a r d s  t o  Afghanistan either by the action of former Soviet 
republics that are US agents or with the participation of US troops under the guise of 
combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and the claims about liberating that region‘s 
women. In this way the United States will  have destroyed the two last remaining 
hotbeds of resistance to it in the Islamic world. For this reason the United States remained 
silent about the brutal massacres that were carried out in Chechnya and the volcanic 
fire that was poured on the head of this small republic. (Zawahiri, 2001: 55) 
 
 Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis both use history to validate their frames in an 
attempt to show the reader the degree of governmental corruption.  This is significant 
because both ―demonstrating‖ that those in power are abusing their authority, corrupt or 
illegitimate supporting the argument that they warrant elimination. Both ideologies 
scapegoat the Jews and Zionism as the dominant ―other‖ and ―masterminds‖ of violence 
against whites and Muslims. Thus, the failed state of morality, threats to ―true‖ Islam and 
the white race, failures in modern morality, usury, communism, materialism and 
socialism are linked to the Jews and Zionism.  The following excerpts illustrate how 
Rockwell and Qutb use history to ―validate‖ the threat of the Jews in their message. 
 President Lincoln never preached racial equality, nor any kind of mixing. In fact, 
Lincoln preached just the opposite - (another example of the way our modern, Jewized 
society lies to the people). Here are some of Lincoln‘s best utterances on the Negro, for 
instance: "He shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I 
am not in favor of Negro citizenship. Now my opinion is that the different States have the 
power to make a Negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States if they 
choose. If the State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. 
That is all I have to say about it" (Speech at Springfield, Illinois on June 26, 1857, Vol. 
II, p.405-09).   (Rockwell, 1967: 197) 
 The name of Isam al-Qamari deserves a pause. Al-Qamari was a unique 
individual who has not been given enough credit for his work and his jihad activity 
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because the media and propaganda tools in our countries are in the hands of groups that do 
not favor the Islamists. Accordingly,  the r ight  of  publ ishing is  controlled by 
them, to the exclusion of the Islamists. In doing so, they are following the footsteps of the 
West, where Jews are in control of the media and the propaganda tools. (Qutb, 1966: 29) 
 Though culpability does not rest solely on the Jews, both distribute blame to 
passive members of their race or religion.  Passive members are identified as assisting in 
the destruction of a superior people and way of life because of their unreceptive attitudes.   
Passive whites or Muslims are often labeled as polluters or traitors because they care 
more about self-preservation than Allah‘s divine law or racial natural law. Enemies of 
racial law and Allah‘s divine law are engaged in a campaign to pollute and eventually 
overthrow the natural or divine ideal.  The following excerpts outline how Lane 
illustrates the violation of racial law and Azzam requires individual obligation to the 
divine law of jihad. 
 It is not constructive to hate those of other races, or even those of mixed races. 
But a separation must be maintained for the survival of one‘s own race. One must, 
however, hate with a pure and perfect hatred those of one‘s own race who commit treason 
against one‘s own kind and against the nations of one‘s own kind. One must hate with 
perfect hatred all those People or practices which destroy one‘s People, one‘s culture, or 
the racial exclusiveness of one‘s territorial imperative. (Lane, 1999: 4) 
 But if they sit back, or are incapable, lazy, or insufficient in number, the 
individual obligation (fard `ayn) spreads to those around them. Then if they also fall short 
or sit back, it goes to those around them; and so on and so on, until the individually 
obligatory (fard `ayn) nature of jihad encompasses the whole world. The individually 
obligatory nature of jihad remains in effect until the lands are purified from the pollution 
of the Disbelievers. (Azzam, 1987: 14) 
 The format in which diagnostic frames are used to neutralize blame targets 
differs. Violent jihadis differ in propaganda style and format.  Violent jihadis use poetry 
and verses from the Quran to validate diagnostic frames.  In contrast, the neo-Nazis in my 
sample do not use poetry as a medium of expression, but instead use fictional accounts to 
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disseminate their diagnostic frames.
51
  Fiction is used because it has broader appeal, 
makes propaganda more accessible and yet communicates the same diagnostic frames.  
Fiction is not used in violent jihadi propaganda, which makes this format unique to neo-
Nazi propaganda. Finally, when citing from a religious text, neo-Nazis either cite verses 
from the Bible in an attempt to demonstrate the fallibility of Christianity or to 
demonstrate that it is possible to be a neo-Nazi and a Christian.
52
  
 Frames associated with masculinity are also used as neutralization technique.  
Masculinity is central to both neo-Nazism and violent jihadism (Ferber, 2004; Kimmel & 
Ferber, 2006; Kimmel, 2007; Fangen, 2003; Knuttila, 2004). Masculinity is defined as 
one‘s gender identity and the need to engage in social and cultural behaviors whose 
meanings are more dominant, aggressive, competitive, and autonomous manner 
(Ashmore, Del Boca, & Wohlers, 1986; Burke, Stets & Pirog-Good, 1988; Spence, 
1985).  Both violent jihadis and neo-Nazis highlight that Muslim or white women are 
being violently victimized by their enemies and both target the immorality associated 
with homosexuality. Women should be protected and ―led‖ by strong males and since 
white and Muslim women are being victimized, the neo-Nazi/violent jihadi ―ideal‖ is 
being violated.  When female victimization and homosexuality are prevalent, neo-Nazi 
and violent jihadi propagandist describe this as a shameful litmus test that exposes the 
current immoralities and the weakness of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi men.  Weakness is 
used to describe neo-Nazi or violent jihadi masculinity because a high prevalence of 
female victimization or homosexuality indicates a shameful failure of neo-Nazi and 
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 Rockwell, Pierce and Chittum use fictional accounts to communicate diagnostic frames. 
52
 It is important to note that Christian Identity propaganda was not part of the sample (who also cite the 
Bible to support their beliefs). Although a Christian Identity propagandist was not part of my sample, 
findings from my sample of neo-Nazi propagandists were consistent with how Christian Identity members 
use the Bible to support maintaining beliefs of racial superiority and ―Christian‖ theology. 
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violent jihadi masculinity.  The following examples illustrate the ―rationale‖ of why neo-
Nazism and violent jihadism is needed to protect women and maintain morality. 
 In other words, rape has been reduced to the status of a punch in the nose. In cases 
where no physical injury can be proved, it is now virtually impossible to obtain a 
prosecution or even an arrest. The result of this judicial mischief has been that the 
incidence of rape has zoomed to the point that the legal statisticians have recently 
estimated that one out of every two American women can expect to be raped at least once 
in her lifetime. In many of our big cities, of course, the statistics are much worse. The 
women‘s-lib groups have greeted this development with dismay. It isn‘t exactly what 
they had in mind when they began agitating for "equality" two decades ago. At least, 
there‘s dismay among the rank and file of such groups; I have a suspicion that their 
leaders, most of whom are Jewesses, had this outcome in mind from the beginning. 
(Pierce, 1978: 57) 
 Is it any different here in America, today? The Jews in Germany, before World 
War II, were pushing homosexuality, loose morals, filthy "literature," crazy "dances" 
fresh from the African jungles, insane "art," Marxist "music," and self-indulgence for 
youth. (Rockwell, 1966; 280) 
 Homosexuality is a crime against Nature. All Nature declares the purpose of the 
instinct for sexual union is reproduction and thus, preservation of the species. The 
overpowering male sex drive must be channeled toward possession of females, as well as 
elements such as territory and power, which are necessary to keep them. (Lane, 1999: 5) 
 The family system and the relationship between the sexes determine the whole 
character of a society and whether it is backward or civilized, jahili or Islamic. Those 
societies which give ascendance to physical desires and animalistic morals cannot be 
considered civilized, no matter how much progress they may make in industry or science. 
This is the only measure which does not err in gauging true human progress. In all 
modern jahili societies, the meaning of ―morality‖ is limited to such an extent that all 
those aspects which distinguish man from animal are considered beyond its sphere. In 
these Societies, illegitimate sexual relationships, even homosexuality, are not considered 
immoral. (Qutb, 1967: 68) 
 Finally, differences between ―ineffective‖ propaganda suggests that what 
persuades target audiences may differ between neo-Nazism and violent jihadism.  The 
neo-Nazi control sample, Chittum, reflects a similar construction and diagnostic frames 
as their effective counterparts.  However, analysis illustrates that the control violent jihadi 
sample, Al Bari, differs in primary frames and the prevalence given to overall diagnostic 
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frame usage.  This is an interesting finding because the results indicate that something 
other the propaganda construction is persuading a target audience (i.e., degree of 
influence variables) for neo-Nazis, while a clear difference is noted in how Al Bari 
differs in diagnostic frames usage. Future research should be directed to expanding the 
sample size and also to analyze how neo-Nazis and violent jihadis interpret and 
internalize or dismiss propaganda.   
Conclusion and Discussion 
 Terrorism is the ultimate form of ―targeted violence‖ in that compared to most 
violence, terrorism is much more planned, calculated and goal oriented.  As such, 
intentional production and distribution of propaganda is critical where neutralizations for 
blame targets as receptors of violence are readily available.  So because terrorism equals 
political violence, it is unlike most violence in that terrorism requires substantial 
―ideological work‖ (Berger, 2004) including exposures and to some extent internalization 
of ideas promoting the necessity and justification of violence as a means to communicate. 
 More generic violent offenders such as rapists employ neutralizations derived 
from ―conventional wisdom‖ that circulates widely throughout society (e.g. ―when 
women say no they really mean yes‖)(Scully & Moralla, 1957), whereas terrorism 
requires individuals to engage in violence in the name of a radical political position that 
may have relatively little salience within mainstream society.  The challenge for the 
propagandist is to emphasize bridges between an extreme ideology and mainstream 
society in a way that guides individuals and groups towards a radicalized state. 
 Diagnostic frames function to organize experience by simplifying and condensing 
the social world to mobilize a target audience to action.   Terrorism as criminogenic 
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propaganda defines neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames as the active 
production of meaning for supporters, neutral observers and victims. Neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propagandists construct meaning to rationalize or ―frame‖ grievances to 
promote criminogenic behavior. Additionally, violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists 
inject emotions into diagnostic frames in order to leverage a target audience to organize 
experience in a certain way.  
In neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda, content is used to generate shame in 
their supporters to evoke a response. Similar to how Lewis (1971) described shame in 
clinical settings, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi shame describes the failures, social insults, 
loss of status or weakness of ―true‖ Islam or the white race.  When information is framed 
as shame, it functions as a powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into shifting 
attitudes that align with a violent subculture (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; Berbrier, 
1998).   Similar to other phenomenon, shame is not produced by a specific situation, but 
rather it is the individual‘s interpretation of the situation(s) that matters (Blumer, 1969).  
If shame is interpreted as unjust, then its potential to function as a ―trigger‖ increases 
because it makes a solution ―right.‖ Moreover, using shame in propaganda is effective 
because it transmits perceived injustices and grievances to local and global populations.   
 Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda (TCP) defines terrorism as a phenomenon 
of emotionally laden diagnostic and prognostic frames. Terrorism as a phenomenon of 
frames uses violence by word and deed as its symbolic medium to bring about active or 
passive alignment in a target audience. Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis create diagnostic 
frames to leverage, coerce, or inspire a revolution of ideas into action. TCP as a 
perspective emphasizes a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi‘s symbolic interpretation of 
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diagnostic frames and its ultimate goal to promote permanent drift into a violent jihadi or 
neo-Nazi subculture.   
 Diagnostic frames in terrorism propaganda function as information boundaries 
that neutralize inner objections to carrying out criminogenic behavior.  Terrorist 
propaganda is criminogenic in nature, which means it intends to produce, promote, or 
increase criminal behavior.  Criminogenic intent expressed through diagnostic frames is 
to generate an emotional climate that increases active or passive support and increasing 
the likelihood of violence. Diagnostic frames in criminogenic propaganda use strong 
emotional appeals to outline who is responsible for a terrorist group‘s grievances and 
target beliefs and assumptions that may be open to persuasion. Active or passive support 
can result in increased membership for the group, a surge in finances, or additional 
resources.  
 After the ―in-group‖ problems are outlined, solutions are then generated via 
prognostic frames that direct the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi to action. Prognostic frames 
promote drift into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture because these solutions are 
framed as rational responses to white or Islamic atrocities.  The next chapter addresses 
how violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists propose to solve their diagnostic frames 
through prognostic frames. 
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CHAPTER 5: Findings-Prognostic Frames   
Introduction  
 This chapter answers the following research question: What types of prognostic 
frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda? This research expands how 
linguistic techniques are used in promoting political violence. The first section of this 
chapter provides a conceptual review of prognostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi 
propaganda.  The next section identifies a typology and the types of neo-Nazi and violent 
jihadi prognostic frames. The chapter concludes by examining the similarities and 
differences between how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic frames 
as neutralization techniques.  
 Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists rationalize criminogenic ideas and 
solutions. Prognostic frames are used when violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists are 
trying to explain themselves and their actions as ―rational.‖  Neo-Nazis and violent 
jihadis use prognostic frames as a method to promote violent jihadism or neo-Nazism but 
and 1) provide greater control by offering a method to organize responses to their social 
world, 2) provide a method to resolve stressful and painful events to whites and Muslims, 
3) establish a degree of hope in racial or Islamic purification, and 4) create a method to 
organize relationships and experiences.  
 Figure 8 illustrates a prognostic typology developed in this research for both neo-
Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.
53
  A prognostic typology organizes the sixty violent 
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 Table 21 and 37(see appendix) shows the thirty-six neo-Nazi and twenty-four violent jihadi prognostic 
frames identified during analysis. 
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jihadi and neo-Nazi prognostic frames identified in this research into six central 
categories.  Each category is listed and defined in Figure 8. The purpose of each category, 
from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, is to validate and rationalize in-group 
―solutions‖ to threats and pollution from the out-group (non-whites and non-Muslims). 
The six categories defined in table 9 organize how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi solutions 
are constructed in response to out-group or in-group conflict.  This typology advances 
how scholars have applied frame analysis to examine social movements, by analyzing 
how terrorist groups frame their solutions to seize power through violent and radical 
solutions.  
Figure 8 A neo-Nazi/Violent Jihadi Prognostic Typology 
Category Category Defined 
Violent Solutions Any form of violence including assault, homicide, terrorism, and conventional 
warfare. 
Policy Solutions Implementation of policy to change conventional culture. 
Religious Solutions Non-violent religious idea or action. 
Moral Solutions Overcome immoral practices. 
Political Solutions Political action. 
Economic 
Solutions 
Economic behavior. 
 
Typologies and Types of Diagnostic Frames 
 A Typology of Neo-Nazi Prognostic Frames 
 
 A neo-Nazi prognostic typology specifies solution categories that serve as a form 
of subcultural social control to dissuade neo-Nazis from responding through conventional 
means.  Neo-Nazi prognostic frames function as a set of ―new‖ social boundaries that 
serve to internalize and justify neo-Nazi solutions.  Neo-Nazi propagandists aspire to 
mobilize followers, increase support and deflate counter frames, while also intending to 
humiliate, kill, deport and/or segregate non-whites.  
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 The neo-Nazi prognostic frames  illustrated in table 5  reflect different Aryan 
solutions intended to counter ―white problems.‖ Neo-Nazi solutions are divided between 
violent, political, policy, moral, economic and religious categories.  Neo-Nazis promote 
violent solutions such as ―white terrorism‖ and ―racial war‖ in addition to policy 
solutions, such as maintaining ―racial segregation‖ or religious solutions that promote 
―white based religions.‖  Table 5 identifies the prevalence of violent and non-violent neo-
Nazi solutions used in the sample to mobilize adherents.  
Table 5 Neo-Nazi Prognostic Typological Categories over Time 
 
Violent  
Solutions 
Policy  
Solutions 
Religious 
Solutions 
Moral  
Solutions 
Economic 
Solutions 
Political 
Solutions 
Propagandist       
Rockwell 
(1967) 
9% 14% 17% 41% 1% 18% 
Pierce 
(1978) 
58% 28% 2% 9% 2% 2% 
Klassen 
(1981) 
12% 28% 26% 31% 1% 2% 
Lane 
(1994) 
6% 12% 50% 28% 0% 3% 
Duke 
(2003) 
2% 37% 19% 41% 0% 1% 
Chittum 
(1997) 
26% 51% 4% 19% 0% 0% 
       
Summary 19% 24% 20% 28% 1% 4% 
 
The prognostic frames discovered in neo-Nazi propaganda reflect a shared world 
view over time.  The most prevalent neo-Nazi solutions are those that pertain to religious, 
policy, and morality issues.  Figure 13 illustrates the prevalence of each type of 
prognostic frame and the lack of frame consistency over time when prognostic frames are 
divided into typological categories.
54
 Frame consistency implies that the method of how 
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 Whereas the prevalence of each neo-Nazi prognostic frame (n=36) is outlined in Table 21 and 36.   Table 
21 illustrates which types of neo-Nazi prognostic frames are shared over time.  Table 22 illustrates the most 
112 
 
information, specifically Aryan solutions, is framed remains constant over time.  Lack of 
consistency can refer to disagreement over how propagandists should resolve racial 
pollution. 
How prognostic frames organize experience to promote solution validity can be 
divided in three central tasks. First, by arguing solutions that dominate or physically 
eliminate non-whites, prognostic frames respond to ―blame targets‖ who are responsible 
for threatening or humiliating the white race.  Second, each prognostic frame intends to 
align the reader‘s attitudes and emotions into either passive or active involvement. Third, 
prognostic frames assist in moving into a permanent state of drift in a neo-Nazi 
subculture. Drift occurs because prognostic frames substitute subcultural solutions over 
conventional cultural solutions in order to neutralize counter frames from ―inner voices‖ 
and conventional culture. 
 Neo-Nazi propagandists outline solutions that promote moving from conventional 
behavior and values into a permanent neo-Nazi subculture.  Neo-Nazi solutions are based 
on appeals to maintain a sense of loyalty to the white race.
55
 Prognostic frames direct 
neo-Nazis to solve the problems confronting the white race by creating a new reality 
through the use of violent and non-violent solutions.  The following excerpt illustrates a 
violent and non-violent solution. 
 Violent: Then, as the TV cameras were preparing to switch from the crowded 
scene outside the Capitol to the speaker's podium in the House chamber, where the 
President would be speaking, a mortar round-although no one realized that's what it was- 
exploded about 200 yards northwest of the building. TV watchers heard the explosion but 
couldn't see anything except an indistinct puff of gray smoke floating above the Capitol. 
Mortars are marvelous little weapons, especially for guerrilla warfare. They drop their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
prevalent types of prognostic frames in each neo-Nazis text, the total number of prognostic frames used in 
the text and how the use of certain prognostic frames compares between each text.  
55
 Table 22 (see appendix) illustrates which solutions are the most prevalent to each propagandist. 
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deadly rounds silently and almost vertically onto their target. They can be fired from total 
cover, and persons in the target area cannot tell from which direction the projectiles are 
coming. We saw beautiful blossoms of flame and steel sprouting everywhere, dancing 
across the asphalt, thundering in the midst of splintered masonry and burning vehicles, 
erupting now inside and now outside the Capitol, wreaking their bloody toll in the ranks 
of tyranny and treason. (Pierce, 1978: 61) 
 Non-Violent: Inter-species compassion is contrary to the Laws of Nature and is, 
therefore, suicidal. If a wolf were to intercede to save a lamb from a lion, he would be 
killed. Today, we see the White man taxed so heavily that he cannot afford children. The 
taxes raised are then used to support the breeding of tens of millions of non-whites, many 
of whom then demand the last White females for breeding partners. As you can see, man 
is subject to all the Laws of Nature. This has nothing to do with morality, hatred, good or 
evil. Nature does not recognize the concepts of good and evil in inter-species 
relationships. If the lion eats the lamb, it is good for the lion and evil for the lamb. If the 
lamb escapes and the lion starves, it is good for the lamb and evil for the lion. So, we see 
the same incident is labeled both good and evil. This cannot be, for there are no 
contradictions within Nature's Laws. (Lane, 1999: 10) 
 
 Neo-Nazi propagandists use prognostic frames as a process of reality 
construction. Reality construction can take different forms and one form consists of 
constructing a ―new‖ reality that legitimizes the need for violent solutions. In this study, 
three different neo-Nazi violent prognostic frames are used to ultimately reverse the 
―tide‖ of the growing threat by non-whites: white terrorism, racial war, and eliminating 
non-whites.  White terrorism is defined as a means of sensational violence carried out by 
coordinated white organizations or lone wolves determined to send a strong racial or 
political message to the federal government, non-whites, and whites. The prognostic 
frame ―race war‖ suggests using conventional and insurgent campaigns divided along 
racial lines where combatants use the tools of conventional warfare: (e.g., medium/heavy 
weapons, uniforms and military organizational structure).  Finally, the prognostic frame 
―eliminate non-whites‖ refers to any form of violence to kill non-whites or race traitors in 
isolated events outside white terrorism or racial war.  
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 Neo-Nazi propagandists illustrate various forms of violence where conventional 
military arms, organizational structure, and tactics are used to counter a Jewish controlled 
federal government dominated by non-whites and race traitors.  Propagandists suggest 
that when at all possible, whites should eliminate non-whites using various methods, 
either as lone wolves or part of an organization.  Generating a new reality, from a neo-
Nazi‘s perspective, involves using violent solutions in text to catalyze violent behavior in 
the United States.  Excerpts from Pierce, Rockwell, and Klassen illustrate violent neo-
Nazi responses. 
White terrorism: An hour earlier, in New York, the Organization used a bazooka to shoot 
down an airliner which had just taken off for Tel Aviv with a load of vacationing 
dignitaries, mostly Jews. There were no survivors (Pierce, 1978: 62). 
 
Racial war: The end will be world racial warfare, in which the swarming colored races 
will be pitted against the minority of Whites for survival. Either the colored swarms, led 
and inflamed by the Jews, will overwhelm the White minority and inherit a ruined world, 
or we will smash them. It's "them or us" (Rockwell, 1967: 277). 
 
Eliminate non-whites: Should the Jews use assassination against our members, or our 
leaders, then the White Race must meet fire with fire, and retribution and vengeance will 
be our answer. For every one of ours they kill we will exact ten times their number, 
starting with the rabbis. When law and persuasion no longer protect our rights to survival 
then we must— as all free, courageous, intelligent people have done through the ages— 
turn on our tormentors with a furious vengeance and destroy them down to the last man 
(Klassen, 1981: 350). 
 
 All neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and behavior into forms 
that are criminogenic in nature.  Whether the outcome is explicit violence outlined by 
violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races into blame targets, the goal is to 
foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into neo-Nazism over conventional culture.  
In The White Man’s Bible, Klassen argues that all whites should be armed and ready for a 
racial war.  He also promotes that hating other races is necessary in order for whites to 
survive.  Klassen argues that whites who are indifferent are ―flawed‖ because their 
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indifference demonstrates internalized Jewish influence by ―turning the other cheek‖ to 
keep whites subdued and passive.  Ultimately, Klassen envisions a full scale racial war, 
preceded by white terrorism and incidents of whites killing non-whites.  However, unlike 
Pierce, Klassen suggests that a full white revolution will occur only if it is preceded by a 
white based religion.   
 Klassen promotes his version of a white based religion, Creativity, which will 
enable whites to engage in racial warfare and racial breeding integrity. If the Creativity 
movement increases substantially, whites will eventually become loyal to their race, 
resulting in a geographic area governed by white racial nationalism. Klassen‘s solutions, 
including creating a white based religion, are all intended to rationalize criminogenic 
ideas and behavior. The following excerpts illustrate Klassen‘s message of inciting racial 
war and the need for a white based religion. 
 The Jews are inassimilable and implacable. The warfare between this biological 
parasite and the White Race is as irreconcilable as that between the pioneer mother and 
the  rattlesnake, as mentioned in an earlier chapter. The only solution to the conflict is the 
complete triumph of one side or the other. (Klassen, 1981: 200) 
 This racial consciousness then must be highly organized and converted into a 
racial religion, as we have set forth in this book. (Klassen, 1981; 207) 
 
 Only by rallying the total power of the White Race and organizing it under a 
powerful  racial religion such as CREATIVITY can we ever hope to break the back of the 
Jewish  Marxist-Communist-Zionist tyranny. (Klassen, 1981: 221) 
 
 Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is a concept that illustrates how neo-Nazis 
use linguistic tools to rationalize violent or radical behavior.
56
 For example, Rockwell 
attributes that he and other white males are entitled to lead non-whites because of racial 
natural law.  Racial natural law justifies white supremacy and therefore whites should be 
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 Mills (1940),  Orbuch, (1997), Scott & Lyman (1968), and Scully & Marolla, (1984) define other 
mechanisms to rationalize behavior. 
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actively engaged in solutions that prevent the weakening and extinction of the white race.  
Rockwell suggests that whites should seek positions of power, unify, obtain weapons, 
and begin a white revolution that will ultimately end in a form of racial war.  In order to 
gather momentum to protect a decaying moral fabric, the dissemination of white 
propaganda is necessary along with complete racial loyalty mandating that whites 
reproduce only with other whites, and whites should unite according to race.  When neo-
Nazis are unified, active and loyal to their race, then whites will be prepared for the 
approaching racial war and the establishment of white territory.  Rockwell rationalizes 
these solutions into a prognostic vocabulary to promote the evolution of criminogenic 
ideas to behavior.  The following excerpts illustrate how Rockwell promotes radical 
solutions as rational responses. 
 America will soon be ready for a leader who has gone through hell to preach pure 
racism, to fight for our White people, as a race, without any pretty excuses or cover-ups. 
(Rockwell, 1967: 260) 
 
The second most important law is the law of TERRITORY. (Rockwell, 1967: 288) 
 
 People are more inert than it is possible to believe, even after you discover this 
fact. It takes an incredible amount of propaganda, repeated over and over and over and 
over to move them even a little bit. (Rockwell: 1967: 246) 
 
 Identifying neo-Nazi prognostic frames specifies how vocabularies are 
constructed to neutralize ―inner objections‖ to violent or radical solutions in politically 
violent groups.   Using emotive vocabularies to create the perception that neo-Nazi 
solutions are ―altruistic‖ enables culpability to be transferred away from an individual 
actor to achieving a greater good for the white race.  Therefore, ―altruistic‖ prognostic 
solutions function as a precondition to violent behavior by neutralizing objections to 
radical solutions. Duke and Lane illustrate how emotive vocabularies are used to 
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transform culpability away from individuals into ―altruistic acts‖ for the greater good of 
all whites. 
 Only when Jewish Supremacism abates will Anti-Semitism disappear. Europeans, 
Asians and Africans will not accept the deceit or the supremacy proclaimed by Jacob. We 
will not wear the yoke of subservience. Our dominion shall be won. We have earned the 
blessings of God and Nature by our genius, our hard work, our creativity and our faith. 
We will not shrink from the fight for our freedom, and we reject the label of Anti-
Semitism from those who are themselves the embodiment of ethnocentrism, intolerance, 
and anti-Gentilism. (Duke, 2003: 198) 
 The folk, namely the members of the Race, are the Nation. Racial loyalties must 
always supersede geographical and national boundaries. If this is taught and understood, 
it will end fratricidal wars. Wars must not be fought for the benefit of another race. 
(Lane, 1999: 5) 
 
 Neo-Nazi propagandists attempt to provide social boundaries by outlining 
solutions in an active process.  Pierce suggests that whites can gain power by creating 
effective propaganda to promote racial loyalty and follow racial natural law.  Pierce also 
asserts that whites need to recruit other whites to their cause, arm themselves, and 
organize into groups.   
 One of our specialized units in New York has been acquiring military materiel of 
all sorts and stockpiling it. When we stepped out of the elevator, I gasped in surprise. In a 
huge, low-ceilinged room, more than a hundred feet on a side, there were immense heaps 
of every sort of military weaponry imaginable: automatic rifles, machine guns, flame 
throwers, mortars, and literally thousands of cases of ammunition, grenades, explosives, 
detonators, boosters, and spare parts. (Pierce, 1978: 64) 
 Pierce also frames that race mixing is linked to ―white racial suicide‖ and whites 
that are ―guilty‖ of this ―crime‖ are equal to non-whites and should also be eliminated.  
Without violent solutions to counter the growing non-white threat, whites will not be able 
to reproduce with other ―pure‖ whites resulting in racial pollution and the destruction of 
the white race.  The following excerpt illustrates a solution to deal with race traitors. 
 The first thing I saw in the moonlight was the placard with its legend in large, 
block letters: "I defiled my race." Above the placard leered the horribly bloated, purplish 
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face of a young woman, her eyes wide open and bulging, her mouth agape. Finally I 
could make out the thin, vertical line of rope disappearing into the branches above. 
Apparently the rope had slipped a bit or the branch to which it was tied had sagged, until 
the woman's feet were resting on the pavement, giving the uncanny appearance of a 
corpse standing upright of its own volition. (Pierce, 1978: 161) 
 
 Klassen frames that racial natural law should be followed and that whites are in 
need of ―true‖ education.  Klassen perceived that white education should include the 
history of why whites are superior, how to live a healthy life style and how to continue to 
strive towards physical and intellectual advancement.  The White Man’s Bible emphasizes 
selective racial breeding integrity to advance white achievement in addition to promoting 
effective health and medical solutions. Klassen emphasizes the need for white 
organizations to confront the existing non-white threat through a large scale deportation 
of non-whites.  Klassen argues that large scale deportations will occur only after whites 
perceive that their race is sacred, worthy of the highest degree of loyalty and are led by 
strong white leaders.  Klassen states the following: 
 Detoxification of the White Man‘s Mind. It is one of the purposes of this book to 
first of all decontaminate the White Man of all the garbage, rubbish and poison that has 
accumulated in  his mind due to the sick religion and sick education with which his mind 
has been indoctrinated  over the many millenniums. It is then our purpose to replace those 
ideas with healthy,  constructive and creative thinking, ideas that are based on the 
ultimate of all truths: the eternal  and unchanging Laws of Nature. (Klassen, 1981: 12) 
  
 The White Race is Nature‘s Elite, the highest living creature it has produced in all  
the eons of time. We CREATORS, being members of this Elite, are supremely interested 
in the welfare and the future for the White Race. (Klassen, 1981: 6) 
 
 We then must expel these parasites from our shores. It is our program to ship the 
niggers back to Africa, and the Mexicans and other mud races back to wherever they 
came from. (Klassen, 1981:93) 
 
 Loyalty or Treason— No Middle Ground. We, of the CHURCH OF THE 
CREATOR, intend to put every White Racial Comrade in a position where he or she will 
be forced to take a stand—either for the White Race, or against it— either demonstrate 
loyalty to the White Race by  word, deed and action, or be branded a traitor to it. In our 
future, there will be no Mr. Inbetweens. (Klassen, 1981: 114).\ 
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How Pierce and Klassen frame ―white problems‖ and ―white victimization‖ is part of an 
active neo-Nazi process that enables individuals and groups to recognize, understand and 
accept subgroup social boundaries according to a neo-Nazi lens. 
 Duke focuses primarily on doctrine and ideological solutions over tactical, 
organizational or violent solutions. The following excerpt illustrates that Duke is trying to 
promote ―love of the white race‖ over ―killing Jews‖ and that it is his ―right‖ to defend 
against the aggression associated with Jewish Supremacism. 
 I am not an anti-Semite. I simply strive for the life and freedom of my people and 
all peoples and nations around the world. While having respect for those Jews who act 
honorably, I must oppose the Jewish Supremacism that plagues so many nations. It is as 
simple as this: Because I love my own people I have no choice but to oppose those who 
would harm us or threaten our survival. Such is as natural and life-giving as the breath we 
take each moment. As long as I live I will breathe. As long as I live I will defend the life 
and the freedom of my people. (Duke, 2003: 198) 
 Neo-Nazi primary frames become believable when they resonate with the myths, 
assumptions, ideology, and worldview of conventional culture.
57
 Lane attempts to 
broaden the appeal of his message by using Nordic mythology, aspects of natural 
selection and illustrations from the natural world to resonate with whites. Lane‘s 
prognostic frames center on the supremacy of the white race manifested through racial 
natural laws.  Lane outlines that it is imperative that whites reproduce only with other 
whites and this will occur if whites are able to discern that racial reproductive regulations 
do in fact follow racial natural law.  When racial natural law is fully understood, whites 
will logically unify, arm themselves and engage in a racial war.  One of the ways of 
ensuring that whites follow racial natural law is to have strong white leadership and 
effective white propaganda that leads to racial loyalty and racial nationalism.   
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 Zuo and Benford (1995) assert that when prognostic frames are more believable, the frames are more 
likely to resonate with a target audience, and therefore increase the possibility of mobilization. 
120 
 
 Pick your strongman wisely! He must be a guardian in his heart. He must be one 
who has shown that his only purpose in life is the preservation of the folk. His ultimate 
aim must be to restore the rule of Law based on the perfect Laws of Nature (Lane, 1999: 
6) 
 
 The White Peoples of the earth must collectively understand that they are equally 
subject to the iron-hard Laws of Nature with every other creature of the Universe, or they 
will not secure peace, safety, nor even their existence (Lane, 1999: 1). 
 A neo-Nazi primary prognostic frame functions as the leading organizational 
principle to identify and validate how a neo-Nazi should interpret the greatest threats to 
the white race. Frame prevalence, determined by overall prevalence of use, is a way of 
interpreting the leading primary prognostic frame for each neo-Nazi propagandist.
58
  
Table 10 illustrates that Rockwell and Duke‘s primary prognostic solution is strong neo-
Nazi leadership.  
Table 6 Primary neo-Nazi Prognostic Frames by Propagandists 
Rank Rockwell 
(1967) 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Lane 
(1994) 
Duke 
(2003) 
Chittum 
(1997) 
       
1 
White Leadership 
White 
Terrorism 
White  based 
religion 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
White 
Leadership 
Carry out Racial 
War 
2 Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
Carry out 
Racial War 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
White Discernment White Praxis 
Establish White 
Territory 
3 
White Praxis 
Eliminate non-
whites 
White 
advancement 
White reproduce 
with Whites 
Promote 
Revisionism 
Follow 
Constitution 
 
 Pierce‘s primary prognostic frames are intended to catalyze whites into using 
violence as the central means to combat the growing threat to the white race.  Klassen‘s 
most prevalent prognostic frame is ―the need to establish a white based religion.‖  
Klassen perceived being enlightened to the fact that ―one‘s race should be one‘s religion‖ 
and that modern Christianity existed to counter that fact.  Abiding by racial natural law is 
Lane‘s primary prognostic frame, and he argues that if racial natural law is enforced by 
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 Table 22 illustrates a comprehensive list of each frame by text, while Table 10 outlines the three primary 
prognostic frames. 
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whites and non-whites, then all other prognostic solutions are more likely to be 
implemented. 
 Finally, the control sample illustrates that ineffective neo-Nazi propaganda differs 
in both in the prevalence of certain types of solutions and primary frames.  Chittum 
places a greater emphasis on policy solutions more than any other neo-Nazi propagandist 
and focuses primarily on establishing white territory and following the Constitution. 
These findings suggest that Chittum is attempting to place a greater emphasis on 
solutions that other neo-Nazi propagandists have deemed less important.  Chittum 
attempts to replicate Pierce‘s use of fiction and focusing on the need for a racial war, but 
results illustrate that Chittum‘s emphasis on violent solutions is significantly less than 
Pierce and places a far greater emphasis on policy and moral solutions. This finding 
suggests that Chittum‘s emphasis of certain prognostic frames deemed less important by 
other neo-Nazis may be a factor explaining why his propaganda has not had a similar 
impact on neo-Nazism as the other ―effective‖ propagandists.  
A Typology of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames  
 A violent jihadi prognostic typology, table 7, organizes the twenty-four violent 
jihadis solutions discovered in this research into six categories.  Each ―solution‖ defines 
the boundaries of a subculture of violence because prognostic frames substitute violent 
jihadi solutions over conventional Islamic solutions. Each prognostic frame serves as a 
form of subcultural social control to internalize that violent jihadi solutions are ―pure‖ 
Islamic behavior.  Violent jihadi solutions are ―legitimate‖ because prognostic frames are 
constructed to internalize the ―altruistic‖ nature of violent jihadism to cleanse ―true‖ 
Islam from secular pollution. 
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Table 7 Violent Jihadi Prognostic Typological Categories over Time 
 
Violent 
Solutions 
Policy 
Solutions 
Religious 
Solutions 
Moral 
Solutions 
Political 
Solutions 
Economic 
Solutions 
Propagandist       
Qutb 
(1966) 
12% 0% 61% 19% 7% 0% 
Azzam 
(1984) 
34% 8% 45% 10% 3% 1% 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
24% 3% 58% 11% 3% 2% 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
51% 14% 16% 15% 4% 1% 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
6% 2% 73% 16% 2% 0% 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
8%  1% 86% 2% 3% 0% 
       
Summary 23% 5% 57% 12% 4% 1% 
 
 Religious, moral, and violent solutions are the most prevalent violent jihadi 
solutions used to respond to threats to ―true‖ Islam.  Table 7 illustrates the prevalence of 
each type of prognostic frame when divided into typological categories.
59
  In contrast to 
neo-Nazi prognostic frames, violent jihadi typological categories are consistent over time.  
Frame consistency implies that the method of how information, specifically solutions, is 
framed remains constant over time.
60
  
 The prognostic frames discovered in violent jihadi propaganda reflect different 
solutions to countering the ―problems‖ facing ―true‖ Muslims.  Findings from the study 
illustrate that violent jihadi propagandists argue that when large numbers of Muslims hate 
other religions more than their own life, they will be willing to engage in martyrdom 
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 Whereas the prevalence of individual violent jihadi prognostic frame (n=24) is outlined in Table 23.    
60
 Table 23 displays the total types of prognostic frames or blame targets derived from the sample of violent 
jihadi propaganda from 1967 to 2009. Table 24 illustrates the total number of prognostic frames, which 
frames are shared, and compares which frames are included in each propaganda sample over time.    
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ushering in an Islamic revolution.  An Islamic revolution, according to violent jihadis, 
offers redemption to all of humanity because all non-Muslims have the option of 
converting.  The ultimate solution, from a violent jihadi perspective, is not violent jihad, 
but rather a true Islamic revolution.  An Islamic revolution will usher in ―pure‖ Islamic 
forms of government, materialized in the form of a caliphate.  ―True‖ Islamic instruction 
is a necessary component to a violent jihadi revolution.  The revolution will produce a 
new found desire for the Quran that will overcome the pervasive ignorance that now 
dominates the Muslim world.  The culmination of the Islamic revolution will be reflected 
in a worldwide Islamic government, which institutionalizes the pursuit of Allah, the 
lifestyle of the Prophet, and a state of power that silences all Muslim victimization and 
humiliation. 
 I am a Muslim who lives only for his religion and is prepared to die for it. I can 
never remain silent while Islam is being fought on all fronts. (Zawahiri, 2001: 62) 
 
 I am not afraid of prison or execution. I am not happy if I am pardoned or 
acquitted. I am not sad if I am sentenced to death--it will be martyrdom for the sake of 
God. Then I will say: I have won, O God of the Kaaba. I am a Muslim who lives and 
dies for his religion. I cannot remain silent while Islam is being attacked 
everywhere. (Zawahiri, 2001: 74) 
 
 We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, 
jahili traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices 
of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili 
characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change 
ourselves so that we may later change the society. (Qutb, 1966: 11) 
 The purpose of each prognostic frame is to neutralize any ―inner objections‖ that 
conflict with violent jihadi radical or violent solutions.   Prognostic frames emphasize the 
culpability of a blame target in order align the reader‘s attitudes and emotions to the 
―rationality‖ of violent jihadi solution. Blame targets are used when violent jihadi 
propagandists are trying to explain their solutions as a rational outcome.  Both Azzam 
124 
 
and Bin Laden are engaged in a process of constructing violent and radical solutions as 
rational responses. Azzam was involved in waging violent jihad against the Soviets 
alongside the Afghan mujahedeen. Azzam associates waging violent jihad with pursuing 
Allah and following the Prophet Mohammad‘s example after members of his community 
were threatened by non-believers.  Because of the dire Soviet threat in Afghanistan, 
Muslims that merely offer verbal support need to put their words and theology into 
action.  It was also during this time that Azzam was involved in a campaign across the 
Middle East, Europe and in the United States to solicit recruits and monetary support for 
the Afghan mujahedin. 
61
 Azzam frames violent jihad as a rational response to the Soviet 
invasion in the following excerpt. 
 In any case, there are two duties, which we are trying to establish: the duty of 
jihad and the duty of arousing the believers. If, in this way, we achieve success, it is from 
Allah, and should we miss it, it is because of Satan and ourselves. It suffices us that we 
have striven sincerely and called attention, with insight, to the terror of the situation. And 
we hope that Allah will provide us with sincerity and steadfastness and that He will 
accept our deeds from us, and bring us our end in martyrdom. (Azzam, 1987: 6) 
 Similar to Azzam, Bin Laden also asserts that the solution to the evils confronting 
Muslims across the globe should not be met by passive restraint, but rather by violent 
jihad.  Violent jihad is a righteous action that follows the example set forth by the 
Prophet Mohammad.  All ―true‖ Muslims cannot remain passive when Palestinian land is 
occupied by Israelis and non-Muslim soldiers are permitted on Muslim lands.  
 No other duty after Belief is more important than the duty of jihad. Utmost effort 
should be made to prepare and instigate the Ummah against the enemy, the American-
Israeli alliance- occupying the country of the two Holy Places and the route of the 
Apostle (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) to the Furthest Mosque (Al-
Aqsa Mosque). (Bin Laden, 1996: 8) 
 
                                                          
61
 Azzam was also suspected to have connections with the CIA.  
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 If solutions are perceived as altruistic, then permanent drift is more likely to occur 
because violent jihadi solutions are perceived as rational substitutions to conventional 
solutions.  Qutb asserts that violent jihad is a method to purify Islam from corrupt or 
ignorant Muslims.  He argues that morally corrupt or secular Muslims are not really 
Muslims, but are pagans masquerading as Muslims.  Therefore, it is permissible to target 
other Muslims actively engaged in polluting Islam.   
 This doctrinal contribution is significant because Qutb makes it theologically 
permissible to target Nasser‘s corrupt Egyptian government and other Muslim 
governmental officials.  Qutb made violence an altruistic act against corrupt Muslims 
because jihad would rid the world of Islamic polluters and therefore assists in purifying 
Islam and redeeming humanity.  In Milestones, Qutb prognostically frames that if 
violence is used to stop the pollution of Islam, then another Golden Age of Islam will be 
ushered in.  Because Qutb grounds each prognostic frame in religious doctrine, he 
suggests that martyrdom is a noble endeavor due to the lofty goals of purifying Islam and 
redeeming humanity. The following excerpt shows how Qutb promotes drift into violent 
jihadism as an altruistic endeavor. 
 But the movement which is a natural outgrowth of the Islamic belief and which is 
the essence of the Islamic society does not let any individual hide himself. Every 
individual of this society must move! There should be a movement in his belief, a 
movement in his blood, a movement in his community, and in the structure of this 
organic society, and as the Jahiliyyah is all around him, and its residual influences in his 
mind and in the minds of those around him, the struggle goes on and the Jihad continues 
until the Day of Resurrection. (Qutb, 1966: 71) 
 All violent jihadi propagandists manipulate ideas and behavior into forms that are 
criminogenic in nature.  Prognostic frames in propaganda are intended to mobilize 
supporters by using current and historical political, social, economic and cultural 
variables. Maqdisi manipulates theological doctrine to mobilize supporters to solve 
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problems from a violent jihadi perspective.  Maqdisi argues that Islam is the solution to 
the ―ills of humanity‖ and it is the duty of all Muslims to bring Islamic salvation to the 
entire world.  Since Islam offers redemption to all, any ―true‖ Muslim cannot stand by 
and observe Muslims being victimized without intervening on their behalf.  Maqdisi 
outlines that it is the righteous duty of any ―true‖ Muslim to bring salvation to humanity 
through the use of violent jihad to remove all enemies of the faith.  Whether the outcome 
is explicit violence, outlined by violent prognostic frames, or ideas that turn others into 
blame targets, the goal is to foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into violent 
jihadi solutions.   
 And Jihad is continuous with every group of the Muslims and the person can 
wage Jihad by himself or with the leaders be they pious or corrupt until the Day of 
Judgment. It is not allowed to obey them in disobedience to Allah, however, it is 
permissible to fight those who disbelieve in Allah with those who disobey Allah for a 
need, from the angle of repelling the greater of the two evils with the lesser of the two. 
However, the Jihad that is under the banner of the virtuous Sunnah is more beloved with 
us and foremost and more obligatory. Jihad is an obligation from the obligations. It is not 
stopped due to the absence of the Imam or the Islamic state. (Maqdisi, 2009: 32) 
 Rationalizing violent or radical solutions can create attitude alignment where 
violence is more likely to occur.  After a violent jihadi believes that the cause of Muslim 
victimization and Islamic pollution can be attributed to Americans or Israelis, then killing 
Americans or Israelis is likely to become a ―reasonable‖ solution. In this sense, killing 
Americans or Israelis is done on behalf of humanity-- a greater good that transcends 
individual motives.  Identifying the need for violence neutralizes inner voices and 
functions as a precondition to carry out violence as a righteous duty.  Bin Laden attempts 
to rationalize violent solutions by outlining how the non-Muslims are polluting Islam. 
 Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon 
your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy --your enemy and 
their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you 
can, with one own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of 
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the sanctities of Islam Exalted be to Allah said in His book: { and if they ask your 
support, because they are oppressed in their faith, then support them!} (Anfaal; 8:72). 
(Bin Laden, 1996: 20-21) 
 
 Since ―true‖ Muslims are being victimized and attacked across the globe, violent 
jihad becomes a ―rational‖ righteous duty.  Zawahiri asserts that Muslims need to pursue 
true Islamic instruction to assist in purifying Islam.  Additionally, because violent jihad is 
framed as ―rational,‖ Zawahiri then introduces two prognostic frames to assist in carrying 
out violent jihad—―seeking weapons‖ and ―starting organizations.‖ Zawahiri states that 
in order to effectively engage in violent jihad, Muslims must seek to arm themselves and 
receive instruction on tactics and weapons. He also outlines the need for violent jihadis to 
organize and possess territory.   
 Confining the battle to the domestic enemy, will not be feasible in this stage of the 
battle. Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the 
territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot 
be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab 
region. Mobilizing and arming the nation will be up in the air, without any tangible 
results, until a fundamentalist state is established in the region. (Zawahiri, 2001: 86) 
 Jihadi organizations bolstered with additional recruits are needed in order to wage 
successful violent jihad.  Organizations attacking blame targets are necessary to establish 
jihadi territory so that Muslims can live under an Islamic form of government and 
maintain a lifestyle devoid of un-Islamic ideals. Whether the prognostic frame is 
―engaging in violent jihad‖ or ―obtaining weapons,‖ each violent jihadi propagandist 
needs to use excuses and justifications to validate the violence against certain blame 
targets. 
 Jihad was a way of life for the Pious Predecessors, and the Prophet (may Allah 
bless him and grant him peace) was a master of the Mujahideen and a model for 
fortunate, inexperienced people. When there was fierce fighting, they used to stand 
resolutely by the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) lest he 
be closest to the enemy. The total number of military excursions which he (may Allah 
bless him and grant him peace) accompanied was twenty-seven. He himself fought in 
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nine of these; namely Badr, Uhud, al- Muraysi`, The Trench, Qurayzah, Khaybar, The 
Triumph of Makkah, Hunayn and Ta'if. The virtuous Companions continued upon the 
path of the Noble Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), for the Glorious 
Qur'an had brought up this generation with an education of Jihad. They had been bathed 
in Jihad and cleansed of engrossment in worldly matters, just as a wound is bathed in 
water. (Azzam, 1987: 15-16) 
 Certain prognostic frames continue to be used despite the changes in the social 
world that have occurred over the past 50 years.  All violent jihadi propagandists assert 
that Muslims are in need of redemption because Muslims exist in a polluted state of self-
destruction.  All propagandists assert that Islam, as the redemptive solution, will occur 
when all of humanity believes in the oneness of God (Tawid), Sharia is prominent, and 
the Prophet Mohammad‘s example is followed. Qutb and Maqdisi promote strict 
adherence to Sharia and following the Prophet Mohammad‘s example in order to redeem 
all Muslims and humanity.  
   The Islamic civilization can take various forms in its material and organizational 
structure, but the principles and values on which it is based are eternal and unchangeable. 
These are: the worship of God alone, the foundation of human relationships on the belief 
in the Oneness of God, the supremacy of the humanity of man over material things, the 
development of human values and the control of animalistic desires, respect for the 
family, the assumption of being the representative of God on earth according to His 
guidance and instruction, and in all affairs of this vicegerency the rule of God's law (al-
Sharia) and the way of life prescribed by Him. (Qutb, 1966: 72) 
 
 So we single Him out in our acts of worship and in our intention and will- for 
there is nothing that is worshipped in truth except Him, the Glorified-so we testify just as 
Allah testified for Himself, as well as the Angels, and those endowed with knowledge-as 
He is always maintaining His creation with justice-[we testify that] there is none that has 
the right to be worshipped but Him, al-Azîz [the Almighty] al-Hakîm [the Most Wise]. 
[We say that] while affirming what this mighty word affirms of singling out the worship 
for Allah alone, as well as its necessary implications and rights. [And we say that] while 
also negating what it negates of the types of Shirk and partnerships and what follows 
behind that. (Maqdisi, 2009: 4) 
 
 Other prognostic frames are grounded in specific events that are unfolding in the 
propagandist‘s lifetime. To Azzam, part of establishing a true ummah is to puts one‘s 
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faith into practice, which meant engaging in violent jihad and possibly becoming a martyr 
against the Soviets, Israelis or corrupt secular Islamic Governments.  Azzam suggests that 
correct Islamic instruction by strong Muslim leaders to dedicated followers of Sharia will 
create a true ummah to repulse the Soviets in Afghanistan.   
 But the situation is more serious, and gravely momentous, and the Muslims in 
Afghanistan are in severe distress and definite, menacing peril. This blessed jihad was 
established by a handful of youths who were nurtured in Islam, and by a group of 
scholars who devoted themselves to Allah. But most of this first generation has fallen in 
martyrdom, and the second generation has advanced. This second generation has not been 
fortunate enough to receive the same share of upbringing and guidance, and have not 
come across a stretched-out hand showing an interest in teaching and training them. Such 
people are in dire need of somebody who can live amongst them to direct them toward 
Allah and teach them religious regulations. (Azzam, 1987: 12) 
 
Also similar to Azzam, Bin Laden prognostically frames that violent jihadis who engage 
in martyrdom operations are acting out ―true‖ Islam and bringing honor upon themselves 
in the afterlife and their families in the present. Bin Laden expanded martyrdom 
operations to Israelis, secular Muslims and non-Muslims, whereas Azzam referred to the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  
 These youths know that: if one is not to be killed one will die (any way) and the 
most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah. They are even more determined 
after the martyrdom of the four heroes who bombed the Americans in Riyadh. Those 
youths who raised high the head of the Ummah and humiliated the Americans-the 
occupier- by their operation in Riyadh. (Bin Laden, 1996: 19) 
 Zawahiri considers it a right to have a territory from which to abide by Sharia, 
pursue Allah and the Quran as prescribed by the Prophet.  In the following excerpt, 
Zawahiri argues that there is no territory in Egypt where violent jihadis can implement 
the ―true‖ version of Islam. 
 The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used to occupy 
me a lot, in view of the pursui ts  to  which  we were subjected by the security 
forces and because of Egypt's flat terrain which made government control easy, for the 
River Nile runs in its narrow valley between two deserts that have no vegetation or 
water. Such a terrain made guerrilla warfare in Egypt impossible and, as a result, forced 
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the inhabitants of this valley to submit to the central government and be exploited as 
workers and compelled them to be recruited in its army. (Zawahiri, 2001: 5) 
 The control sample illustrates that ineffective violent jihadi propaganda differs in 
the prevalence of certain types of solutions.  Al Bari places a greater emphasis on 
religious solutions, more than any other violent jihadi propagandist and focuses primarily 
on pursing divine leadership and following the Prophet Mohammad‘s example. These 
findings suggest that Al Bari is attempting to place a greater emphasis this solutions than 
other violent jihadi propagandist. Although Maqdisi and Bin Laden also emphasize 
religious solutions, they also suggest that violent and moral solutions are also important.  
This finding suggests that Al Bari‘s emphasis of a certain prognostic frame over all others 
may be a factor explaining why his propaganda has not had a similar impact on violent 
jihadism as the other ―effective‖ propagandists. 
 Each violent jihadi primary prognostic frame outlines the leading organizational 
principle for the text. Table 8 illustrates violent jihadi primary prognostic frames derived 
from the sample.  Violent jihadi primary frames function as leading organizational 
principles to identify and validate how all Muslims should interpret and respond to 
Islam‘s threats. Qutb states that the leading solutions are religious in nature. If Muslims 
would pursue what is written in the Quran, follow the example set by the Prophet 
Mohammad and abide by Sharia then Islam would be purified.  Azzam‘s primary 
prognostic frame asserts that Muslims across the globe should engage in violent jihad 
against the Soviet Union because of the violence perpetrated against Muslim men, 
women and children in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden‘s primary prognostic frame argues all 
Muslims should pursue Allah‘s divine leadership in all areas of life, especially when 
Muslims are being attacked by non-Muslims.  Zawahiri‘s primary prognostic frame is a 
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call to use violent jihad against apostate Muslims and non-Muslims.  Maqdisi suggests 
that the highest calling of all Muslims is to pursue divine guidance from Allah and follow 
the example set forth by the Prophet Mohammad.   
Table 8 Primary Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames by Propagandists 
Rank Qutb 
Milestones 
(1966) 
Azzam 
Defense 
(1984) 
Bin Laden 
Declaration of 
War 
(1996) 
Zawahiri 
Knights 
(2001) 
Maqdisi 
Aqeedah 
(2009) 
Al Bari 
Swords 
(1850) 
       
1 
Pursue the Quran 
Engage in Violent 
Jihad 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
2 Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Engage in Violent 
Jihad 
Muslim 
Praxis 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
3 Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Jihadi 
Territory 
Muslim Praxis 
Engage in Violent 
Jihad 
 
Similarities & Differences between neo-Nazi & Violent Jihadi Neutralization 
Techniques 
 Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is a tool to neutralize ―inner voices‖ that 
conflict with violent or radical solutions. Violent or radical solutions are framed as 
rational responses because they can be interpreted as altruistic, connected to ensuring the 
―greater good‖ for whites or Muslims.  Drastic solutions are ―necessary‖ because the 
threat of racial or religious pollution is epidemic, requiring violent and radical measures. 
Neutralizing conventional objections to radical and violent solutions desensitizes 
adherents to any justification questions and increases the likelihood that prognostic 
solutions will be put into action. A difference in format between ideologies is illustrated 
in the following passage where Pierce uses a fictional narrative, while Bin Laden uses 
poetry to assert the rationality associated with violent responses. 
 It's still three hours until first light, and all systems are "go." I'll use the time to 
write a few pages-my last diary entry. Then it's a one-way trip to the Pentagon for me. 
The warhead is strapped into the front seat of the old Stearman and rigged to detonate 
either on impact or when I flip a switch in the back seat. Hopefully, I'll be able to manage 
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a low-level air burst directly over the center of the Pentagon. Failing that, I'll at least try 
to fly as close as I can before I'm shot down. (Pierce, 1978: 202) 
 
Our women encourage Jihad saying: 
Prepare yourself like a struggler, the matter is bigger than words! 
Are you going to leave us else for the wolves of Kufr eating our wings?! 
The wolves of Kufr are mobilizing all evil persons from everywhere! 
Where are the freemen defending free women by the arms?! 
Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and shames will never be 
otherwise eradicated. (Bin Laden, 1996: 20) 
 
 Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames intend to provide a method to 
channel emotions generated by diagnostic frames into action. Figure 9 illustrates the 
differences and similarities between how violent jihadis use prognostic frames to 
neutralize blame targets over time.  Although differences exist between neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi frames and style/format, a common goal is shared—to mobilize violent and 
radical behavior.   
Figure 9 Similarities and Differences between neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Neutralization 
Techniques 
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 Findings reveal that violent jihadis differ from neo-Nazis in the types of 
prognostic frames used to neutralize violent or radical responses (see Figure 13 and 
Figure 14 in the appendix).   Violent jihadi propagandists desire to usher in the ―true‖ 
ummah or universal Muslim community.  This community is not bound by nationalistic 
boundaries or along racial lines, but on religious piety and devotion to Allah and the 
prophet.  The ummah is emphasized because violent jihadi propagandists argue that a 
―true‖ revolution will occur only after Muslims are united behind the use of violent 
measures. If violence is used to force converts into Islam, then corrupt or ignorant 
Muslims will be saved from the current polluted version of Islam and non-Muslims 
would not be able to wage war against Islam.  Therefore, violence becomes rational 
according to this logic, because humanity will be redeemed if Islam is purified. 
 The requirement of Islamic belief is that it takes shape in living souls, in an active 
organization, and in a viable community. It should take the form of a movement 
struggling against the jahili environment while also trying to remove the influences of 
jahili society in its followers, because they were people of Jahiliyyah before the faith 
entered their souls, and the influence of Jahiliyyah might have remained in their hearts 
and minds as well as in their lives. Islamic belief has a much wider range of action than 
simply academic discussions, as it not only addresses itself to hearts and minds but also 
includes practices and morals. (Qutb, 1966: 24) 
 
 Conversely, a white based religion offers no redemptive value for the rest of 
humanity.  Neo-Nazi prognostic frames differ from violent jihadis in that they do not 
perceive that the white race provides a form of ―redemption‖ for all humanity. Since race 
is determined at birth, there is no upward or downward mobility as in the case of non-
Muslims converting to Islam. Although neo-Nazi propagandists do integrate a religious 
component to their ideology, it is only to spiritualize the notion that racial segregation is a 
sacred duty. Since the white race is the apex of humanity, the white race needs to be 
preserved through various prognostic solutions designed to prevent racial extinction. 
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Neo-Nazis argue that the white race has advanced humanity in every aspect and this 
―fact‖ determines why violent or radical measures should be used against those 
determined to extinguish the white race.   
 The Nordics are thus supreme in those special qualities of character that build 
civilization; especially energy, idealism and objective, abstract thought. Our great White 
Race, led by the Nordics, is the most precious thing on this planet, for all those who love 
the best of civilization, idealism and justice, regardless of one's own position in the racial 
scale. Let the heritage of hundreds of thousands of years of the White Race be drowned 
in a flood of darker blood, and all the idealism, justice and culture will perish. (Rockwell, 
1967: 191) 
 
 Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists desire to neutralize any objections to 
using violence as a solution.  Neo-Nazis frame violent solutions as an effective measure 
to combat racial extinction, whereas jihadis frame violent solutions to purify Islam.  
 The Creative Way. To those bleeding hearts (led by the Jews) who scream, ―But 
you can‘t do that! That is un-Christian! That is genocide!‖ we calmly reply, ―Yes, you‘re 
damned right it is un-Christian. But then, fortunately, we are not Christians. We are 
CREATORS. We intend to follow our own program, and we will.‖ Not to do so would be 
genocide of the White Race. We are far more interested in our own survival than see the 
world overrun with worthless mud races. Actually there is no choice. It is either the 
White Race or the mud races that are going to inhabit the limited space on this planet. If 
you are White you had better make up your mind whether you are going to join the White 
Race in its fight for survival, or you are stupidly going to play the traitor, and allow the 
White Race to be exterminated. (Klassen, 1981: 114) 
 
 To a violent jihadi, violence is a religious tool to reverse an immoral and secular 
tide that will place the true God back into a correct position.  Therefore, violence is 
prognostically framed as ―altruistic‖ behavior taken on behalf of those who truly 
understand their faith, their God and the documented theology behind using violence.  
Violent jihadi propagandists advance violent solutions as a justified religious duty in 
order purify Islam and to usher in a community of ―true‖ Muslims.  In this community or 
ummah, all ―true‖ Muslims are governed by a caliphate, where all matters of the 
individual, social, economic and political world are governed by Sharia.  
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 The Ummah of Jihad, which is led by extraordinary people who emerged through 
the long Jihad movement, will not easily lose command, nor serve as easy prey for 
collapse. It is also not easy for its enemies to make it have suspicions about its heroes' 
excursions. The Jihad movement familiarizes the Ummah with all its individuals, 
informing them that they have contributed to the price paid, and have participated in the 
sacrifice for the establishment of the Islamic community. Thus they will be trustworthy 
custodians of this newborn community which has relieved the whole Ummah from the 
agony of its labor-pains. Without a doubt, the Islamic community will be born, but birth 
cannot be accomplished without labor, and with labor there must be pain. (Azzam, 1987: 
19) 
 Although neo-Nazi propagandists include violence as a means of racial 
preservation, they do not have a religious precedent similar to jihad, which has been 
validated by Islamic religious scholars who support violence as an obligation under 
certain conditions (Brachman, 2009; Calvert, 2007; Gerges, 2005).  The controversy that 
surrounds the concept of jihad is not whether it exists, but rather the correct 
interpretation. Neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to make violence a religious precedent 
for a white based religion.  If white skin becomes a religious identifier and violence 
become a spiritual obligation, then neo-Nazi propagandists have successfully replicated 
what already exists in Islam. 
 Neo-Nazis also attempt to neutralize objections to racial superiority, deportation 
and segregation. Unlike violent jihadis, neo-Nazis promote a reproductive solution to 
neutralize objections to racial superiority because whites must procreate with other 
whites to ensure that the ―sacredness‖ of the white race continues.  Furthermore, because 
of racial superiority, the threat of an increasing non-white population needs to be 
confronted, therefore all foreign (non-white) immigration needs to be stopped and the 
flow of illegal aliens needs to be curtailed.  Neo-Nazi propagandists also assert that racial 
superiority was maintained by ―conventional‖ solutions, segregation and deportation and 
that both practices should be reinstated in order to preserve the white race.  Finally, 
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because of the serious threat to all whites by the ―Jewish problem,‖ white superiority 
must be maintained through Holocaust revisionism, replacement theology,
62
and 
identifying the Jews as a race  
 Be fruitful and multiply. Do your part in helping to populate the world with your 
own kind. It is our sacred goal to populate the lands of this earth with White people 
exclusively. (Klassen, 1981: 355) 
 
 The instinct for sexual union is part of Nature's perfect mechanism for species 
preservation. It begins early in life and often continues until late in life. It must not be 
repressed; it's purpose, reproduction, must not be thwarted either. Understand that for 
thousands of years our females bore children at an early age. Now, in an attempt to 
conform to and compete in an alien culture, they deny their Nature-ordained instincts and 
duties. Teach responsibility, but, also, have understanding. The life of a race springs from 
the wombs of its women. He who would judge must first understand the difference 
between what is good and what is right. (Lane, 1999: 5) 
 
 An honest debate between the high priests of the Holocaust and Holocaust 
questioners would reveal that the latter are not crackpots or hate-mongers, but people 
with legitimate questions and arguments based on sound evidence. Such a debate would 
reveal that revisionists do not deny that Jews, like the Japanese in World War II America, 
were incarcerated in concentration camps. Revisionists acknowledge that the conditions 
in the European camps were horrendous near war‘s end, and they maintain that many 
thousands of Jews died in the camps, mostly from malnutrition and disease. (Duke, 2003: 
296) 
 
….we will physically remove the alien mud races from our midst. This includes niggers, 
Jews, Chinese, or whatever from all White countries, whether they be England, France, 
Sweden, Germany or the United States. They must be expelled just as the human body 
identifies and expels germs, bacteria, virus and foreign bodies from amongst its own 
cells. (Klassen, 1981: 140) 
 Violent jihadi propagandists in this sample also differ from their neo-Nazi 
counterparts in that they have personally engaged in fatal violence.  When only the texts 
are considered, both samples of propaganda promote the use of violence via text.  
However, when the actual deeds of the propagandists are examined, only one neo-Nazi, 
Lane, has personally engaged in fatal violence. Conversely, all of the violent jihadis, with 
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 Replacement theology is a view that substitutes Jews/Israel in the Bible with the modern church (Vlach, 
2004).  Instead of the modern church, Duke asserts that the white race has replaced the Jews/Israel.  
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the exception of Qutb,
63
 has personally participated in violence.  Although all of the 
propagandists possess a strong record of engagement and leadership in their movement, 
actual participation in violent behavior is skewed towards jihadis.  A higher prevalence of 
violent solutions in jihadi propaganda may suggest a certain ―credibility‖ to advocate 
violence because of their personal example.  
 Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in their use of prognostic 
frames.
64
 Findings reveal that neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in how they 
neutralize violent solutions. Propagandists construct prognostic frames in ways to 
neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor‘s actions. 
A technique to neutralize individual responsibility involves promoting violent jihad, even 
to the point of martyrdom, as the first step in truly abiding in Allah‘s favor under the 
current environment.  Thus, violent jihad and martyrdom are honorable actions because 
they will ultimately redeem humanity, purify Islam of its pollutants and create an ideal 
civilization led by strong Muslims. 
 These youths know that: if one is not to be killed one will die (any way) and the 
most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah. They are even more determined 
after the martyrdom of the four heroes who bombed the Americans in Riyadh. Those 
youths who raised high the head of the Ummah and humiliated the Americans-the 
occupier- by their operation in Riyadh. (Bin Laden, 1996: 19) 
 Hence, it is permissible for a person to fight them even if by himself and even if 
he is certain of martyrdom and not gaining victory. Jihad is an act of worship and an 
obligation that is legislated until the Day of Judgment. Nothing invalidates it. It is 
permissible to perform it in any time such as charity when compared to Zakah. (Maqdisi 
2009: 33) 
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 Although Qutb did not personally engage in violence, he was severely tortured and imprisoned for over a 
decade. 
64
 A similarity exists between the control samples, Al Bari and Chittum.  Both ―ineffective‖ propagandists 
place a higher emphasis on solutions over those used by ―effective‖ propagandists.  This finding suggests 
that certain solutions have broader appeal or that a particular solution should be accompanied by a greater 
emphasis on other solutions. 
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 Neo-Nazi propagandists justify violence as a legitimate means to confront racial 
oppression and humiliation against whites.  Racial violence is also prognostically framed 
as honorable behavior worthy of making the ultimate sacrifice as a neo-Nazi racial 
martyr, similar to a violent jihadi martyr.   
 Heroic Death. As we have stated in NATURE‘S ETERNAL RELIGION in the 
chapter on Horatius at the Bridge— ―How can a man, die better than facing fearful odds 
for the ashes of his fathers and the temple of his gods?‖ This is the glorious death, the 
heroic death, and we believe that there is none better. I believe it is much better fighting 
and dying for a noble cause in the face of your enemies (and taking some of them with 
you) than dying a pointless death, no purpose, no reason, aiding no cause. I believe one of 
the worst ways of dying is at the cruel hands of your enemies without even having a 
chance to fight back and inflict retribution. Even such, if it is a martyr‘s death that 
inspires vengeance and retribution on the enemy (such as the stand at the Alamo) it can 
be considered a hero‘s death and win the acclaim and adulation of our peers. (Klassen, 
1981: 317) 
 
 Violent jihadi and neo-Nazis prognostic frames also intend to neutralize passivity.  
Non-violent and violent solutions intend to counter white or Muslim passivity by 
promoting active engagement (praxis)
 65
 in confronting white or religious injustices.  One 
way of promoting active engagement for both ideologies is to cite the need for strong 
white or Islamic leadership that emulates historic charismatic leaders (Adolf Hitler and 
the Prophet Mohammad).  In addition to finding strong leaders to direct the movement, 
both sets of propagandists emphasize the need to gain additional recruits and provide all 
whites and Muslims with correct instruction to counter conventional education. Neo-
Nazis and violent jihadis include historical ―evidence‖ to support active engagement.  
Historical ―evidence‖ is used to validate solution rationality by attempting to outline a 
historical precedent.  
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 I define white praxis as whites actively living out their white/religious ideology and actively involved in 
countering racial/religious injustices. 
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 The war, first of all, between the Texans and the Mexicans, and ten years later 
between the United States and the Mexicans, was, first and foremost, a Racial War. It 
was a war of racial  
hatred between the inferior, mongrel Mexicans and the healthy expansion of the White 
Race. (Klassen, 1981: 180) 
 
 They would have answered the same as Rabati bin 'Amer, Huzaifa bin Muhsin 
and Mughira bin Shtuba answered the Persian general Rustum when he asked them one 
by one during three successive days preceding the battle of Qadisiyyah, "For what 
purpose have you come?" Their answer was the same: "God has sent us to bring anyone 
who wishes from servitude to men into the service of God alone, from the narrowness of 
this world into the vastness of this world and the Here- after, and from the tyranny of 
religions into the justice of Islam. God raised a Messenger for this purpose to teach His 
creatures His way. If anyone accepts this way of life, we turn back and give his country 
back to him, and we fight with those who rebel until we are martyred or become 
victorious." (Qutb, 1966: 46) 
 
 Finally, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists intend to neutralize any 
objections to geographic territory populated only by whites or Muslims.  Neo-Nazis want 
the United States partitioned according to racial boundaries, while violent jihadis desire 
Muslim lands to be devoid of countering ideologies and religious influences.  The desire 
for territory is offered as a solution in order that whites may ―defend‖ their race from 
extinction and where violent jihadis can implement a complete form of worship to God, 
devoid of un-Islamic influences, while honoring the example set forth by the Prophet.  
Possessing substantial jihadi or neo-Nazi territory reflects what both ideologies desire to 
see; mobilization on a grand scale driven by adherents that have neutralized any 
objections to violent or radical solutions.   
 This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected 
in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahedeen movements in Kashmir. The 
belt will be linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic to the 
Muslims of Central Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the Muslim 
Caucasus and allow it to communicate with the Islamic world in general. (Zawahiri, 2001: 
55) 
 
 That program must be: relentlessly pressing forward, expanding our territory at 
the expense of the mud races, crowding them into smaller and smaller territory just as we 
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did the Indians in  the westward expansion of America, and the Mexicans in moving 
South and West. We must  vigorously and aggressively proceed until over the next few 
generations the White Race will  have occupied all the hospitable and productive land on 
the face of this planet, every square mile  that we consider worthwhile inhabiting. 
(Klassen, 1981: 112) 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 This chapter examines prognostic frames from a sample of effective violent jihadi 
and neo-Nazi propagandists.  The analysis outlines a prognostic typology for both 
ideologies, illustrates how prognostic frames vary over time and discusses the differences 
and similarities between neutralization techniques.  The prognostic frames outlined by 
both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists are constructed in a way that offers 
individual neo-Nazi and violent jihadis methods to solve problems facing their 
race/religion.  Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames intend to provide the 
method to channel emotions to confront blame targets outlined by diagnostic frames. This 
chapter also analyzes the prevalence of prognostic frames in text for each violent jihadi 
and neo-Nazi propagandist.   
 Findings reveal that although differences do exist between the types of frames 
used by neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists, there are a number of similarities in 
how each ideology is framed.  This is an interesting finding, given differences in 
language, culture, history, geography and narratives associated with each ideology.  This 
finding suggests that how terrorist groups frame solutions is not unique among ideologies 
or propagandists.  Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists require members to be 
catalyzed out of a lethargic state into a large scale racial or Islamic revolution where an 
ideal civilization of emerge. Another considerable finding between both ideologies is the 
degree of honor given to martyrs who sacrifice fighting for a racial or religious cause. 
 After ―in-group‖ and ―out-group‖ problems are outlined by diagnostic frames, 
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solutions are generated via prognostic frames to provide meaning and direct neo-Nazis or 
violent jihadis to action. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic frames 
as a dynamic process of reality construction to solve problems and to organize meaning.  
Prognostic framing in terrorist propaganda functions in a similar manner to other social 
movements because the active production of solutions is needed in order to mobilize a 
target audience to action (Gamson et al, 1982; Snow et al 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988). 
Snow and Benford‘s (1988) definition of mobilization can be applied to neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propagandists because they also aspire to catalyze, recruit, and neutralize 
counter perspectives.  
 Prognostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda accomplish distinct 
objectives to mobilize. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi solutions are needed to offer a 
method to combat the grievances outlined by diagnostic frames.  Prognostic frames tend 
to be inflexible because neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists demand that their 
solutions are necessary and defensive in nature.  Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propagandists claim that their solutions are defensive because they are in response to 
whites or Muslims being violated, humiliated, or killed. As a result, neo-Nazi and violent 
jihadi prognostic frames direct members to drift permanently into a subculture that 
emphasizes violence and dominance, over dialogue or compromise.  Prognostic frames 
promote permanent drift because prognostic frames argue that violent and radical 
solutions are ―logical‖ and ―altruistic.‖ 
 Prognostic frames are constructed to seem ―altruistic‖ because they appear to be a 
rational response to the persistent threat against the white race and the Muslim 
community.  Violent and radical solutions are framed to be a necessary outcome to 
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protect white and Muslims from further injustices.  Prognostic frames are then 
constructed to neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from a 
neo-Nazi or violent jihadi lone wolf or group. Under conventional norms, violent and 
radical solutions would be considered ―wrong,‖ but because of the magnitude of the 
―injustices‖ against whites or Muslims, unconventional solutions are required to stop 
racial or religious pollution. Therefore, violent or radical prognostic solutions are 
interpreted as ―altruistic‖ because saving the white race from extinction or stopping the 
defilement of Islam is for the greater good of humanity.    
 Interpreting radical or violent solutions as altruistic is also effective for attitude 
formation. If radical or violent solutions are perceived as legitimate, then neo-Nazis or 
violent jihadis are more likely to rationalize that violent solutions are necessary for the 
greater good.  Sykes and Matza (1957) suggest that delinquency is perceived as a method 
to solve problems for those living in environments where the loss of close relationships, 
loss of status, discriminatory action, poverty, stigma, or abuse is common.  The need to 
rationalize solutions also applies to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists who need 
to shape attitudes by rationalizing why violence is required and neutralize any ―inner 
objections‖ to radical or violent solutions. 
 A significant contribution to understanding neutralization in terrorist groups is to 
understand the distinction between how objections are overcome in prognostic frames 
and diagnostic frames.  Where diagnostic frames neutralize ―blame target‖ culpability, 
prognostic frames neutralize objections to violent or radical solutions.  In order for a 
terrorist attack, segregating along racial lines, or promoting hatred to be perceived as 
―rational‖ or ―altruistic‖ behavior, conventional solutions need to be neutralized. If neo-
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Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic solutions are to supersede conventional cultural norms, 
―effective‖ prognostic solutions need to neutralize conventional inhibitions.  
Neutralization of conventional solutions is more likely to occur if humanity is believed to 
be polluted, because conventional cultural responses then become inadequate, therefore 
racial or violent methods are necessary to reorient humanity back to its correct path.     
 The purpose of using prognostic frames is to set the stage for action by supporters 
and potential supporters.  The next step is to examine the relationship between how 
diagnostic and prognostic frames interact in text.  The relationship between diagnostic 
and prognostic frames is analyzed in the next chapter at three different levels. The first is 
to analyze both diagnostic and prognostic simultaneously, until now, they have been 
examined independently.  The second is to examine specific prognostic frames that 
promote violence and their links to diagnostic frames in order to better understand their 
relationship. The third level is to identify where violent jihadi and neo-Nazi 
propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic frames in text. 
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CHAPTER 6: The Relationship Between Diagnostic & 
Prognostic Frames   
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I focus on the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic 
frames.  This chapter addresses research question three and its supporting research 
question.  What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent 
jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda? Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in 
neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda?  
 Previous chapters analyzed prognostic and diagnostic frames independently, 
whereas this chapter examines the relationship between both types of frames.   Prognostic 
and diagnostic typologies, in addition to network text analysis, are used to analyze how 
frames are related in text.  The term ―relationship‖ in this study is defined as the degree 
of contact that prognostic and diagnostic have in the text.  The relationship between 
diagnostic and prognostic frames is operationalized by frame prevalence, links between 
frames (closeness) and frame location.  
 Four types of figures illustrate the relationship between core framing tasks. The 
first figure, total frame prevalence, illustrates the combined prevalence of prognostic and 
diagnostic typologies.  The second and third figures are derived from network text 
analysis.  The second figure examines out-group and in-group diagnostic frames that are 
linked to violent prognostic frames (solutions that promote violent behavior). The third 
figure outlines the network measure of ―closeness‖ between diagnostic frames and 
violent prognostic frames.  The final figure illustrates frame location or where neo-Nazi 
and violent propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic frames in text.   
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Central Findings 
 A comparative research design enables propaganda to be analyzed and compared 
across two types of ideologies. A central finding is that neo-Nazi propaganda is 
dominantly diagnostic whereas violent jihadi propaganda is prognostically skewed. Neo-
Nazi propagandists emphasize ―white‖ problems and the threats posed by non-whites and 
race traitors.  Neo-Nazi propaganda emphasizes the need to neutralize ―inner voices‖ that 
question the culpability of blacks, Jews, race traitors or the federal government. All neo-
Nazi propaganda in this sample follows the same format of emphasizing diagnostic 
frames over prognostic solutions.  This finding is significant because it does not change 
over time, despite different external variables associated with current events, culture and 
politics.  
 When compared to their neo-Nazi counterparts, violent jihadi propaganda is 
prognostically skewed across the sample. A possible explanation can be found in the 
difference between racial and religious in and out-groups.  Neo-Nazis must convince the 
white population that their race is the apex of natural selection and headed towards racial 
extinction.  Although institutional racism is prevalent in the United States (Knowles & 
Prewitt, 1969; Hing, 2009), linking race to natural selection, racial wars and a white 
based religion does not share the same degree of institutional memory for the current 
generation of whites.  For that reason, neo-Nazis are attempting to transform a white 
population‘s view rather than trying to modify it (Feagin, Vera & Batur, 2001; Feagin, 
2010).  A neo-Nazi transformation method is to emphasize diagnostic frames that are 
intended to awaken whites to the ―racial threat‖ they face.  
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 Violent jihadis, however, only need to modify a worldview over transforming it.  
Unlike racial wars, violent jihad is a legitimate concept within Islam (Brachman, 2009; 
Calvert, 2007; Gerges, 2005).  Violent jihadis (the in-group) are not engaged in trying to 
promote ―violence as a solution‖ as a ―new‖ concept separate from Islamic theological 
grounding, whereas neo-Nazi propagandists are trying to promote violence as a legitimate 
solution based on racial theological grounds as a response to ―white racial 
extinction/pollution.‖  Neo-Nazis attempt to legitimize violence by arguing that 
―ignorant‖ whites are engaged in shameful ―racial treason‖ by being passive and letting 
their race become ―muddied‖ or ―extinct.‖  Whites that are involved in race mixing and 
are actively polluting the white race are deemed equal to non-whites and deserve violent 
retribution. In other words, neo-Nazis are trying to re-frame problems and solutions 
where violent jihadis are focused on re-framing the use of a violent solution. This point is 
illustrated when contrasting neo-Nazi racial wars with violent jihad.   
 Violent jihadis are attempting to re-frame how and when violence should be 
legitimized.  Violent jihadis reframe the argument by claiming that it is only ―true‖ 
Muslims that engage in violence.  Findings reveal that ―true‖ Muslims understand that 
violent jihad should be a sixth pillar of Islam and is a correct response to the threats, 
humiliation, or violence directed towards Muslims.  Therefore, it becomes logical to 
reframe an existing violent solution in their propaganda and apply it to current problems 
experienced by Muslims across the globe.  Unlike neo-Nazis, whose solidarity is based 
on skin color and who must convert whites to their problem/solution interpretations, 
violent jihadist must convert Muslims to a violent jihadi interpretation of a legitimate 
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theological solution---jihad.  This is quite different and offers a possible explanation of 
why violent jihadis are skewed prognostically, where neo-Nazis assert diagnostic frames.  
 Violent jihadis are unified by a theological belief where different races and 
nationalities form a community—the ummah.  Although this community is diverse, it is 
unnecessary to morph violence into a sacred notion because jihad already exists as a 
religious concept on a personal and collective level. The focal point for the violent jihadi 
propagandist is not to transform the dominant Muslim worldview by creating ―holy 
violence,‖ but to modify how violent jihad is perceived by all Muslims.  Neo-Nazi 
propagandists must equate violence as an individual and collective response to racial 
pollution in order to transform a ―white worldview.‖  Furthermore, neo-Nazi 
propagandists must morph racial war into racial holy war in order to connect violence to a 
religious precedent.  Neo-Nazi propagandists are endeavoring to create and promote a 
similar religious concept in which race is a divine characteristic and violence becomes a 
sacred endeavor to protect it. Disproportionately embedding diagnostic frames in text is a 
method to accomplish this morphing process.  
 Where propagandists embed frames in text provides a deeper understanding of a 
method used to transform or modify a white or Muslim worldview. A central finding is 
that frame location diverges between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.  Frame 
location is a distinct characteristic to examine how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi construct 
propaganda.  This finding makes frame location unique from previous comparisons in 
that there are no similarities between where neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandist 
locate frames.   
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 Understanding that diagnostic frames are far more prevalent and equally 
distributed across each neo-Nazi text highlights construction uniformity. Frame location 
reveals another method to examine the degree that neo-Nazi propagandists place on 
valuing problems over solutions.  When textual summaries are analyzed, the emphasis on 
diagnostic frames represents complete uniformity across all neo-Nazi texts.  Where neo-
Nazis emphasize diagnostic frames uniformly, violent jihadi propaganda is 
disproportionately prognostic across the sample. 
 Another difference between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is how 
violent prognostic frames are used as solutions for blame targets. Across the sample, neo-
Nazi prognostic frames that solicit violent behavior are less frequent when contrasted to 
violent responses by jihadi propagandists.  Pierce is the only neo-Nazi propagandist 
whose use of violence in the text reflects a similar prevalence level to violent jihadis.  
When compared to violent jihadi targets, the targets associated with neo-Nazi violence 
are more uniform over time. Neo-Nazi propagandists also assert violence against the 
same blame targets over time when compared to violent jihadi propagandists who 
disperse violence across various types of blame targets. 
 Neo-Nazi propagandists also differ from violent jihadi propagandists in that they 
use more types of frames and distribute them proportionately in their propaganda. Violent 
jihadis use fewer frames and distribute them more unevenly.  Fewer frames and an 
uneven distribution results in highlighting a ―central‖ or dominant theme, which is 
followed by a wider margin of tertiary frames.   Having more types of frames with a more 
proportionate distribution, increases the complexity of neo-Nazis grievances because they 
are more broadly dispersed.  Having a higher number of frames also suggests that neo-
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Nazi propagandists are attempting to increase the ―appeal‖ of neo-Nazism by tapping into 
a wider range of grievances held by an ideologically and religiously diverse white 
population. 
 Despite various differences, neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in 
typology, strategy and use of neutralization techniques.  Regarding typology, the majority 
of the frames were identified in the first sample, Rockwell and Qutb, with little variation 
from these central themes over time.  Although new frames were added as current events 
and political structure changed, the frames used by Rockwell and Qutb were also used by 
subsequent propagandists.  Using the same types of diagnostic or prognostic types over 
time illustrates that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists are not creating new ideas 
but rather reordering and restricting themes used by previous or contemporary 
propagandists.   
 A consistent strategy of using violent solutions at different intervals is reflected 
by both sets of propagandists.  Individual propagandists from both ideologies can be 
identified as being extremely violent, while others seem to promote a ―softer‖ version 
with very little violence reflected in their text.  Both ideologies mirror each other in 
format because some propagandists are more violent while others endorse ―softer‖ 
versions as a precondition for violence. A precondition for violence can be defined as the 
aligning of attitudes by rationalizing the solutions or problems outlined by neo-Nazism 
and violent jihadism. 
 Neo-Nazis and violent jihadi propagandists focus on neutralizing threats to their 
ideology while promoting criminogenic ideas and behavior as normative.  All neo-Nazi 
and violent jihadi propagandists use both diagnostic and prognostics frames to promote 
150 
 
subcultural ideas and behavior deemed criminal under the norms and laws of 
conventional culture.  Both sets of propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and 
behavior into forms that are criminogenic.  Whether the outcome is explicit violence 
outlined by violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races or religions into 
pollutants, the goal is promote or reinforce attitudes that ―rationalize‖ permanent drift 
into neo-Nazism and violent jihadism over conventional culture.  Rationalization must 
occur to permit permanent drift into a subculture where segregation, deportation, war, 
terrorism or elimination is perceived as legitimate solutions over any conventional 
methods of ―restoring justice.‖ 
 Finally, when diagnostic and prognostic frames are analyzed together and 
organized into broader categories, both control samples show a greater degree of 
similarity to their ―effective‖ counterparts.  Previous chapters illustrated differences when 
specific diagnostic and prognostic frames are analyzed independently and on a more 
detailed level.  However, when specific diagnostic and prognostic frames are combined 
and organized into broader categories, findings suggest typological similarities.  Al Bari 
and Chittum;s texts reflect similarities in prevalence, diagnostic out-group/in-group 
ratios, closeness measures, and frame location.  These findings indicate that although 
differences do exist when diagnostic and prognostic frame types are analyzed, the 
―ineffective‖ propaganda resembles their ―effective‖ counterparts on a categorical level.  
This suggests that how propaganda becomes effective goes beyond categorical 
similarities and to factors that are beyond the scope of this study (i.e., degree of influence 
by the propagandist).  Because the data used in this research is known to be ―effective,‖ 
understanding that the control samples are similar, clearly establishes that ―effective‖ 
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propaganda is not based on construction or content alone.
66
  On the other hand, when a 
neo-Nazi or violent jihadi propagandist resonates with a subgroup audience, it is equally 
important to recognize that the types, mechanics, and structure of ―effective‖ diagnostic 
and prognostic frames impact ideology, neutralization, and radicalization of subgroup 
populations. 
The Relationship Between Neo-Nazi Diagnostic/Prognostic Frames   
 Neo-Nazi Total Frame Prevalence 
 The following figure illustrates frame prevalence for both neo-Nazi diagnostic 
and prognostic frames in each text.  Data were parsed into two separate categories for 
diagnostic frames, out-group (non-whites and race traitors) and in-group (neo-Nazis) 
problems while prognostic frames were divided along violent and non-violent solutions.  
The purpose of table 9 is to illustrate the prominence of either neo-Nazi diagnostic or 
prognostic frames while distinguishing how diagnostic frames are divided between out-
groups or in-groups and prognostic frames are categorized as violent or non-violent 
solutions.
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Table 9 Neo-Nazi Diagnostic/Prognostic Prevalence 
 Diagnostic Diagnostic Prognostic Prognostic 
 
Out-Group 
Blame Targets 
In-Group 
Blame Targets 
Violent 
Solutions 
Non-Violent 
Solutions 
Propagandist     
Rockwell 
(1967) 
75% 12% 1% 12% 
Pierce 
(1978) 
54% 17% 17% 12% 
Klassen 
(1981) 
61% 10% 7% 22% 
Lane 
(1994) 
48% 13% 4% 35% 
Duke 
(2003) 
87% 8% 1% 4% 
Chittum 
(1997) 
61% 22% 6% 11% 
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 It is important to note that construction and content is important and should not be minimized.  The 
findings of this research indicate that Neo-Nazi propaganda should be diagnostically skewed and violent 
jihadi propaganda should give greater attention to solutions over identifying problems. 
67
 For a complete list of each diagnostic/prognostic types, see Table 25 in the appendix. 
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Summary 64% 14% 6% 16% 
 
 Table 9 illustrates that the neo-Nazi propaganda samples used in this study are 
diagnostically dominant.  Neo-Nazi propagandists uniformly emphasize diagnostic 
frames over prognostic solutions.  Additionally, neo-Nazi propagandists focus on out-
group flaws, failures, and immorality over in-group blame targets.  Non-violent solutions 
are more prevalent across the sample with the exception of Pierce who emphasizes the 
use of violence over non-violent solutions.  Particular attention should be given to the 
low-degree of violent solutions by Duke who promotes ―softer‖ versions or non-violent 
neo-Nazi solutions as a precondition for violence (Berbrier, 1998).  
 The significance of analyzing diagnostic or prognostic frame prevalence is found 
in knowing whether propaganda emphasizes problems or solutions. Since the sample of 
propaganda can be classified as ―effective,‖ understanding the relationship between 
frames can be described as ―the code‖ or best practices of how propaganda channels 
emotions, assists in attitude change, and promotes action. Combining both types of 
frames for analysis reveals the degree of prevalence between the two.  Each text has a 
prominent theme, a problem oriented theme (diagnostic) or a solution based theme 
(prognostic) and knowing the dominant theme reveals how propaganda has mobilized 
supporters. Understanding  a prominent neo-Nazi or violent jihadi theme reveals how 
propagandists morph content into motivational tools to radicalize individual and group 
members. 
Neo-Nazi Violent Prognostic Frames as Solutions 
 
 This section gives particular attention to neo-Nazi violent frames.  Specifically, 
data are analyzed to determine which problems neo-Nazi propagandists argue will be 
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solved through violence.  Network text analysis creates semantic networks that visualize 
how neo-Nazi propagandists associate violent solutions to white problems.  In order to 
illustrate the prevalence of links between neo-Nazi diagnostic frames and violent 
prognostic solutions table 10 is divided into two categories, out-group and in-group 
problems. 
 
Table 10 Violent neo-Nazi Solutions to Out-Group/In-group Problems 
 Diagnostic  Diagnostic 
 Out-Group  In-Group  
Propagandist   
Rockwell 
(1967) 
81% 19% 
Pierce 
(1978) 
85% 15% 
Klassen 
(1981) 
88% 12% 
Lane 
(1994) 
75% 25% 
Duke 
(2003) 
66% 33% 
Chittum 
(1997) 
59% 41% 
   
Summary 76% 24% 
 
 Table 10 combines the three violent neo-Nazi prognostic frames into a single 
category, ―violence,‖ in order to analyze how violent solutions are connected to 
diagnostic frames in the text.  The three neo-Nazi prognostic codes are: white terrorism, 
eliminate non whites, and race war.
68
  Table 10 illustrates two central findings.  First, 
violence is more prevalent as a solution for out-groups. Second, neo-Nazis using violence 
for in-group problems steadily increases over time.  Neo-Nazis also uniformly target 
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 White terrorism is defined as the propagandist suggesting the use or threat of violence for a 
racial/political intent.  The goal of ―white terrorism‖ is to convey an emotionally charged political/racial 
message to whites and non-whites. The prognostic frame ―eliminate non whites‖ refers to the use of any 
form of violence by propagandists to kill non-whites/race traitors in isolated events that are not connected 
to white terrorism or racial war. Finally, the prognostic frame ―race war‖ implies the propagandist suggests 
using conventional and insurgent campaigns divided along racial lines where combatants use the tools of 
conventional warfare: medium/heavy weapons, uniforms and military organizational structure.   
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violence as a solution for out-groups over time and across different types of propaganda.  
Since neo-Nazi propaganda is predominantly diagnostic, it is logical that the majority of 
violent solutions target out-groups.  However, it is interesting to note that the prevalence 
of violent solutions to counter out-group problems shows a steady decrease from 
Rockwell to Duke.   
 Table 11 illustrates another way of analyzing how violent solutions are connected 
to diagnostic problems.  Table 11 outlines the leading diagnostic types solved through 
violence, their prevalence, and closeness measure.
69
  Closeness is a measure to 
understand where individual nodes (frames) lie between other nodes in the network.  
Closeness reflects another way of understanding the relationship between diagnostic and 
prognostic frames in each text and over time.  Closeness as a measure takes into account 
the connectivity of the node‘s neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the 
shortest paths to violent nodes in the network.   
Table 11 Linking Violent Solutions to Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Types, Prevalence and Closeness 
 Rockwell 
(1967) 
Frame/Prevalence/
Closeness 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Frame/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Frame/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Lane 
(1994) 
Frame/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Duke 
(2003) 
Frame/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Chittum 
(1997) 
Frame/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
       
 Blacks 29% 
0.9474 
Federal 
Government 30% 
0.8718 
Blacks 17% 
0.9091 
Federal 
Government 50% 
.6677 
Whites Humiliated 
33% 
0.6667 
Federal Government 25% 
0.8636 
 Violence 
Against 
Whites 17% 
0.7500 
Race Traitors 10% 
0.6667 
Jews 16% 
0.8889 
Modern Morality 
25% 
0.6677 
White Extinction 33% 
0.6667 
Violence Against Whites 
25% 
0.7917 
 Communism 
10% 
0.9000 
Modern Morality 
5% 
0.7727 
Jewish Influence 
15% 
0.8163 
Race Traitors 25% 
0.5455 
Holocaust 33% 
0.8000 
White Oppression 15% 
0.7600 
 Jews 10% 
0.7826 
Jewish Influence 
5% 
0.7391 
Native Americans 
10% 
0.7843 
* * Modern Morality 10% 
0.7600 
 Liberalism 
7% 
0.9000 
Racial Pollution 5% 
0.6667 
Violence Against 
Whites 10% 
0.7843 
* * Native Americans 9% 
0.6786 
 Jewish 
Influence 7% 
White Oppression 
5% 
Traditional Religion 
6% 
* * Non whites Advance 
Crime 4% 
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 The definitions for each neo-Nazi diagnostic type can be found in figure 12 in the appendix. 
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0.6207 0.6939 0.6452 
 
0.6786 
 Modern 
Morality 
0.9474 
Blacks 5% 
0.7727 
Race Traitors 6% 
0.6557 
* * Blacks 3% 
0.6552 
 Non whites 
Advance 
Crime 5% 
0.7200 
Liberalism 5% 
0.7727 
Racial Pollution 5% 
0.7273 
* * Racial Integration 3% 
0.6786 
 Native 
Americans 
5% 
0.5806 
Communism 4% 
0.5667 
Communism 2% 
0.5263 
* * Whites Humiliated 3% 
0.6552 
 Federal 
Government 
2% 
0.6207 
Jews 4% 
0.6182 
Whites Humiliated 
2% 
0.6667 
* * Feminism 1% 
0.5135 
 
 Table 11 illustrates closeness measures for each neo-Nazi propaganda diagnostic 
frame as it is connected to a violent solution. Closeness in Table 11 reflects the total 
number of frames that are connected through direct links. For example, closeness from a 
―target audience perspective‖ reveals how long it takes information to spread from the 
problem to the solution in the network. The individual frames with the highest closeness 
value reveal that the propagandist places the frames within close proximity to each other 
in the text.   
 Table 11 reveals Pierce and Klassen argue violence will solve a multitude of 
threats against whites.  Pierce‘s text has the highest number of links between violent 
prognostic frames (n=24).  Having the highest number of links illustrates that Pierce is 
asserting that violence is an all encompassing solution to a greater number of injustices 
confronted by the white race.  Pierce‘s highest ranked target for violence is the ―federal 
government‖ followed by race traitors.  Pierce‘s Turner Diaries is unique in that it 
provides the reader with the technical and tactical ―know how‖ to carry out his suggested 
violence.   
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 Although Pierce‘s text is fiction, the tactical and technical solutions are grounded 
in reality and provide the reader with a pragmatic handbook of how to carry out violence. 
This means that in addition to realistic tactical and technical input, the reader‘s emotions 
are being constantly directed to use violence against the federal government.  When 
compared to Pierce, Klassen has the next highest number of violent prognostic frames 
(n=20). In contrast to Pierce, Klassen does not link violence against the federal 
government.  Instead, Klassen argues to use violence against individual blacks, Jews, and 
their organizations.  Klassen also repeatedly discusses the historical violence against 
Native Americans as a justified solution to solving the current non-white problem.   
 Figure 10 reveals that Rockwell links violence to solving the problems associated 
with blacks more than any other diagnostic frame.  Rockwell also promotes violence 
against Jews and communists.  Rockwell argues that any violence directed against whites 
should be countered with violence.  Similar to Pierce, Rockwell also links violence 
against the federal government, but not to the degree reflected in Pierce‘s propaganda.     
 Lane and Duke have the fewest links between violent prognostic frames and 
diagnostic problems.  Similar to Pierce, Lane suggests that violence is a viable solution 
against the federal government, moral decay, and race traitors.  Both Lane and Pierce 
argue that the threat to the white race is derived from federal government failures and the 
increasing moral decay found in American society.   Duke, however, argues that violence 
is justified when whites are being humiliated and face extinction.  Duke is unique among 
all neo-Nazi propagandists in that he suggests violence should be used to counter the 
fallacies associated with the Jewish version of the Holocaust.  
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 Finally, violent prognostic frames associated with Lane and Duke‘s propaganda 
do not target specific groups, like Rockwell, Klassen or Pierce.  The violent prognostic 
frames associated with the 88 Precepts and Jewish Supremacism link violence 
differently.  Lane and Duke do not specifically target blacks or Jews but rather the impact 
that non-whites have upon society and government.  Lane argues that violence is justified 
because the federal government is becoming increasingly hostile to whites and the 
―traditional‖ way of life is being destroyed by non-whites.  Duke asserts that violence is 
necessary when whites are humiliated and when the Holocaust is being used as leverage 
to further weaken the white race.   
 Using violence as a solution appears to have changed from Rockwell to Duke. A 
possible explanation for this effect is that Lane and Duke wanted to focus more on 
ideological arguments and less on violent solutions or that they intended to shift solutions 
that will resonate with a larger target audience. Table 27 (see appendix) demonstrates that 
across time, the degree of associating violent solutions appears to have shifted to a 
―softer‖ and increasing focused approach to violence. In agreement with Berbier (1998), 
softer does not imply that this type of neo-Nazi propaganda is any less dangerous. 
Instead, softer refers to a reduction of violent solutions. Yet at the same time, aiming to 
generate solutions that have a greater appeal to whites suggests that ―softer‖ solutions 
may be more palatable to generate ideological converts.   
Locating neo-Nazi Diagnostic and Prognostic Frames in Text 
 Frame location is important because it reveals an individual propagandist‘s 
communicative strategy and identifies framing trends across neo-Nazism.  Identifying 
frame location illustrates the underlining emotive structure and format of how each frame 
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type is used in text. Because the data used in this research are effective propaganda, the 
results reveal the structural process of how target audiences have been persuaded both by 
the content and location of frames. The propagandist intends both diagnostic and 
prognostic frames to channel emotions to alter attitudes and incite criminogenic attitudes 
to engage in certain political action.  Channeling emotions via diagnostic and prognostic 
frames is an important condition necessary for persuading target audiences.  
 Each sample of propaganda was divided into four equal sections or quartiles in 
order to determine if a propagandist emphasizes a particular section of text to embed 
frames.  Table 12 illustrates the percentage of diagnostic and prognostic frames in each 
quartile as they are dispersed throughout the text and how they compare to other texts 
over time.   
Table 12-The location of neo-Nazi diagnostic/prognostic across in propaganda 
 (Quartiles reflecting over 50% prognostic frames are shaded) 
Propagandist Textual Quartile 1 Textual Quartile 2 Textual Quartile 3 Textual Quartile 4 Document Total 
      
Rockwell 
(1967) 
Diagnostic 97% 
Prognostic 3% 
Diagnostic 92% 
Prognostic 8% 
Diagnostic 94% 
Prognostic 6 % 
Diagnostic 67% 
Prognostic 33% 
Diagnostic 87% 
Prognostic 13% 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Diagnostic 72% 
Prognostic 28% 
Diagnostic 69% 
Prognostic 31% 
Diagnostic 73% 
Prognostic 27% 
Diagnostic 68% 
Prognostic 32% 
Diagnostic 71% 
Prognostic 29% 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Diagnostic 68% 
Prognostic 32% 
Diagnostic 69% 
Prognostic 31% 
Diagnostic 89% 
Prognostic 11% 
Diagnostic 62% 
Prognostic 38% 
Diagnostic 71% 
Prognostic 29% 
Lane 
(1994) 
Diagnostic 69% 
Prognostic 31% 
Diagnostic 45% 
Prognostic 55% 
Diagnostic 55% 
Prognostic 45% 
Diagnostic 76% 
Prognostic 24% 
Diagnostic 61% 
Prognostic 39% 
Duke 
(2003) 
Diagnostic 95% 
Prognostic 5% 
Diagnostic 98% 
Prognostic 2% 
Diagnostic 96% 
Prognostic 4% 
Diagnostic 93% 
Prognostic 7% 
Diagnostic 95% 
Prognostic 5% 
Chittum Diagnostic 91% 
Prognostic 9% 
Diagnostic 77% 
Prognostic 23% 
Diagnostic 84% 
Prognostic 16% 
Diagnostic 81% 
Prognostic 19% 
Diagnostic 83% 
Prognostic 17% 
      
Summary Diagnostic 80% 
Prognostic 20% 
Diagnostic 75% 
Prognostic 25% 
Diagnostic 82% 
Prognostic 18% 
Diagnostic 75% 
Prognostic 25% 
Diagnostic 78% 
Prognostic 22% 
 
 Table 12 illustrates that Rockwell emphasizes diagnostic frames across the text as 
his method of constructing propaganda. Eighty-seven percent of all frames used in White 
Power are diagnostic.  Rockwell devotes little attention to prognostic frames in the first 
three quartiles before directing more attention to solutions in the final quartile. Table 12 
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illustrates that Rockwell‘s White Power has high variation between framing types. If read 
chronologically, three-fourths of White Power has to be examined before reaching any 
substantial prognostic frames.  This type of structure ―bombards‖ the reader with 
problems to demonstrate injustices, leading to an emotional reaction that is then directed 
towards the Rockwell‘s blame targets.  In the last quartile of White Power, Rockwell 
transitions to offering a higher percentage of solutions to the growing non-white ―threat.‖ 
In the end, prognostic frames account for thirty-three percent of the frames used in White 
Power, with the highest percentage in the last quartile.  
 Duke also disproportionately emphasizes diagnostic frames, but differs from 
Rockwell by focusing on even fewer solutions.  One difference between Duke and 
Rockwell is that Duke‘s percentage of prognostic frames is consistent across all four 
quartiles with a total percentage of ninety-five percent diagnostic frames, the highest of 
the sample. Like Rockwell, Table 12 reveals that Duke consistently emphasizes 
diagnostic frames through each of the first three quartiles of the text.  However, in 
contrast to Rockwell, Duke does not increase the number of prognostic frames in the 
fourth quartile.  In other words, Duke‘s propaganda devotes almost all of the text to 
addressing problems confronting the white race. Duke is asserting that problems are more 
important than solutions by adopting a diagnostically heavy format. 
 It may be possible that Duke‘s intent for diagnostic frames is to function as a type 
of solution.  Pointing out problems, or the source of a ―sickness,‖ is the first step in 
reaching a point to ―solve the problem‖ or ―cure the disease.‖  Duke does include 
diagnostic frames used by other neo-Nazi propagandists, but some of his solutions differ 
from those used by other neo-Nazi propagandists.  Duke argues that whites should 
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identify Jews as a race, claims that it is the Jews who are the ―real‖ supremacists, and 
promotes replacement theology so that whites can maintain ―Christian‖ beliefs as a neo-
Nazi.  Identifying threats, specifically the threat of ―Jewish supremacism,‖ is a 
―diagnostic‖ solution because Duke is attempting to demonstrate the accuracy of what 
truly is threatening the white race.  
 In contrast to Duke and Rockwell, Lane offers a much higher percentage of 
prognostic frames in his work.  Lane is unique in that he is the only neo-Nazi 
propagandist in the sample where the percentage of prognostic frames in a single quartile, 
fifty-five percent, is higher than the diagnostic frames (forty-five percent).  Table 12 
illustrates that Lane‘s propaganda has the highest percentage of prognostic frames at 
thirty-nine percent.  Lane‘s propaganda also has the two highest quartile percentages of 
prognostic frames in the sample (fifty-five and forty-five percent).   
 Having a higher number of prognostic frames does not necessarily make Lane‘s 
text more violent.
70
  Violence is determined by the types and frequency of frames that 
suggest that neo-Nazis should resort to violent solutions as the means to reduce white 
threats.  In fact, Lane‘s text does use violent frames, but it is the type of prognostic 
frames that determine the degree of violence in a text.    
 Table 12 illustrates that Pierce and Klassen use diagnostic and prognostic frames 
in a similar manner.  The cumulative percentage of diagnostic frames for The Turner 
Diaries and The White Man’s are the same, seventy-one percent.  This is an interesting 
finding because The Turner Diaries and The White Man’s Bible differ from each other in 
format and style.  While The Turner Diaries is fiction, The White Man’s Bible was 
                                                          
70
 The 88 Precepts was written to provide ideological ―solutions‖ or a path for neo-Nazis after the threats 
have been identified.  Some of the ideological solutions involve the use of violence, but the majority of 
solutions are non-violent. 
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created as a pragmatic manifesto outlining how to live as a white in a way that 
acknowledges that ―your race is your religion.‖ The content also differs: as Pierce focuses 
on the use of racial violence against the federal government, race traitors, blacks and 
Jews in a future setting, while Klassen, integrates history, nutrition, science and religion 
to create a lifestyle recipe or booklet as opposed to white power fantasy fiction (i.e. 
Pierce).  Despite the differences in format and content, both neo-Nazi propagandists 
deliver a mixed bag of diagnostic and prognostic frames.  This finding reveals that 
manifestos or fictional accounts can convey the same percentage of frames to an 
audience.  This finding highlights how fictional accounts can be as just effective to non-
fiction political treatises or pamphlets.  
 Table 12 also summarizes the findings for each text. Duke‘s propaganda has the 
highest percentage of diagnostic frames at ninety-five followed by Rockwell (eighty-
seven), Chittum (eighty-three), Klassen (seventy-one), Pierce (seventy-one) and Lane 
(sixty-one). A noticeable trend in neo-Nazi propaganda is that the first quartile has a 
higher percentage of diagnostic frames than the last quartile.  When summarizing all of 
the quartiles over time, the final quartile has a higher percentage of prognostic frames 
than the first (with the exception of Lane).  This reveals a couple of things.  First, neo-
Nazi propagandists emphasize the need to highlight problems at the beginning of the text 
before concluding with solutions.  This structure assumes that neo-Nazis will complete 
the text and link the problems outlined in the first three-fourths of the text to the solutions 
in the final section. Again, Lane is unique in that the format of The 88 Precepts functions 
more as a ―legal‖ code and disperses frames differently than the other texts.  Second, neo-
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Nazi propagandists rely on inciting the emotion of shame consistently over time by 
promoting in-group and out-group differences.  
 Neo-Nazi propagandists place a higher emphasis on inciting emotions via 
diagnostic frames through each text over motivating through solutions. The in-group 
(whites) is constantly being attacked, humiliated, stigmatized or oppressed by ―inferior‖ 
out-groups (race traitors and non-whites). Each diagnostic frame is designed to motivate 
the audience by crafting content to illicit an emotional response and link it to a white 
―injustice‖ or problem.  Table 12 illustrates that neo-Nazi propagandists are pushing the 
―shame‖ button repeatedly throughout each text and over time.  A possible explanation is 
based on a greater need to gain recruits and ―enlighten‖ whites about the threat facing 
their race.  As a result, it seems plausible that neo-Nazi propagandists emphasize 
diagnostic frames because solutions are secondary to creating ―white converts‖ to neo-
Nazism. The emphasis on diagnostic frames reflects the perception among neo-Nazi 
propagandists that most whites are unaware of white victimization and are in need of 
―racial enlightenment.‖ 
Violent Jihadi prognostic/diagnostic frames 
 Violent Jihadi Total Frame Prevalence 
 The preceding figure illustrates frame prevalence for both violent jihadi 
diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text.  Data were parsed into two separate 
categories for diagnostic frames, out-group (non-Muslims and secular Muslims) and in-
group (violent jihadi) problems while prognostic frames were divided along violent and 
non violent solutions.  Table 13 illustrates how diagnostic frames are divided between 
out-groups or in-groups and how prognostic frames are split between violent or non-
violent solutions. 
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Table 13 Violent Jihadi Diagnostic/Prognostic Prevalence 
 Diagnostic Diagnostic Prognostic Prognostic 
 
Out-Group 
Blame Targets 
In-Group 
Blame Targets 
 
Violent 
Solutions 
 
 
Non-Violent 
Solutions 
 
Propagandist 
    
Qutb 
(1966) 
47% 3% 6% 44% 
Azzam 
(1984) 
12% 13% 26% 49% 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
27% 16% 14% 43% 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
39% 18% 23% 20% 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
17% 21% 4% 58% 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
34% 5% 5% 56% 
 
    
Summary 
29% 13% 13% 45% 
 
 Table 13 illustrates that the violent jihadi propaganda samples used in this study 
are prognostically dominant.  Violent jihadi propagandists across the sample emphasize 
prognostic solutions over diagnostic problems.  Additionally, with the exception of 
Maqdisi, violent jihadi propagandists focus on out-group flaws, failures, and immorality 
over in-group blame targets.  Non-violent solutions are more prevalent across the sample 
with the exception of Zawahiri who emphasizes the use of violence over non-violent 
solutions.  Particular attention should be given to the low-degree of violent solutions by 
Qutb and Maqdisi who promote ―softer‖ versions or non-violent versions of violent jihadi 
solutions as a precondition for violence.  
Jihadi Violent Prognostic Frames as Solutions 
 
 This section gives particular attention to violent frames used by jihadi 
propagandists.  Specifically, analysis involves determining which problems violent jihadi 
propagandists suggest will be solved through violence. Network text analysis creates 
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semantic networks that visualize how jihadi propagandists associate violent solutions to 
the problems encountered by ―true‖ Muslims in the text.  Network text analysis provides 
an understanding of the relationship between violent solutions and problems because this 
method measures the links between violent prognostic frames and diagnostic frames and 
the total number of diagnostic frames that violence is perceived to ―solve.‖  
  Table 14 is divided into two categories, out-group and in-group problems, in 
order to illustrate the prevalence of links between violent jihadi diagnostic frames and 
violent prognostic solutions. ―Engaging in violent jihad‖ is the prognostic code used 
when a jihadi propagandist suggests that ―true‖ Muslims use violence to solve their 
problems.  ―Engaging in violent jihad‖ is defined as using violence to ―defend‖ the ―true‖ 
faith to kill, threaten or harm non-Muslims or corrupt Muslims.  The following figure 
illustrates how jihadis link violence to in-group and out-group problems. 
Table 14 Violent Jihadi Solutions to Out-group/In-group Problems 
 Diagnostic  Diagnostic 
 Out-Group  In Group  
Propagandist   
Qutb 
(1966) 
96%   4% 
Azzam 
(1984) 
31%  69% 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 38%  62% 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 61%  39% 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 84%  16% 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 71%  29% 
   
Summary  63% 37%  
 
 Table 14 illustrates two central findings.  First, although it is more prevalent for 
violent jihadi propagandists to link violence as a solution for out-groups, this pattern is 
not uniform across the sample. Second, jihadi use of violence for in-group problems 
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shows a wide range of fluctuation between propagandists.  A distinct pattern does not 
emerge over time and across different types of propaganda because jihadis do not 
uniformly link violence as a solution for out-groups or in-groups. Since violent jihadi 
propaganda is predominantly prognostic, it is logical that violent solutions would target 
in-groups as well as out-groups.  However, it is interesting to note that the prevalence of 
violence as a solution for in-group problems has a more uneven distribution than the out-
group. 
 Table 15 shows the leading jihadi diagnostic problems that will be solved through 
violence.
71
  In addition to showing the type of problem linked to violence, table 15 
indicates node prevalence and closeness.
72
   
Table 15 Linking Violent Solutions to Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Types, Prevalence and Closeness 
 Qutb 
(1966) 
 
Type/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Azzam 
(1984) 
 
Type/Prevalence/ 
Closeness 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 
Type/Prevalence/Cl
oseness 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 
Type/Prevalenc
e/Closeness 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 
Type/Prevalen
ce/ Closeness 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 
Type/Prevalence/Closeness 
       
 Islam is Polluted 30% 
0.6000 
Muslim Passivity 
29% 
0.6667 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 17% 
0.6744 
United States 
14% 
0.7193 
Kafir 50% 
0.7500 
Kafir 29% 
0.8462 
 Jahiliyyah 19% 
0.8333 
Muslim women 
Victimization 19% 
0.6000 
Non Muslim soldier
s permitted on Musl
im lands 13% 
0.5800 
Islamic 
Governments 
13% 
0.7736 
 
Jahiliyyah 17% 
0.6000 
Muslims Governed by Non-
Muslims 18% 
0.6111 
 Kafir 15% 
0.7895 
Kafir 14% 
0.6122 
Kafir 10% 
0.6170 
Jews 8% 
0.6721 
Jews 17% 
0.6000 
Islam is Polluted 18% 
0.6471 
 Modern Morality 7% 
0.6000 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
11% 
0.5882 
Israel Exists 8% 
0.5179 
Israel Exists 8% 
0.6406 
Muslim Oppression 
16% 
0.6429 
Islamic Governments12% 
0.6111 
 Jews 7% 
0.7895 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 8% 
0.6122 
Muslim Oppression 
8% 
0.6744 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 8% 
0.6406 
* Modern Morality 6% 
0.5238 
 Satan 7% 
0.7143 
Islamic Governments 
4% 
0.5455 
Modern Morality 
6% 
0.5800 
Muslims oppress 
true Muslims 7% 
0.5942 
* Muslim women Victimization 
6% 
0.5500 
                                                          
71
 The definitions for each violent jihadi diagnostic type can be found in figure 11 in the appendix. 
72
 Closeness measures the location of where individual nodes lie in relation to other nodes in the network.  
This measure takes into account the connectivity of the node‘s neighbor and assigns a higher value for 
nodes that are closer in the text.    
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 Muslim Oppression 
4% 
0.7895 
Secular Innovations 
4% 
0.5357 
United States 6% 
0.5918 
Muslim violence 
against true 
Muslims 6% 
0.6308 
* Satan 6% 
0.6111 
 Islamic Governments 
4% 
0.7500 
Christianity 3% 
0.5085 
Muslim women 
Victimization 6% 
0.5686 
 
Communism 5% 
0.6029 
* Non-Muslims humiliate 
Muslims 5% 
0.5500 
 Liberalism 4% 
0.7895 
Jahiliyyah3% 
0.6000 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
6% 
0.5918 
Secular 
Innovations 4% 
0.5857 
* * 
 Paganism 4% 
0.8333 
Muslim 
Oppression1% 
0.5769 
Islam is Polluted 
4% 
0.5686 
Kafir 4& 
0.5541 
* * 
 
 Table 15 illustrates the degree of closeness between violent solutions listed for 
Zawahiri and Bin Laden.  Zawahiri and Bin Laden have the highest number of problems 
linked to violent solutions.
73
 Zawahiri‘s Knights has the highest number of links between 
violent prognostic frames (n=24).  Having the highest number of links illustrates that 
Zawahiri is asserting that violent solutions will counter a greater number of injustices 
confronted by Muslims.  The ―United States‖ and ―Islamic governments‖ are Zawahiri‘s 
most prevalent recipients of violence.  Bin Laden has the next highest number of violent 
prognostic frames linked to problems (n=18). Bin Laden‘s violent solutions differ from 
Zawahiri in that he focuses less on Islamic governments, but instead links violence to 
solving the problem related to non-Muslim soldiers on Muslim lands and non-Muslim 
violence against Muslims. 
 Qutb and Azzam reflect a similar number of links between violent solutions and 
problems.  Qutb links violent solutions to eleven diagnostic frames (n=11), while Azzam 
links violence to thirteen diagnostic frames (n=13).  Qutb‘s most prevalent links between 
violent solutions and problems are the diagnostic frames associated with ―religious 
                                                          
73
 See Table 28 for a complete list of how Zawahiri and Bin Laden link violent solutions to diagnostic 
frames. 
167 
 
pollution‖ and ―jahiliyyah.‖ Azzam links violent solutions to solving problems associated 
with ―Muslim passivity‖ and the ―victimization of Muslim women.‖ Qutb and Azzam 
also link violence against kafirs, whom they argue are destroying humanity and 
weakening Islam. In contrast to Qutb, Azzam links violence against Christianity, Arab 
Nationalists, secular innovations and non-Muslim soldiers on Muslim lands.   
 Maqdisi has the fewest links between violent prognostic frames and diagnostic 
problems (n=4).  Similar to Qutb, Maqdisi suggests that violence against Muslim 
oppressors, Muslims living in a state of jahiliyyah, Jews, and kafirs is a legitimate 
method to resolve ―Islamic‖ problems.  Both Maqdisi and Qutb argue that the threat to 
Islam is derived from jahiliyyah and the increasing influence of Jews across the globe.    
 Table 28, see appendix, illustrates two important violent jihadi trends. First, with 
the exception of Maqdisi, the number of problems solved through violent solutions 
increases over time.  This finding is significant because it demonstrates that jihadi 
propaganda argues that violent behavior will counter an increasing number of problems 
facing Muslims.  Second, the highest ranked diagnostic frames that are linked to violent 
frames are diverse across the sample. Qutb links violence to purifying Islam of pollutants, 
while Bin Laden and Zawahiri both frame the United States as being a source of 
legitimized violence. Bin Laden links violence against the United States far less than 
Zawahiri and focuses on violence against Muslims from any non-Muslim source. Maqdisi 
and al Bari‘s propaganda reflects linking violent solutions specifically to Kafirs.  
Diversity of the most important target for violence suggests that violent jihadis differ on a 
violent strategy. 
 
168 
 
Locating Violent Jihadi Diagnostic and Prognostic Frames in Text  
 Each violent jihadi propaganda sample was divided into four equal sections, 
quartiles, in order to determine if a propagandist emphasizes a particular section where 
certain types of frames are embedded.  Table 16 illustrates the percentage of violent 
jihadi diagnostic and prognostic frames in quartiles as they are dispersed throughout the 
text and how they compare over time.  Knowing the percentage of frames in quartiles 
advances our understanding of violent jihadi prognostic and diagnostic frames because is 
shows how propaganda is constructed. 
Table 16- The location of violent jihadi diagnostic/prognostic across in propaganda 
 (Quartiles reflecting 50% or higher diagnostic frames are shaded) 
Propagandist 
Textual Quartile 1 Textual Quartile 2 Textual Quartile 3 Textual Quartile 4 Document 
Total 
      
Qutb 
(1966) 
Diagnostic 45% 
Prognostic 55% 
Diagnostic 37% 
Prognostic 63% 
Diagnostic 50% 
Prognostic 50% 
Diagnostic 67% 
Prognostic 33% 
Diagnostic 50% 
Prognostic 50% 
Azzam 
(1984) 
Diagnostic 23% 
Prognostic 77% 
Diagnostic 29% 
Prognostic 71% 
Diagnostic 33% 
Prognostic 67% 
Diagnostic 16% 
Prognostic 84% 
Diagnostic 25% 
Prognostic 75% 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
Diagnostic 64% 
Prognostic 36% 
Diagnostic 52% 
Prognostic 48% 
Diagnostic 25% 
Prognostic 75% 
Diagnostic 30% 
Prognostic 70% 
Diagnostic 43% 
Prognostic 57% 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
Diagnostic 53% 
Prognostic 47% 
Diagnostic 50% 
Prognostic 50% 
Diagnostic 65% 
Prognostic 35% 
Diagnostic 58% 
Prognostic 42% 
Diagnostic 57% 
Prognostic 43% 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
Diagnostic 21% 
Prognostic 79% 
Diagnostic 16% 
Prognostic 84% 
Diagnostic 21% 
Prognostic 79% 
Diagnostic 59% 
Prognostic 41% 
Diagnostic 29% 
Prognostic 71% 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
Diagnostic 44% 
Prognostic 56% 
Diagnostic 47% 
Prognostic 53% 
Diagnostic 51% 
Prognostic 49% 
Diagnostic 14% 
Prognostic 86% 
Diagnostic 39% 
Prognostic 61% 
      
Summary Diagnostic 42% 
Prognostic 58% 
Diagnostic 39% 
Prognostic 61% 
Diagnostic 36% 
Prognostic 64% 
Diagnostic 59% 
Prognostic 41% 
Diagnostic 41% 
Prognostic 59% 
 
 Table 16 reflects that violent jihadi propagandists use a higher percentage of 
prognostic frames when compared to diagnostic frames.  When all of the frames are 
summarized, violent jihadi propaganda is fifty-nine percent prognostic.  Although two 
propagandists have a higher percentage of diagnostic frames, Qutb at fifty-percent and 
Zawahiri at fifty-seven, overall the distribution for the sample is skewed toward 
prognostic frames.  This finding advances our understanding that violent jihadi 
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propaganda emphasizes solutions over problems.  Emphasizing solutions suggests that 
Muslim problems are more widely known, but the ―correct‖ solutions are not being 
pursued by ―true‖ Muslims.  Islam is polluted because secular or ignorant Muslims are 
not following the ―correct‖ path to resolving these problems. 
 Table 16 reveals that Qutb‘s Milestones has a higher percentage of prognostic 
frames in the first two quartiles and then shifts to emphasizing diagnostic frames in the 
latter two quartiles.  Qutb‘s propaganda is unique in that a summary of prognostic and 
diagnostic frames is proportionate.  This is notable since Table 26 (see appendix) 
illustrates that Qutb has ―jahiliyyah,‖ a diagnostic frame, as the highest ranked frame.   
 Qutb‘s greatest contribution to modern violent jihadi literature is that Milestones 
theologically enables secular Muslims to be identified as non-Muslims, consequently 
justifying violence toward these individuals.  Having a diagnostic frame as the most 
prevalent frame implies that Qutb is emphasizing that ―religious ignorance‖ is the central 
problem.  Qutb‘s proportionate distribution of frames reflects the need to validate a 
―newer‖ interpretation of why Islam is polluted and to justify the ―correct‖ solutions 
required to purify Islam and return to its glorified origins. 
 Zawahiri has the highest total percentage of diagnostic frames at the quartile level 
and across the document. Table 16 illustrates that Zawahiri has a greater percentage of 
diagnostic frames across three quartiles although the second quartile is evenly split 
between diagnostic and prognostic frames.  Knights Under the Prophets Banner 
emphasizes the problems associated with the United States and secular Islamic 
governments.  Zawahiri, similar to Qutb, emphasizes Islamic pollution and only the 
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―correct‖ solutions will adequately purify the faith.  In contrast to Qutb, Zawahiri places 
greater emphasis on blaming the United States and Israel throughout the text. 
 Prognostic frames are more prevalent in Azzam and Maqdisi‘s text. Both 
propagandists emphasize prognostic frames across each quartile (the exception is 
Maqdisi‘s last quartile) reflecting the two highest percentages of prognostic frames for 
the total document, (seventy-five percent prognostic for Azzam and seventy-one percent 
for Maqdisi). Although the primary solutions differ, Azzam is arguing for violent jihad 
and Maqdisi asserts ―correctly‖ following Allah and the Prophet.74 These findings are 
illustrated in table 16 and reveal that both propagandists perceive putting solutions into 
practice will purify Islam.   
 The importance of dividing the text into quartiles is illustrated by a closer 
examination of Bin Laden and Qutb‘s propaganda.  Bin Laden‘s Declaration of War is 
unique in that a higher percentage of diagnostic frames are located in the first two 
quartiles followed by a significant shift to prognostic frames in the latter two quartiles.  
Bin Laden also has the greatest variability between the first two quartiles and the last two 
quartiles.  Bin Laden is justifying why current Islamic regimes are corrupt and thus 
illegitimate.  Similar to Qutb‘s need to justify that jahiliyyah is the central source of 
Islamic pollution, Bin Laden outlines why corrupt Islamic regimes are polluting ―true‖ 
Muslims. Table 16 illustrates the difference in how Qutb and Bin Laden carry out the 
same task of presenting the information.  Qutb places a greater emphasis on diagnostic 
frames, but it occurs in the latter two quartiles, whereas Bin Laden disproportionately 
outlines diagnostic frames in the first two quartiles.     
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 See Table 24 in the appendix for a complete list of Azzam and Maqdisi‘s prognostic frames. 
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 Finally, Table 16 illustrates that the location of violent jihadi prognostic and 
diagnostic frames are inconsistent and do not follow the same pattern.  When individual 
texts are examined, greater variability exists across time and in each document.  There is 
not a uniform method of constructing violent jihadi propaganda that emphasizes certain 
type of frames in any quartile.  Qutb‘s overall use of frames is evenly split across the 
sample.  Azzam and Maqdisi consistently emphasize prognostic frames throughout the 
text, resulting with the largest margin of difference between diagnostic and prognostic 
frames for the entire document. Zawahiri disproportionately uses diagnostic frames in 
each quartile, while Maqdisi and al Bari both have a single quartile that reflects a higher 
percentage of diagnostic frames over prognostic frames. Bin Laden‘s location of 
diagnostic frames is the opposite of Qutb, but the percentage of usage is higher.   
Conclusion and Discussion 
 This chapter examines the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames 
in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.  The findings in this chapter assist in gaining a 
better understanding of how both core framing tasks function together in text.  This is 
accomplished by analyzing the similarities and differences between how neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic and diagnostic frames. Where the two 
previous chapters examined diagnostic and prognostic independently, this chapter 
combined both frames in order to analyze how they function together.  Additionally, 
violent prognostic frames were isolated using network text analysis in order to understand 
how a propagandist links violent solutions to diagnostic problems.  Finally, where 
propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic in text was examined in order to better 
understand the propaganda anatomy and the propagandist‘s communicative strategy. 
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 This research illustrates that there are unique similarities between neo-Nazi and 
violent jihadi propaganda.  Similarities reveal two important details about how 
neutralization functions in radicalization. First, inner disagreements or doubts about the 
solutions and problems for either ideology need to be neutralized. Propaganda contributes 
to the neutralization process by promoting that ―white/Islamic problems‖ must be 
directed to ―blame targets‖ and the solutions must be believed to be justified as altruistic.   
Noting the similarities between both ideologies illustrates the importance of the type of 
―propaganda method‖ used by neo-Nazis and violent jihadis to catalyze individuals and 
particular groups.   Similarities demonstrate that despite differences, propagandists use 
similar strategies to channel emotions for neutralization.   
 Neutralization appears to be a fundamental pathway to radicalization.  Techniques 
of neutralization function in similar patterns despite differences between groups and/or 
ideologies. Propaganda contributes to the neutralization process by promoting and 
reinforcing attitudes and beliefs through frames that rationalize why a white or Muslim 
should drift deeper into a violent subculture. Since the data in this study are considered 
―effective‖ propaganda, findings suggest a possible explanation as to why each sample 
has resonated with neo-Nazi or violent jihadi supporters over time. 
 Creating diagnostic and prognostic typologies identifies which core framing tasks 
are intended to motivate target audiences.  Typologies reveal how a propagandist uses 
content to motivate audiences into action.  Diagnostic and prognostic typologies provide 
a way to organize and understand how propaganda is constructed and how frames direct 
and channel emotions to form attitudes.  Channeling emotions to either change or solidify 
attitudes is the desired outcome of the propagandist.  Put another way, this chapter 
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illustrates how a propagandists fuses frames together with the goal of neutralizing inner 
voices that threaten to counter neo-Nazi or violent jihadi ―blame targets‖ or violent 
solutions. 
 Neutralization is a prerequisite for action and propaganda is a tool that 
operationalizes ideology.  Neutralizing targets and solutions creates the perception that 
violence or a radical solution is best for whites or Muslims.  This occurs because it 
enables the individual neo-Nazi or violent jihadis to defer culpability.  In this sense, if 
―killing Jews‖ is perceived as being done on behalf of ―humanity,‖ then the greater good 
of whites and Muslims nullifies individual motives.  As a result, the message identifying 
the need to ―kill Jews‖ is an implication that both neutralizes inner voices and functions 
as a precondition to carry out violence. After a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi internalizes the 
shame associated with racial or religious victimization, loss of power and status, then 
―killing Jews‖ becomes a ―reasonable‖ solution. This research identifies these solutions, 
both violent and non-violent, to understand how propagandists are engaged in a campaign 
to turn a social movement into a revolution. 
 Finally, the method used in this chapter contributes a systematic way of analyzing 
content in order to examine the anatomy of propaganda.  Understanding how core 
framing tasks are linked in the text illustrates how frames function together in a 
problem/solution dichotomy. This is especially important when violence becomes the 
―rational‖ solution to the problems confronting the white race or Islam.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
 This study increases our understanding of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda 
by examining the role of prognostic and diagnostic frames as techniques of 
neutralization.  Techniques of neutralization are intended to promote criminogenic 
attitudes and behavior which supports permanent drift into a subculture of violence.  The 
ultimate goal of diagnostic and prognostic frames in terrorist propaganda is to assist in a 
radicalization process of attitude formation ending in permanent drift. Permanent drift 
into a violent subculture is the goal, as opposed to shifting back and forth between 
conventional culture and a violent subculture, because propagandists seek to 
revolutionize conventional culture instead of tolerating it. This study also achieves a 
deeper understanding of how shame is used in diagnostic frames to radicalize supporters, 
particularly how information in text is used to catalyze action.  
 By using a comparative research design, this study provides a better 
understanding of how propaganda persuades target audiences to engage in criminogenic 
ideas and actions. Previous chapters discuss neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda 
framing typologies, illustrate individual frame types, examine the relationship between 
violent solutions/problems and reveal where frames are embedded in text.  The objective 
of this chapter is to discuss the key findings and how they fit into the larger 
criminological literature.  This chapter also examines the rationale and limitations of the 
research in order to offer policy and future research recommendations. 
 This research advances our understanding of how core framing tasks function 
together in propaganda text. Neo-Nazi propaganda differs from violent jihadi propaganda 
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in that it is skewed diagnostically (intended to generate shame in supporters).  All neo-
Nazi propaganda in this sample emphasizes diagnostic frames over prognostic solutions 
and follows the same format over time.  Neo-Nazi propagandists also differ from violent 
jihadi propagandists in that they use a greater number of frames that are more equally 
distributed across each text when compared to violent jihadi propagandists.  This finding 
illustrates that a greater number of neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are more dispersed along a 
broader range of targets and solutions, which is different from where violent jihadi 
propagandist embed diagnostic frames in text. 
 Violent jihadis vary from neo-Nazis in that their propaganda is skewed 
prognostically across the sample.  This finding is significant because emphasizing 
solutions over problems does not change over time, even with the different external 
conditions associated with current events and politics. Violent jihadi propagandists also 
differ from their neo-Nazi counterparts in that they use violent prognostic frames more 
dominantly and frequently across the sample. Whereas neo-Nazis embed diagnostic 
frames throughout each text, violent jihadi propagandists disproportionately embed 
prognostic frames across each text.  Violent jihadis also emphasize different targets of 
violence over time, whereas neo-Nazi propagandists demonstrate uniformity of targets. 
Finally, violent jihadi propagandists differ from their neo-Nazi counterparts in that they 
have personally engaged in fatal violence.
75
   
 Despite the various differences between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis, they share 
similarities in typology and strategy.  Similarities suggest that how terrorist groups frame 
their ―problems‖ is not unique among ideologies or groups despite differences in 
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 Although all of the propagandists in the sample possess a strong record of engagement and leadership, 
violent jihadi propagandists have disproportionally engaged in lethal violence when compared to their neo-
Nazi equivalent. 
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language, culture, history, and geography.  A similarity is reflected in the fact that both 
sets of propagandists are not creating new frames, but instead use the same types of 
diagnostic/prognostic frames over time. Reordering or adjusting themes used by previous 
or contemporary propagandists illustrates that propagandists are not generating new 
ideas.  Both sets of propagandists reflect a consistent strategy of using violence as a 
solution at different intervals.  Individual propagandists from both ideologies can be 
identified as being extremely violent, while others seem to promote a ―soft‖ version with 
very little violence reflected in their text.   
 Violent jihadi and neo-Nazis argue that all whites and ―true‖ Muslims must be 
actively engaged in confronting and countering injustices.  Both ideologies cite 
leadership as active engagement and argue the need for strong charismatic white or 
Islamic leadership.  In addition to finding strong leaders, both sets of propagandists 
emphasize the need to gain additional recruits and supplement all whites and Muslims 
with correct instruction to counter the pervasive racial and religious fallacies in modern 
conventional education. 
 Findings also illustrate that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists promote 
maintaining territory governed and populated either by whites or ―true‖ Muslims.  The 
desire for territory is offered as a solution in order that whites may ―defend‖ their race 
from extinction and where violent jihadis can implement a pure form of worship while 
honoring the example set forth by the Prophet.    Possessing jihadi or neo-Nazi territory 
reflects what both ideologies desire to see on a grand scale----a revolution. 
 Finally, neo-Nazis and violent jihadi propagandists focus on neutralizing threats 
to their ideology, while promoting criminogenic ideas and behavior as normative 
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responses.  All neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use both diagnostic and 
prognostic frames to promote subcultural ideas and behavior that violate the norms of 
conventional culture.  Rationalization is required in order to permit permanent drift into a 
subculture where segregation, deportation, war, terrorism or elimination is perceived as 
legitimate solution.  
 Neutralization Theory 
 This study assesses how applicable diagnostic and prognostic frames are to 
neutralization theory.  I apply neutralization theory to understand how attitude formation 
occurs in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda to outline subcultural boundaries and 
neutralize objections. The strength of neutralization theory, its emphasis on attitude 
formation (cognitive activity), can be extended to include terrorist subcultures and 
violence. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi frames intend to shape attitudes by functioning as 
cognitive techniques to neutralize conventional norms and inner conflict with blame 
targets. Violent or radical solutions are framed as rational responses because they are 
promoted as ―altruistic.‖ Violent or radical solutions are defined as altruistic because they 
counter non-whites, non-Muslims, and traitors for the ―greater good‖ of whites or 
Muslims.  Diagnostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda neutralize 
conventional values because they outline that conventional culture breaks racial or 
religious laws.
76
  Subcultural laws are expressed through violent jihadi propaganda in 
order to further separate the social world into in-groups or out-groups.   
 Reconceptualizing neutralization theory to understand terrorism ideology follows 
other scholars who have applied the theory to crime (Ball, 1966; Mannle & Lewis, 1979; 
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 Terrorist propaganda functions to identify neo-Nazi racial natural law, what violent jihadis perceive to be 
―pure‖ Islamic law and how conventional culture is violating these laws.   
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Minor, 1980; 1981; 1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes 2003; Rosenfeld, 
Jacobs & Wright, 2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005).  Understanding attitude 
formation in political criminality acknowledges the importance of specifying in-group 
subcultural norms over out-group conventional norms. Terrorist propaganda identifies the 
out-groups engaged in a campaign to pollute and eventually overthrow the natural/divine 
ideal.
77
 However, unlike common criminality or delinquency, where drift between 
conventional and unconventional culture is expected (Sykes & Matza, 1957; McCarthy & 
Stewart, 1998; Thurman, St. John & Riggs, 1984; Topalli, 2005), ―permanent drift‖ into a 
violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture is the desired outcome.  
 Expanding neutralization theory to terrorist propaganda and its role in attitude 
formation towards permanent drift can be summarized by two central points: first, unlike 
Topalli‘s (2005) description of subcultures and conventional culture, there is clear 
separation between conventional and nonconventional terrorist cultural values and, 
second, that allegiance to a given value system needs to be absolute and can expand the 
concept of ―drift‖ to be defined as ―radicalization.‖78  
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 In addition to racial and religious ideals, gender roles are also being violated by the out-group.  Violent 
jihadis and neo-Nazis highlight that white and Muslim women are being victimized and masculine roles are 
being reversed by the increase of homosexuality and feminism. 
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 It is important to acknowledge that there are neo-Nazis and violent jihadis that co-exist between a violent 
subculture and conventional culture, so it makes sense to conceive of a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi value 
system outlined by propaganda, as a radicalization continuum that allows for simultaneous attachment to 
conventional and unconventional rules of behavior. However it is equally important to acknowledge that 
thriving in a ―polluted‖ culture is not what violent jihadis or neo-Nazi propagandists‘ desire.  If these 
individuals do ‗drift‘ they are doing so either because they are sleeper cells where drift serves a higher 
subcultural value, that they are not completely loyal to their race or religion because they cannot choose 
between the two cultures, or that because of their current situation it is impossible to reject conventional 
culture for various reasons.  It also makes sense to acknowledge that where a terrorist (or potential terrorist) 
lies along the radicalization continuum depends on a number of factors that are beyond the scope of this 
study. The distinction between how individuals maintain intrinsic or extrinsic loyalties is also beyond the 
scope of this study but certainly warrants attention. It may be that certain types of neo-Nazi or violent jihadi 
―loyalty breeches‖ transgressions are more tolerable externally because internal loyalties neutralize any 
thoughts that minimize racial or religious loyalty. 
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 Topalli (2005: 824) asserts that ―conventional cultures, subcultures, 
countercultures have become more interdependent, with the precepts of one entity 
bleeding into and altering those of another‖ he therefore argues that the distinction 
between criminal subcultures and conventional culture has blurred. Although this may be 
the case for violent, street offenders, such as drug dealers, armed robbers, and carjackers, 
the goal of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists is to create a clear distinction 
between a violent jihadi and neo-Nazi subculture. A clear distinction from previous 
conceptualizations of subcultures is critical because the end game for terrorists is 
different from street crime.  Terrorists intend to mobilize supporters, ultimately leading to 
a revolution where the norms associated with a violent subculture becomes formal 
legislation and those engaged in violence become a governing body.  Therefore, it is 
critical to neutralize any conflict with violence as a rational measure to mobilize the 
white race and Muslims. 
 Techniques of neutralization are intended to promote drift or radicalize two 
different audiences.  The first audience can be identified as those who already support 
violent jihadism or neo-Nazism and the second are those not ideologically aligned.  
Techniques of neutralization allow violent jihadis or neo-Nazis to drift further (or 
radicalize) into a terrorist subculture over conventional society. Diagnostic and 
prognostic frames assert information in such a way that permits radical attitudes or 
behavior to be perceived as rational and altruistic. Diagnostic frames rationalize and thus 
neutralize conventional cultural norms by removing responsibility from neo-Nazi or 
violent jihadi groups and lone wolves.  Individual responsibility is removed because 
whites or Muslims are being attacked, humiliated, and oppressed by members of the ―out-
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group.‖ Therefore violent measures are for the greater good and transcend individual 
culpability. Neutralizing conventional values enable a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi to shut 
off ―inner objections‖ to counter frames from conventional culture that conflict with a 
violent subculture.  When conflicting conventional cultural values and inner conflict are 
rejected, permanent drift occurs.  Another way to define permanent drift is ―conversion‖ 
or the complete rejection and withdrawal from conventional culture. Complete rejection 
of conventional culture is the ultimate goal of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists 
because a high number of ―converts‖ indicates social movement towards collective 
radicalization. 
 Individuals that are not ideologically aligned with neo-Nazism or violent jihadism 
are the second target audience.  Diagnostic frames are used to ―awaken‖ whites and 
Muslims to the just nature of neo-Nazism or violent jihadism by focusing on white or 
Muslim problems as blame targets.  Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists also use 
prognostic frames to clearly distinguish between conventional and subculture solutions.   
Both diagnostic and prognostic frames are used to strengthen social ties (if they exist) 
with current neo-Nazis /violent jihadis or mobilize individuals to seek these relationships 
out.  Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to clearly define the differences 
between a subculture of violence over conventional culture.  This distinction differs from 
Sykes and Matza (1957) orientation between how conventional and subcultures are 
related.  
 Sykes and Matza‘s (1957) theoretical orientation of neutralization theory argues 
that a subculture of delinquency was not absolute nor should be permanent. Other studies 
also support Sykes and Matza‘s theoretical orientation that subcultures blur with 
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conventional culture and are transitory (Anderson, 1990; 1999; Jacobs, 2000; 1999; 
Wright & Decker, 1997; 1994; Shover, 1996; Wolfgang and Feracuti, 1967; Copes, 
2003).  This means that it is possible for individuals to behave according to subcultural 
values while also using conventional culture as points of reference. Subcultural theorists 
also state that an allegiance to a subcultural code does not negate an individual‘s ability 
to co-exist in conventional culture (Wolfgang and Fercuti, 1967; Cohen, 1955; Cohen & 
Short, 1958; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965; Miller, 1958; Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1983; 
Anderson, 1999; Fagan, 1996). However, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists 
argue the exact opposite because the ―end game‖ or outcomes for political violence is 
different from common crime.  Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists argue that it is 
because there is a lack of allegiance to their race or religion that the white race and Islam 
is being polluted.  The objective is to convert an individual from drifting between 
conventional cultures into an absolute allegiance to a subculture that has every intention 
of becoming the future conventional culture. 
 Both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists need to neutralize ―inner voices‖ 
that question using violence as a solution in a terrorist subculture. Neo-Nazis frame 
solutions to neutralize violent measures intended to confront racial extinction, whereas 
violent jihadis frame solutions to neutralize violence to purify Islam. What distinguishes 
neo-Nazi violent solutions from jihadi violence is that motivation is based on prevention, 
whereas violent jihad is a religious obligation.  Even though neo-Nazi and violent jihad 
propagandists share a similarity of using violence as a solution, they differ on motivation.  
Jihadis modify violence into a religious obligation for all Muslims in order to purify 
Islam and force non-Muslim conversions. To a violent jihadi, violence is a religious tool 
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to obtain a position of power, reversing an immoral and secular tide. Although, neo-Nazi 
propagandists include violence as a means of racial preservation, they do not have a 
religious precedent as do violent jihadis where violence becomes an obligation.  Neo-
Nazis, however, want to transform violent solutions by aligning violence as a justifiable 
response promoted by a white based religion. 
 Neutralization theory is based on the idea that individuals choose a value system 
that is more important to them.  Their choice drives attitude formation (cognitive activity) 
and behavior. By opening neutralization theory to terrorist propaganda a model is created 
that differs from Sykes and Matza (1957), Matza (1964), and Topalli‘s (2005) 
perspective.  Unlike common crime or delinquency, terrorism is part of an ideology 
meant to revolutionize conventional culture instead of allowing the status quo to 
continue. Expanding neutralization theory to diagnostic frames in propaganda also 
permits the role of shame to be examined.  
Shame 
 Examining shame in terrorist propaganda advances what Sherman (2002), 
Karstedt (2006) and Rice (2009) assert as a pressing need to examine different types of 
criminality from an emotional perspective.  This study joins the effort to increase the role 
of emotions in criminology and broaden its domain within the field (Bouffard, 2002; Jang 
& Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; Barblet, 2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; 
Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002). By exploring framing in 
terrorist propaganda, this study also address concerns by LaFree (2006) and Rice (2009) 
who assert that criminologists have examined emotions in certain types of crime but have 
ignored emotional analysis of political violence.  
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As suggested by Rice (2009) and Victoroff (2005) I use shame in this research as 
an ideal emotion to examine terrorism because numerous scholars both in criminology 
and terrorism studies have noted the frequency of a narrative of shame, and its 
relationship to political and generic violence (Braithwatie, 1989; 2001; Katz, 1999; Post, 
2005; Haidt, 2006; Scheff & Retzinger; 1991; 2000; Victoroff, 2005;  Scheff, 1994; Rice, 
2009, Shaprio, 2003, Lindner, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Cook & Allison, 2007: Hafez, 
2007; Khasan, 2003; Moghadam, 2002 , 2006; Speckhard, 2005; Stern, 2003; Telhami, 
2002, 2004; LaFree, 2006; Fattah & Fierke, 2009).
79
  Shame is used to increase 
recruitment potential, legitimate grievances in order build a social movement that 
mobilizes into a revolution.
80
 This study is an exploratory attempt to elaborate on the use 
of shame in propaganda for group mobilization, recruitment, radicalization, and group 
solidarity.   
As this study illustrates, shame is framed in terrorist propaganda to trigger 
emotions in a target audience leading to attitude change.
81
 Shame functions as an 
emotional catalyst to generate anger, then rage that ultimately leads to violence (Gilligan, 
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 Although some terrorism scholars acknowledge the power of shame it is not the prevailing terrorism 
studies perspective (Post, 2005; Victoroff, 2005;  Rice, 2009).   
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 According to some observers shame is the master emotion because of its power to influence social 
behavior (Scheff, 1994; 2000; Gilligan, 1996; MacDougall, 1908)
80
.  Gilligan states that ―The emotion of 
shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether towards others or towards the self‖ 
(Gilligan, 1996: 110).  MacDougall (1908:56) ―Shame is the emotion second to none in the extent of its 
influence upon social behavior.‖ Shame is holistic because it describes the entire self and may be evoked 
by failure, loss, social insult, loss of status, pubic exposure of a private incident or scape-goating (Lewis, 
1971). It is how shame is framed and interpreted that makes it the master emotion with the potential to 
become the powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into action (Klandermas, 1984, Jasper, 1998; 
Berbrier, 1998).   
81
Ethnographers or cultural experts assert that shame is a powerful motivator, most notably, Juergensmeyer 
(2003), Gerges (2005) and Stern (2003) are three of the more widely known scholars to stress the emotion 
of shame and terrorism. Masters and Deffenbaugh (2007) provide a short discussion about the role of 
emotions in motivation while Moghaddam (2005) conceptually examines the deep level of perceived 
injustices and the feelings of shame among terrorists.  Victoroff (2005) asserted that humiliation-revenge 
theory seems promising, yet five years later this theory has received little attention.   
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1996). Findings reveal that neo-Nazi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames as the 
leading propaganda method to promote attitude change.  Neo-Nazis consider it shameful 
that members of the white race do not resist being overpowered by ―inferior‖ races. 
Using propaganda, neo-Nazis intended to shame whites into resistance and mobilization 
by illustrating that their race is facing extinction through racial pollution. Neo-Nazis 
characterize the majority of whites as shamefully indifferent and powerless, leading to 
the ultimate demise of the white race.   Because whites are ―nature‘s pinnacle of 
achievement,‖ they should be honored, and instead they are treated with contempt by 
non-whites and this unjust ―weaker‖ status is shameful.  Nazi propaganda assaults whites 
with shame for their ignorance, indifference or passivity to the plight of their race.  The 
reason for their current weaker state is the fact that the majority of whites are not engaged 
in any form of race preservation and in some cases engage in racial destruction by 
supporting multiculturalism, civil rights, affirmative action and other liberal social 
programs.  
 Findings illustrate that shame is also used by violent jihadi propagandists to 
motivate individual Muslims, sects, and global communities, but not to the degree as their 
neo-Nazi counterparts.   This research finds that violent jihadi propagandist intend to 
reach Muslims who are discontented and are feeling either humiliated or frustrated in 
their current status.   Violent jihadi propaganda is constructed in a way that promotes the 
perspective that the West perceives Muslims as ―inferior‖ and powerless, therefore 
‖crusaders‖ and ―infidels‖ are killing Muslims because their blood is less valuable.   An 
unjust ―inferior‖ status is shameful because violent jihadis assert that Muslims are Allah‘s 
standard bearers and therefore should be honored, yet they are treated with contempt.  
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Violent jihadis assault Muslims in their propaganda with shame for their ignorance, 
indifference or passivity to the plight of fellow Muslims under siege by crusaders.  
Muslims are to blame for their current weaker state because they are not following the 
true faith, therefore allowing non-Muslims to dominate them.    
 Emphasizing emotions in this study is line with other criminologists who 
acknowledge that emotions are central to understanding individual and social behavior 
(Sherman, 2002; Bouffard, 2002; Jang & Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; 
Barblet, 2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 
2001; Katz, 2002).  This study also confirms why criminologist should be interested in 
emotions to understand criminological theory because they are powerful motivators that 
wield biological, social and psychological influence (Darwin, 1916; O‘Neal, 1996; 
Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1963; Lewis, 1971; Elias, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; 
Simmel, 1950).
82
 This study also advances how information is fused with emotions, 
specifically shame, to persuade and convert into neo-Nazism and violent jihadism. The 
findings of this study provide the motivation for future research to understand how shame 
plays a role in channeling action, determining opinions, and uniting social ties against a 
common enemy at an individual and organizational level. 
RESEARCH RATIONALE 
 A strength of this study is that it is exploratory and also advances the 
understanding of terrorist propaganda as a technique to neutralize criminogenic attitudes 
and behavior. This study is exploratory on several levels. To my knowledge, this is the 
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 Collins describes emotions as ―the glue of solidarity—and what mobilizes conflict‖ (Collins, 1990; 28). 
Alfred McClung Lee (1945) concludes that emotions are ―deep, largely unverbalized, and withal powerful 
in the determination of opinion and behavior‖ (Lee, 1945: 130).  Jasper (1998) argues that ―our world is 
patterned by affect. Our relationship with other humans, even fleeting ones, is charged with emotions‖ 
(Jasper, 1998; 405).   
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only study that uses frame analysis to examine terrorist propaganda from a criminogenic 
perspective. This is important because frame analysis assists in gaining a better 
understanding of violent subcultural boundaries outlined in terrorist propaganda. One of 
the strengths of this study is that the analysis and approach reveals new insights on data 
readily available to researchers. New insights can compliment or compete with existing 
ways of understanding attitude formation and radicalization among terrorist subcultures. 
Perceiving terrorism as criminogenic propaganda reveals a deeper understanding of how 
frames catalyze emotion in text to evoke participant neutralization.  Understanding the 
process of how neutralization is linked to frames reveals the anatomy of how propaganda 
functions as a criminogenic tool and how ―emotional buttons‖ are used to radicalize and 
convert.   
  This study advances how terrorism is studied in criminology by applying frame 
analysis to terrorist propaganda.  Terrorist propaganda exists to increase crime and 
catalyze movements against conventional culture.  The purpose of criminogenic 
propaganda is to incite emotions, direct them towards ―blame‖ agents and evoke violent 
responses.  Propaganda analysis is normally outside the research domain of 
criminologists, therefore understanding the connection between ideology, dissemination 
and neutralization is a neglected area within criminology and criminal justice.  Using 
frame analysis to examine terrorism propaganda as a process of radicalization expands 
how criminologists have studied the phenomenon.  Violence associated with terrorism 
involves the dissemination of ideas and this study adapts a criminological lens to reveal 
new insights into ideas that transform into behavior that is both criminal and political.   
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 Using a comparative research design and mixed methodology are other strengths 
of this study. A mixed methods approach enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be 
analyzed as emotive catalysts used to incite criminogenic behavior through attitude 
formation. Since emotions are integrated with diagnostic and prognostic frames in 
terrorist propaganda, mixed methods unify the strengths of human cognition and 
computer processing. A comparative research design enables similarities and differences 
to be observed that demonstrate whether a phenomenon is cross-cultural. Qualitative 
methods enable nuances, implied meaning and interpretation of the data to be determined, 
whereas qualitative methods are used because they enable cultural and contextual 
knowledge to be integrated into the coding process.  
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 Generalizability is a limitation of this study because it is exploratory.  This study 
uses a small sample of effective propagandists and while it is valuable for informing 
future research, it also hinders generalizability. The findings of this study cannot be 
extended to all forms of violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda without a larger sample 
size generated by probabilistic sampling.  However, a small sample size does increase the 
depth of analysis and the findings from this study do provide an intricate understanding 
of the anatomy behind neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. A suggestion to improve 
generalizability for future research is to expand analysis to different types of terrorist 
propaganda over different time intervals. 
 This research only examines effective propaganda in text, which is another 
sampling limitation that relates to generalizability. Since effective textual propaganda 
was the focus of the study, the study was limited to written propaganda by influential 
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neo-Nazi and violent jihadi leaders.  Other forms of propaganda, music or speeches, were 
not included and should be examined in future research.  Additionally, it is not known 
what percentage of violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda is considered effective.  A 
comprehensive data base of violent jihadi or neo-Nazi propaganda does not exist to 
determine the percentage of what is considered ―effective‖ propaganda. Specifically, 
future research is needed to determine the ratio of what is considered effective 
propaganda in contrast to the number of all types of propaganda published.   
 Another limitation of this study is the amount of data and the types of measures 
generated by network text analysis.  Specifically, each node can be analyzed 
independently with each other linked node, creating a high number of combinations 
between diagnostic and prognostic frames.  An exhaustive examination and discussion of 
all the quantitative network measures for each node in each semantic network was 
beyond the scope of this research.  Therefore, the relationship between violent solutions 
was chosen as the most important relationship and the measure of closeness was selected 
to outline proximity of solution/problem in the text. Future studies could explore all of 
the measures associated with network text analysis to understand the relationship 
between non-violent solutions and diagnostic problems.  
 A final limitation is the process of internalization or rejection by individuals or 
groups of ―effective‖ propaganda.  Although the samples in this study have a 
demonstrated track record of shaping neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, knowing the 
exact process of how these text were internalized or rejected by different audiences 
remains a limitation.  This research focuses on theoretical and construction issues 
regarding propaganda, so exactly how propaganda is internalized or dismissed by various 
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audiences is beyond the scope of this study.   Additional research is needed to understand 
how ideas transcend propaganda and are dismissed or internalized by adherents to 
increase radicalization to neo-Nazism or violent jihadism. Future research also needs to 
include how individuals and groups internalize propaganda and to what extent it drives 
their violence. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Propaganda Analysis 
Some of the policy implications drawn from this research can be used to better 
understand a critical national and international problem confronting the U.S. 
government
83—how to deconstruct violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda. 84  
Specifically, deconstructing propaganda in a way that allows analysts to isolate and 
examine propaganda from the terrorist‘s point of view. Two of the most powerful 
outcomes of the current information war
85
 are to legitimize neo Nazi and violent jihadi 
                                                          
83
 The threat remains that neo-Nazi propaganda has the potential to incite emotions leading a systematic 
increase of killings, bombings and guerilla warfare by lone wolves (individual actors) and small cells (Simi 
& Futrell, 2010).  Currently violent jihadis are conducting a global campaign to win the hearts and minds of 
―neutral‖ Muslims over to their cause.  Violent jihadis are using propaganda to attempt to create enough 
emotional outrage against the West so that Muslims will join, fund, donate or support their efforts.  If 
successful, the outcome would be significant.  Increasing violent jihadi organization with recruits, finances, 
and equipment would lead to a reciprocal response by U.S. and Coalition Forces.  A counter surge would 
expend a great deal of finances and lives. 
84
 In a U.N sponsored conference on racism in 1997, Marc Knobel from the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 
Los Angeles, California noted that the 600 Internet sites were devoted to hate (Denning, 1999).  In 2010, 
Abraham Cooper also of the Simon Wiesenthal Center reported that the number of hate and terrorists 
websites that now included social network pages, chat room, micro bloggers was 11,500 (Lohr, 2010).  
These figures are supplemented by the spring 2010 report from the Southern Poverty Law Centers 
indicating a 54% rise of hate groups between 2000 and 2008.   The same report identified that almost 1,000 
hate groups existed in 2009.  However, ―anti-immigrant vigilante groups soared by nearly 80%, adding 
some 136 new groups during 2009‖ which was an increase from 173 in 2008 to 309 in 2009 (Potok, 2010: 
second paragraph). 
85
 An information war is defined as global battle of ideas intent on winning the hearts and minds of local 
and global populations. The ideological battlefield of 2011 has evolved into a warzone defined by digital 
geography and an enemy that cannot be recognized by a uniform (Crilley, 2001). 
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grievances and shame a population to anger or rage.  Anger arising from perceived 
injustices is intended to be forceful enough to make targeted listeners support the 
propagandists‘ cause.  Winning minds implies ideological consent, while winning hearts 
by terrorists is measured by an increased number of recruits, more funds and resources 
for their cause. 
This research provides a better understanding of the mechanics of how 
propaganda can persuade audiences to gain popular support in order to mobilize.  Gaining 
popular support is arguably one of the most important functions of any political, religious 
or social movement (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998).  In order to carry out a revolution 
with the support of the people their hearts must be ―won‖ (Carruthers, 1995).  Without a 
certain degree of support from the general population, any political movement will 
remain on the fringes and marginalized. Therefore, a propagandist is interested in 
disseminating his or her information as rapidly and broadly as possible (Lee, 1952).  
Until recently, defeating terrorists and terrorist groups militarily demonstrated 
success, not winning an information war (Aylin-Foster, 2005; Friis, 2010).  Governments 
are not necessarily interested in ―understanding‖ the emotions of terrorists; defeating the 
enemy militarily has usually been the logical paradigm (Brannan, Esler & Strindberg, 
2001). Without specific nation states to label as the enemy, despite George Bush‘s 
attempt to do so in the countries listed as the axis of evil, fighting a terrorist information 
war was given short shrift.  Under George Bush‘s leadership, the War on Terrorism 
promoted a strategy that stressed military defeat, not ―knowing the hearts of the enemy.‖ 
An outcome of not knowing the enemy or the local population led to using tactics that 
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often turned the local population against coalition forces fostering an increase of recruits 
and resources for the terrorists (Sennott, 2008).   
It took an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan for United States Governmental and 
military officials to realize that the Cold War conventional war doctrine was not working 
(Anderson, 2010).  Simply killing every terrorist in Iraq was not effective.  In response to 
this problem, the U.S. paradigm shifted in 2007 when a new strategy was implemented 
by the United States military in Iraq (JCSP, 2009). A central component of this strategy 
recognized that success depended on understanding the emotional pulse of the local 
population in which terrorists are embedded (JCSP, 2009). 
The U.S. government‘s hearts and minds strategy is barely four years old and is 
still an emerging doctrine (Friis, 2010; JCSP, 2009).  Identifying, examining, and 
analyzing how ideas, emotions and diagnostic/prognostic frames are integrated in text is a 
tangible way to utilize TCP as part of this doctrine.  Frames are significant because they 
provide a way to examine the symbolic interaction between emotions and ideas in 
terrorist propaganda in order to develop effective counter propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns in the current information war. This study is significant for future policy 
implications because it defines how to expand TCP in two ways: operationalization and 
analysis. This is accomplished by incorporating methods and theory from criminology 
and other disciplines to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze how propagandists frame 
their problems and solutions in text to radicalize supporters. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In closing, there are several different directions for future research. One of the 
most pressing is to better understand the relationship between propaganda and 
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radicalization/recruitment. Neo-Nazi and violent propaganda is intended to promote 
attitudes that foster conversion or reinforce existing attitudes.  Future research can be 
directed to understand how propaganda persuades recruits to organize their experience 
through a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi point of view. Additional research is also needed to 
examine the relationship of propaganda throughout the radicalization process, specifically 
in attitude formation. Furthermore, research is needed to gain insights in how propaganda 
also serves as a tool to reinforce radical attitudes of existing members in order to remain 
permanently in a violent subculture. 
 Future research should expand propaganda research beyond text and also explore 
additional terrorist movements. In order to generalize to other terrorist ideologies, 
propaganda from other terrorist movements needs to be examined.  These additional 
domains can be compared to how information is framed in text.  A first step to expanding 
this research into other domains is the development of a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi 
propaganda database to collect different types of propaganda generated by either 
movement.  
  Finally, neutralization theory is difficult to test because the independent variable 
(whether someone neutralizes or not) casts a prospective effect on the dependent variable 
(violation of conventional culture, including offending or not offending) (Topalli, 2005). 
However, criminologist can advance neutralization theory by examining how individuals 
involved in terrorist groups neutralize conflicting ―inner voices‖ and counter frames from 
conventional culture when entering, engaging or exiting violent subcultures. Examining 
how techniques of neutralization function (or fail) for individual neo-Nazis and violent 
jihadis can be accomplished through interviews, ethnographic observation or content 
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analysis.  When techniques of neutralization fail is also an interesting approach to 
examine why neo-Nazi or violent jihadis cut ideological and social ties to re-enter 
conventional culture. Most studies of neutralization theory are retrospective and it is 
often hard to distinguish whether individual responses are recollections of a 
neutralization process or excuses created to justify their actions in response to the 
researcher (Minor, 1981; 1980). Nevertheless, Agnew (1994) suggests such questions can 
be answered through longitudinal methodologies that track offenders‘ use of 
neutralizations prospectively. Such studies for terrorists would support neutralization 
theory by distinguishing the effect on radical/violent behavior of neutralizations as a 
preemptive and ideological reinforcing cognitive process. More important, ethnographic 
longitudinal studies would allow researchers to illustrate the extent to which the use of 
neutralization changes across time and whether propaganda continues to remain salient to 
subcultural attitudes and behavior that makes engaging in terrorism ―rational‖ or 
―altruistic‖ behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 
 
References 
Aaron, D. (2008) In the Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad—Compilation and 
Commentary. RAND Corporation. 
Abbott, A. 1992. Of time and space: The contemporary relevance of the Chicago School. 
Sorokin Lecture delivered to the Southern Sociological Society, New Orleans, LA.  
Aboul-Enein, Y. (2004) Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic 
Militancy. Counterproliferation Paper No. 21., USAF Counterproliferation Center, 
Maxwell AFB.  
Adler PA. 1985. Wheeling and Dealing. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 
 
Agnew, R. (1992). "Foundation for a General Strain Theory." Criminology 30(1), 47-87 
 
Agnew, R. (1994) The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence. Criminology. Volume 
32, Issue 4. Pp. 555-580. 
Agnew, R. (2001) Building on the Foundation of General Strain: Specifying the types of 
strain most likely to lead to crime and delinquency. Journal of Crime and Delinquency. 
38: 319-361. 
Agnew, R. (2006) Storylines as a neglected cause of crime. Journal of Research in Crime 
and Delinquency.  43, 119-147. 
Agnew, R. & Peters, A. (1986) The techniques of neutralization: An analysis of 
predisposing and situational factors. Criminal Justice and Behavior 13:81–97. 
Akers, R. (2000). Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evaluation, and Application. 
Los Angeles: Roxbury. 
Allardt, Erick. (1990)  ‗Challenges for Comparative Social Research.‘  Acta Sociologica. 
Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 183-193. 
Altheide, D. (1985) Media Power. Beverly Hills, CA.:Sage. 
Altheide, David (1987) Ethnographic Content Analysis. Qualitative Sociology, Spring. 
Pp. 65-77. 
Altheide, David. (2008) Ehtnographic Content Analysis. The Sage Encyclopedia of 
Qualitative Research. Sage. 
Altheide, D. & Snow, R. (1979) Media Logic.Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
 
Alvarez, A. (1997) Adjusting to genocide: The techniques of neutralization and the 
holocaust. Social Science History. 21:2 Summer Pp.139-178. 
 
Anderson, E. (1999) Code of the Streets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Anderson, E. (1990) Streetwise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
195 
 
 
Anderson,  G. (2010) Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism: A Civilian‘s View. Small 
Wars Journal. Accessed July 2010 at: smallwarsjournal.com. 
 
Anheier, H., Neidhardt, F. & Vortkamp, W. (1998) Movement Cycles and the Nazi Party: 
Activities of the Munich NSDAP, 1925-1930. American Behavior Science. 41: 1262-81. 
 
Arena, M. P., & Arrigo, B. A. (2000). White supremacist behavior: Toward an integrated 
social 
psychological model. Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 21, 213–241. 
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. (2005) How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.   
Cambridge University Press:New York. 
 
Ashmore, R. D. , & Del Boca, F. K. (1979). Sex stereotypes and implicit personality 
theory: Toward a cognitive-social psychological conceptualization. Sex Roles, 5, 219-
248. 
 
Aylwin-Foster, N. (2005) Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations. 
Military Review. (November-December) Pp. 1-15. 
 
Azzam, A. (1987a) The Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman. 
Available at Religioscope. http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence 
_1_table.htm. 
 
Azzam, A. (1987b) Join the Caravan. Available at Religioscope. 
http://www.religioscope.com/ 
info/doc/jihad/azzam_caravan_1_foreword.htm. 
Azzam, A. (1988) ―Al-Qa‘ida.‖ al-Jihad 41 (April): 46. 
 
Azzam, A.  (2001) ―Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations.‖ Originally posted on the 
website 
of Azzam Publications; extracted from earlier lectures. Available at http:// 
www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm. 
 
Azzam (n.d. #1) ―The Signs of al-Rahman in the Afghan Jihad.‖ Available at 
IslamicAwakening.com. http://www.islamicawakening.com/print.php? 
articleID=877. 
 
Azzam (n.d. #2) ―What Role Can Sisters Play in Jihad?‖ Available at 
IslamicAwakening.com. 
http:// www.islamicawakening.com/print.php?articleID=623. 
 
Babbie, E. (1986). Observing Ourselves. Belmont: Wadsworth.  
196 
 
Babbie, E. (1993) The Practice of Social Research. (7
th
 ed.) Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company. 
Babbie, Earl & Benaquisto, Lucia (2010) Fundamentals of Social Research. 2
nd
 Edition.  
Nelson Education: Toronto, Ontario. 
Baird, J.W. (1974) The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945. University 
of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 
Baker, Al; Javier C. Hernandez (May 20, 2009). "4 Accused of Bombing Plot at Bronx 
Synagogues". New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/nyregion/21arrests.html. Retrieved March, 2010. 
 
Ball, R. A.(1966) An empirical exploration of neutralization theory. Criminology. 4:22–
32. 
 
Ball-Rokeach, S. (1973). Values and violence: A test of the subculture of violence thesis. 
American Sociological Review, 38, 736-749. 
Ballard, J. D. (2005). Terrorism, media, and public policy. The Oklahoma City bombing. 
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
 
Barak (1994)(ed.) Media, Process, and the Social Construction of Crime: Studies in 
Newsmaking Criminology. New York: Garland. 
 
Barak, Gregg, ed. (2000). Crime and crime control: A global view. Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 
 
Barak, Gregg. (2004). ―A Reciprocal Approach to Terrorism and Terrorist-Like 
Behavior.‖  In M. Deflem (ed.), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological 
Perspectives (pp.33-49). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
Barak, Gregg. (2005). ―Applying Integrated Theory: A Reciprocal Theory of Violence 
and Nonviolence.‖ In S. Henry and M. Lanier (eds.), The Essential Criminology Reader 
(forthcoming). Boulder, CO: Westview.  
 
Barblet, J.M. (2002) Moral indignation, class, inequality and justice: An exploration and 
revision of Ranulf. Theoretical Criminology. Vol. 6(3): 279-297. 
Baron, S. W. (1998). Street youth and criminal violence. Journal of Research in Crime 
and Delinquency [Online], 35 (2), 29 pages. 
Barsade S.G. (2002). The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and Its Influence on Group 
Behavior. Administrative Science Quarterly; 47, 644-675. 
 
Bass, B.M.  & Dunteman, G.B. (1963) Behavior as a function of self interaction and task-
orientation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 66, pp. 419-428. 
197 
 
 
Bennett, W.L.(1988) News: The politics of illusion. New York: Longman. 
 
Bennett, Richard. (2004) 'Comparative criminology and criminal justice research: The 
state of our Knowledge.‘ Justice Quarterly, 21:1, pp. 1-21. 
 
Berbrier, Mitch. (1998) Half the Battle: Cultural Resonance, Framing Process, and Ethnic 
Affections in Contemporary White Separatist Rhetoric.  Social Problems. 45. Pp. 431-50. 
 
Benford, R.D. (1993) Frame disputes with the nuclear disarmament movement. Social 
Forces. 71:677-701. 
 
Benford, R.D. & Hunt, S.A. (1992) Dramaturgy and social movements: the social 
construction and communication of power.  Sociological Inquiry. 62:36-55. 
 
Benford, R. D.& Snow, David (2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment.‖ Annual Review of Sociology. 26:611-39. 
 
Berger, Bennett (1988) The Survival of a Counterculture: Ideological work and Everyday 
life among Rural Commndards. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ. 
 
Berkowitz, Stephen D. 1982. An Introduction to Structural Analysis: The Network 
Approach to Social Research. Toronto: Butterworth.  
 
Bergen, P. (2006) The Osama bin Laden I Know: New York: Free Press, 2006 
 
Bernys, Edward. (1928) Propaganda. Horace Liveright: New York.  
Best, J. (1987) Rhetoric claims-making: Constructing the Mission Children Problem.  
Social Problems. Vol. 34, No. 2, April. Pp. 101-121. 
 
Best, J. (1990) Threatened Children. The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bjorgo, Tore. (2005) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and was forward.  
Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a multi pronged approach.  New York: Routledge. 
Black, D. (2004) The geometry of Terrorism. Sociological Theory. 22, 14-25. 
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Prentice 
Hall.Bobrow and Collins. 
Blum-Kulka, S. & Liebes, T. (1993) Frame Ambiguities: Inftifada Narrativization of the 
experience by Israeli Soldiers. Pp. 27-52 in Framing the Intifada: People and the Media, 
edited by Akiba A. Cohen and Gadi Wolsfeld, Norwood, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Bobrow, D.G. & Collins, A.M. (1975) (eds) Representation and Understanding, New 
York: Academic Press. 
198 
 
Bohner, G. Reinhard, M., Rutz, S. Strum, S. Kerschbaum, B. & Effler, D. (1998) Rape 
myths as neutralizing cognitions for a causal impact of anti-victim attitudes on men‘s self 
reported likelihood of raping.  European Journal of Social Psychology. Vol. 28. Issue 2, 
Pp. 257-268. 
Bonacich, P., (1972). Factoring and weighing approaches to clique identification. Journal 
of Mathematical Sociology. 2, 113–120. 
Bouffard, J. (2002) The Influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual 
aggression. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 30. Issue 2, March-April, Pp. 121-134. 
 
Borgatti, S.P. (2005) Centrality and network flow. Social Networks. 27(1): 55-71. 
 
Brachman, J. (2009) Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice. Routledge Press: New York, 
New York. 
 
Braithwaite, J.(1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Braithwaite, J. (2001) Decomposing a holistic vision of restorative justice, Contemporary 
Justice Review 3(4). 433-440. 
 
Brannan, D. W., Esler, P. F., & Strindberg, N. T. A. (2001). Talking to "terrorists": 
Towards an independent analytical framework for the study of violent substate activism. 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24(1), 3-24. 
Bridges, T. (1995) The Rise of David Duke. Mississippi University Press. 
Burke, J. (2004) Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. I.B. Tauris: London. 
Burke, P.J, Stets, J.E. & Pirog-Good, M.A. (1988) Gender Identiy, Self Esteem, and 
Physical and Sexual Abuse in Dating Relationships. Social Psychology Quarterly. Vol. 
51, No. 3, Sep., pp. 272-285. 
Burris, V., Smith, E. & Strahm, A. (2000) White Supremacist Networks on the Internet. 
Social Focus. Vol. 33(2), pp. 215-235. 
Burt, Ronald S. (1992). Structural Holes: The Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Byers, B., Criders, B., & Biggers, G. (1999) Bias crime motivation: A study of hate crime 
and offender neutralization techniques used against the Amish. Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice, I, 15.  
 
Cable, S. & Shriver,T. ( 1995) The Production and Extrapolation of Meaning in the 
Environmental Justice Movement. Sociological Spectrum. Vol. 15, Pp. 419-442. 
 
Callahan, J. & McCollum, E. (2002) ‗Conceptualizations of Emotion Research in 
Organizational Contexts.‘ Advances in Developing Human Resources, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 
4-21. 
199 
 
 
Calvert, John (2000), "`The World is an Undutiful Boy!`: Sayyid Qutb's American 
Experience," Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. II, No.1, pp. 87–103:98. 
Calvert, J. (2007) The Context of Religion and Violence: The Striving Shaykh: Abdullah 
Azzam and the Revival of Jihad. Journal of Religion and Society.  Supplement Series 2. 
Pp. 83- 102. 
 
Cantril, H. (1938) Propaganda Analysis.  The English Journal. Vol. 27. No. 3, March. Pp. 
217-221. 
Cao, L., Adams, A., & Jensen, V. J. (1997). A test of the black subculture of violence 
thesis: A research note. Criminology, 35 (2), 367-379. 
Capek, S.M. (1993) The environmental justice frame: A conceptual discussion and an 
application. Social Problems. Vol. 40. No. 1, Feb., Pp. 5-24. 
Carley, K.M. (1986) ‗An Approach for Relation Social Structure to Cognitive Structure.‘ 
Journal of Mathematical Sociology. 12(2): pp. 137-89. 
Carley, K.M. & Palmquist, M. (1992) ‗Extracting, Representing, and Analyzing Mental 
Models.‘  Social Forces, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Mar.), pp. 601-636  
Carley, K.M., & Reminga, J. (2004) ORA: Organizational Risk Analyzer. Carnegie 
Mellon 
University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research International, 
Technical Report CMU-ISRI-04-106. 
 
Carley, K.M. (1993) Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content 
Analysis and Mapping Analysis. Sociological Methodology. Vol. 23. Pp. 75-126. 
Carley, K.M. (1988) Formalizing the Social Expert‘s Knowledge. Sociological Methods 
and Research.  Vol. 17. Pp. 165-232. 
Carley, K.M. (2006) A Dynamic Network Approach to the Assessment of Terrorist 
Groups and the Impact of Alternative Courses of Action. In Visualising Network 
Information (pp. KN1-1 – KN1-10). Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-IST-063, Keynote 1. 
Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: RTO. Available from: http://www.rto.nato.int/abstracts.asp. 
Carley, K. & Reminga, J. (2004) ORA: Organization Risk Analyzer. CASOS Technical 
ReportJanuary, CMU-ISRI-04-101 Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer 
Science ISRI - Institute for Software Research International. 
 
Carley, K.M.( 1984) Consensus Construction. Thesis (Ph.D.) Harvard University. 
Carley, K. M. (1994) Extracting Culture Through Textual Analysis. .Poetics, Vol. 22. Pp. 
291-312. 
200 
 
Carley, K.M. (2006) A Dynamic Network Approach to the Assessment of Terrorist 
Groups.  Paper presented at the Institute for Software Research International.  Oct, 
Pittsburgh PA. 
Carley, K.M. & Palmquist, M..(1992)  Extracting, Representing, and Analyzing Mental 
Models. Social Forces. March. Vol. 70. Issue 3. Pp. 601-636  
Carmichael, S. & Piquero, A. ( 2004) Sanctions, Perceived Anger, and Criminal 
Offending.  Journal of Quantitative Criminology. Vol. 20, Number , Pp. 371-393. 
Carroll, W.K. & Ratner,R.S. (1999) Media Strategies and Political Projects: A 
Comparative Study of Social Movements. Canadian Journal of Sociology.  Vol. 24. 1: 
Pp. 1-34. 
Carruthers, Susan. (1995) Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media 
and Colonial Counter-Insurgency, 1944-1960. Leicester University Press: Leicester. 
Chaiken, S. Wood, W. & Eagly, A. H. (1996) Principles of persuasion. In E.T. Higgins & 
Kruglanski (Eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of basic principles.  (Pp. 702-742). 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Charon, Joel. (1998)Symbolic Interactionism: An Introduction, an Interpretation an 
Integration.  New Jersey: Prentice Hall;   
Cicourel A. (1974) Cognitive Sociology. Free Press. 
Cohen, A. (1955) Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 
Cohen, A. and Short, J.F. (1958) Research in delinquent subcultures. Journal of Social 
Issues 14:21–32. 
 
Collins, Randall. (1990) Stratification, emotional energy and transient emotions. In 
Theodore D Kemper (ed.), Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions. Albany: 
SUNY Press. 
Cook, D. & Allison, O. (2007) Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith 
and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Muze Press. 
Cooley, Charles (1922) Human Nature and the Social Order.  New York: Scribner‘s. 
Copes, H. (2003) Societal attachments, offending frequency, and techniques of 
neutralization. Deviant Behavior 24:101–127. 
 
Coy, P. G. & Woehrle, M. (1996) Constructing Identity and Oppositional Knowledge: 
The Framing Practices of Peace Movements Organizations during the Gulf War. 
Sociological Spectrum.  16: 287-327. 
Crilley, K. (2001) Information warfare: New battle fields, terrorists, propaganda, and the 
Internet. Aslib Proc. 53, 7, 250--264.  
 
201 
 
Crenshaw, Martha. (1995) Terrorism in Context. Pennsylvania State University Press: 
University Press Pa. 
Crelinsten, R. (2005). Mass-mediated terrorism: The central role of the media in 
terrorism and counterterrorism. Political Communication, 22(1), 115-118. 
Cressey, Donald R. 1983 ‗‗Delinquent and Criminal Subcultures.‘‘ In S. E. Kadish, ed., 
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. New York: Free Press. 
Cromwell, P. & Thurman, Q.( 2003) ―The Devil Made Me Do It: Use of Neutralizations 
by Shoplifters.‖ Deviant Behavior 24 (6): 353-550. 
 
D‘Angelo, P. (2002) News Framing as Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A 
Response to Entman. Journal of Communication. Vol. 52. Issue 4, Pp. 870-888. 
Dabney, D. (1995) Neutralization and deviance in the workplace: Theft of supplies and 
medicines by hospital nurses. Deviant Behavior 16:313–331. 
 
Danowski,J. (1982) A Network-based Content Analysis Methodology for Computer 
Mediated Communication: An Illustration with a Computer Bulletin Board.‖ Pp. 904-25 
in Communication Yearbook. Sage. 
Danowski, J. (1993). Network Analysis of Message Content. In W.D. Richards & G.A. 
Barnett (Eds.), Progress in Communication Science, XII (pp. 197 – 222). Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex.  
Danchev, Alex. (2006) ‗Like a Dog!: Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror‘, 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31(3): pp. 259–83. 
Darwin, Charles. (1916) The expression of the emotions in man and animals.  Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
De Armond, Paul (1999) Right Wing Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Motives, Strategies and Movements. Public Good Project. 
www.publicgood.org/reports/wmdbrief.pdf 
De Haan, W. & Loader, I. (2002) On the emotions of crime, punishment and social 
control. Theoretical Criminology. Vol. 6(3). Pp. 243-253. 
Deflem, Mathieu (1997). The Globalization of Heartland Terror: Reflections on the 
Oklahoma City Bombing. The Critical Criminologist 8(1), 5.  
Deflem, M. (2005). "Reading Terrorism and Terrorists: Review essay." Theoretical 
Criminology 9(2):231-236. 
Della Porta, D. (1995) Italian Leftwing Terrorism, in M. Crenshaw (ed.), "Terrorism in 
Context." University Park, PA, Penn State Press, pp. 105-159. 
 
202 
 
Denzin, N. (2006). Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook. Aldine Transaction. (5th 
edition). 
Denzin, Norman, and Yvonna Lincoln, S. (1998) Entering the Field of Qualitative 
Research. In Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, edited by N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln, S. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing. 
Diesner, J., & Carley, K. M. (2004) AutoMap1.2 - Extract, analyze, represent, and 
compare mental models from texts (Technical Report CMU-ISRI-04-100): Carnegie 
Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research 
International. 
Diesner, J., & Carley, K. M. (2005) Revealing Social Structure from Texts: Meta-Matrix 
Text Analysis as a novel method for Network Text Analysis. In V. K. Narayanan & D. J. 
Armstrong (Eds.), Causal Mapping for Information Systems and Technology Research 
(pp. 81-108). Harrisburg, PA: Idea Group Publishing. 
Diesner, J. &  Carley, K.M. (2005)  Exploration of Communication Networks from the 
Enron Email Corpus. Paper is part of the Dynamics Network Project in CASOS at 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
Dobratz, Betty and Shanks-Meile, Stephanie. (1997) White Power! White Pride! The 
White Separatist Movement in the United States. New York: Cengage Gale. 
Doob, Leonard W. (1935) Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique.  New York: 
Henery Hold and Company, Inc.  
Dorronsoro, Gilles. (2009) The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan. Washington, 
D.C.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Douglas, Jack D. (1970) Understanding Everyday Life: Toward the Reconstruction of 
Sociological Knowledge . Chicago: Aldine. 
Dowd, David L. (1946) Art as propaganda in the French Revolution: A Study of Jacques-
Louis David.  University of California, Berkeley Press. 
Dowling, R. E. (1986). Terrorism and the media: A rhetorical genre. Journal of 
Comunication, 36(1), 12-24.  
 
Dubin, R. (1959) "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continuities in Social Theory." 
American Sociological Review 24:147-163. 
 
Dugan,L. LaFree, G., & Piquero, A.R. (2005) Testing rational choice model of airline 
hijackings. Criminology, 43, 1031-1065. 
 
Durham, Martin. (1996) Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot 
Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing. Terrorism and Political Violence 8:65-79 
Spring. 
 
203 
 
Duke, David. (2003) Jewish Supremacism. Free Speech Press. 
Duke, D. (1998) My Awakening. Free Speech Books. 
Durkheim, E. (1897/1997). Suicide. NY: Free Press. 
 
Durkheim, Emile. (1964), The Rules of Sociological Method, translated from the French 
by S. S. Solovay and J. H. Mueller edited by George E. G. Catlin, New York, London, 
the Free Press. 
 
Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2007) The Role of History and Continuity in Terrorism Research. 
In Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction, edited by 
Magnus Ranstorp. Routledge London and New York.   
 
Dyer, M.G. (1987) ‗Emotions and Their Computations: Three Computer 
Models.‘Cognition and Emotion, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 323-347.  
 
Ebbe, Obi N.I., ed. (1996) Comparative and international criminal justice systems: 
Policing, judiciary, and corrections. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Elias, Norbert. (2000) The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic 
Investigations. Editors, Dunning, E. Goudsblom and Mennell, S.  Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers Inc. 
Eliason, S. L., & Dodder, R. A. (1999). Techniques of neutralization used by deer 
poachers in the western United States: A research note. Deviant Behavior, 20 (3), 233-
252. 
Ellison, C. G. (1991). An eye for an eye? A note on the southern subculture of violence 
thesis. Social Forces, 69, 1223-1239. 
Ellul, Jacques. (1973) Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. Trans. Konrad 
Kellen & Jean Lerner. New York: Knopf, 1965. New York: Random House. 
 
Ellul, Jacques. (1982)  FLN propaganda in France during the Algerian war / Jacques 
Ellul ; translated with an introduction by Randal Marlin  By Books: Ottawa. 
Emirbayer, M. & Goodwin, J. (1994) Network Analysis, Culture and the Problem of 
Agency. American Journal of Sociology.  99:1411-53. 
Entman, R. M. (1993) Framing: Towards clarification of fractured paradigm. Journal of 
Communication. 43(4), Pp. 51-58. 
Entman, R. (2007) Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power. Journal of 
Communication. Vol. 57, Issue 1, Pp. 163-173. 
204 
 
Erlanger, H. S. (1974). The empirical status of the sub-cultures of violence thesis. Social 
Problems, 22, 280-292. 
Evans, E. (2005) The Mind of a Terrorist: How Terrorists See Strategy and Morality. 
World Affairs. Vol. 167, Number 4, Spring. Pp. 175-179. 
Fahmy, S. (2007) Filling out the Frame: Transnational Visual Coverage and News 
Practitioners’ Attitudes towards the Reporting of War and Terrorism. Saarbrücken: 
VDM Verlag Dr. Müller. 
 
Fagan, J. (1996) ‗‗Gangs, Drugs, and Neighborhood Change.‘‘ In C. Ronald Huff, ed., 
Gangs in America, 2d ed. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage. 
 
Falkenrath, R. (1998) Confronting Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism. Survival 
40:43– 65. 
 
Fangen, K.(2003) A Death Mask of Masculinity: The Brotherhood of Norwegian Right-
Skinheads. Ashgate: Aldershot. 
 
Fattah, K. and Fierke, K. M., (2009), 'A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation 
and Political Violence in the Middle East', European Journal of International Relations, 
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 67-93 
 
Fauconnier, G. 1985 Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural 
Language.  Cambridge: Bradford Books. MIT Press. 
Feagin, J.R., Vera, H., & Batur, P. (2001). White racism (2nd ed). New York: Routledge. 
Feagin, J.R. (2010) Racist America: Roots, Current Realities and Future Reparations 
Remaking. Taylor and Francis: New York, NY. 
Feldman, M. & March, J. (1981) Information Organizations as Signal and Symbol. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 26, No. 2. (June) Pp. 171-186. 
Felson, R. B., Liska, A. E., South, S. J., & McNulty, T. L. (1994). The subculture of 
violence and delinquency: Individual vs. school context effects. Social Forces, 73(1), 
155-73. 
Ferber, Abby. (1998) White Man Falling: Race Gender and White Supremacy.  Rowan & 
Littlefield: New York. 
Ferber, A. (2004) Home Grown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism. Routledge: New 
York, NY. 
Ferraro, K. & Johnson, J. (1983) How Women Experience Battering: The Process of 
Victimization. Social Problems. 30:325-338. 
205 
 
Filene, Edward. (1938) Institute for Propaganda Analysis.  Propaganda Analysis. New 
York: Columbia, University Press. 
Fischer, C. (1975). "The Effect of Urban Life on Traditional Values." Social Forces 53 
(March): 420-32. 
Flynn, K. & Gerhardt, G. (1990) The Silent Brotherhood, Signet. 
Fontan, Victoria (2006) ‗Polarization between Occupier and Occupied in Post-Saddam 
Iraq: Colonial Humiliation and the Formation of Political Violence.‘Terrorism and 
Political Violence. 18: pp. 217–38. 
 
Frazier, E. Franklin. (1957). The Black Bourgeoisie. Free Press paperback edition: 1997 
 
Freeman, L.C. (1979) Centrality in social networks. I. Conceptual clarification. Social 
Networks 1 , pp. 215–239.  
 
Friis, K. (2010) Peacekeeping and Counter-insurgency-Two of a Kind? International 
Peacekeeping. Vol. 17. No. 1. February. Pp. 49-66. 
 
Friedman, T. (2001) Fighting bin Ladenism.  Foreign Affairs. November 6. 
Friedman, R. (1995) Blowback. New York. March 27. Pp. 38-48. 
Futrell, R., Simi, P. and Gottschalk, S. (2006). ―Understanding Music in Movements: The 
White Power Music Scene.‖ The Sociological Quarterly 47:275–304. 
 
Gallimore, T. (1998) American Propaganda Broadcasting to Cuba in a Post-Cold War 
Order. In Propaganda in the 20
th
 Century: Contributions to its History.  Edited by Jurgen 
Wilke.  Hamilton Press, Inc. Cresskill New Jersey. 
 
Gamson, W., Fireman, B. & Rytina, S. (1982) Encounters with Unjust Authority.  
Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. 
Gamson, W.A. (1992) The social psychology of collective action. In A.D. Morris & 
McClung Mueller (eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory.  (Pp. 53-76). New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Ganor, B. (2007). The counter-terrorism puzzle: A guide for decision makers. New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
Gans, H.J. (1979) Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly 
News, Newsweek and Time. New York: Pantheon 
Gant, Jim. (2009) A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan. One Tribe at a Time. Produced 
and published by Nine Sisters Imports, Inc., Los Angeles, California.  Available 
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-
content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf. 
 
206 
 
Gardell, M. (2003), Gods of the Blood: The Pagan Revival and White Separatism, Duke 
University Press. 
Gentner, D.  Stevens, A. (1983) Mental Models. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribaum 
Associates, Inc.  
Gerhards, J. & Rucht, D. (1992) Mesomobilization: Organizing and framing in two 
protest campaigns in West Germany. American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 98. Pp. 555-
595. 
Gescheider, G. (1997). "Chapter 1: Psychophysical Measurement of Thresholds: 
Differential Sensitivity". Psychophysics: the fundamentals (3rd ed.). Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Gerges, F.A. (2005) The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 
Gerstenfeld, G.A. Grant, D.R. & Chiang, C.P. (2003) Hate online: A Content Analysis of 
Extremist Internet Sites. Annual of Social Issues and Public Policy. Vol. 3(1). Pp. 29-44. 
Gibbs, Jack P. (1989). Conceptualization of Terrorism. American Sociological Review. 
54(3), 329-340.  
Gilligan, J. (1996) Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic.  Vintage Books. 
 
Gitlin, T. (1980) The whole world is watching: Mass Media in the making of the new left. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
Goffman, Erving. (1963) Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Goffman, Erving. (1974) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.  
Goodrick-Clarke. (2002) Black Sun: Ayran Cults, Esoteric Nazis and the Politics of 
Identity. New York University Press: New York  
Goodwin, J.,  Jasper, J. & Poletta, F. (2001) Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social 
Movements. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Gray, E., Jackson, J. and Farrall, S. (2008)  Reassessing Fear of Crime in England and 
Wales‗, European Journal of Criminology, 5(3): 309-36. 
 
Gregg, Gary. (2007) Culture and Identity in a Muslim Society.  Oxford University Press. 
Griffin, R. (2001) The Fame of a Dead Man’ s Deeds: An Up-Close Portrait of the White 
Nationalist William Pierce. ISBN 0-7173-7845-4. 
Gunaratna, R. (2002) Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
207 
 
Gustavson, T. & Sherkat, D.E. (2004) Elucidating the Web of Hate: The Ideological 
Structuring of Network Ties Among White Supremacist Groups on the Internet. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, 2004. 
Hafez, M. (2007) Suicidal Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom.  
Washington D.C. United States Institute for Peace. 
Haidt, Jonathan. (2006) Positive Emotions Motivate Terrorism.  Paper presented at The 
Federation of Behavioral, Psychological and Cognitive Sciences.  Access March 2010: 
http://www.thefederationonline.org/events/Briefings/2006_SPSP_DHS/Haidt_Emotions_
Sum.pdf 
 
Hale, C. (1996), Fear of Crime: A Review of the Literature, International Review of 
Victimology, 4: 79–150. 
Hall, P. & Hewitt, J. (1970) The Quasi-Theory of Communication and the Management 
of Dissent. Social Problems. (Summer). Vol. 18. No. 1 Pp. 17-27. 
Hall, P. & Hewitt, J.(1973) Social Problems, Problematic Situation and Quasi Theories. 
American Sociological Review. Vol. 38. (June). Pp. 367-374. 
Hancock, J. Beaver, D., Chung, C., Frazee, J., Pennebaker, J., Graesser, A., & Cai, Z. 
(2010) Social Language Processing: A Framework for analyzing the communication of 
terrorists and authoritarian regimes.  Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression.  Vol. 2, No. 2, May, Pp. 108-132. 
Hamm, M.S. (2004) Apocalyptic violence: The Seduction of Terrorist Subcultures. 
Theoretical Criminology, 8, 323-339. 
Harris, J. & Huntington, A. (2000) ‗Emotions as Analytic Tools: Qualitative Research, 
Feelings and Psychotherapeutic Insight.‘  In  The Emotional Nature of Qualitative 
Research.  Edited by Kathleen Gilbert.  CRC Press Boca Raton Florida. 
Hauner, Philipp (2007) The Voice of Al Qaeda An analysis of its propaganda and media 
strategies. Druck and Bindung: Books on Demand GmbH, Norderstedt Germany. 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotional contagion.  New York:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Heidegger, Martin (2000), Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), 
London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Herf, J. (2009) Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World. Yale University Press.  
Herman, Edward S. & Chomsky, Noam . (1988).  Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media.  Pantheon Books: New York. 
Hess, S. & Kalb, M. (2003) The Media and the War on Terrorism.  Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Hewitt, J. P., & Stokes, R. (1975). Disclaimers. American Sociological Review, 40, 1–11. 
208 
 
Hing, B.O. (2009) Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform. University 
of San Francisco Law Review, Vol. 44, pp. 1-50. 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006) Inside terrorism. Columbia University Press, New York, N.Y. 
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006) The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremist. Testimony 
presented to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on May 4, 2006. 
Rand  Document: CT-262-1 
 
Hollingner, R.C. (1991) Neutralizing in the workplace: An empirical analysis of property 
theft and production deviance. Deviant Behavior An Interdisciplinary Journal, 12, 169-
202. 
Horgan, John. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism. London: Routledge. 
Hovland, Carl. (1949) Experiments in Mass Communication. Princeton University Press.  
Hughes, Lorine A. (2007). ―Youth Street Gangs.‖ Pp. 41-59 in Youth Violence and 
Delinquency: Monsters and Myths (Vol. 1), edited by Marilyn McShane and Frank P. 
Williams III. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing. 
International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008). Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of 
Words?, 24 July, Asia Report No. 158. 
Iyengar S. & Kinder, D. R. (1987) News that matters: Television and American Opinion.  
Chicago: University Press. 
Jackall, Robert. (1995) Propaganda. New York: New York University Press. 
Jacobs, B. A.(1999) Dealing Crack: The Social World of Street Corner Selling. Boston: 
Northeastern University Press. 
 
Jacobs, B.A. (2000) Robbing Drug Dealers: Violence Beyond the Law. New York: 
Allyn de Gruyter. 
 
James, P. (1992) "Knowledge Graphs", in R.P. Van de Riet and R.A. Meersman (eds) 
Linguistic Instruments in Knowledge Engineering, pp. 97-117. 
Jang, S. & Johnson, B. (2003) Strain, Negative Emotions, and Deviant Coping Among 
African Americans: A Test of General Strain Theory. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology. Vol. 19. No. 1, Pp. 79-105. 
Jasper, J.M. (1998) Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around 
Social Movements.  Sociological Forum. Vol. 13, No. 3 (September). 
Jasper, James M. & Poulsen, Jane D. (1995) Recruiting Stranger and Friends: Moral 
Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protest.: Social 
Problems.  42:493-512. 
209 
 
Jenkins, P. (2003) Images of Terror: What We Can And Can’t Know About Terrorism. 
Aldine De Gruyter: New York. 
Jennes, V. (1995) Social Movement Growth, Domain Expansion, and Framing Processes: 
The Gay/Lesbian Movement and Violence against Gays and Lesbians as a Social 
Problem. Social Problems. Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb) Pp. 145-170. 
Johnson, D.W. (1967). Use of role reversal in intergroup competition. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 135-141. 
Johnson, K. (1997) News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc. Lanham, MD. 
Johnson-Laird, PN. (1983) Mental models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, 
Inference and Consciousness. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson, H. & Snow, D. (1998) Subcultures and the Emergence of the Estonian 
Nationalist Opposition 1945-1990. Sociological Perspectives. Vol. 41, No. 3 Pp. 473-
497. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, 3-26,  (2009) Counterterrorism. 13 November 2009 
edition. 
 
Jowett, G. & O'Donnell, V. (2006). Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications, Inc. 
6
th
 edition. 
Jowett, G. & O‘Donnell, V. (1999) Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications, Inc. 
Juergensmeyer, M. (2003) Terror in the Mind of God.  University of California Press.  
Los Angeles California. 
Kahane, H. (1971)  Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday 
Life.  Nancy Cavender Books. 
Kahneman, D.  & Tversky, A. (1984) Choices, Values, and Frames. American 
Psychologist.  Vol. 39. Pp. 341-350. 
Kaplan, Jeffery (2000) Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical 
Racist Right.  Rowman & Littlefield: New York. 
Karmon, E. (2005) Coalitions Between Terrorist Organizations: Revolutionaries, 
Nationalists and Islamists. Leiden Martinus Nijjoff Publishers. 
Karstedt, S. (2006), Emotions, Crime and Justice: Exploring Durkheimian Themes, in 
Professor Mathieu Deflem, University of South Carolina, deflem@sc.edu (ed.) 
Sociological Theory and Criminological Research (Sociology of Crime Law and 
Deviance, Volume 7), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.223-248 
Kazimi, N. (2005) A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maddisi. Edited 
by Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown in Current Trends in Islamist 
210 
 
Ideology.  Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World: Hudson 
Institute. Vol. 2. Pp. 59-73. 
Katz, D. (1947) Psychological Barriers to Communication. The Annuals. Issue 250. 
March. pp. 17-25. 
Katz, J. (1988), The Seductions of Crime, New York: Basic Books. 
Katz, J. (1999) How Emotions Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Katz, J. (2002) Start Here: Social Ontology and research strategy. Theoretical 
Criminology. Vol. 6(3) Pp. 255-278. 
Kaufer, D. & Carley,K. (1993) Communication at a Distance: The Effect of Print on 
Socio-Cultural Organization and Change. Lawrence Erlhaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Kemper, T.D. (1978) A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions.Wiley Publishers: New 
York. 
Kennedy, L. W., & Baron, S. W. (1993). Routine activities and a subculture of violence: 
A study of violence on the street. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30 (1), 
88-112. 
Kepel, Gilles. (2006) The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West. Cambridge: The 
Harvard University Press. 
Kepel, G. and Milelli, J.P. (2008) Al Qaeda in its own words.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Kepel, G. (2005) The Roots of Radical Islam. London: Saqi Books. 
Khasan, Hilal (2003) `Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings', Third 
World Quarterly 24(6): 1049-67. 
 
Kimmel, Michael (2007) Gender, Class and Terrorism. In Men’s Lives. Edited by 
Michael Messner and Michael Kimmel 7
th
 edition. Pearson Education. (pgs 67-71)  
Kimmel, M. & Ferber,A. L,  (2006) White Men are this Nation: Right Wing Militias and 
the Restoration of Rural American Masculinity. In Country Boys: Masculinity and Rural 
Life.  Edited by Campbell, H., Bell, M., & Finney, M. The Pennsylvania State University 
Press: University Park, PA. 
Klandermans, Bert, and Sjoerd Goslinga.( 1996). ―Media Discourse, Movement 
Publicity, and the Generation of Collective Action Frames: Theoretical and Empirical 
Exercises in Meaning Construction.‖ Pp. 312-337 in Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 
Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
211 
 
Klandermans, Bert. (1997)The Social Psychology of Protest. Cambridge, MA: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Klandermans Ber, (1984). ―Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological 
Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory.‖ American Sociological Review 49: 583–
600. 
 
Klassen, Ben. (1992)  The White Man’s Bible. Milwaukee Church of the Creator. 
Klassen, Ben. (1993) Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs.  
Klassen, Ben. (1973) Nature’s Eternal Religion. 
Knowles, L. and Prewitt, K..(1969) Institutional Racism in America. Engle- wood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall.  
 
Kohlman, E. (2001) The Legacy of the Arab-Afghans: A Case Study. International 
Politics 
Honors Thesis, Georgetown University, April 17. 
Kovecses,Zoltan. (1986) Metaphors of Anger, Pride and Love: A Lexical Approach to the 
Structure of Concepts.  John Benjamins Publishing Company: Amsterdam/Philadelphia. 
Knuttila, Murray,  2004, ―Lean and Mean: Hegemonic Masculinity as Fundamentalism‖, 
in Carol Schick et al., (eds.), Contesting Fundamentalisms. Nova Scotia: Fernwood 
Publishing, pp. 91-104.  
 
Krebs, Valdis (2006) Social Network Analysis, A Brief Introduction. (Includes a list of 
recent SNA applications Web Reference.) 
 
Krippendorff, K. and Bock (2009) The Content Analysis Reader.Sage: Los Angeles. 
Krippendorf , K. ( 2004)Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. Sage 
Publications: Thousand Oak, California. 
Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. ―Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is 
There a Casual Connection?‖ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 
4, Fall 2003, pp.119–144. 
 
Kubal, T. (1998) The Presentation of Political Self: Cultural Resonance and the 
Construction of Collective Action Frames. Vol. 39, Issue 4, Pp. 539-554. 
 
Kuntzel, M. (2007) Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11. 
Telos Press Publishing. 
 
Kurzman, Charles. (1998) Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement  
Mobilization: A Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements.Mobilization  
3:23-49. 
212 
 
Kuypers,J. (2009) Bush's War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age. 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
LaFree, Gary. (1998). A summary and review of cross-national comparative studies of 
homicide. In Homicide: A sourcebook of social research, edited by M. Dwayne Smith 
and Margaret A. Zahn. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. 
LaFree, G. (2002) Conceptual and Methodological Challenges to the Criminological 
Study of 
Terrorism. Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Conference in 
Chicago, November 2002. 
 
Lafree, Gary, (2010) The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Accomplishments and 
Challenges.  Perspectives on Terrorism.  Vol. 4. Issue 1. Pp. 24-46. 
LaFree, Gary, and Nancy Morris, Laura Dugan. (2009). "Cross-National Patterns of 
Terrorism: Comparing Trajectories for Total, Attributed and Fatal Attacks, 1970-2006." 
British Journal of Criminology 0:1-28.  
Landau, Elaine, (1993) The White Power Movement: America’s Racist Hate Groups.  
The Millbrook Press: Brookfield, Connecticut.  
Lane, David. (1999) Lane Deceived, Damned & Defiant– The Revolutionary Writings of 
David Lane. Fourteen Word Press. 
Langer, Elinor. (2003) A Hundred Little Hitlers. Henry Holt and Company: New York. 
Laqueur, W. (2001) A History of Terrorism. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ. 
 
Laqueur, W., & Alexander, Y. (Eds.) (1987). The terrorism reader: A historical 
anthology (rev. ed.). New York, NY: New American Library. 
 
Lasswell, H.D. Lerner, D. & Speier, H. (1980) Propaganda and Communication in 
World History. Vol. 2.  Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, East-West Center, 1980. 
Lee, A. M. (1945) The Analysis of Propaganda: A Clinical Summary.  The American 
Journal of Sociology,  Vol. 51. No. 2. pp. 126- 135. 
Lee, A.M. (1952) How to Understand Propaganda. Rinehart: New York. 
Lee, A.M, & Lee, E.B. (1939) The Fine Art of Propaganda: A Study of Father 
Coughlin’s Speeches. Harcourt, Brace and Company: New York. 
Levi, K. (1981) Becoming a Hit Man: Neutralization in a very Deviant Career. Journal of 
Contemporary Ethnography. Vol. 10, No. 1. (April) Pp. 47-63. 
Levitas, D. (2002) The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical 
Right. New York: Thomas Dunne Books. 
213 
 
Lewis, H. (1971). Shame and Guilt in Neurosis.  New York: International University 
Press.   
Lijphart, Arend. (1975) The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. 
Comparative Political Studies.  8:157-175. 
Lindner, Evelin Gerda (2001). ‗Humiliation as the source of terrorism: A new paradigm. 
In Peace Research.’  33 (2), pp. 59-68.  
Lindner, Evelin G. (2006) Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict. 
Westport, CT, London: Greenwood Press and Praeger Publishers. 
Lippman, Walter. (1925) The Phantom Public. Macmillian: London.  
Liu, Hugo, Lieberman, Henry  & Selker, Ted. (2003) A Model of Textual Affect Sensing 
using Real-World Knowledge. Proceedings of the 2003 International Conference on 
Intelligent User Interfaces, IUI 2003, January 12-15, 2003, Miami, FL, pp. 125-132.  
Lofland, John. (1993) Theory-bashing and Answer-improving in the Study of Social 
Movements.  The American Sociolgist. Vol 24. No. 2. pp. 37-59. 
Loseke, Donileen. (2009) Examining Emotion as Discourse: Emotion Codes and 
Presidential Speeches Justifying War. The Sociological Quarterly. 50 Pp. 497–524. 
 
Lotz, R. (1991) Feeling safe by comparison: Crime in the newspapers. Social Problems, 
37, 360–374.  
Luckenbill D, Doyle D (1989) Structural position and violence: developing a cultural 
explanation. Criminology. 27:801–818. 
 
Lukazewski, J., (2006) Terrorism as Propaganda. Retrieved from 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Special:RecentChanges&feed=rss. 
Accessed March 2010. 
Lyman, S. and Marvin S. (1970) A Sociology of the Absurd. New York: Appieton-
Century-Crofts. 
 
Macann, C. (2007) Being and Becoming, Volume I, General Metaphysics; Volume II, 
Natural Philosophy; Volume III, Social Philosophy; Volume IV, Practical Philosophy, 
Online Originals: London & Bordeaux. 
Mannle, H. W. and P. W. Lewis (1979) Control theory reexamined: Race and the use of 
neutralizations among institutionalized delinquents. Criminology 17:58–74. 
 
Mansfield, Laura. (2006) His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writing of Dr. 
Ayman Al Zawahiri.  TLG Publications: United States. 
Marullo, Sam, Ron Pagnucco, and Jackie Smith. (1996) Frame Changes and Social 
Movement Contraction: U.S. Peace Movement Framing After the Cold War." 
Sociological Inquiry 66:1-28. 
214 
 
 
Marx, K. (1843) Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx to Ruge,  On the canal-boat 
going to D., (March) 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_03.htm accessed June 2010. 
 
Mastor, E. & Deffenbaugh, A. (2007) The Lesser Jihad Recruits and the Al Qaeda 
Network. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers: Lanham Maryland. 
Maruna, S. and Copes, H. (2004) Excuses, excuses: What have we learned from five 
decades of neutralization research? In Crime and Justice, vol. 32: A Review of Research. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Matza, D. (1964) Delinquency and Drift. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Mazarr, Michael J. (2007), The Iraq War and Agenda Setting, Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Vol. 
3 (1), pp. 1-23. 
 
McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McAdam, D. (1986). "Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom 
Summer."American Journal of Sociology 92:64-90. 
 
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.  and Zald, M.. (1988). ―Social Movements.‖ Pp. 695-737 in 
Handbook of Sociology, ed. Neil J. Smelser. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
McAdam, Douglas, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. ―Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory,‖ American Journal of Sociology 82:1212-1241. 
McCarthy, J. G. and Stewart, A. L. (1998) Neutralization as a process of graduated 
desensitization: Moral values of offenders. International Journal of Offender Therapy 
and Comparative Criminology 42:278–290. 
 
McCombs, M. and Shaw, D. (1972)The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. Public 
Opinion Quarterly 36: 176-85.  
McMichael, Philip. (1990) Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical 
Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method.  American Sociological Review.  
55:385-97. 
Mead, George Herbert (1962) Mind, Self and Society. University of Chicago Press. 
215 
 
Mead, George Herbert (1964) ―The Genesis of the Self and Social Control‖ In Recent 
American Philosophy: Studies of Ten Representative Thinkers, edited by Andrew J. Rock. 
Bobbe-Merrill. 
McCants, W. & Brachman, J. (2006) The Militant Ideology Atlas.  Combating Terrorism 
Center at West Point. Accessible at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/. 
McVeigh, R. Myers, D. & Sikkink, (2004) Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and 
Framing in Social Movements. Social Forces.  Vol. 83. No. 2 (Dec) Pp. 653-690. 
Merton, R. K. (1957). Social theory and social structure. Free Press. 
Messner, S & Rosenfeld, R. (1994). Crime and the American Dream. Belmont: 
Wadsworth. 
Messner, Steven. F., and Richard Rosenfeld. (1997) Political restraint of the market and 
levels of criminal homicide: A cross-national application of institutional-anomie theory. 
Social Forces 75:1393–1416. 
Meyer, David S. (1995) ‗Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear 
Weapons During the Cold War‘, Political Communication 12: 173–92. 
 
Michael, G.,(2006)  The Enemy of My Enemy – The Alarming Convergence of Militant 
Islam and the Extreme Right, University Press of Kansas. 
Michael, George (2006) RAHOWA! A History of the World Church of the Creator. 
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 18. Issue 4. December. Pp. 561-583. 
Michel, L., & Herbeck, D. (2001). American terrorist : Timothy McVeigh & the 
Oklahoma City Bombing (1st ed.). New York: Regan Books. 
 
Miller, Walter (1958). "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang 
Delinquency". Journal of Social Issues 14: 5–20. 
Miller, L. (2006) The Terrorist Mind: A Psychopathologies and Practical Guideline for 
Investigation.  International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 
Vol. 50, Pp. 225-268. 
Mills, C. R. (1940) Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. American Sociological 
Review. Vol. 5, No. 6, (Dec) Pp. 904-913 
Minor,W.W. (1980). The neutralization of criminal offense. Criminology, 18, 103-120. 
Minor, W. W. (1981) Techniques of neutralization: A reconceptualization and empirical 
examination. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 18:295–318. 
 
Minor, W.W. (1984) Neutralization as a hardening process: Considerations in the 
modeling of change. Social Forces 62:995–1019. 
 
216 
 
Moïsi, Dominique. (2007) The Clash of Emotions. Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb., Vol. 86, 
Issue 1. 
Moghaddam, Fathali M.(2005) ‗The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological 
Exploration.‘ American Psychologist. Vol 60(2), Feb-Mar 2005, pp. 161-169. 
Moghaddam, Fathali.  (2006) From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they experience 
and why they come to destroy.  Praeger Security International, West Port Connecticut. 
Monge, P.R. & Contractor, N.S. (2003) Theories of Communication Networks. Oxford 
University Press. 
Monge, P.R., & Contractor, N.S. (2001) ‗Emergence of Communication Networks.‘  In 
F.M. Jablin, & L.L. Putnam (Eds.), The New Handbook of Organizational 
Communication: Advances in Theory, Research and Methods (pp. 440-502). Thousand 
Oaks CA: Sage. 
Moore, M.H. (2010) Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945.  
Cambridge University Press: New York. 
Moore, Richter H., Jr., and Charles B. Fields. (1996) Comparative criminal justice: Why 
study? In Comparative criminal justice: Traditional and nontraditional systems of law 
and control, edited by Charles B. Fields and Richter H. Moore, Jr. Prospect Heights, 
Illinois: Waveland Press. 
Morgan, Stephen (2007) ‗Insurgent Psychology — Honour, Dignity, Shame and 
Humiliation — the Roots of an Endless War‘; http://searchwarp.com/ swa139357.htm, 
accessed on 19 February 2009. 
 
Morse, C. (2003)  The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin 
Al-Husseini. iUniverse Inc. Lincoln, NE. 
Most, Johann.(1885)  "Action as Propaganda," Freiheit, July 25. 
Muntassir, Al-Zayat. (2004) The Road to Al Qaeda: The Story of bin Laden’s Right Hand 
Man.  Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Nacos, Brigitte L. (2007) Mass-Mediated Terrorism. The Central Role of the Media in 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Nacos, B. L. (1994). Terrorism and the media. From the Iran hostage crisis to the World 
Trade Center bombing. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Nacos, B. L. (2003). Terrorism as Breaking News: Attack on America. Political Science 
Quarterly, 118(1), 23-52. 
 
Nadel, SF. (1957) The Theory of Social Structure. London: Cohen and West. 
 
217 
 
Naji, Abi-Hashem. (2003) ―Peace and War in the Middle East: A Psychopolitical and 
Sociocultural Perspective‖ in Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, 
Consequences and Interventions  Edited by Fathali M Moghaddam and Anthony J 
Marsella, 69-89. American Psychological Association: Washington D.C.   
 
Namewirth, J. & R. Weber. (1987). Dynamics of Culture. Boston: Allen and Irwin. 
 
Nepstad, S.E. (1997), ―The Process of Cognitive Liberation: Cultural Synapses, Links 
and Frame Contradictions in US-Central America Peace Movement‖, in Sociological 
Inquiry 67: pp. 470-87. 
 
Noonan, Rita K. (1995) ―Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and 
Collective Action Frames in Chile‘s Transition to Democracy.‖ Pp. 252-267 in Social 
Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, edited 
by Doug McAdam and David A. Snow. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing 
Co. 
 
North, Robert C., Ole R. Holsti, George Zaninovich, and Dina A. Zinnes. (1963) Content 
Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
 
Oliver, P. E., & Johnston, H. (2000). What a good idea! Mobilization, 4, 37–54. 
 
O'Neil, J., ed. (1996) Freud and the Passions. University Park: Pennsylvania University 
Press. 
Olson, M.(1 965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Orbuch, T.L. (1997) People‘s accounts count: The sociology of accounts. Annual Review 
of Sociology, Vol. 23, Pp. 455-478. 
Page, B. & Shapiro, R. (1992) The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ 
Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Pan, Z. & Kosicki, G.M. (1993) Framing Analysis: An approach to news discourse. 
Political Communication, 10, 55-75. 
Park, B., Ryan, C. S., & Judd, C. M. (1992). The role of meaningful subgroups in 
explaining differences in perceived variability for in-groups and out-groups. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 553-567. 
Parker, R. N. (1989). Poverty, subculture of violence, and type of homicide. Social 
Forces, 67, 983-1007. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
218 
 
Pennebaker & Chung (2009) in Computerized Text Analysis of Al- Qaeda Transcripts.  
In The Content Analysis Reader edited by Krippendorff, K. & Bock, M.A. Sage: Los 
Angeles 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and 
peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Pierce, William. (1999) The Turner Diaries. (author pseudonym Andrew Macdonald). 
Vanguard Press. 
Polletta F. and Ho, M. (2006) Frames and Their Consequences.‖ Pp. 187-209 in the 
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodin and 
Charles Tilly. Oxford University Press. 
Popping, R. (2000) Computer Assisted Text Analysis.  London, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Popping, R. (2003) ‗Knowledge Graphs and Network Text Analysis.‘  Social Science 
Information .42(1), pp. 91-106. 
Post, Jerrod. (2005). When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of. 
Contemporary Terrorism.‖ Political Psychology 26 (4): 615 – 636. 
Post, J.M. Sprinzak, E. & Denny,L. ( 2003) The Terrorists in Their Own Words: 
Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle East Terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence. 
Vol. 15. No. 1 (Spring) Pp. 171-184. 
Potok, Mark (2010) Rage on the Right: The Year in Hate and Extremism.  Intelligence 
Report. Spring, Issue Number: 137.  Accessed at: http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/spring/rage-on-the-right 
Potter, G. & Kappeler,V. (1998) Constructing Crime: Perspectives on Making News and 
Social Problems. Waveland Press, Inc. 
Pratkanis, A. & Aronson, E. (2001) The Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and 
Abuse of Persuasion.  Henry Holt and Company: New York. 
Price, V., Tewsbury, D. & Powers, E. (1997) Switching trains of thought: The impact of 
news frames on reader‘s cognitive responses. Communication Research. Vol. 24, Pp. 
481-506. 
 
Priest, T.B. and J.H. McGrath (1970). Techniques of Neutralization: Young Adult 
Marijuana Smokers." Criminology (August): 185-194. 
 
Pynchon, M.R. & Borum, R. (1999) Assessing Threats of Targeted Group Violence: 
Contributions from Social Psychology. Behavioral Sciences and the Law. Vol. 17, Pp. 
339-355. 
 
Qutb, Sayyid. (1988) Milestones. Translated by Badrul Hasan, M.A. Karachi, Pakistan: 
International Islamic Publishers Lt. 
219 
 
Qutb , Sayyid, (1964) A New, Influential Vision of Jihad. In Khater, Akram (editor) 
Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East. (2004). (pp. 232-331). Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Ragin, Charles. C. (1987) The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies.  Berkley: University of California Press. 
Ragin, Charles, C. (1998) Comparative Methodology, Fuzzy Sets, and the Study of 
Sufficient Causes. Apsa-CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the APSA. 
9(1): 18-22. 
Ragin, Chalres, C. (2000) Fuzzy Set Social Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Ranstorp, M. (2006) Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future 
Direction. Routledge: New York. 
 
Raphaeli Nimrod, (2002) Ayman Muhammad Rabi‘ Al-Zawahiri: The Making of an 
Arch-Terrorist. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.14, No.4 (Winter), pp.1–22. 
Rapoport, D.C. (2006) Terrorism: Third or New Left Wave. Routledge: New York, NY.  
Reed, J. S. (1972). The enduring south: Subcultural persistence in mass society. 
Lexington, MA: D.C. Health. 
Reese, S. (2007) The Framing Project: A Bridging Model for Media Research Revisited. 
Journal of Communication. Vol. 57, Pp. 148-154. 
 
Reese, S., Gandy, O., & Grant, A. (Eds.) (2001). Framing public life. Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Reichel, Philip L. (1994) Comparative criminal justice systems: A topical approach. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Reid, E.O.F. (1997) Evolution of a Body of Knowledge; An Analysis of Terrorism 
Research.  Information Processing and Management.  Vol. 33 Issue 1, pp. 91-106. 
Reid, E. and Hsinchun, C. (2007) Mapping the Contemporary Terrorism Research 
Domain.  International Journal of Human Computer Studies.  Vol. 65. Issue 1 pp. 42-56. 
Rice, Stephen. (2009) ‗Emotions and terrorism research: A case for a social-
psychological agenda.‘ Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 37, Issue 3. May-June 2009.  
Pp. 248-255.  
Roberts, C.M. (1989) Other Than Counting Words: A Linguistic Approach to Content 
Analysis.  Social Forces 68 (1): Pp. 147-77. 
220 
 
Roberts, C.W (1997). Semantic text analysis: On the structure of linguistic ambiguity in 
ordinary discourse. In Text analysis for the social sciences: Methods for drawing 
statistical inferences 
from texts and transcripts, ed. C. W. Roberts, 55–77. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Rockwell, George Lincoln. (1996) White Power. John McLaughlin Press. 
Rockwell, George Lincoln (1979) This Time the World.  Liberty Bell Publications. 
Romano, T. (1984) Terrorism: An Analysis of the Literature. Dissertation. Fordham 
University, Department of Sociology, Criminology and Penology. 
 
Rose, D. (1992) The Emergence of David Duke and the Politics of Race. University of 
North Carolina Press. 
Rosenfeld, R. (1997) Changing relationships between men and women: a note on the 
decline in intimate partner homicide. Homicide Studies. 1:72.83 
Rosenfeld, R. (2002) Why criminologists should study terrorism. The Criminologist, 
27(6), 1, 3-4. 
Rosenfeld, R., (2004), Terrorism and Criminology, in Professor Mathieu Deflem, 
University of South Carolina, deflem@sc.edu (ed.) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
(Sociology of Crime Law and Deviance, Volume 5), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 
pp.19-32. 
Rosenfeld, R., Jacobs, B.A. and Wright, R. (2003) Snitching and the code of the street. 
British Journal of Criminology 43:291–309. 
 
Roy, O. (2004) Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University 
Press. 
Rubin, Alissa. (2010) ‗Taliban Overhaul Image to Win Allies.‘ The New York Times. Jan. 
20, 2010. Can be accessed at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/asia/21taliban.html. 
Rubin, Allen, and Earl Babbie. 1993. Research Methods for Social Work. Pacific Grove:  
Brooks/Cole Publishers. 
Ruthven, M. (2005) In Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning. Oxford University 
Press. 
Ryan, C. (1991) Prime Time Activism. Boston: South End Press. 
 
Ryan, G. W., and H. R. Bernard. (2000) Data management and analysis methods. In 
Handbook of qualitative research, 2d ed., edited by N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln, 769–802. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
221 
 
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.   
Sageman. M. (2008) Leaderless Jihad. Terrorist Networks in the 21
st
 Century.  
Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Salwen, M. B., & Lee, J. S. (1988). News of Terrorism: A Comparison of the United-
States and South-Korean Press. Terrorism, 11(4), 323-328. 
Sandler, T.(2003) Controlling Transnational Terrorism: Cooperation Dilemma, Mimeo. 
 
Schafer, J. (2002) Spinning the web of hate: Web-based hate propagation by extremist 
organizations. J. Criminal Just. Popular Culture 9, 2, 69--88.  
 
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of 
Communication, 
49(1), 103–122. 
Scheff, T.J. Working Class Emotions and Relationships: Secondary Analysis of Classic 
Texts by Sennett and Cobb, and Willis. Available at: 
http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/main.php?id=22.html 
Scheff, T.J. (1994) Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
Scheff, T.J. & Retzinger, S.M. (2000) ‗Shame As The Master Emotion Of Everyday 
Life.‘ Journal of Mundane Behavior. Can be accessed at:  
http://www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v1n3/scheff-retzinger.htm 
Scheff, T.J. and Retzinger, S.M. (1991) Emotion and Violence Shame and Rage in 
Destructive Conflicts.  Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.   
Scheuer, M. (2002) Through Our Enemies' Eyes, Washington, D.C. : Brassey's. 
Schmaltz, W. (1998) Hate: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi 
Party.: Batsford Brassey: Herndon, VA. 
Schmid, A. & de Graff (1982) Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the 
Western Media. Sage Publications: London; Beverly Hills, California.  
Schoenewolf, G. (1990). Turning points in analytic therapy. Northvale, New Jersey, 
Jason. 
Schmid, A. P. and Jongman, A. J. (2005). Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, 
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. Transaction Publishers, 2nd 
edition. 
Scott, J. P. (2000). Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. SAGE Publications. 
222 
 
Scott, M.B. & Lyman,S.M. (1968) Accounts. American Sociological Review. Vol. 33, 
(Feb) Pp. 46-62. 
Scully, D. & Marolla, J. (1984) Convicted Rapist‘s Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and 
Justifications. Social Deviance: Readings in Theory and Research. 5
th
 Edition (eds.) 
Henry Pontell, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005. 
Sennott, Charles. (2008) ‗General David H Petraeus: The general's knowledge.‘ The 
Sunday Times.  June 29, 2008.  Can be accessed at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article4212055.ece 
Shaheen, J. (2003) Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People.  Annuals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 588, Islam: Enduring Myths and 
Changing Realities. (July) Pp. 171-193. 
Shapiro, D. (2003). The Tortured, Not the Torturers, are Ashamed. Social Research, 70,. 
Pp. 1131-1148. 
Shaw, Clifford (1930). The Jackroller: A Delinquent Boy's Own Story. Reprint edition: 
1966. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1953): Groups in harmony and tension. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood W.R., and Sherif, C.W. (1961) Intergroup 
cooperation and competition: The Robber’s Cave Experiment. Norman OK: University 
Book Exchange 
Sherman, L. (1993) Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal 
Sanction. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. Vol. 30, No. 4, Pp. 445-473.  
Sherman, L.W. (2003) Reason emotion: Reinventing justice with theories, innovations, 
and research-The American Society of Criminology 2002 presidential address. 
Criminology, 4, 1-37. 
Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the Message. New York: Longman 
Publishers. 
 
Shover, N. (1996) Great Pretenders: Pursuits and Careers of Persistent Thieves. 
Boulder, CO:  
 
Short, J. F. and Strodtbeck, F.L., (1965). Group Process and Gang Delinquency. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Westview. 
 
Shover, N. and Bryant, K.M. (1993). Theoretical explanations of corporate crime. In 
M.B. 
Blankenship (Ed.), Understanding Corporate Criminality (pp. 141–176). New York: 
Garland. 
223 
 
Silke, A. P. (2003). Becoming a terrorist. In Terrorists, victims and society, edited by A. 
Silke, 29-53. Chichester, 
UK: Wiley. 
Silke, A. (2007) The Impact of 9/11 on Research on Terrorism in Mapping Terrorism 
Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction, edited by Magnus Ranstorp, 76-93.. 
Routledge London and New York. 
Simi, Pete and Futrell Robert. (2010) American Swastika: Inside the White Power 
Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 
Maryland. 
Simi, Pete. (2010) Why Study White Supremacist Terror? A Research Note.  Deviant 
Behavior, 31:3. Pp. 251-273. 
Simmel, G. (1955) Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Edited by L. Coser and 
translated by R. Bendix. Glencoe: Free Press. 
Simon, D. and S. Eitzen. (1993) Elite Deviance. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Simon, A., & Xenos, M. (2000). Media framing and effective public deliberation. 
Political Communication, 17, 363–376. 
 
Simonelli,F. (1999)  American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American 
Nazi Party. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Simmons, B. K., & Lowry, D. N. (1990). Terrorists in the News, as Reflected in 3 News 
Magazines, 1980-1988. Journalism Quarterly, 67(4), 692-696. 
Sivan, Emmanuel (1985). Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics. Yale 
University Press. 
Slocum, D.J. (2005) Terrorism Media Liberation. Rutgers University Press. 
Smith, B.L., & Damphousse, K.R. (1998) Terrorism, politics, and punishment: A Test of 
Structural Contextual Theory and the Liberation Hypothesis. Criminology, 36, 67-92. 
Smith, B.L. & Damphousse, K.R., & Karlson, A. (2002) The prosecution and punishment 
of international terrorists in federal court: 1980-1999. Criminology and Public Policy, 1, 
311-338. 
Smith, B. L. (1994). Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press.  
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochfold, Jr., Steven K. Worder, and Robert D. Benford. 
(1986). ―Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,‖ 
American Sociological Review 51:464-481. 
224 
 
Snow, David and Benford, Robert.(1988). ―Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization.‖ International Social Movement Research 1: 197-217. 
Snow, David and Byrd, Scott (2007). Ideology, Framing Processing, and Islamic 
Terrorist Movements.‖  Mobilization: An International Journal. 12. 119-136. 
Snow, David. (2004) Framing Process, Ideology and Discursive Fields.‖ Pp. 380-412 in 
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. 
Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi.  Blackwell: Malden, Mass. 
Snow, Nancy. (2003) Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and 
Opinion Control Since 9-11. New York: Seven Stories Press. 
Sowa, J.F. (1984) Conceptual Structures.  Addison-Wesley. 
Speckhard, A. (2005) Defusing Human Bombs: Understanding Suicide Terrorism. In 
Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism.  Edited by 
Jeffery Victoroff.  NATO Public Diplomacy Division: IOS Press. Pp. 277-291. 
Spence, J.T., (1985) Achievement American Style: The Rewards and costs of 
individualism. American Psychologist, Vol. 40(12), Dec., pp. 1285-1295. 
Sproule, Michael. (1984) The Propaganda Analysis Movement Since World War I.  Paper 
presented at the convention of the Speech Communication Association. (November). 
Chicago. 
Sproule, Michael. (1997) Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of 
Media and Mass Persuasion. Cambridge University Press: New York, New York. 
Stern, J. (2003) Terror in the name of God: Why religious militants kill. New York: Ecco. 
Stern, J. (2010) Denial: A Memoir of Terror.  HarperCollins Press:  New York 
Steuter, E. & Wills, D. (2008) A War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda and Racism in 
the War on Terror.  Lexington Books: Lanham, Maryland. 
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park, EUA: Sage. 
Stryker, Sheldon, (1980) Symbolic Interactionism : A Social Structural Version 
Benjamin/Cummings Pub. Co., Menlo Park, Calif. 
Subasic, P. & Huettner. (2001) ―Affect Analysis of Text using Fuzzy Semantic Typing.‖ 
IEEE Tran. Fuzzy Systems. Vol. 9(4), Pp. 483-496. 
Surrette, R. (1989) Media Trials. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 17, Pp. 203-308. 
Sutherland, E.H. and D.R. Cressey. (1974) Principles of Criminology, 9th edition. 
Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott. 
225 
 
Sykes, Gresham and David Matza. (1957). ‗‗Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of 
Delinquency.‘‘ American Sociological Review. Vol. 22:664-670. 
 
Tangney, J. P.  & Fischer, K. W.  (Eds.),(1995) Self-conscious emotions: The psychology 
of shame, guilt, embarrassment, and pride (pp. 198-218). NY: Guilford. 
 
Tankard, J., Hendrickson, L., Silberman, J., Bliss, K., & Ghanem, S. (1991, August). 
Media frames: Approaches to conceptualization and measurement. Paper presented at the 
annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communication, 
Boston, MA. 
Tarrow, S. (1991) Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, 
and Cycles of Protest. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Center for International Studies. 
Tarrow, Sidney. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 
2
nd
 edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, P.M. (2003) Munitions of the Mind. Manchester University Press, 3rd ed. 
Telhami, S. (2002) The Stakes: America in the Middle East. Westview Press: Boulder 
Colorado. 
Telhami, S. (2004) ‗Photos Etched in Arab Minds‘, The Brookings Institute, at; 
http://www.brokings.edu/opinions/2004/0509iraq_telhami.aspx, accessed on Jan. 2010. 
 
Thrasher, F.M. (1927). The Gang. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Thurman, Q. C. (1984). ‗‗Deviance and the Neutralization of Moral Commitment: An 
Empirical Analysis.‘‘ Deviant Behavior 5:291-304. 
 
Thurman, Q. C., St. John, C. and Riggs, L. 1984 Neutralization and tax evasion: How 
effective would a moral appeal be in improving compliance to tax laws? Law and Policy 
6:309 327. 
 
Tilly, Charles. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company. Reading, Massachusetts. 
 
Tilly, Charles. (2005). Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
press. ISBN 1-59451-131-4 
 
Tissari, Heli. (2006) Conceptualizing Shame: Investigating Uses of the English Word 
Shame, 1418 – 1991.  Selected Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on New Approaches 
in English Historical Lexis (HEL-LEX), ed. R. W. McConchie et al., 143-154. 
Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project. 
 
Tittle, C. (1995)  Control Balance: Toward a General Theory of Deviance. Boulder, CO; 
Westview Press. 
226 
 
 
Tittle, C. & Paternoster, R. (2000) Social Deviance and Crime: An Organizational and 
Theoretical Approach. Roxbury Publishing Company: Los Angeles, CA. 
 
Tololyan, K. (2001) Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist.  In Inside 
Terrorist Organizations, edited by David Rapoport, 217-236. Frank Cass Publisher, 
Portland Oregon.   
 
Topalli, V. (2005) When Being Good is Bad: An Expansion of Neutralization Theory. 
Criminology. Vol. 43, Number 3: 797-835. 
 
Trevor Stanley, (2010) Abdullah Azzam: The Godfather of Jihad.  Perspectives on World 
History and Current Events, 2003-2005. URL: http://www.pwhce.org/azzam.html 
Downloaded: 31 December 2010. 
 
Triandafyllidou, A. & Fotiou, A. (1998) Sustainability and Modernity in the European 
Union: A Frame Theory Approach to Policy Making. Sociological Research Online. Vol. 
3, No. 1.http://www.socresonline.org.uk/3/1/2.html 
 
Tuchman, Gaye (1978) Making news. A study in the construction of reality. New York: 
Free Press. 
 
Tuman, J. (2003) Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. Sage 
Publications: Thousand Oaks, California. 
Turk, Austin T. (1982). Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defense of Authority. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.  
T yler. T.R. (1990). Why people obey the law: Procedural justice, legitimacy, and 
compliance. Ne w Haven, CT : Yale University Press. 
 
Valkenburg, P., Semetko, H. & De Vreese, C. (1999) The Effects of News Frames on 
Readers‘ Thoughts and Recall. Communication Research. Vol. 26. No. 5. Pp. 550-569. 
Valocchi, S. (1996) The Emergence of the Integrationist Ideology in the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Social Problems. Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb) Pp. 116-130. 
Van dijk, T.A. (1985) Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Dimensions of Discourse. 
Academic Press. 
Van Maanen, J. (1979) Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research: A 
Preface. Administrative Science Quarterly. Vol. 24, No. 4, Pp. 520-526. 
Vlach, M. J (2004). ―The Church as Replacement of Israel: An Analysis of 
Supersessionism.‖ Ph.D. dissertation, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary. 
 
Victoroff, J. (2005) ‗The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 
Approaches.‘  Journal of Conflict Resolution.  Vol. 49 No. 1 pp. 3-42. 
227 
 
Walters, Jerome (2000) One Aryan Nation Under God Exposing the New Racial 
Extremists. The Pilgrim Press: Cleveland, Ohio. 
Wagemakers, J. (2009) A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The ideology of Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 36(2): 281-297. 
 
Wasserman, S, and K Faust. (1994)\ Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications: 
Cambridge. University Press. 
 
Weber, Max. (1949  The Methodology of Social Sciences; translated and edited by 
Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 
 
Weed, F.J. (1997), ―The Framing of Political Advocacy and Service Responses in the 
Crime Victim 
Rights Movement‖, in Journal of Sociology of Social Welfare 24, pp. 43-61. 
Welch, David. (1983) Nazi propaganda : The Power and the Limitations. Croom Helm ; 
Barnes & Noble Books, London. 
Wellman, B. (1999). The network community. In B. Wellman (Ed.), Networks in the 
global village (pp. 1-48). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 
White, J. (2001) Political eschatology: A theology of antigovernment extremism. The 
American Behavioral Scientist; Feb., 44, 6; Pp. 937-956. 
 
Whitsel, Brad. (1995) Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains.  
Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 7. No. 4. Pp. 117-139. 
Whitsel, Brad. (1998) "The Turner Diaries and Cosmotheism: William Pierce's Theology 
of Revolution," Nova Religio 1(2): 183-197. 
 
Wilson, J (1973) Introduction to Social Movements. New York: Basic Books. 
Wolfgang, Marvin and Ferracuti, Franco. 1967. The Subculture of Violence: Toward an 
Integrated Theory of Criminology. London: Tavistock.  
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2003)  Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana 
University Press. 
Wright, R. & Decker, S. (1994) Burglars on the Job. Boston: Northeastern University 
Press. 
 
Wright, R. & Decker, S. (1997) Armed Robbers in Action: Stickups and Street Culture. 
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 
 
Wright, J. (1990) Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional 
IRA, 1968-1985. New York: St. Martin‘ s Press. 
228 
 
Wright, L., (2006) The Looming Tower : Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11.  Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York. 
Wright, L. (2008) The Rebellion Within; An Al Qaeda mastermind questions terrorism. 
The New Yorker.  June 2. 
Wrong, D.  (1976) Skeptical Sociology. Columbia University Press; New York. 
Wykes, M. (2001) News Crime and Culture. London: Pluto Press. 
Yonah, A. (1990) Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and 
the Public.  Brassey‘s: Washington. 
Zald, Mayer N. and Michael Berger. 1978. "Social Movements in Organizations: Coup 
d'etat, Bureaucratic Insurgency and Mass Rebellions." American Journal of  
Sociology 83:823-61. 
Zallar, J. (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press. 
Zatarain, M. (1990) David Duke: Evolution of a Klansman Pelican Publishing Company: 
Gretna, Louisiana. 
Zdravomyslova, E. (1996) Opportunities and Framing in the transition to democracy: The 
Case of Russia. (eds.) McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., & Zald, M.in Comparative 
Perspective on Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing, Structures and 
Cultural Framings. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY.  
Zeman, A.B. (1964) Nazi Propaganda.  London, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Zeskind, Leonard. (2009) Blood and Politics: The History of the White Nationalist 
Movement from the Margins to the Mainstream.   New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Zimmerman, J.C. (2004) Sayyid Qutb‘s Influence on the 11th September Attacks.  
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 222-252.    
Zuo, J.P. and Benford, R.D. (1995) Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese 
Democracy Movement. The Sociological Quarterly. 36: 131-135. 
 
Zwerman, Gilda, Patricia Steinhoff, Donatella Della Porta. (2000). "Disappearing Social 
Movements: Clandestinity in the Cycle of New Left Protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany, 
and Italy." Mobilization 5:85-104. 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
Appendices 
Violent Jihadi Propagandists: 
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) 
Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian educator and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, is 
the ideological godfather of violent jihadis (Sivan, 1983; Zimmerman, 2004; Calvert, 
2000).  Qutb‘s time in the United States, Egyptian politics, imprisonment/torture in Egypt 
and his association with other ‗radical‘ thinkers paved the way for his rise to prominence 
(Wright, 2006; Calvert, 2000).  Qutb‘s ideas theologically legitimized the use of violence 
to change society (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). Qutb‘s ―altruistic‖ framework emphasized 
humanity‘s ―salvation‖ through the use of violence (Qutb, 1988). 
Qutb interpreted jihad as a means to free humanity from depravity and the chains 
of moral corruption.  Qutb advanced jihad beyond an inner struggle or a military 
defensive posture to one of ―offense is the best defense.‖  Qutb argued that Muslim 
nations are currently under attack by a mixture of covert and overt tactics (Qutb, 1988).   
By placing jihad as the divine will of Allah and his holy prophet, Qutb 
theologically made it possible to justify violence against corrupt Islamic governments 
(Qutb, 1988). The same claim enabled violent jihadis to target individual Muslims who 
deviated from Qutb‘s version of Islam (Qutb, 1988).  Qutb‘s idea of jihad as Allah‘s 
divine law made violent jihad a duty.    
Qutb‘s stance ideologically moved Muslims from defensive passivity to one of 
proactive offense (Qutb, 1988).  It is a Muslim‘s duty, according to Qutb, to save 
humanity from the encroaching ills coming from the West.  Qutb compared the moral 
decay in the 1950‘s and 1960‘s in Egypt to what he experienced during his two year stay 
in the United States.  Based on his observations, Islamic society was becoming like the 
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West: secular, materialistic, corrupt, immoral, and increasingly nationalistic.  In Qutb‘s 
assessment, Muslims who remain passive ultimately engage in corruption and 
immorality.  Polluting Islam through passivity was not an option in Qutb‘s Islam.  
Qutb projected the future as a time when Islam would become so indoctrinated by 
the mores of the West that it would lose its unique character.  Qutb perceived Westerners 
as invaders. In Qutb‘s view, Islam was under an ideological, moral, philosophical, and 
religious siege.   
Qutb did not idly stand by.  He became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood and 
began an active ideological campaign to resist the ‗invasion.‘ Qutb began to write down 
his ideas and subsequently, Gamal Nasser, the president of Egypt, imprisoned Qutb from 
1954 - 1964.   Part of the reason for his imprisonment was Qutb‘s leadership in the 
Muslim Brotherhood and his continued public criticism of Nasser‘s regime (Wright, 
2006). It was during his prison sentence that he wrote several important works, most 
notably Signpost/Milestones and his commentary on the Quran (Qutb, 1988; Zimmerman, 
2004).  It is also of great consequence that his most influential publication was written 
after being tortured and incarcerated at the hands of Muslims.  Qutb reasoned that these 
indescribable injustices could only occur to Muslims by Muslims if: 1) Muslims served 
Nasser over Allah, 2) worshipped nationalism over Allah, 3) feared the government over 
Allah, and 4) were ignorant of how to live as a true Muslim.  To Qutb, it was 
inconceivable that other Muslims would torture and imprison ‗righteous‘ Muslims in 
ways that he experienced (Qutb, 1988).   
Qutb observed that most Muslims were not even aware that their faith was under 
attack. Qutb‘s believed that the majority of Muslims were ignorant of Islam. Though they 
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believed themselves to be Muslims, Qutb asserted in reality they were not. Qutb invoked 
the phrase, ―state of ignorance,‖ 86or jahiliyyah to account for Muslims‘ general lack of 
religious awareness as the reason that they were not ‗true‘ Muslims (Qutb, 1988).   
In 1966, Qutb was executed to silence his increasing popular support.
87
  Since his 
death, Signposts/Milestones has become his most famous work and is the culmination of 
his life experiences at the height of his ideological maturity (Kepel, 2005).  Since his 
execution in 1966, Qutb‘s ideological impact has reached a global level (Zimmerman, 
2004).  
Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) 
The authors of the mujahedeen‘s 7,000 page Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, a 
book that covers tactics, strategy, weapons, and warcraft against the Soviets, honors 
Abdullah Azzam by dedicating the book to him.  It reads: ―To our beloved brother and 
revered Sheikh Abdullah Azzam who revived the spirit of jihad in the souls of the youth 
with the work of God…who suffered harm from most people except from the faithful‖ 
(Gunaratna, 2003; 71). Prominent violent jihadi scholars label Abdullah Azzam as the 
father of jihad (Brachman, 2009; Calvert, 2007; Wright, 2002; Fighel, 2001; Trevor, 
2010).  Azzam is credited with reviving the doctrine of violent jihad in a current context 
(Azzam 1987a; 1987b, Calvert, 2007).  Azzam correlated how fighting against modern 
forces fits into a classical doctrine of jihad.  Arguing that modern invading forces are a 
current expression of ancient campaigns, Azzam asserted that these forces are purposely 
besieging Islam in hopes of eternally suppressing Muslim superiority (Calvert, 2007).  
                                                          
86
 Defined as a prevailing state of ignorance among Muslims that makes them un-Islamic and equal to the 
time before the Prophet Mohammad (Gerges, 2005). 
87
 His execution also assisted in demonstrating the takfir doctrine (Takfir refers to the concept of the 
legality of killing other Muslims that have been labeled as apostate) and that the current Muslim regime 
was not true but was a slave to materialism, communism and later capitalist.   
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To build the jihadi movement on solid theological doctrine, Azzam used classical 
Islamic jurisprudence and Middle Eastern history to interpret current events (Calvert 
2007).  Azzam also used medieval literature to highlight how Muslims encountered 
enemies in the past to serve as a model to face them in the present (Calvert, 2007).  He 
reduced all Muslim battles to a common denominator: Islam and Allah‘s supreme ruling 
over mankind was under attack.  This was important because Azzam transformed the 
modern and ‗apologetic‘ meaning of jihad from an inner spiritual struggle to that of 
waging a physical campaign.  Azzam‘s physical campaign targeted conventional forces 
that represented corrupt ideological, political and religious influences (Trevor, 2010).  In 
Azzam‘s estimation, a violent jihadi was a Muslim warrior, fighting with his intellect and 
physical strength, which was legitimized by ink and blood.  Azzam argued that a 
―warrior-scholar‖ is the ultimate culmination of education and strength, and suggested 
that the Prophet Mohammad was the best role model (Calvert, 2007). 
Azzam articulated his doctrine of jihad in Defense of the Muslim Lands (1989) 
and Join the Caravan (1989).  Though he published many other books, articles and 
pamphlets, Join the Caravan (1987) made Azzam‘s version of jihad an obligation for 
every Muslim (Azzam, 1987a; 1988; 2001).  Azzam‘s speaking circuit across Europe, the 
Middle East, and the United States magnified his influence to recruit fighters and 
supporters for his version of jihad (Wright, 2006).  
Those who heard Azzam describe him as a charismatic speaker that no one 
wanted to openly dispute (Asharq al-Awsat, 2005).  In terms of personality, Azzam 
blended intellect, charismatic ability, rigid religious discipline, and piety.  His personal 
involvement in fighting Soviet troops in occupied Afghanistan only reinforced his 
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reputation as a warrior-scholar (Trevor, 2010). To further magnify his influence, Azzam‘s 
messages were videotaped, converted to audio messages and disseminated widely.  The 
speaking engagements, books, audio messages, and his videos granted Azzam a 
substantial impact in the violent jihadi movement (Kholman, 2001). Azzam‘s speaking 
circuit was unique because those interested in violent jihad had an outlet to put their 
ideology into practice by fighting the Soviets in occupied Afghanistan.  In this way, 
potential recruits had the opportunity to demonstrate their level of commitment to jihad. 
One of Azzam‘s most influential ideas was the idea of a ―vanguard.‖  To quote 
Azzam: ―Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way 
into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, 
neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything 
it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology‖ (Gunaratna, 2002; 26). After 
Azzam and both of his sons were killed by a car bomb in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1989, 
Osama bin Laden
88
 and Ayman al Zawahiri gave Azzam‘s ―vanguard‖ or ―the base‖ a 
name and a place in history. Azzam‘s term vanguard is not as recognizable as its 
synonym, ‗the base,‘ which in Arabic is translated as al Qaeda.  Hence, Azzam‘s vision 
of a vanguard was materialized by what became known as al Qaeda.   
Ayman Zawahiri (1951-present) 
Amongst those who have studied violent jihadis, Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian 
medical doctor,
89
 is known as the intellect behind al Qaeda (Kepel & Milelli, 2008; 
Brachman, 2009). After Bin Laden‘s death in 2011, this former leader of Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is currently known as al Qaeda‘s commander.  Many experts consider 
                                                          
88
 Osama bin Laden was one of Azzam‘s disciples. 
89
 Al Qeada‘s second in command graduated from Cairo University in 1978 with a medical degree. 
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Ayman al Zawahiri to be the most important ideological architect of al Qaeda and the 
former ideological mentor to bin Laden (Kepel & Milelli, 2008; Aboul-Enein, 2004; 
Brachman, 2009). Zawahiri‘s ideology was formed by his studies in science, mathematics 
and in medicine fused with his experiences in prison, torture and war (Raphaeli, 2002). 
Zawahiri shares many biographical similarities with Sayyid Qutb, such as being 
imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian government. Zawahiri continues to issue 
communiqués via the internet, audio recordings, and video.  The communiqués address 
current events and how the ‗faithful‘ should respond to them (Sageman, 2004).  
Zawahiri‘s ideas and actions continue to impact the violent jihadi movement (Brachman, 
2009).   
Zawahiri has decades of experience as a violent jihadi in Egypt, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan (Wright, 2006).  Zawahiri grew up in Egypt during the political instability 
that characterized the period between the 1960‘s and the 1980‘s. During this time as a 
young adult, Zawahiri interacted with Islamic groups that were adamantly against Gamal 
Nasser‘s regime (Wright, 2006). Zawahiri hated the corruption in Egyptian politics and 
believed that Egypt‘s military loss to Israel in 1967 and 1973 was a result of Egyptian‘s 
impure brand of Islam (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004). These events, combined with the 
execution of Sayyid Qutb, solidified his belief that ‗true‘ Muslims had to respond to 
existing injustices.
90
   
Before founding a violent jihadi group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, he had been a 
long time member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004).  
Zawahiri was imprisoned by the Egyptian government after Anwar‘s Sadat‘s 
assassination. In prison, he was tortured, which solidified his view that Muslims who 
                                                          
90
 The execution of Sayyid Qutb by the Egyptian government was a pivotal movement during his youth.   
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torture other Muslims could not be true Muslims, thus sharing a similar ―revelation‖ as 
Sayyid Qutb (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004).  After his release from prison, Zawahiri 
planned to use violent jihad to remove the current Egyptian government and restore 
―pure‖ Islam over corrupt Egyptian nationalism. 
Zawahiri‘s focus on violent jihad in his early years was a type of national jihad, 
not the global jihad he would later promote.  It took several years for Zawahiri to shift his 
ideology beyond Egypt.  After he was released from prison, he left Egypt for Saudi 
Arabia to practice medicine.  During Zawahiri‘s stint in Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan.   After hearing that Muslims were attacked by an atheist army, he 
believed that it was his duty to assist besieged Muslims (Wright, 2008).  Zawahiri joined 
the Red Crescent and left for Peshawar, Pakistan.  From his clinic in Peshawar he served 
as a doctor in the Red Crescent treating wounded Mujahedeen (Aboul-Enein, 2004).  
Zawahiri perceived the time in Afghanistan as an opportunity to strengthen Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, fulfill a religious duty of participating in jihad and build a stronger 
platform to later ‗purify‘ Egypt (Wright, 2008).  
 He was preparing to ―free‖ Egypt after the Soviets had been repelled from 
Afghanistan.  Zawahiri used his time in Afghanistan to restructure EIJ, obtain funds, and 
find new recruits (Aboul-Enein, 2004).  It was during this time that he met Osama bin 
Laden, an encounter that altered both of their lives (Wright, 2006).   
Zawahiri was competing with Abdullah Azzam for the attention of Osama bin 
Laden.  Bin Laden was committed to violent jihad and could bring considerable financial 
resources to a group (Wright, 2006).  At the time, Zawahiri direly needed additional 
funding and recruits so he was traveling to Europe and the United States to raise money 
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and obtain recruits for EIJ.   If Zawahiri could solidify his partnership with Bin Laden, he 
believed that their collaboration would greatly advance EIJ‘s capabilities (Wright, 2006)  
Bin Laden needed Zawahiri‘s decades of experience with violent jihadi groups 
and direction from an ideological advisor (Bergen, 2006).  Bin Laden eventually gave his 
full financial support to Zawahiri for global jihad, not Egyptian jihad.  Bin Laden 
convinced Zawahiri that the best strategy of ‗purifying‘ Egypt was to cut its ―umbilical 
cord‖ to the west (Bergen, 2006).  Bin Laden argued that if violent jihadi‘s would target 
the parent of Egypt, the far away enemy, mainly the United States, then Egypt and Israel 
will fall (Burke, 2004).  Shifting the target to the United States was a major change in 
Zawahiri‘s ideology and thus global jihad became his new obsession. 
Zawahiri‘s ‗new‘ obsession is outlined in an ideological publication, Knights 
Under the Prophets Banner, written under U.S. aerial bombardments in 
Pakistan/Afghanistan.  Zawahiri describes violent jihad as the way for a ―true‖ Muslim to 
receive favor from Allah when Islam is under attack (Mansfield, 2006).  An army of 
infidels, crusaders and apostates were waging war against Allah and any Muslim that 
remained passive was not a ‗true‘ Muslim.  Under this definition, Zawahiri describes 
violent jihad as an obligation in line with the example set by the prophet Mohammad 
(Sageman, 2004).    Zawahiri extends violent jihad to the existing political regimes across 
the Middle East because they are advancing a tainted strain of Islam (Muntaser, 2004).  
To counter the political corruption, Zawahiri desires to remove apostate Muslims 
governments and replace them with violent jihadi leadership (Mansfield, 2006).  
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 Currently, media reports claim that he is hiding in northern Pakistan and regularly 
issues video and audio communiqués calling for violent jihadis to rise up and attack 
Islam‘s enemies wherever they exist.91 
Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) 
 Osama Bin Laden has become one of the world‘s most recognizable names and 
faces. He has gone from obscurity before 2001 to a global phenomenon.  The coining of 
the term bin Ladenism reflects the degree to which his actions and al Qaeda have 
impacted jihad on a global stage, but this was not always the case (Friedman, 2001).   
 Bin Laden was born to a wealthy Saudi family that owns the largest construction 
company in the Middle East; the bin Laden Group (Wright, 2006).   His father had moved 
from Yemen to Saudi Arabia for employment and to seek a better life.  Bin Laden‘s 
father would work different construction jobs to eventually become the owner of the 
largest construction company in Saudi Arabia and one of the largest in the Middle East 
(Wright, 2006).  The royal Saudi family trusted bin Laden‘s father and liked his work, 
therefore granting large governmental contracts.
92
 After Bin Laden‘s father died in a 
plane crash in 1967, his elder brother took over the family business (Bergen, 2006). 
 Osama attended King Abdul Aziz University in hopes that his education would 
assist in running the family business (Wright, 2006).  While attending King Abdul Aziz 
University, he met two professors that would later become ideological mentors.  
Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam played key roles in 
the formation of bin Laden‘s ideology and future path (Wright, 2006).  Mohammad Qutb 
and Abdullah Azzam discussed jihad with bin Laden and recounted the ideas of other 
                                                          
91
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1560834.stm accessed June 2010. 
92
 He was give the task of redesigning and the Great Mecca Mosque to create a better system for handling 
the millions of pilgrims that come to Mecca for the Haj.   
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violent jihadi scholars (Wright, 2006; Calvert, 2007).  The personal connection with 
Azzam served as a catalyst to set bin Laden on a path to violent jihad (Calvert, 2007). 
Azzam later moved to Peshawar and founded the Office of Services, an 
organization to recruit Muslims to fight against the Soviets (Calvert, 2007).  Azzam sent 
a personal invitation to bin Laden to join him in Peshawar.  Azzam wanted bin Laden to 
assist him in recruiting Arabs to assist in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Calvert, 
2007).  This agreement put bin Laden in a war zone to experience violent jihad.   
Azzam invited bin Laden to Peshawar because he was a desirable associate to 
have.  Bin Laden was wealthy, pious, humble, and not overly ambitious.  During the war 
against the Soviets, Azzam continued to mentor bin Laden (Calvert, 2007).  It was in 
Afghanistan that bin Laden fought against Soviet forces engaged in attacking Muslims 
(Wright, 2006; Bergen, 2006). 
 Bin Laden and other Arabs engaged in a firefight with a Soviet Special Forces 
unit in the Afghan mountains (Wright, 2006).  Bin Laden and the Arabs defeated the 
numerically larger and better equipped Soviet Forces.
93
  Bin Laden perceived their 
victory as a miracle and confirmation that Allah was on their side and granting them 
favor. Bin Laden interpreted the victory as a similar experience to what the Prophet 
Mohammad had experienced after overcoming superior forces-- a testament of divine 
favor.  Their victory was confirmation by Allah that violent jihad and pious living were a 
favorable combination (Wright, 2006).   
In a similar vein, after Soviet Forces left Afghanistan in 1989, violent jihadis 
believed the withdrawal was a sign from Allah rewarding the faithfulness of the Afghan 
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Arabs and the Mujahedeen (Scheuer, 2002).  This correlation, no matter how spurious, 
was key to the future direction of al Qaeda.  If pious Muslims can defeat the Soviet 
Union, no nation or army can withstand the divine favor of Allah.  Experiencing Allah‘s 
blessing in real time when attacking a superior foe was a lesson bin Laden did not forget 
(Scheuer, 2002). After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, bin Laden and his fighters needed 
another front to experience Allah‘s favor.   
Bin Laden‘s fatwa, The Declaration of War, issued in 1996, demanded the 
withdrawal of America troops from Saudi Arabia and the lifting of sanctions against Iraq.  
Bin Laden also wanted Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris free from invasion (Burke, 
2004).  Bin Laden condemned America for using atomic bombs in WWII, countless 
scores of human rights abuses (branding America the worst civilization ever), and a 
destroyer of natural surroundings by polluting it with industrial waste (Burke, 2004; 23-
24). By declaring war, Bin Laden wanted to engage the United States in a war of attrition.  
Bin Laden wanted to draw the United States into a long drawn out campaign similar to 
that which occurred to the Soviet Union (Scheuer, 2002).
94
  Bin Laden wanted the United 
States to retaliate against the Mujahedeen and then they would bleed them dry over a 
period of time (Wright, 2006). Bin Laden would use this attrition war against the United 
States as another opportunity to receive Allah‘s favor by global jihad. 
Scheuer (2002) asserts that people are surprised to hear that it was never bin 
Laden‘s intention to defeat the United States.  The attacks against the United States 
would in no way destroy the United States, but would send a very clear message.  Bin 
Laden saw the image of what happened to the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen as a metaphor to 
what he believed should happen to the United States if it invaded Afghanistan (Scheuer, 
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2002).  An advanced and fearsome Navy vessel was taken out of service by explosives 
packed into a little dingy.  To bin Laden, the U.S.S. Cole represented the armament, 
technology, and godlessness of the United States against the small dingy which 
represented violent jihadis supported by Allah‘s favor.  The dingy sent the U.S.S. Cole 
back to the United States in shame, and this was a perfect metaphor to describe the battle 
between al Qaeda and the United States (Burke, 2004).  Bin Laden was certain that the 
United States would end up like the U.S.S. Cole-wounded, weak, and unable to function.   
Bin Laden also wanted to wage a large scale media campaign to win the hearts 
and support of Muslims across the globe (Bergen, 2006; Hauner, 2007).  As a general 
principle, bin Laden did not want to isolate al Qaeda from Muslim nations or non-jihadi 
Islamic groups (Burke, 2004).  Instead, bin Laden sought to impact popular sentiment to 
increase the scale of a war of attrition (Scheuer, 2002).   
One of the strategic objectives of al Qaeda was to generate a great deal of support 
for their cause. Bin Laden wanted to frame violent jihad as a logical response to the 
United States‘ support for Israel, corrupt Muslim governments, and the U.S. assault on 
Islam (Burke, 2004). He also wanted to make the Palestinian issue central to al Qaeda‘s 
media campaign because this would unite the Muslim world and would eventually turn 
the American public away from supporting Israel (Burke, 2004). 
 Bin Laden successfully evaded the United States for almost 16 years until his 
death in 2011. In the last ten years, he managed to evade capture despite one of the most 
intensive man hunts in the history of the United States. In 2011, Bin Laden was killed by 
U.S. Special Forces in a compound in northern Pakistan.  Since the United States is 
responsible for his death, he has already be immortalized as martyr by violent jihadis, in a 
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similar fashion to Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden‘s ideology and actions have set into motion a 
method for carrying out global jihad that will continue long after his death. 
Abu Mohammad Maqdisi (1959-Present) 
     Abu Mohammad Maqdisi, born in 1959 as Muhammad Tahir Barqawi, has been 
identified as one of the most influential contemporary violent jihadi propagandists 
(Wagemakers, 2009; McCants & Brachman, 2006; Brachman, 2009).  Barqawi adopted 
the name ‗Maqdisi‘ as a title because it functions as constant reminder of a violent jihadi 
goal, the ‗liberation‘ of Bayt al Maqdis (Jerusalem) which is near to the village of his 
birth Barqa (Kazimi, 2005).  Maqdisi‘s family later moved to Kuwait where he stayed 
until he finished his secondary education.  He wanted to study Sharia law at the Islamic 
University in Medina but followed his father‘s guidance and moved to Mosul Iraq to 
study science (Wagemakers, 2009).  In Mosul, he met with members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood that strongly adhered to Qutbist ideology.  It was also in Mosul that Maqdisi 
was influenced by the work of Juhaiman al ‗Uteibi.  Utebi, a leader of the 1979 Grand 
Mosque seizure, later executed by the Saudi government, railed against corrupt Islamic 
governments. This was significant because Maqdisi‘s most influential work, This is our 
Aqeedah, was an extension of the Uteibi‘s letter (Wagemakers, 2009).   
     Similar to Sayyid Qutb and Ayman Zawahiri, Maqdisi‘s ideology was impacted by 
time spent in Muslim prisons.  Maqdisi experienced torture during 14 years in a 
Jordanian prison and a year in solitary confinement (Wagemakers, 2008).
95
   In prison, 
Maqdisi authored numerous books, which were then translated into many different 
languages and smuggled into countries where his work is considered illegal.  Maqdisi 
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currently manages al Tawhed.com, an online resource library that McCants and 
Brachman (2006) have titled al Qaeda‘s library.  His work, This is our Aqeedah, has 
generated the most fanfare among violent jihadis and other Maqdisi publications make 
the top five downloaded texts on the al Taweed website.
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 Maqdisi wrote This is our Aqeedah in Kuwait as a theoretical discourse to 
validate takfir, the practice of declaring apostasy in Islam.  He argues that any Muslim is 
an apostate if they accept secular Islamic governmental laws. Maqdisi rejects the current 
political reality and labels current political leaders as ‗unbelievers‘ who follow man made 
inventions.  These inventions exist in the form of constitutions, democratic rule, 
following religious leaders supported by current governments, public education at all 
levels, and secular police/military (Wagemakers, 2009).     
     The central component in Maqdisi‘s ideology was to counter takfir and manmade 
inventions that hindered complete loyalty to Allah (Wagemakers, 2009).  In other words, 
a ‗true‘ Muslim demonstrates loyalty by rejecting all manmade inventions and worships 
Allah according to the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad.  The Taliban 
demonstrates this type of ‗true‘ worship and claims that Muslims who oppose violent 
jihad are not true Muslims.  Maqdisi is popular among violent jihadis not only for his 
ideological publications, but because of his credibility.  His beliefs do not waiver despite 
torture or imprisonment, thus leading to Madqisi to be sought out as a mentor. 
     Many of Maqdisi‘s disciples have been killed either in Iraq or Afghanistan.  His eldest 
son, Mohammad, is believed to have been killed in Iraq fighting coalition forces.  
Zarqawi, his most famous disciple, became the face of al Qaeda before his death in 2006 
(Kazimi, 2005).  It was in Peshawar, Pakistan that Maqdisi met Zarqawi in the early 
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1990‘s.   They would meet again to form the organization Tawhid wel Jihad (Kazimi, 
2005).   
     The objective of Tawhid wel Jihad was to convert youth to the cause of violent jihad. 
Members of Tawhid wel Jihad engaged in limited forms of violence but preferred to 
support other groups for carrying out violence.  In 1994, both Maqdisi and Zarqawi were 
arrested in separate incidents and after trial were both given life sentences (Kazimi, 
2005).  They spent four years together in prison, 1995 – 1999, where Maqdisi became the 
spiritual mentor of Zarqawi.  When the King Abdullah II of Jordan came to power in 
1999, he pardoned Maqdisi and Zarqawi.  Maqdisi stayed in Jordan while Zarqawi 
traveled to Iraq. 
     Zarqwai‘s use of violence in Iraq as the face of al Qaeda made international news 
(Kazimi, 2005).   Maqdisi later disagreed with Zarqawi‘s regular use of violence against 
Muslim women and children. The Jordanian government perceived their disagreement as 
an opportunity to demonstrate that Maqdisi‘s beliefs were no longer extreme and that his 
time in Jordanian prisons had ―corrected‖ his view.  The Jordanian government released 
Maqdisi in hopes that he would condemn Zarqawi‘s actions and appear more moderate 
(Kazimi, 2005).  But this strategy failed. When it was confirmed that Zaraqawi had been 
killed by U.S. Forces, Maqdisi publically praised Zaraqawi as a hero of Islam and was 
subsequently rearrested.  At the time of writing, Maqdisi remains imprisoned in Jordan.  
His ideas are still perceived as dangerous and despite his incarceration, the al Qaeda 
library website still functions.   
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Neo-Nazi Propagandists: 
George Lincoln Rockwell (1918-1967) 
Known as the American Fuhrer, George Lincoln Rockwell, founder of the 
American Nazi Party, is considered to be one of the most influential leaders in the white 
power movement (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  His status in neo-Nazi thought can be 
compared to Sayyid Qutb‘s influence among violent jihadis.  In June 1967, as Rockwell 
exited a laundry mat in Arlington Virginia, he was shot and killed by an assassin.  
Rockwell‘s execution immortalized him as a neo-Nazi martyr.97   
During the 1950‘s and 1960‘s, Rockwell was a charismatic leader and a 
polarizing figure across America (Simonelli, 1999). His persona and use of media 
catapulted him to national attention. Rockwell articulated his ideology through a 
charismatic communicative style intermixed with stage bravado in public appearances, 
counter civil rights demonstrations, and a public speaking circuit (Schmaltz, 1998; 
Simonelli, 1999).   Rockwell‘s parents were successful actors, to which attributed his 
oratory abilities and the love of being in the public eye (Simonelli, 1999; Kaplan, 2000). 
When in front of a crowd, Rockwell relied on emotional appeals disseminated through 
the mass media to propel him as the champion of the white race. Understanding how to 
manipulate the media, he made every attempt to obtain ―free press‖ to spread his ideas.   
Rockwell‘s ideological stamp on the white power movement continues.  His 
ideas, such as denying the Holocaust, the phrase ―white power,‖ the use of music in the 
movement, advocating ties with Christian Identity, expanding Hitler‘s notion of Aryans, 
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or using visual imagery through distinctive dress and public forums set a precedence for 
other neo-Nazi groups (Simonelli, 1999).  Rockwell‘s example as a leader, public 
persona, and ideologue also inspired future neo-Nazi leaders. William Pierce, David 
Butler, Colin Jordan, David Duke, and Matt Koehl all worked with Rockwell (Langer, 
2003; Simonelli, 1999, Zeskind, 2009).  Rockwell‘s disciples proved to be ―effective‖ in 
replicating and advancing what they learned.   
The groundwork for Rockwell‘s ideology was formed during World War II, the 
Korean War, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam War (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 
2000). To Rockwell, the civil rights movement, moral depravity in the United States, the 
threat of communism, and the destructive cultural revolution were all signs that society 
was falling apart (Rockwell, 1979; Simonelli, 1999). He saw a new society emerging that 
was different from the classical ethos that permeated the United States until the time of 
the cultural revolution.  To counter these changes, Rockwell wanted to start an 
organization that would effectively turn the tide against a corrupt society that was 
threatening the white race (Simonelli, 1999; Kaplan, 2000).  One day he received a 
package in the mail that would be the catalyst to create an organization to counter societal 
decay.  
The idea of a new organization originated after a package arrived in the mail 
(Rockwell, 1979).  One of Rockwell‘s friends sent him a Nazi flag, which after opening, 
he hung in his home.  He felt inspired and lit a couple of candles in honor of Nazi 
Germany.   Rockwell describes standing before the Nazi flag as a deeply religious 
moment, a moment that altered his future (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 2000).  Rockwell 
was committed to starting a new group that integrated a new religious and political 
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identity that placed the white race at the center (Kaplan, 2000; Simonelli, 1999).  
Rockwell wanted to stand on the shoulders of other proto fascists, racists, and Nazis to 
carve out a new niche.  Rockwell was able to act on his convictions, modified existing 
ideologies, and persuaded others to join him and his new group (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 
2000).  
In March 1959, he formed the American Nazi Party (ANP) (Simonelli, 1999).  
Rockwell incorporated the Nazi uniform, the swastika and the sieg heil salute to 
demonstrate his solidarity with the Third Reich and the power of the white race 
(Schmaltz, 1998).  His clean cut look, sharp dress, and corn cob pipe was intended to 
create a progressive/positive image.  By integrating these seemingly divergent socio-
political strands, Rockwell‘s group would form the ANP. Rockwell used visual imagery 
in public rallies, civil rights counter protests, and speaking engagements to gain attention 
for the ANP. Rockwell was center stage in the media due to his controversial public 
appearances and debates, therefore giving the white power movement ample national 
coverage. 
White Power (1967) serves as a manifesto for the ANP.  One of the central themes 
outlines that a race war will be fought based on the color of skin.  The white population 
will be fighting for its survival against an ever increasing non-white populace.  Rockwell 
targeted de-segregation and used the notion of an impending race war to forecast the 
devastating long range impact on whites. Rockwell also targeted the Holocaust as history 
used by Jews to leverage sympathy to accomplish their agenda (Rockwell, 1979; 
Simonelli, 1999) Rockwell argued that the Holocaust was misused as a deceptive device 
to foster international sympathy to obtain votes from the United Nations for Israeli 
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statehood (Rockwell, 1979).   Civil rights activists were using the same tactic, obtaining 
sympathy for blacks because of the oppression caused by slavery and Jim Crow laws, 
which Rockwell argued put the white race at risk. Rockwell stated that the civil rights 
movement and the Holocaust were effective weapons against the white race, because it 
gave immense resources, leverage, and political power to non-whites and Jews 
(Rockwell, 1979, Simonelli, 1999).    
One of the ways Rockwell tried to counter civil rights, the Holocaust, the cultural 
revolution, and communism was to marry Nazi racial and political ideology to a spiritual 
foundation (Simonelli, 1999). Rockwell reasoned that if politics and religion are fused 
together, a population is likely to demonstrate a higher level of commitment to a cause.  
Therefore, in the mid 1960‘s Rockwell entertained the notion of merging Nazi political 
philosophy within the Christian Identity Movement (Simonelli, 1999).  Christian Identity 
was a good starting point because a racial theology and anti Semitic views were already 
present (Kaplan, 2000; Zeskind, 2009).  Rockwell insisted that a white political 
philosophy and spiritual grounding was needed for the white race because a race war was 
inevitable (Rockwell, 1996). Rockwell was killed before this fully materialized but his 
disciple, William Pierce, who founded the National Alliance, merged a political 
philosophy to a spiritual foundation (Griffin, 2001; Kaplan, 2000; Zeskind, 2009; 
Whitsel, 1995; 1998).   
Rockwell‘s impact can be felt to this day in the neo-Nazi movement.  His use of 
literature, music, the creation of a visual identity, and organizational structure, are still 
used by the National Alliance, Aryan Nations, and the National Socialist Movement. 
248 
 
Rockwell‘s death is considered by neo-Nazis as a martyr‘s death, solidifying his 
prominence in the white power movement. 
William Pierce (1933-2002) 
 Dr. William Luther Pierce gained national attention in 1995 after the bombing of 
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City (Ballard, 2005).  His fictional work, The Turner 
Diaries (1999), outlines a future race war between whites and non-whites, where 
characters in the book target an FBI building.  The Turner Diaries was cited as the 
inspiration for Timothy McVeigh because the circumstances in the book are similar to 
those in the Oklahoma City bombing (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Walters, 2000; Ferber, 
1998).  McVeigh regularly handed out free copies of the Turner Diaries and sold the 
book during gun shows (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).  McVeigh‘s connection to the Turner 
Diaries brought the views and work of William Pierce, pen name Andrew MacDonald, to 
mainstream America.   
Pierce‘s degree of influence on the neo-Nazi movement has been significant 
(Kaplan, 2000).  Pierce founded The National Alliance (an organization devoted to white 
separatist ideology), and Cosmotheism (a race based religion).  While directing The 
National Alliance, Pierce supervised National Vanguard Books Incorporated, pioneered 
neo-Nazi websites, and managed Resistance Records as methods of disseminating neo-
Nazi ideology (Kaplan, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Whitsell, 1995; 
1998).  
 William Pierce graduated in 1962 with a Ph.D. in physics from the University of 
Colorado at Boulder (Kaplan, 2000).  After graduation he obtained an assistant professor 
position for three years at Oregon State University, 1962-1965 (Griffin, 2001; Kaplan, 
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2000).    Constant media coverage of anti Vietnam protests and  civil rights clashes led 
Pierce to conclude the American social fabric was unraveling (Whitsell, 1995; 1998). 
During his first year at Oregon State University Pierce‘s increasing interest in 
politics led him to join the John Birch Society (Zezkind, 2009).  After three years of 
academic life in the midst of civil rights protests and the beginning of the Vietnam war, 
he grew increasingly dissatisfied with academic life and resigned in 1965 (Griffin, 2001; 
Whitsell, 1995; 1998).   
One year after his resignation, he sought out George Lincoln Rockwell and joined 
the American Nazi Party (National Socialist White People‘s Party).  To Rockwell‘s 
delight, Pierce became the editor of the ideological journal, National Socialist World 
(Kaplan, 2000; Simonelli, 1999). Pierced learned a great deal from Rockwell, but their 
relationship was cut short by Rockwell‘s death.  Then in 1970, three years after 
Rockwell‘s death, Pierce emerged as a new neo-Nazi leader. Pierce led the National 
Youth Alliance and changed the name in 1974 to the National Alliance (Kaplan, 2000; 
Griffin, 2001; Zeskind, 2009).  
Pierce led the National Alliance in a different direction from Rockwell. Pierce 
distanced himself from the overt use of Nazi symbolism and regalia and moved from 
Virginia to rural West Virginia (Whitsell, 1995;1998).  Pierce replaced the politicized 
swastika with the Nordic life rune.  The life rune, often surrounded by a band of ivy, is a 
character in the runic alphabet that represents rebirth, life and creation.
98
  The rune is 
found on the gravestones of SS soldiers to signify their birth date. To Pierce, the life rune 
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symbolizes the white race as a sacred/spiritual element and his ideological leadership 
initiates a rebirth of white supremacy.
 99
    
Pierce, like Rockwell, wanted a spiritual movement to parallel his political 
ambitions.  He wanted to advance this idea further than Rockwell (Simonelli, 1999).  
Pierce inserted a type of neo-Nazi mysticism in what was to be called the Cosomotheist 
Community Church.  The theology associated with Cosmotheism fuses eugenics, white 
racialism, and pantheism (Griffin, 2001; Whitsell, 1995; 1998).  Pierce based 
Cosmotheism on evolution, arguing that through the process of natural selection, the 
white race emerged as the pinnacle of the human race (Whitsell, 1995; 1998).  
Cosmotheism attributes divinity to a universal consciousness over the concept of a single 
god.  Pierce‘s religion was revealed to mankind through the constant genetic 
improvement of humanity, preserved in the white race (Whitsell, 1995; 1998).  The white 
race epitomizes the best union between the forces of the universe and humanity.  The 
genetic code of the white race is the manifestation of this union.  Pierce perceived that the 
white race emerged as the ―fittest‖ of the human races.  Therefore, Pierce argued that the 
white race demonstrates more than just skin color, it is a sacred element representing 
harmony between a universal consciousness and humanity.  Protecting this harmony, 
according to Pierce is a higher calling (Whitsell, 1995;1998; Griffin, 2001). 
According to Pierce, the white race was on the verge of extinction and in need of 
redemption.  Since Pierce perceived the white race as sacred, whites who reproduce with 
non whites are deemed race traitors (Whitsell, 1995; 1998).  In order to preserve the 
white race, Pierce also forecasted a race war, where racial cleansing ensured white racial 
salvation (Zeskind, 2009).  Pierce perceived that a group needed to protect the white race 
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and by doing so, would eventually move conflict to open racial warfare.  Pierce fused his 
ideology in a fictional narrative in the Turner Diaries, where such a group waging a race 
war materializes.  Pierce‘s fictional account of a race war served as the ideological 
inspiration in the 1980‘s for a terrorist cell of ten men lead by Bob Matthews, the Silent 
Brotherhood (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990). 
Pierce‘s political agenda was based around the idea of ―white racial redemption‖ 
which the National Alliance, National Vanguard Books, Resistance Records, and his 
radio broadcast, American Dissident Voices, were the mechanism of dissemination 
(Kaplan, 2000; Whitsell, 1995; 1998).  The National Alliance Compound in West 
Virginia became the headquarters, the site where National Vanguard Books and 
Resistance Records are distributed, and the location where Pierce would tape his radio 
broadcasts (Simi & Futrell, 2010).
 
 
 Since his death in July 2002, the National Alliance continues to function under 
Erich Gliebe, their website is readable in fifteen languages and the publishing and music 
industry is still going strong.
 100
 Simi and Futrell (2010; 105) state ―almost a decade after 
his death, the group does not appear to be dissolving.  National Alliance‘s sophisticated 
Web presence and radio broadcasts still draw a wide Aryan audience.‖  
Ben Klassen (1918-1993) 
 Ben Klassen, author of the White Man’s Bible (1981) and founder of the Church 
of the Creator (COTC)
101
 is described by Michael (2006; 561) as having ―a significant 
influence on the international far right.‖  Klassen wrote more than fifteen books and 
hundreds of magazine articles during his twenty year tenure of leading the COTC. Most 
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notably, Klassen created and promoted the concept of ―RAHOWA,‖ a condensed version 
of ―racial holy war‖ (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000).  RAHOWA became a 
battle cry for the COTC and the ideological backdrop for opening a training center to 
prepare for the upcoming race war.  
 Before Klassen was leading members of the COTC, he was a relatively successful 
realtor and inventor (Zeskind, 2009; Klassen 1993).  According to Klassen, his first 
introduction into the racist political ideology occurred when he was twenty after reading 
Mein Kampf (Klassen, 1993).  Klassen states in his autobiography that Mein Kampf‘s 
impact overshadows everything else that he had read until then or since (Klassen, 1993). 
Mein Kampf was the catalyst for him to create a new religion base on the white race 
(Klassen, 1993; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001).  Klassen believed that after 
reading Mein Kampf and contemplating its meaning, he stumbled on a mystery that he 
alone seemed to have discovered; race is one‘s religion and that Jews created Christianity 
to weaken whites (Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006). 
Klassen‘s new religion was based on creativity, or the notion that one‘s race is the 
determinate for that person‘s religion (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001).  Klassen, 
like Rockwell, felt that his creation of a new racial religion was his destiny and the 
purpose of his life (Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006).  Klassen firmly believed that 
establishing a new religion would ensure the survival of the white race. Klassen 
emphasized that the white race is a religion, the apex of natural selection, responsible for 
social progress, and was under attack from race mixers, Jews and non whites (Michael, 
2006; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000).  Ultimately, the only possible outcome of 
this increasing threat was a racial holy war. 
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In 1973, Klassen founded the COTC in Florida as a response to the increasing 
threat against whites (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Michael, 2006).  The manifesto of the 
COTC was Klassen‘s White Man’s Bible, a 511 page document that outlined the 
ideological foundations for the group (Michael, 2006). The doctrine outlined in White 
Man’s Bible (1981) claims that the white race is unique and sacred. Members of the 
COTC asserted that their religion is grounded in the external laws of nature, history, and 
logic (Michael, 2006; Klassen, 1993).  Klassen asserted that the Jews‘ most powerful 
weapon against the white race and the COTC was the Jewish invention of Christianity 
(Klassen, 1993; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).   
Klassen asserted that Christianity was a Jewish invention determined to weaken 
and eventually destroy the white race while protecting Jewish populations (Kaplan, 2000; 
Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006).  Klassen observed that the entire Christian faith was 
founded by Jews but was not practiced by Jews (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  Klassen also 
noted that a central tenet of Christianity was to ―love thy neighbor‖ and ―turn the other 
cheek‖ (Klassen, 1993).   The doctrine of forgiveness was central to Christianity because 
Jews created the faith to protect them from the stronger white race.  Klassen saw this 
revelation as an epiphany and concluded that the Jews created Christianity as a means to 
indoctrinate the stronger white race against attacking the ‗weaker‘ Jews (Michael, 2006).  
Klassen cited the fact that Jews sought to convert non-Jews to Christianity as evidence of 
the plot (Klassen, 1993). Members of the COTC label Christianity as a religion of 
violence against the white race, reject the existence of Jesus, and encourage the hating of 
the enemies of the white race (Michael, 2006; Zeskind, 2009; White, 2001).     
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Throughout the remainder of the 1970‘s Klassen continued to publish and build 
the COTC (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  In 1981, he published The White Man’s Bible, 
which outlines the details of how members should live.  In an attempt to live out what 
was written in the White Man’s Bible, Klassen moved in 1982 from Florida to North 
Carolina to begin construction of a new COTC headquarters (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  
The new location was to be an ideological, physical, tactical, and spiritual training ground 
to prepare hearts, minds and bodies for the upcoming racial war (Michael, 2006).  A 
personal residence, a three story church, a warehouse, a ‗school‘ building, a small arms 
firing range, paramilitary barracks, and a barn were constructed.  After a year the 
construction was completed, and Klassen conferred the title ―Pontifex Maxims‖ (high 
priest in Latin) to himself as leader of the COTC and began a monthly publication, Racial 
Loyalty (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000; Michael, 2006).  
Klassen committed suicide by consuming four bottles of sleeping pills in his 
residence in 1993 (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000).  His suicide took place 
shortly after the death of his wife and the completion of his autobiography (Kaplan, 
2000).  His autobiography outlines the future vision and direction of the COTC.  He 
was buried in the COTC compound.  As far as the future of the Creator Movement, 
Michael (2006; 579), asserts ―the theology of the COTC will continue to inspire 
racial activists in the future.‖ 
David Lane (1938-2007) 
 David Lane, a former member of The Silent Brotherhood, a terrorist group 
committed to protecting the white race, has had a significant impact on the neo-Nazi 
movement.  Lane‘s impact is derived from his exploits in The Silent Brotherhood, 
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being a ‗political‘ prisoner, and his publications.  Lane created two ‗coded‘ phrases 
that summarize the tenets of the white nationalist movement.  Lane‘s creation of the 
14 words ―we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white 
children‖ and the 88 precepts, is a way of providing an altruistic mission statement 
and ‗natural law‘ for the white nationalist movement.  Before Lane‘s death in 2007, 
the 14 words, the 88 precepts and many other publications were drafted in prison, 
while he served out his 190 year sentence for racketeering, conspiracy, and civil 
rights violations.   
Lane always sought to lead throughout his career as a neo-Nazi.  Lane joined 
the Ku Klux Klan and in 1979 he became the organizer of the KKK Denver Unit.  In 
1981, he transitioned to the Aryan Nations and soon was given the duties and 
responsibilities of being the Colorado State Organizer (Lane, unk).  Lane later 
relocated to Hayden Lake, Idaho (the location of the Aryan Nations compound) and 
then returned to lead the Colorado Headquarters of the White American Political 
Association founded by Tom Metzger.  It was during this time that he met Bob 
Matthews; a meeting that would influence the rest of his life (Lane, unk).  
Lane later joined Matthews at his home in Metaline Falls, Washington 
because Matthews was able to channel Lane‘s frustration with the passivity of white 
supremacist groups (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  Matthews led 
Lane and ten other men in taking an oath to protect the white race and ensure that 
white children would have a future (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Zeskind, 2009).  Lane 
swore an oath and the Silent Brotherhood, later called Bruder Schweigen, was 
founded (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).  Over the course 
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of the next two years, Lane was involved in a terrorist campaign to save the white 
race and spark a revolution (Flynn &Gerhardt, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).   
Lane and members of the Silent Brotherhood carried out armored car 
hijackings, two assassinations, counterfeit operations, organized military training 
camps, and detonated bombs (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; 
Zeskind, 2009).
102
 Each activity was carried out as a series of terrorist incidents 
which would gain momentum to eventually overthrow the federal government. The 
actions of the group would lead to the death of Matthews and the arrest of the other 
members who were incarcerated in federal prisons around the country (Flynn & 
Gerhardt, 1990; Zeskind, 2009).  Lane was arrested in 1985 in North Carolina and 
sentenced to 190 years in federal prison (Kaplan, 2000).  Lane‘s time in prison 
increased his status in the neo-Nazi movement, because he identified himself as a 
―white political prisoner,‖ under persecution by the federal government for his racist 
political views and actions (Kaplan, 2000).  
Lane‘s status within the neo-Nazi movement was often mythical because of 
his actions with The Silent Brotherhood (Kaplan, 2000).  Mythical because members 
of the Silent Brotherhood put their ideology into action as fighters and whose leader 
ultimately paid the ultimate price as a ‗race‘ martyr.  Lane‘s status as a member of 
The Silent Brotherhood afforded him respect and credibility amongst other neo-
Nazis. Lane was often asked for his signature by incarcerated Aryans that revered 
and respected what he had accomplished.  Second, because of Lane‘s incarceration, 
he now had time and resources to publish.  Lane, his wife, Katja, and Ron McVan, 
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created 14 Word Press and the three served as editors (Kaplan, 2000).  Lane was also 
a regular contributor to White Aryan Resistance, Racial Loyalty, The Klansman  and 
Jew Watch.  He wrote numerous pamphlets and published letters, most notably the 
14 Words and the 88 Precepts. Similar to Pierce and Klassen, Lane also founded a 
religion based on a contemporary racist ideology.  Lane‘s Wotanism was a blend of 
racist theology mixed with ancient pagan themes.  
Wotanism is a hybrid mix of ancient Norse and Germanic religions fused with 
white racist ideology (Gardell, 2003; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).  Labeled as Wotan or 
(Will of the Aryan Nations), Lane adapted tenets of the ancient Norse religion to 
incorporate the worship of Odin, Thor and the Norse Gods with a racist adaptation 
(Gardell, 2003).   Lane‘s creation of Wotanism was a way to protect the white race 
primarily from race mixing (Gardell, 2003).  Wotanism was also intended to be the 
intellectual and spiritual precursor to a larger revolution (Gardell, 2003). Lane 
wanted to provide a spiritual foundation to prevent white women from race mixing 
and therefore securing the future of white children (Lane, 1999; Goodrick-Clarke, 
2002).   
 The importance of white women and children is a constant thread throughout 
Lane‘s written work.  Lane constantly reflects about the beauty of white women and 
how their beauty should be protected and preserved (Lane, 1999).  Lane‘s 14 Words 
serves both as a battle cry and objective.  ―We must secure the existence of our 
people and a future for white children‖ serves as a battle cry to fight for the survival 
of the white race while protecting white women from race mixing (Lane, 1999; 
Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). Lane‘s (1999) other motto did not reach the same 
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level of popularity as the 14 Words ―Because the beauty of the white Aryan woman 
must not perish from the earth.‖  
Lane died on May 28, 2007 in Terre Haute, Indiana in the Federal 
Correctional Complex apparently due to complications associated with cancer.
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 He 
was more influential in prison as a ‗political‘ prisoner than a freeman leading neo -
Nazi organizations. After his death, small memorial demonstrations for Lane 
occurred in the United States, Germany, Russia, and the Ukraine, many of which 
were broadcasted on the internet.
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  The purpose of these demonstrations was to pay 
homage to an influential neo-Nazi leader that led by armed resistance and by the pen.  
The use of ‗14‘ and ‗88‘ in tattoos, slogans, signs, and literature reflect Lane‘s 
impact on the neo-Nazi movement.  
David Duke
105
 (1950-Present) 
Duke describes himself as a white civil rights activist, not a white supremacist 
(Duke, 2007). Duke has published numerous articles and four books.  In 1998, he 
published a book that outlines his social philosophies in My Awakening: A Path to Racial 
Understanding. In 2002, he published Jewish Supremacism, which is considered a 
comprehensive outline of his beliefs.  He currently resides in Austria and is very active 
on the internet, publishing, and streaming audio messages.
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 Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, David Duke is nationally known as a neo-Nazi 
politician (Zatarian, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).  He received national 
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attention during his failed bid for president of the United States and his role in politics in 
Louisiana.  A former KKK Grand Wizard and mainstream politician, his message has not 
always been so overt and thus is considered ―soft‖ by those in the neo-Nazi movement 
(Rose, 1992; Zeskind, 2009).  The so called soft approach should not be misinterpreted as 
weaker (Berbrier, 1998).  Duke has a different agenda and seeks a wider audience with a 
more appealing and seemingly less offensive message over hard line neo-Nazi groups 
(Landau, 1993; Zeskind, 2009).   
Part of this ―appealing‖ to the masses approach is how Duke carefully crafts a 
positive image of his past.  Duke describes himself as a former Louisiana member of the 
House of Representatives, recipient of a doctorate degree, a teacher, and author of one of 
the bestselling books in the world (Duke, 1998).  Duke uses these titles to establish 
credibility in order to overcome the stereotype of the ignorant, uneducated, and 
unsuccessful white supremacist.  Additionally, he seeks to be identified as well traveled 
with internationally credibility.  In 2006, Duke was a delegate in Tehran at the 
International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust and in April 2009 
Duke was invited by Czechoslovakian neo-Nazis to deliver three lectures.
107
   
Duke‘s introduction to neo-Nazi ideology started in a small town in Louisiana far 
from the international flair he now flaunts.  It was during high school that Duke was 
exposed to neo-Nazi and racial theories (Duke, 1998; Bridges, 1995).  At the time he was 
working on a high school paper that opposed racial integration.  In order to research the 
paper, he went to the local office of the Segregationist White Council and met several 
men who would become his racial ideological mentors (Rose, 1992).  Duke was 16 when 
his father left their family and his mother was an alcoholic who spent time in and out of 
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hospitals in an attempt to deal with her addiction (Bridges, 1995; Landau, 1993).  The 
void created by Duke‘s parents was filled by men at the White Council and later by 
William Pierce, founder of the National Alliance, whom he met in the late 1960‘s 
(Zatarain, 1990; Zeskind, 2009).  The ideological seeds planted during his high school 
years, would continue to grow deeper in college. 
The origin of his future political ambition began at Louisiana State University.  In 
1970, Duke founded a student group, The White Youth Alliance. Duke borrowed its 
ideology and organizational structure from the National Socialist White People‘s Party, 
formally the American Nazi Party (Rose, 1992; Bridges, 1995).  He was an active debater 
in LSU‘s free speech area.  He would stand in the middle of campus on a soap box with a 
full Nazi uniform armed in one hand with a copy of George Lincoln Rockwell‘s White 
Power (1967) (Zatarain, 1990).  He would debate anyone within earshot that wanted to 
disagree with him.  He graduated from LSU in 1974 and changed tactics. 
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Duke was no longer interested in overt Nazism, but wanted to create a new and 
‗softer‘ brand that would be more appealing to a wider audience (Zatarain, 1990).  He 
entered the KKK and wanted to soften and professionalize its image (Zeskind, 2009).  He 
broadened its membership to include women and Catholics in order to expand the pool of 
potential members.  In 1974, he founded the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in order to 
promote a new type of Klansman (Zatarain, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).  A 
KKK Knight should be educated, driven, handsome, professional, and articulate.  Duke 
believed that he embodied these attributes (Bridges, 1995).   
Attempting to maximize his public appeal, he appeared on national talk shows as 
a Grand Wizard (Rose, 1992; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).  His ideology at the time 
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focused more on Jews and Nazi ideas than grievances with African Americans.  
However, KKK members had problems with his personality, specifically his 
womanizing, his self promotion, and his personal financial gain (Zeskind, 2009).   
Duke formally left the KKK, but desired to retain a softer professional image.  He 
formed the NAAWP (National Association for the Advancement of White People) as a 
grass roots effort to inflate his political base and aligned himself with Willis Carto, an 
influential anti Semtic propagandist (Rose, 1992; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; 
Zeskind, 2009).  Both Duke and Carto collaborated to disprove the Holocaust.  It was 
during this time that he published his first two books. 
African Atto, (1973) a street fighting manual for African Americans in urban areas 
and Finders Keepers (1976), a book for women in how to keep their male companions.  
He selected misleading pseudonyms for each book; Malcolm X for African Atto and 
Dorothy Vanderbilt and James Konrad for Finders Keepers (Zeskind, 2009).  The 
strategy behind African Atto was to provide African Americans with better tactics and 
techniques to kill each other on the street. Finders Keepers was to prevent white women 
from race mixing.  Both books were to be published and distributed without drawing 
attention to the fact that it was a white male pushing a subversive agenda.  Duke‘s modis 
operandi is subversive, an approach he used in publishing both books and in pursuing 
political office. 
His first run for political office was in 1975 for a 10
th
 district seat in the Louisiana 
State Senate (Zeskind, 2009).  He lost, but received 26% of the votes (Bridges, 1995).  
He ran a Democratic presidential campaign in 1988 and received 47,047 votes or four 
percent of the national popular vote.  However, in 1989 he changed his party affiliation to 
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Republican and won the State‘s House 81st district seat with 3,995 votes or 33% (Bridges, 
1995).  He served in this post from 1990 to 1992. Then in 1992, now as a Republican, he 
sought his party‘s nomination for President, which he failed to obtain (Bridges, 1995).   
In 1994, he ran for the US Senate seat and lost, but received 44% of the votes or 607,391 
(Bridges, 1995).  In 1996, he campaigned again for a US Senate seat and in 1999 for the 
US House of Representatives, where he failed in both attempts (Bridges, 1995; Zeskind, 
2009).  After his failed political bid in 1999, Duke was finished with running for office. 
Any other future political ambitions dissolved after his conviction of filing a false tax 
return in December 2002.
 109
   He was sentenced to 15 months in prison where he spent 
the time in Big Springs Texas.  He was released in 2004 and shifted gears.  Duke 
organized a White Nationalism Conference where attendees would agree to unify the 
white movement, establishing peace within the movement, and foster a new image.
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Duke drafted a protocol that was adopted by those in attendance and has been labeled as 
the New Orleans Protocol.  Paul Fromm, Don Black, Willis Carto, Kevin Strom, and 
John Tyndall signed the document. The protocol is listed on the Southern Poverty‘s Law 
Center website and has three provisions;  
1. Zero Tolerance for Violence 
2. Honorable and ethical behavior with other signatory groups.  This includes not 
denouncing others who have signed this protocol.  In other words, no enemies on 
the right. 
3. Maintaining a high tone in arguments and public presentation. 
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In 2005 Duke was awarded a Ph.D. from the Ukrainian Interregional Academy of 
Personnel Management.
 111
   His doctoral dissertation, titled ―Zionism as a Form of 
Ethnic Supremacism,‖ is a ―scholarly‖ attempt to promote his ideology in an academic 
format.  During his studies there, he taught courses in international relations and history.
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   Duke has two adult daughters from his wife, Chloe Hardin, who was an active 
member in Duke‘s LSU student group (Bridges, 1995).  They married in 1974 and 
divorced ten years later.  
Currently, Duke resides in Salzburg, Austria.  He manages a business that is internet 
mediated.  On his website he sells copies of his books, wildlife photography, streams his 
audio messages and distributes the David Duke newsletter.
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Figure 11: Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frame Definitions/Codes 
Violent Jihadi 
Diagnostic Frames 
Definitions/List of Codes 
  
Islamic Government Depicts the failure of Islamic Governments. 
Modern Ummah Depicts the failure of the local and/or global modern Islamic 
community. 
Democracy Outlines how democracy is a failure and not is opposed to Islam. 
Secular Innovations Delineates how including and following secular laws is a failure. 
United States Depicts that the United States has failed culturally, spiritually, 
morally, militarily or socially. 
Sharia Ignored Explains how Sharia law is not followed by Muslims individually or 
collectively. 
Modern Morality Individual or collective morality is depicted as failing or a complete 
failure. 
Corrupt Leaders  Identifies specific Muslim leaders as being corrupt and a threat to 
true Islam. 
Usury Poverty is created by individually/collective lending and is  a 
violation of Sharia law. 
Non-Muslims 
humiliate    
Muslims  
Non-Muslims depict Muslim culture, religion, skill, piety or fighting 
ability as being inferior.  
Muslims humiliate 
true Muslims 
Muslims depict violent jihadis as being inferior, misguided, corrupt 
or inept. 
Capitalism Capitalism is a flawed ideology and way of life. 
Westernization Shows that the Westernization of Muslims is flawed. 
Jahiliyyah Illustrates that a prevailing state of ignorance among Muslims makes 
them un-Islamic and equal to the time before the Prophet 
Mohammad. 
Materialism Describes how materialism is a flawed objective and lifestyle. 
Liberalism Explains how liberalism is a flawed objective and lifestyle. 
Communism Portrays communism as flawed system of government. 
Arab Nationalism Shows that Arab Nationalism is flawed. 
Polytheism Depicts Polytheism as flawed and theologically incorrect. 
Christianity Delineates Christianity as flawed, tainted and theologically 
incomplete. 
Paganism Describes paganism as flawed and counter to Islam. 
Socialism Expresses that socialism is a flawed philosophy and system of 
government. 
Science Describes that secular modern science is flawed. 
United Nations The United Nations as a governing body is corrupt and anti Islamic. 
Human Rights The concept of human rights is flawed and counter to Sharia law. 
Apostasy Apostasy demonstrates flaws in Muslim theology. 
Abortion  Abortion is morally defective. 
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Alcohol Using alcohol is morally defective and against the Quran. 
Blasphemy  Actions or words of blasphemy against Allah or his prophet is 
morally defective. 
Corruption Corruption outside of Islamic government, ie. businesses, trade, 
banks, etc. 
Crime The presence of crime is an indicator of a morally defective Muslim 
society. 
Homosexuality  Homosexuality is described as a morally defective practice. 
Jews The Jews by nature are morally defective. 
Kafir ―Unbelievers‖ using a charged label, are morally defective and are 
outside Islam. 
Fornication Those that practice fornication are morally defective. 
Muslims oppress true 
Muslims 
Muslims that oppress ‗true‘ Muslims are morally defective. 
Islam is Polluted Those engaged in polluting ‗true‘ Islamic doctrine/ummah, 
specifically against violent jihad. 
Satan Satan is an enemy of Allah and is morally defective. 
Zionism Zionism is a morally defective ideology that is engaged in occupying 
Muslim lands and the Ummah located there. 
Israel exists The continued existence of Israel despite Arab wars. 
Muslim Oppression Illustrates injustices associated with non violent Muslim oppression 
by non Muslims. 
Injustices tolerated Expresses how weak Muslims are when injustices outside of violent 
jihad are tolerated. 
Muslims governed by 
non Muslims  
Delineates the state of weakness of Islam if Muslims are governed 
by non Muslims. 
Muslims Passivity Illustrates how weak Muslims are when they refuse to engage in 
jihad. 
Non Muslim Violence 
against Muslims 
Outlines the injustices and weakness of Muslims when non Muslims 
are able to use violence against Muslims. 
Muslim women 
Victimization 
Portrays the weakness of Muslims when they are not able to protect 
Muslim women from being victimized. 
Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim 
Lands 
Express the weakness of Islam when non Muslim Soldiers are allow 
on Muslim land. 
Muslim violence 
against true Muslims 
Outlines the injustice of Muslims using violence against other 
Muslims, namely violent jihadis.  
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Figure 12: Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frame Definitions/Codes 
Neo-Nazi Diagnostic 
Frames 
Definitions/List of Codes 
  
Modern Morality Individual or collective morality is depicted as failing or a 
complete failure. 
Federal Government Depicts the United States Federal Government as a complete 
failure or failing. 
Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 
Illustrates how the white race functioning as the apex of 
natural selection is being violated. 
Traditional Religion  Depicts how tradition religion has failed the white race. 
 Modern Education Explains that modern education is a failure. 
Modern Medicine Shows that modern medicine has failed. 
Non whites create 
poverty 
Portrays non whites as creating poverty. 
Whites Humiliated Words or deeds by non whites that humiliate the white race. 
Jews humiliate 
Muslims  
Words or deeds by Jews that intend to humiliate Muslims. 
Materialism Explains that materialism is a flawed concept and way of life. 
Liberalism Illustrates that liberalism is a flawed concept and way of life. 
Feminism Delineates that feminism is flawed and detrimental to the 
white race. 
Civil Rights Explains that the civil rights movement in the United States is 
a flawed movement that threatens the white race. 
Zionism  Outlines that Zionism is a flawed concept to grant more 
power to Jews. 
Racial equality Expresses that the concept that all races are equal is erroneous 
and a threat to the white race. 
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Racial integration Depicts that racial integration in the United States is a flawed 
concept and weakens the white race. 
Taxation Federal taxation policies and practices are flawed. 
Communism Communism is a flawed system of government. 
Blacks Blacks are a flawed and inferior race. 
Asian Asians are a flawed and inferior race. 
Jews Jews are historically flawed. 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
Foreigners or illegal immigrants threaten the white race and 
are flawed. 
Usury Poverty is created by individually/collective lending and is 
therefore an injustice. 
Non Whites Advance 
Crime 
Non whites are criminogenic in nature. 
Disease Physical disease is a sign of a flawed lifestyle. 
Native Americans Native Americans are flawed. 
Muslims Muslims adhere to a flawed religion and are inferior. 
U.S. aid to  Israel U.S. aid to Israel is a flawed foreign policy. 
Holocaust The way in which the Holocaust has been portrayed by Jews 
is erroneous. 
Abortion Abortion is a morally defective act. 
Homosexuality  Homosexuality is a morally defective lifestyle. 
Jewish Influence Jews maintaining positions of power in government, banking, 
media, investments, academia and industry is to dominate and 
weaken the white race. 
Jewish Supremacists Jews perceive themselves as superior to all others and 
therefore entitled to dominate and control. 
Racial pollution The concept that any form of mixing between race is a form 
of racial pollution, bent on weakening and eventually 
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destroying the white race. 
Race traitors Whites that marry or sympathize with non whites are morally 
defective.  
Media The modern media is defective and controlled by liberals and 
Jews. 
Injustices are tolerated Injustices beyond those associated with race are tolerated. 
White Extinction The white race is close to extinction or will be extinct in the 
near future. 
Whites Passivity Whites do not catalyze when racial injustices to whites 
occurs. 
Whites Unarmed  Whites do not possess firearms preventing them to defend 
their race and promoting a weaker status. 
Violence against 
Whites 
 Non-whites use violence against whites revealing the 
weakness of whites to prevent/stop such violence. 
White women 
victimized 
White women are victimized by non whites revealing the 
weakness of white males to protect them. 
Future of white 
children unprotected 
White children are threatened by either the actions and/or 
words of non whites and/or race traitors. 
White oppression Whites are oppressed by non violent methods by non whites 
or race traitors. 
Decline of white power The status and power of whites is declining. 
White guilt Whites feeling guilt over past treatment of non whites is a 
sign of weakness and is erroneous. 
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Figure 13: Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frame Definitions/Codes 
 Neo-Nazi 
Prognostic  
Frames 
Definitions/List of Codes 
  
Interrogate 
communists 
Expose communists embedded in the U.S. through systematic 
and public questioning. 
Control 
Immigration 
Stringent control of immigration of non-whites is a solution to 
solving the problem of more non whites in the U.S. 
Identify Jews as a 
race 
Part of solving the ‗Jewish Problem‘ is to identify Jews as a race. 
Deport non-whites Deport non-whites back to their country of origin or simply 
outside the U.S. as a permanent solution to the increasing non-
white population in the U.S.  
Eliminate non-
whites 
The use of any form of violence to kill non-whites/race traitors in 
an isolated event that is not connected to white terrorism or racial 
war.    
Maintain 
Traditional 
Morality 
Efforts taken by whites to maintain the state of morality in the 
United States before the 1960‘s. 
Establish White 
Territory 
Create a geographic territory in the U.S. for the white race. 
Follow Constitution Endeavor to follow what is outlined in the Constitution. 
Whites need to 
Organize 
A proactive campaign for members of the white race to organize 
into groups. 
Punish communists All communists should be exposed and either incarcerated or 
deported. 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
Granting power, influence and dominance to the white race is 
following natural selection and the natural order. 
Empower Racial Nations where whites reside should be led by a governmental 
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Nationalism structure that emphasizes race as a form of solidarity. 
Promote Racial 
loyalty 
Whites should maintain a sense of loyalty to their race above all 
other.  
Generate Racial 
Hatred 
Hating other races is promoted as a logical solution. 
Carry out Racial 
War 
Conventional and insurgent campaigns along racial lines where 
combatants use the tools of wars: medium/heavy weapons, 
uniforms, military organizational structure. 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
Separating people groups according to race is a solution. 
Recruit Whites Actions or strategies intended to add whites to the neo-Nazi 
movement. 
Understand 
Replacement 
Theology 
The need for whites to understand that Israel or the Jews are not 
God‘s chosen people, they have been replaced by the white race. 
Promote 
Revisionism 
The Jewish portrayal of the Holocaust is erroneous and history 
needs to be revised with the correct version. 
Use non-whites for 
labor  
One options for keeping non-whites in the U.S. is to use them for 
manual labor. 
White Advancement The ideal that the white race needs to continue to advance in 
education, science, the arts, culture and government to advance 
humanity.  
White Praxis Whites should be actively living out their white ideology and 
engaged when injustices to their race occur. 
Promote White 
Education 
Modern education is polluted and a correct version centering on 
the white race is needed. 
White Discernment Whites should be able to think critically and discern the fallacies 
that exist in the social world around them. 
White Based 
Religion 
Whites need a religion based on race. 
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White Martyrdom  It is honorable to become a martyr for the white race. 
White Terrorism Using or threatening violence for a racial/political intent.  The 
goal is to convey an emotionally charged political/racial message 
to whites and non-whites. 
White Leadership Strong white leadership is needed. 
White Revolution A revolution according to race is needed, where the white race 
dominates and threats are reduced or are greatly diminished.  
Whites seek 
positions of power 
Whites should seek positions that grant them influence, power 
and control. 
Whites reproduce 
only with Whites 
Whites should avoid polluting their race by reproducing only 
with whites. 
White unity The white race needs to unify. 
Whites create 
productive 
economies 
A productive economy occurs when whites are in control. 
White propaganda Various media are needed to disseminate neo-Nazism to whites. 
Whites to arms Whites need to own firearms in order to protect their race and 
freedoms. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273 
 
Figure 14: Neo-Nazi Prognostic Frame Definitions/Codes 
Violent Jihadi 
Prognostic Frames 
Definitions/List of Codes 
  
Pursue Divine 
leadership 
Allah will lead all violent jihadis down the ‗right‘ path and 
should be pursued. 
Establish True Ummah A true community of Muslims is needed to replace the 
current polluted version. 
Follow Muhammad’s 
example 
Seek to emulate the Prophets actions in all areas of life. 
Abide by Sharia Sharia law is required over secular innovations. 
Start Islamic 
revolution/movement 
A revolution/movement is needed to replace the corrupt and 
polluted form of Islam followed by the majority of 
misguided Muslims. 
Humanity needs Islamic 
redemption 
Humanity is on the path to destruction and true Islam is 
needed to save humanity from being destroyed from the 
inside. Integrating Islam brings a degree of harmony with 
nature and universal laws to confront moral decay. 
Create ideal civilization 
via Islam 
An ideal civilization is created when true Islam is the 
dominant factor. 
Engage in Violent jihad Using violence to ‗defend‘ the ‗true‘ faith to kill, threaten or 
harm non-Muslims or corrupt Muslims. 
Muslim Praxis Muslims should be active in applying their theological 
doctrines. 
Pursue the Quran Memorizing, studying, reading, reciting and hearing the 
Quran will assist in drawing closer to God and purifying 
Islam. 
Return to golden age Modern society should return to the Islamic age where 
Sharia, the Ummah and the Caliphate were ‗true.‘ 
Strong Leadership Strong leadership from ‗true‘ Muslims is needed. 
Tawhid The doctrine of the ‗oneness‘ of God must be incorporated 
by humanity. 
Recruit Jihadis More violent jihadis are needed. 
Engage in Martyrdom
  
Becoming a martyr for the sake of ‗true‘ Islam against its 
enemies is honorable. 
Boycott Western Goods All true Muslims should refrain from western produced 
goods. 
Generate Religious 
Hatred 
Hating those that are destroying the ‗true‘ faith is required. 
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Islamic instruction ‗True‘ Islamic instruction is needed to replace the dominant 
corrupted versions. 
Punishment  The theological doctrine of retaliation is needed in order to 
re-set the moral/social balance. 
Establish Jihadi 
territory 
Create an expanding geographic location where the ummah 
exists, Sharia is follow and Allah is correctly worshipped. 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
‗True‘ Muslims can only be governed by a legitimate 
caliphate. 
Organize  All ‗true‘ Muslims should organize with other ‗true‘ 
Muslims. 
Tactical instruction Violent jihadis need to seek to be trained in weapons, 
strategy and tactics. 
Obtain weapons Violent jihadis need to be armed to defend their faith, their 
people and their way of life. 
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Table 17 Types of Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames 
NEO-NAZI  
DIAGNOSTIC TYPOLOGY: 
Rockwell 
(1967) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Lane 
(1994) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Duke 
(2003) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Chittum 
(1997) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
       
Modern Morality 3/0.8352 4/0.3760 15/0.1126 1/1 18/0.0613 3/0.5870 
Federal Government 12/0.2095 1/1 8/0.2757 3/0.6667 13/0.2290 1/1 
Violation of Racial Natural Law 20/0.0511 30/0.0080 22/0.0821 2/0.700 * * 
Traditional Religion  28/0.0102 24/0.0240 4/0.5437 7/0.4333 17/0.0710 * 
 Modern Education * * 16/0.1087 * 27/0.0258 * 
Modern Medicine * * 14/0.1165 * * 20/0.0109 
non-whites create poverty 13/0.1866 27/0.0188 23/0.0621 25/0.0667 29/0.0129 18/0.0435 
Whites Humiliated 8/0.3206 6/0.3120 9/0.2408  3/0.7258 14/0.1848 
Jews humiliate Muslims  * * 38/0.0039 * 6/0.3645 * 
Materialism 17/0.0702 17/0.0880 29/0.0350 8/0.4000 30/0.0129 23/0.0109 
Liberalism 6/0.5236 9/0.2400 25/0.0583 * 16/0.0806 15/0.1196 
Feminism * 21/0.0360 * * 29/0.0129 22/0.0109 
Civil Rights 21/0.0460 28/0.0080 * * 36/0.0065 21/0.0109 
Zionism  17/0.0728 * 33/0.0194 * 4/0.5323 * 
Racial equality 14/0.1584 15/0.1040 19/0.0854 9/0.2667 26/0.0355 10/0.2283 
Racial integration 26/0.0255 19/0.0440 17/0.1049 10/0.2667 25/0.0387 5/0.5109 
Taxation 18/0.0613 25/0.0200 18/0.1010 11/0.2667 21/0.0516 12/0.2011 
Communism 2/0.08838 16/0.0960 13/0.1204 * 5/0.4000 11/0.2228 
Blacks 5/0.06897 2/0.4880 2/0.6738 15/0.1333 20/0.0516 9/0.2391 
Asian 34/0.0026 * 34/0.0155 21/0.0667 * * 
Jews 4/0.4720 13/0.1480 3/0.6563 17/0.1333 1/1 16/0.0978 
 Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 25/0.0255 31/0.0080 30/0.0272 22/0.0667 15/0.2032 7/0.3913 
Usury 27/0.0204 * 36/0.0078 5/0.4667 11/0.2548  
Non-whites Advance Crime  11/0.2286 11/0.1920 11/0.1825 16/0.1333 19/0.0613 8/0.3478 
Disease * * 27/0.0466 * 11/0.2548 * 
Native Americans 24/0.0307 33/0.0040 12/0.1709 23/0.0667 31/0.0129 13/0.1957 
Muslims 29/0.0077 23/0.0240 28/0.0388 * 14/0.2194 24/0.0109 
U.S. aid to  Israel * * * * 22/0.0452 * 
Holocaust 31/0.0026 26/0.0160 35/0.0155 * 10/0.2710 * 
Abortion 32/0.0026 * * 24/0.0667 34/0.0097 * 
Homosexuality  23/0.0358 32/0.0080 37/0.0039 18/0.1333 37/0.0065 * 
Jewish Influence 1/1 7/0.3040 1/1 19/0.1333 2/0.8613 * 
Jewish Supremacists * * * * 8/0.3210 * 
Racial pollution 19/0.0613 14/0.1360 5/0.3456 6/0.4667 35/0.0097 * 
Race traitors * 12/0.1720 20/0.0816 20/0.1333 * * 
Media * * 23/0.0621 * 9/0.2742 17/0.0652 
Injustices are tolerated 9/0.2542 18/0.0840 31/0.0272 * 23/0.0419 19/0.0217 
White Extinction 22/0.0409 20/0.3660 7/0.2796 4/0.6667 24/0.0403 25/0.0109 
Whites Passivity 7/0.3206 10/0.2360 24/0.0621 13/0.2667 33/0.0129 28/0.0109 
Whites Unarmed  30/0.0051 22/0.0320 * * 38/0.0065 18/0.0435 
Violence against Whites 10/0.2299 5/0.3520 6/0.3456 26/0.0667 12/0.2452 4/0.5761 
White women Victimized * 8/0.2680 32/0.0272 12/0.2667 * 27/0.0109 
Future of white children unprotected 16/0.0741 * * * * * 
White oppression 15/0.0868 3/0.4080 10/0.2097 14/0.2000 7/0.3419 2/0.7826 
Decline of white power * 29/0.0080 21/0.0816 * 32/0.0129 6/0.4348 
White guilt * * 26/0.0505 * 28/0.0226 26/0.109 
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Table 18 Types of Neo Nazis Diagnostic Frames by Propagandist/Text 
Prevalence Rockwell 
(1967) 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Lane 
(1994) 
Duke 
(2003) 
Chittum 
(1997) 
       
1 Jewish Influence Federal 
Government 
Jewish Influence Modern 
Morality 
Jews Federal 
Government 
2 Communism Blacks Blacks Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 
Jewish 
Influence 
Whites 
Oppressed 
3 Modern Morality Whites 
Oppressed 
Jews Federal 
Government 
Whites 
Humiliated 
Modern Morality 
4 Jews Modern Morality Traditional 
Religion 
White 
Extinction 
Zionism Violence against 
Whites 
5 Blacks Violence against 
Whites 
Racial Pollution Usury Communism Racial Integration 
6 Liberalism Whites 
Humiliated 
Violence against 
Whites 
Racial 
Pollution 
Jews Humiliate 
Muslims 
Decline of White 
Power 
7 White Passivity Jewish Influence White Extinction Traditional 
Religion 
Whites 
Oppressed 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
8 Whites 
Humiliated 
White Women 
Victimized 
Federal 
Government 
Materialism Jewish 
Supremacists 
Crime 
9 Injustices 
Tolerated 
Liberalism Whites 
Humiliated 
Racial Equality Mass Media Blacks 
10 Violence against 
Whites 
White Passivity Whites 
Oppressed 
Racial 
Integration 
Jewish 
Holocaust 
Racial Equality 
11 Non-whites 
Advance Crime 
Non-whites 
Advance Crime 
Non-whites 
Advance Crime 
Taxation Non-whites 
Advance 
Crime 
Communism 
12 Federal 
Government 
Race Traitors Native 
Americans 
White Women 
Victimized 
Violence 
against Whites 
Taxation 
13 Non-whites 
create Poverty 
Jews Communism White 
Passivity 
Federal 
Government 
Native 
Americans 
14 Racial Equality Racial Pollution Modern Medicine Whites 
Oppressed 
Muslims Whites 
Humiliated 
15 Whites 
Oppressed 
Racial Equality Modern Morality Blacks Foreigners Liberalism 
16 White Women 
Victimized 
Communism Modern 
Education 
Non-whites 
Advance 
Crime 
Liberalism Jews 
17 Zionism Materialism Racial Integration Jews Traditional 
Religion 
Mass Media 
18 Materialism Injustices 
Tolerated 
Taxation Homosexuality Modern 
Morality 
Non-white create 
Poverty 
19 Taxation Racial Integration Racial Equality Jewish 
Influence 
Usury Whites Unarmed 
20 Racial Pollution White Extinction Race Traitors Race Traitors Blacks Injustices 
Tolerated 
21 Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 
Feminism Decline of White 
Power 
Asians Taxation Modern Medicine 
22 Civil Rights Whites Unarmed Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 
Foreigners U.S. aid to 
Israel 
Civil Rights 
23 White Extinction Muslims Non-whites 
create poverty 
Native 
Americans 
Injustices 
Tolerated 
Feminism 
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24 Homosexuality Traditional 
Religion 
Mass Media Abortion White 
Extinction 
Materialism 
25 Native 
Americans 
Taxation White Passivity Non-whites 
create Poverty 
Racial 
Integration 
Muslims 
26 Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
Jewish Holocaust Liberalism Violence 
against Whites 
Racial Equality White Extinction 
27 Racial Integration Non-whites 
create Poverty 
White Guilt * Modern 
Education 
White Guilt 
28 Usury Civil Rights Disease * White Guilt White Women 
Victimized 
29 Traditional 
Religion 
Decline of White 
Power 
Muslims * Non-whites 
create Poverty 
White Passivity 
30 Muslims Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 
Materialism * Feminism * 
31 Whites Unarmed Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
* Materialism * 
32 Jewish Holocaust Homosexu ality Injustices 
Tolerated 
* Native 
Americans 
* 
33 Abortion Native 
Americans 
White Women 
Victimized 
* Decline of 
White Power 
* 
34 * * Zionism * White 
Passivity 
* 
35 * * Asians * Abortion * 
36 * * Jewish Holocaust * Racial 
Pollution 
* 
37 * * Usury * Civil Rights * 
38 * * Homosexuality * Homosexuality * 
39 * * * * Whites 
Unarmed 
* 
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Table 19 Types of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames 
VIOLENT JIHADI 
DIAGNOSTIC FRAME: 
Qutb 
(1966) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Azzam 
(1984) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
       
Islamic Governments 4/0.2735 11/0.1786 1/1 2/0.7829 7/0.1084 7/0.1176 
Modern ummah * 13/0.1429 14/0.1739 14/0.1711 * * 
Democracy 26/0.0256 * * 30/0.0132 5/0.1687 * 
Secular Innovations 6/0.2564 14/0.1071 15/0.1739 12/0.1974 2/0.6386 * 
United States 22/0.0598 * 5/0.6087 1/1 * * 
Sharia Ignored * 16/0.1071 16/0.1739 17/0.1184 * * 
Modern Morality 14/0.1026 15/0.1071 4/0.6087 23/0.0595 6/0.1325 12/0.0392 
Corrupt Leaders  * * 12/0.2174 * * * 
Usury 21/0.0684 23/0.0357 33/0.0435 * * 15/0.0392 
Non-Muslims humiliate    
Muslims  
* 10/0.1786 13/0.2174 11/0.2500 * 17/0392 
Muslims humiliate true 
Muslims 
* * 19/0.1739 8/0.3158 * * 
Capitalism 24/0.0342 * * 31/0.0132 * * 
Westernization * 19/0.0357 22/0.1304 *   
Jahiliyyah 1/1 12/0.1786 29/0.0435 * 3/0.5301 8/0.1176 
Materialism 12/0.1197 * 20/0.1304 27/0.0263 * * 
Liberalism 18/0.0684 * * * * * 
Communism 11/0.1197 9/0.1786 24/0.0870 10/0.2632 *  
Arab Nationalism * 20/0.0357 25/0.0870 * * * 
Polytheism 25/0.0342 * * * 15/0.0241 6/0.1569 
Christianity 15/0.0855 21/0.0357 * 26/0.0263 14/0.0241 3/0.03333 
Paganism 2/0.3333 22/0.0357 21/0.1304 * * * 
Socialism 19/0.0684 * * 28/0.0263 * * 
Science 10/0.1368 * * 32/0.0132 * * 
United Nations * * 26/0.0870 29/0.0263 * * 
Human Rights * * 28/0.0435 * * * 
Apostasy * * * 25/0.0263 13/0.0241 5/0.1569 
Alcohol 16/0.0855 * * * 10/0.0482 13/0.0392 
Blasphemy  * * 30/0.0435 * * * 
Corruption * * * 18/0.0943 * * 
Crime 20/0.0684 18/0.0714 31/0.0435 20/0.0526 16/0.0241  
Homosexuality  27/0.0174 * * * * * 
Jews 3/0.3333 24/0.0179 17/0.1739 5/0.5592 8/0.0964 4/0.2353 
Kafir 7/0.2393 3/0.5357 6/0.6087 16/0.1316 1/1 1/1 
Fornication 17/0.0855 * * * 11/0.0482 14/0.0392 
Muslims oppress true 
Muslims 
* * 27/0.0870 9/0.3026 12/0.0482 * 
Islam is Polluted 13/0.1111 5/0.3929 9/0.2609 15/0.1579 4/0.2169 2/0.8627 
Satan 5/0.2735 8/0.3214 32/0.0435 24/0.0395 9/0.0723 9/0.1176 
Zionism * * 8/0.3043 21/0.0526 * * 
Israel exists * * 23/0.1304 3/0.6579 * * 
Muslims Oppression 8/0.1966 6/0.3571 3/0.6957 18/0.1053 * 10/0.1176 
Injustices tolerated * * * 21/0.0377 *  
Muslims governed by non 
Muslims  
* 7/0.3214 10/0.2609 6/0.3947 * 11/0.1176 
Muslim Passivity 23/0.0513 1/1 18/0.1739 22/0.0526 * * 
Non Muslim Violence 
against Muslims 
* 4/0.4643 2/0.8696 7/0.3553 * * 
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Muslim women victimized 9/0.1453 2/0.6964 11/0.2391 19/0.0789 * 16/0.0392 
Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim Lands 
* 17/0.0714 7/0.5870 13/0.1842   
Muslim violence against 
true Muslims 
* * * 4/0.6053 * * 
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Table 20 Types of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandist/Text 
Rank Qutb 
Milestones 
(1966) 
Azzam 
Defense 
(1984) 
Bin Laden 
Declaration of War 
(1996) 
Zawahiri 
Knights 
(2001) 
Maqdisi 
Aqeedah 
(2009) 
Al Bari 
Swords 
(1850) 
       
1 Jahiliyyah Muslim Passivity Islamic Government United States Kafir Kafir 
2 Paganism Muslim Women 
Victimized 
Non Muslims attack 
Muslims 
Islamic 
Government 
Secular 
Innovations 
Islam is 
Polluted 
3 Jews Kafir Muslim Oppression Israel Jahiliyyah Christianity 
4 Islamic 
Government 
Non Muslims 
attack Muslims 
Modern Morality Muslims attack 
true Muslims 
Islam is 
Polluted 
Jews 
5 Satan Islam is Polluted United States Jews Democracy Apostasy 
6 Secular 
Innovations 
Muslim 
Oppression 
Kafir Non Muslims 
govern Muslims 
Modern 
Morality 
Polytheism 
7 Kafir Non Muslims 
govern Muslims 
Non Muslim Soldiers on 
Muslim Land 
Non Muslims 
attack Muslims 
Islamic 
Government 
Islamic 
Government 
8 Muslim 
Oppression 
Satan Zionism Muslims 
humiliate true 
Muslims 
Jews Jahiliyyah 
9 Muslim Women 
Victimized 
Communism Islam is Polluted Muslims 
Oppress true 
Muslims 
Satan Satan 
10 Modern Science Non Muslims 
humiliate 
Muslims 
Non Muslims govern 
Muslims 
Communism Muslim 
Oppression 
Muslim 
Oppression 
11 Communism Islamic 
Government 
Muslim Women 
Victimized 
Non Muslims 
humiliate 
Muslims 
Alcohol Non Muslims 
govern 
Muslims 
12 Materialism Jahiliyyah poverty_corrupt_leaders Secular 
Innovations 
Fornication Modern 
Morality 
13 Islam is Polluted Modern Ummah Non Muslims humiliate 
Muslims 
Non Muslim 
Soldiers on 
Muslim Land 
Muslims 
Oppress True 
Muslims 
Alcohol 
14 Modern 
Morality 
Secular 
Innovations 
Modern Ummah Modern 
Ummah 
Apostasy Fornication 
15 Christianity Modern Morality Secular Innovations Islam is 
Polluted 
Christianity Usury 
16 Alcohol Sharia Ignored Sharia Ignored Kafir Polytheism Muslim 
Women 
Victimized 
17 Fornication Non Muslim 
Soldiers on 
Muslim Land 
Jews Sharia Ignored Crime Non Muslims 
humiliate 
Muslims 
18 Liberalism Crime Muslim Passivity Muslim 
Oppression 
Muslim 
Passivity 
* 
19 Socialism Westernization Muslims humiliate true 
Muslims 
Muslim Women 
Victimized 
* * 
20 Crime Arab Nationalism Materialism Crime * * 
21 Usury Christianity Paganism Zionism * * 
22 United States Paganism Westernization Muslim 
Passivity 
* * 
23 Muslim 
Passivity 
Usury Israel Modern 
Morality 
* * 
24 Capitalism Jews Communism Satan * * 
25 Polytheism * Polytheism Apostasy * * 
26 Democracy * United Nations Christianity * * 
27 Homosexuality * Muslims Oppress True Materialism * * 
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Muslims 
28 * * Human Rights Socialism * * 
29 * * Jahiliyyah United Nations * * 
30 * * Blasphemy Democracy * * 
31 * * Crime Capitalism * * 
32 * * Satan Modern Science * * 
33 * * Usury  * * 
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Table 21 Types of Neo Nazis Prognostic Frames 
NEO-NAZI  
PROGNOSTIC 
TYPES: 
Rockwell 
(1967) 
Prevalence/ 
Value 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Prevalence 
/Value 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Prevalence 
/Value 
Lane 
(1994) 
Prevalence 
/Value 
Duke 
(2003) 
Prevalence 
/Value 
Chittum 
(1997) 
Prevalence 
/Value 
       
Carry out Racial 
War 
6/0.3043 2/0.4844 14/0.1748 4/0.4286 * 1/1 
Interrogate 
Communists 
20/0.0145 * * * * * 
Control 
Immigration 
* * * * * * 
Identify Jews as a 
race 
* * * * 4/0.3333 * 
Identify 
Communists 
14/0.0580 * 28/0.0081 * * * 
Deport non-whites * * 7/0.3008 * 7/0.1667 11/0.1333 
Eliminate non-
whites 
10/0.1377 3/0.4375 5/0.4065 * * 8/0.2667 
Maintain 
Traditional 
Morality 
19/0.217 * * * * * 
Establish White 
Territory 
12/0.1014 11/0.1875 11/0.2033 8/0.1905 * 2/0.7333 
Follow 
Constitution 
8/0.2319 19/0.0313 15/0.1585 12/0.0952 9/0.1667 3/0.4667 
Whites need to 
Organize 
* 4/0.3906 6/0.3089 * * 4/0.4667 
Promote White 
Education 
* * 4/0.4146 * * * 
Punish 
communists 
21/0.0145 * * * *  
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
2/0.4130 13/0.0938 2/0.5203 1/1 6/0.2083 9/0.2000 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
4/0.3162 18/0.0313 17/0.1057 7/0.1905 * * 
Promote Racial 
loyalty 
17/0.0290 7/0.3594 10/0.2033 11/0.0952 10/0.0833 * 
Generate Racial 
Hatred 
* * 20/0.0569 * * * 
283 
 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
16/0.0290 9/0.2500 23/0.0488 * 11/0.0833 6/0.4000 
Recruit Whites * 5/0.3906 27/0.0163 * * * 
Promote 
Revisionism 
* * * * 3/0.4167 * 
Understand 
Replacement 
Theology 
* * * * 5/0.2500 * 
Use non-whites for 
labor  
* * 29/0.0081 * * * 
White 
Advancement 
* * 3/0.4715 * 12/0.0833 * 
White Praxis 3/.3551 16/0.0313 8/0.2846 * 2/0.6250 7/0.3333 
White 
Discernment 
* * 18/0.0813 2/0.4762 * * 
White Based 
Religion 
* 20/0.0313 1/1 * * * 
White Martyrdom  * * 19/0.0569 * * * 
White Terrorism * 1/1 21/0.0569 * * 14/0.0667 
White Leadership 1/1 14/0.0938 9/0.2195 6/0.2857 1/1 12/0.1333 
White Revolution 7/0.2609 10/1875 26/0.0244 * 15/0.0833 * 
Whites seek 
positions of power 
5/0.3043 * 24/0.0407 * * * 
Whites to Arms 15/0.0435 6/0.3906 25/0.0407 9/0.0952 * 5/0.4667 
Whites reproduce 
only with Whites 
13/0.0725 17/0.0313 12/0.1951 3/0.4286 * * 
White unity 11/0.1377 15/0.0469 16/0.1301 10/0.0952 16/0.0833 10/0.2000 
Whites create 
productive 
economies 
18/0.0290 12/0.1250 22//0.0569 * * * 
White propaganda 9/0.1594 8/0.2500 13/0.1870 5/0.3810 14/0.0833 13/0.0667 
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Table 22 Types of Neo Nazis Prognostic Frames by Propagandist/Text 
Rank Rockwell 
(1967) 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Lane 
(1994) 
Duke 
(2003) 
Chittum 
(1997) 
       
1 
White Leadership White Terrorism 
White  based 
religion 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
White Leadership 
Carry out 
Racial War 
2 Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
Carry out Racial 
War 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
White 
Discernment 
White Praxis 
Establish White 
Territory 
3 
White Praxis 
Eliminate non-
whites 
White 
advancement 
White reproduce 
with Whites 
Promote 
Revisionism 
Follow 
Constitution 
4 Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
Whites need to 
organize 
Promote White 
Education 
Carry out Racial 
War 
Identify Jews as 
race 
Whites need to 
organize 
5 Whites Seek 
Positions of 
Power 
Recruit Whites 
Eliminate non-
whites 
White 
Propaganda 
Understand 
Replacement 
Theology 
Whites to arms 
6 Carry out Racial 
War 
Whites to arms 
Whites need to 
organize 
White 
Leadership 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
7 
White Revolution 
Promote Racial 
Loyalty 
Deport non-
Whites 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
Deport non-
Whites 
White Praxis 
8 Follow 
Constitution 
White 
Propaganda 
White Praxis 
Establish White 
Territory 
Eliminate non-
whites 
Eliminate non-
whites 
9 
White Propaganda 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
White Leadership Whites to arms 
Follow 
Constitution 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
10 Eliminate non-
whites 
White Revolution 
Promote Racial 
Loyalty 
White Unity 
Promote Racial 
Loyalty 
White Unity 
11 
White Unity 
Establish White 
Territory 
Establish White 
Territory 
Promote Racial 
Loyalty 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
Deport non-
Whites 
12 
Establish White 
Territory 
Whites create 
productive 
economies 
White reproduce 
with Whites 
Follow 
Constitution 
White 
advancement 
White 
Leadership 
13 White reproduce 
with Whites 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
White Propaganda 
* Promote White 
Education 
White 
Propaganda 
14 Identify 
Communists 
White Leadership 
Carry out Racial 
War 
* 
White Propaganda 
White 
Terrorism 
15 
Whites to arms White Unity 
Follow 
Constitution 
* 
White Revolution 
* 
16 Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
White Praxis White Unity 
* 
White Unity 
* 
17 Promote Racial 
Loyalty 
White reproduce 
with Whites 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
* * * 
18 Whites create 
productive 
economies 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
White 
Discernment 
* * * 
19 Maintain 
Traditional 
Morality 
Follow 
Constitution 
White martyrdom 
* * * 
20 Maintain 
Interrogate 
Communists 
White based 
religion 
Generate Racial 
Hatred 
* * * 
21 Punish 
Communists 
* White Terrorism 
* * * 
22 
C * 
Whites create 
productive 
economies 
* * * 
23 
* * 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
* * * 
24 * * Whites seek * * * 
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positions of power 
25 * * Whites to arms * * * 
26 * * White Revolution * * * 
27 * * Recruit Whites * * * 
28 
* * 
Control 
Immigration 
* * * 
29 
* * 
Use non-whites 
for labor 
* * * 
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Table 23 Types of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames 
VIOLENT 
JIHADI 
PROGNOSTIC 
TYPES: 
Qutb 
(1966) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
Azzam 
(1984) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 
Prevalence/Va
lue 
       
Pursue Divine 
leadership 
7/0.1901 2/0.9484 1/1 13/0.0452 1/1 1/1 
Establish True 
Ummah 
* 8/0.1127 9/0.0769 15/0.0271 * * 
Follow 
Muhammad’s 
example 
2/0.9008 3/0.4601 3/0.3846 5/0.1357 2/0.4638 2/0.8283 
Abide by Sharia 4/0.6116 12/0.0751 6/0.1231 4/0.2986 * 5/0.1010 
Start Islamic 
revolution/move
ment 
 15/0.0563 10/0.0615 7/0.1176 7/0.0870 4/0.1313 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
redemption 
3/0.7934 13/0.0751 12/0.0462 10/0.0724 4/0.1594 8/0.0404 
Creates ideal 
civilization via 
Islam 
* 16/0.0094 * * * * 
Engage in Violent  
jihad 
5/0.5289 1/1 2/0.6615 1/1 5/0.1304 3/0.2424 
Muslim Praxis * 4/0.2723 4/0.2923 2/0.4570 3/0.2464  
Pursue the Quran 1/1 6/0.1502 16/0.0154 19/0.0181 9/0.0580 7/0.0606 
Return to golden 
age 
8/0.1653 9/0.1127 17/0.0154 * *  
Strong 
Leadership 
9/0.1405 7/0.1315 11/0.0615 9/0.0814 * 11/0.0202 
Pursue Tawhid 10/0.0661  14/0.0308 20/0.0181 12/0.0145 * 
Recruit Jihadis * 10/0.0939 * 12/0.0633 * * 
Engage in 
Martyrdom  
11/0.0579 11/0.0845 5/0.1385 6/0.1267 10/0.0435 6/0.0606 
Boycott Western 
Goods 
* * 8/0.0769 210.0181 * * 
Generate 
Religious Hatred 
* * 15/0.0154 * 8/0.0725 9/0.0202 
Islamic 
instruction 
* 14/0.0657 * 17/0.0181 6/0.0870 10/0.0202 
Punishment  * * * 18/0.0181 * * 
Establish Jihad 
territory 
* 5/0.2300 7/0.0923 3/0.3258 * * 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
12/0.0165 * 13/0.0308 8/0.0814 11/0.0290 * 
Organize  * * * 14/0.0362 * * 
Tactical 
instruction 
* * * 11/0.0724 * * 
Obtain weapons * * * 16/0.0271 * * 
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Table 24 Typology of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames by Propagandist/Text 
Rank Qutb 
Milestones 
(1966) 
Azzam 
Defense 
(1984) 
Bin Laden 
Declaration of 
War 
(1996) 
Zawahiri 
Knights 
(2001) 
Maqdisi 
Aqeedah 
(2009) 
Al Bari 
Swords 
(1850) 
       
1 
Pursue the Quran 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
2 Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Muslim Praxis 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
3 Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Jihadi Territory Muslim Praxis 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
4 
Abide by Sharia Muslim Praxis Muslim Praxis Abide by Sharia 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Start Islamic 
Revolution 
5 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Jihadi Territory 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
Abide by Sharia 
6 Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
Pursue the Quran Abide by Sharia 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
Islamic 
Instruction 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
7 Start Islamic 
Revolution 
Strong 
Leadership 
Jihadi Territory 
Start Islamic 
Revolution 
Start Islamic 
Revolution 
Pursue the Quran 
8 
Return to Golden 
Age 
Establish True 
Ummah 
Boycott Western 
Goods 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
Generate 
Religious Hatred 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
9 Strong 
Leadership 
Return to Golden 
Age 
Establish True 
Ummah 
Strong 
Leadership 
Pursue the Quran 
Generate 
Religious Hatred 
10 
Believe Tawhid Recruit Jihadis 
Start Islamic 
Revolution 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
Islamic 
Instruction 
11 Engage in 
Martyrdom 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
Strong 
Leadership 
Tactical 
Instruction 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
Strong 
Leadership 
12 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
Abide by Sharia 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Recruit Jihadis Believe Tawhid 
* 
13 * Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
* * 
14 * Islamic 
Instruction 
Believe Tawhid Organize  
* * 
15 * Start Islamic 
Revolution 
Generate 
Religious Hatred 
Establish True 
Ummah 
* * 
16 * Creates ideal 
civilization via 
Islam 
Pursue the Quran Obtain Weapons 
* * 
17 * * Return to Golden 
Age 
Islamic 
Instruction 
* * 
18 * * * Punishment * * 
19 * * * 
Pursue the Quran 
* * 
20 * * * Believe Tawhid * * 
21 * * * Boycott Western 
Goods 
* * 
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Table 25 Relationship between neo-Nazi prognostic/diagnostic frames 
(Diagnostic Frames are shaded) 
RANK: Rockwell 
(1967) 
Frame/Value 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Frame/Value 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Frame/Value 
Lane 
(1994) 
Frame/Value 
Duke 
(2003) 
Frame/Value 
Chittum 
(1997) 
Frame/Value 
       
1 Jewish Influence 
1.0000 
Federal 
Government 1.0000 
Jewish Influence 
1.0000 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 1.0000 
Jews 1.0000 Federal 
Government 
1.0000 
2 Communism 
0.8851 
Whites need to 
Organize 0.8598 
Blacks 0.7156 Modern Morality 
0.8333 
Jewish Influence 
0.8476 
White 
Oppression 
0.7684 
3 Modern Morality 
0.8277 
White Terrorism 
0.4512 
Jews 0.6506 Federal 
Government 0.6667 
Whites Humiliated 
0.7238 
Violence Against 
Whites 0.6316 
4 Jews 0.7478 Blacks 0.3933 Traditional 
Religion 0.5762 
White Extinction 
0.6111 
Zionism 0.5429 Modern Morality 
0.5789 
5 Blacks 0.6792 White Oppression 
0.3720 
White Based 
Religion 0.5390 
Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 288 
0.5833 
Communism 
0.3937 
Racial Integration 
0.5053 
6 Liberalism 0.5218 Modern Morality 
0.3049 
Racial Pollution 
0.3346 
Traditional Religion 
0.4444 
Jews humiliate 
Muslims 0.3619 
Decline of White 
Power 0.4421 
7 White Passivity 
0.3283 
Violence Against 
Whites 0.2805 
Violence Against 
Whites 0.3309 
Usury 0.3889 White Oppression 
0.3429 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 
0.3789 
8 Whites Humiliated 
0.3159 
Whites Humiliated 
0.2409 
Federal 
Government 
0.2900 
Racial Pollution 
0.3889 
Jewish 
Supremacists 
0.3159 
Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.3368 
9 Injustices are 
Tolerated 0.2484 
Jewish Influence 
0.2378 
White Extinction 
0.2751 
Materialism 0.3333 Holocaust 0.2984 Blacks 0.2316 
10 White Leadership 
0.2347 
Carry out Racial 
War 0.2256 
White 
Advancement 
0.2416 
White Discernment 
0.2778 
Media 0.2698 Racial Equality 
0.2316 
11 Violence Against 
Whites 0.2285 
White Women 
Victimized 0.2073 
Whites Humiliated 
0.2416 
Whites Reproduce 
only with Whites 
0.2500 
Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.2540 
Carry out Racial 
War 0.2316 
12 Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.2247 
White Passivity 
0.1921 
Promote White 
Discernment 
0.2342 
Racial Equality 
0.2222 
Violence Against 
Whites 0.2413 
Communism 
0.2263 
13 Federal 
Government 
0.2097 
Liberalism 0.1890 Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
0.2082 
Racial Integration 
0.2222 
Federal 
Government 
0.2254 
Establish White 
Territory 0.2105 
14 Racial Equality 
0.1598 
Promote racial loyal
ty 0.1890 
White Oppression 
0.2045 
Taxation 0.2222 Muslims 0.2159 Taxation 0.1947 
15  White Praxis 
0.1149 
Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.1463 
Eliminate non 
Whites 0.2007 
Carry out Racial 
War 0.2222 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 0.2000 
Native 
Americans 
0.1895 
16 Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
0.0949 
Race Traitors 
0.1463 
Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.1859 
White Propaganda 
0.2222 
Liberalism 0.0794 Whites 
Humiliated 
0.1789 
17 White Oppression 
0.0849 
Whites to arms 
0.1159 
Native Americans 
0.1859 
White Women 
Victimized 0.2222 
White Leadership 
0.0730 
Jews 0.1263 
18 White Women 
Victimized 0.0724 
Racial Pollution 
0.1128 
Deport Non-
Whites 0.1747 
White Passivity 
0.2222 
Traditional 
Religion 0.0698 
Liberalism 
0.1158 
19 Zionism 0.0712 Jews 0.1128 Whites need to 
Organize 0.1487 
White Leadership 
0.1667 
Modern Morality 
0.0603 
Follow 
Constitution 
0.1053 
20 Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
0.0699 
Eliminate non 
Whites 0.1098 
White Praxis 
0.1487 
White Oppression 
0.1667 
Blacks 0.0603 Whites need to 
Organize 0.0842 
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21 Materialism 
0.0687 
Recruit Whites 
0.0854 
Modern Medicine 
0.1413 
Blacks 0.1111 Usury 0.0603 Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
0.0737 
22  Carry out Racial 
War 0.0674 
Communism 0.0854 White Leadership 
0.1375 
Non whites 
Advance Crime 
0.1111 
Taxation 0.0508 White Praxis 
0.0737 
23 Taxation 0.0599 Maintain Racial 
Segregation 0.0854 
Follow 
Constitution 
0.1338 
Jews 0.1111 White Praxis 
0.0460 
White Unity 
0.0737 
24 Racial Pollution 
0.0599 
Racial Equality 
0.0793 
Communism 
0.1152 
Homosexuality 
0.1111 
U.S. support of 
Israel 0.0444 
Whites to arms 
0.0737 
25 Whites seek 
Positions of Power 
0.0574 
Materialism 0.0671 Modern 
Education0.1115 
Jewish Influence 
0.1111 
Identify Jews as a 
Race 0.0444 
Media 0.0632 
26 Whites Revolution 
0.0537 
Injustices are 
Tolerated 0.0671 
Modern Morality 
0.1115 
Race Traitors 
0.1111 
Promote 
Revisionism 
0.0413 
Eliminate non 
Whites 0.0421 
27 Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 0.0499 
White Propaganda 
0.0488 
Promote 
 racial loyalty 
0.1115 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 0.1111 
Injustices are 
Tolerated 0.0413 
Whites Unarmed 
0.0421 
28 Follow 
Constitution 
0.0474 
Whites Revolution 
0.0427 
Establish White 
Territory 0.1078 
Establish White 
Territory 0.1111 
White Extinction 
0.0413 
Promote racial 
loyalty 0.0316 
29 Civil Rights 
0.0449 
Establish White 
Territory 0.0366 
Racial Integration 
0.1004 
Asians 0.0556 Racial Integration 
0.0381 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
0.0316 
30 White Extinction 
0.0400 
Racial Integration 
0.0335 
Taxation 0.1004 Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 0.0556 
Racial Equality 
0.0349 
White Leadership 
0.0316 
31 Homosexuality 
0.0350 
White Extinction 
0.0305 
Whites Reproduce 
only with Whites 
0.0967 
Native Americans 
0.0556 
Modern 
Education0.0254 
Deport Non-
Whites 0.0211 
32 Native Americans 
0.0300 
Feminism 0.0305 White Propaganda 
0.0929 
Abortion 0.0556 Understand 
 Replacement The
ology 0.0222 
White Terrorism 
0.0211 
33 White Propaganda 
0.0300 
Whites create 
Productive 
Economies 0.0274 
Carry out Racial 
War 0.0911 
Follow Constitution 
0.0556 
White Guilt 
0.0222 
Injustices are 
Tolerated 0.0211 
34 Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 0.0250 
Whites Unarmed 
0.0244 
Racial Equality 
0.0818 
Promote racial loyal
ty 0.0556 
Whites need to 
Organize 0.0190 
Modern Medicine 
0.0105 
35 Racial Integration 
0.0250 
White Leadership 
0.0183 
Race Traitors 
0.0818 
White Unity 0.0556 Feminism 0.0127 Civil Rights 
0.0105 
36 White Unity 
0.0250 
Taxation 0.0183 Decline of White 
Power 0.0781 
Whites to arms 
0.0556 
Materialism 
0.0127 
Feminism 0.0105 
37 Eliminate non 
Whites 0.0237 
Muslims 0.0183 Violation of 
Racial Natural 
Law 0.0632 
Violence Against 
Whites 0.0556 
Native Americans 
0.0127 
Materialism 
0.0105 
38 Usury 0.0200 Traditional Religion 
0.0183 
Media 0.0595 
* 
Decline of White 
Power 0.0127 
Muslims 0.0105 
39 Establish White 
Territory 0.0175 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 0.0152 
White Unity 
0.0595 * 
White Passivity 
0.0127 
White 
Propaganda 
0.0105 
40 Whites Reproduce 
only with Whites 
0.0150 
Follow Constitution 
0.0122 
White Passivity 
0.0595 * 
Abortion 0.0095 White Extinction 
0.0105 
41 Whites to arms 
0.0125 
White Unity 0.0122 Liberalism 0.0558 
* 
Racial Pollution 
0.0095 
White Guilt 
0.0105 
42 Traditional 
Religion 0.0100 
Holocaust 0.0122 Empower Racial 
Nationalism 
0.0483 
* 
Follow Racial 
Natural Law 
0.0095 
White Women 
Victimized 
0.0105 
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43 Promote racial loy
alty 0.0100 
White Praxis 0.0061 White Guilt 
0.0483 
* 
Civil Rights 
0.0063 
White Passivity 
0.0105 
44 Whites need to 
Organize 0.0075 
Non whites create p
overty 0.0061 
Disease 0.0446 
* 
Homosexuality 
0.0063 
* 
45 Muslims 0.0075 Civil Rights 0.0061 White 
Discernment 
0.0409 
* 
Deport Non-
Whites 0.0063 
* 
46 Whites Unarmed 
0.0050 
Empower Racial 
Nationalism 0.0061 
White Terrorism 
0.0409 
* 
Eliminate non 
Whites 0.0063 
* 
47 Enforce traditional
 morals 0.0050 
Decline of White 
Power 0.0061 
Muslims 0.0372 
* 
Follow 
Constitution 
0.0063 
* 
48 Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
0.0050 
Native Americans 
0.0061 
Materialism 
0.0335 * 
Promote racial loy
alty 0.0063 
* 
49 Whites create 
Productive 
Economies 0.0050 
White Based 
Religion 0.0061 
White Martyrdom 
0.0335 * 
White Propaganda 
0.0063 
* 
50 Holocaust 0.0025 Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 0.0061 
Generate racial hat
red 0.0297 
* 
Whites Unarmed 
0.0063 
* 
51 Abortion 0.0025 Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 0.0061 
Foreigners/Illegal 
Immigrants 0.0260 * 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
0.0032 
* 
52 Asians 0.0025 Homosexuality 
0.0061 
Maintain Racial 
Segregation 
0.0260 
* 
White 
Advancement 
0.0032 
* 
53 
* * 
Whites create 
Productive 
Economies 0.0260 
* 
Promote White 
Discernment 
0.0032 
* 
54 
* * 
Injustices are 
Tolerated 0.0260 
* 
Whites Revolution 
0.0032 
* 
55 
* * 
White Women 
Victimized 0.0260 
* 
White Unity 
0.0032 
* 
56 * * Zionism 0.0186 * * * 
57 
* * 
Whites seek positi
ons of power 
0.0186 
* 
* * 
58 
* * 
Whites to arms 
0.0186 
* 
* * 
59 * * Asians 0.0149 * * * 
60 * * Holocaust 0.0149 * * * 
61 
* * 
Whites Revolution 
0.0112 
* 
* * 
62 * * Usury 0.0074 * * * 
63 
* * 
Recruit Whites 
0.0074 
* 
* * 
64 
* * 
Homosexuality 
0.0037 
* 
* * 
65 
* * 
Use non whites for
 labor 0.0037 
* 
* * 
66 
* * 
Jews humiliate 
Muslims 0.0037 
* 
* * 
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 Table 26 Relationship between violent Jihadi prognostic/diagnostic frames 
(Diagnostic Frames are shaded) 
RANK Qutb 
(1966) 
 
Frame/Value 
Azzam 
(1984) 
 
Frame/Value 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 
Frame/Value 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 
Frame/Value 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 
Frame/Value 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 
Frame/Value 
       
1 Jahiliyyah 1.0000 Engage in Violent 
Jihad 1.0000 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 1.0000 
Engage in Violent 
Jihad 1.0000 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
1.0000 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
1.0000 
2 Promote the 
Quran 0.8598 
Pursue Divine 
Leadership 0.9224 
Engage in Violent 
Jihad 0.5814 
United States 0.5194 Kafir 0.5977 Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 0.6418 
3 Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 0.7317 
Follow Muhammad‘s 
Example 0.4082 
Follow Muhammad‘s 
Example 0.3023 
Islamic Governments 
0.3881 
Follow 
Muhammad‘s 
Example 
0.3908 
Kafir 0.4925 
4 Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
0.6707 
Muslim Passivity 
0.2939 
Islamic Governments 
0.2791 
Muslim Praxis 
0.3134 
Secular 
Innovations 
0.3563 
Islam is Polluted 
0.3582 
5 Abide by Sharia 
0.6463 
Muslim Praxis 
0.2367 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 0.2442 
Israel Exists 0.3104 Jahiliyyah 
0.2759 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
0.1940 
6 Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
0.4817 
Establish Jihadi 
Territory 0.2122 
Muslim Praxis 
0.2209 
Jews 0.2746 Muslim Praxis 
0.2529  
Christianity 
0.1269 
7 Jews 0.2927 Muslim women 
Victimization 0.1878 
Kafir 0.1860 Muslim violence 
against true Muslims 
0.2746 
Humanity 
needs Islamic 
Redemption 
0.1264 
Jews 0.1045 
8 Paganism 0.2683 Kafir 0.1306 Muslim Oppression 
0.1860 
Establish Jihadi 
Territory 0.2567 
Engage in 
Violent Jihad 
0.1264 
Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 
0.0970 
9 Secular 
Innovations 
0.2622 
Promote the Quran 
0.1306 
Modern Morality 
0.1744 
Abide by Sharia 
0.2030 
Islam is 
Polluted 0.1149 
Abide by Sharia 
0.0896 
10 Pursue Divine 
Leadership 
0.2439 
Strong Leadership 
0.1143 
United States 0.1628 Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
0.1910 
Modern 
Morality 
0.0920 
Islamic 
Governments 
0.0597 
11 Islamic 
Governments 
0.2195 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
0.1061 
Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim 
lands 0.1628 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 0.1672 
Democracy 
0.0805 
Apostasy 0.0597 
12 Satan 0.2134 Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 0.1061 
Muslim women 
Victimization 0.1395 
Muslims humiliate 
true Muslims 0.1552 
Islamic 
Instruction 
0.0805 
Polytheism 
0.0597 
13 Kafir 0.1951 Islam is Polluted 
0.0980 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 0.1047 
Muslims oppress true 
Muslims 0.1493 
Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 
0.0690 
Muslim 
Oppression 
0.0597 
14 Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 
0.1768 
Establish True 
Ummah 0.0980 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
0.0930 
Communism 0.1373 Islamic 
Governments 
0.0575 
Jahiliyyah 
0.0448 
15  Muslim 
Oppression 
0.1463 
Return to Golden 
Age 0.0980 
Zionism 0.0814 Follow Muhammad‘s 
Example 0.1194 
Generate 
Religious 
Hatred 0.0575 
Satan 0.0448 
16 Return to Golden Recruit Jihadis  Abide by Sharia Non-Muslims Jews 0.0460 Engage 
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Age 0.1220 0.0816 0.0814 humiliate Muslims 
0.1134 
in martyrdom 
0.0448 
17 Strong 
Leadership 
0.1159 
Muslim Oppression 
0.0816 
Islam is Polluted 
0.0698 
Secular Innovations 
0.0955 
Promote the 
Quran 0.0460 
Promote the 
Quran 0.0448 
18 Science 0.1098 Engage in 
Martyrdom 0.0735 
Usury 0.0698 Engage in 
Martyrdom 0.0896 
Satan 0.0345 Muslims 
Governed by 
Non-Muslims 
0.0448 
19 Islam is Polluted 
0.1098 
Satan 0.0735 Establish Jihadi 
Territory 0.0698 
Modern Ummah 
0.0836 
Engage in 
Martyrdom 
0.0345 
Humanity needs 
Islamic 
Redemption 
0.0299 
20 Muslim women 
Victimization 
0.1037 
Humanity needs 
Islamic Redemption 
0.0735 
Corrupt leaders 
0.0581 
Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 0.0836 
Muslim 
Oppression 
0.0345 
Modern Morality 
0.0149 
21 Communism 
0.0976 
Islamic Instruction 
0.0571 
Boycott Western 
Goods 0.0581 
Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim 
lands 0.0836 
Alcohol 0.0230 Alcohol 0.0149 
22  Materialism 
0.0854 
Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 0.0490 
Establish True 
Ummah 0.0581 
Islam is Polluted 
0.0716 
Fornication 
0.0230 
Fornication 
0.0149 
23 Modern Morality 
0.0732 
Non-Muslims 
humiliate Muslims 
0.0490 
Strong Leadership 
0.0581 
Kafir 0.0597 Muslims 
oppress true 
Muslims 
0.0230 
Usury 0.0149 
24 Fornication 
0.0732 
Jahiliyyah 0.0490 Non-Muslims 
humiliate Muslims 
0.0581 
Sharia Ignored 
0.0537 
Establish 
Islamic 
Caliphate 
0.0230 
Generate 
Religious Hatred 
0.0149 
25 Christianity 
0.0610 
Communism 0.0449 Modern Ummah 
0.0465 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 0.0537 
Apostasy 
0.0115 
Islamic 
Instruction 
0.0149 
26 Alcohol 0.0610 Abide by Sharia 
0.0408 
Secular Innovations 
0.0465 
Strong Leadership 
0.0537 
Christianity 
0.0115 
Strong 
Leadership 
0.0149 
27 Liberalism 
0.0488 
Islamic Governments 
0.0408 
Sharia Ignored 
0.0465 
Tactical Instruction 
0.0537 
Polytheism 
0.0115 
Muslim women 
Victimization 
0.0149 
28 Socialism 0.0488 Secular Innovations 
0.0327 
Jews 0.0465 Humanity needs 
Islamic Redemption 
0.0478 
Crime 0.0115 Non-Muslims 
humiliate 
Muslims 0.0149 
29 Crime 0.0488 Modern Ummah 
0.0327 
Start Islamic 
Revolution / 
Movement 0.0465 
Muslim Oppression 
0.0478 
Tawhid 0.0115 * 
30 Usury 0.0488 Modern Morality 
0.0245 
Muslim Passivity 
0.0465 
Recruit 0.0418 Muslim 
Passivity 
0.0115 
* 
31 Tawhid 0.0488 Sharia Ignored 
0.0245 
Muslims humiliate 
true Muslims 0.0465 
Muslim women 
Victimization 0.0358 
* * 
32 Engage 
in Martyrdom 
0.0427 
Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim 
lands 0.0163 
Communism 0.0349 Pursue Divine 
Leadership 0.0299 
* * 
33 United States 
0.0427 
Crime 0.0163 Materialism 0.0349 Crime 0.0239 * * 
34 Muslim Passivity 
0.0366 
Westernization 
0.0082 
Paganism 0.0349 Zionism 0.0239 * * 
35 Capitalism Arab Nationalism Polytheism 0.0349 Jihadis need to * * 
293 
 
0.0244 0.0082 Organize 0.0239 
36 Polytheism 
0.0244 
Christianity 0.0082 Westernization 
0.0349 
Muslim Passivity 
0.0239 
* * 
37 Democracy 
0.0183 
Paganism 0.0082 Humanity needs 
Islamic Redemption 
0.0349 
Modern Morality 
0.0179 
* * 
38 Homosexuality 
0.0122 
Jews 0.0082 Israel Exists 0.0349 Satan 0.0179 * * 
39 Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 0.0122 
Usury 0.0082 United nations 
0.0233 
Establish True 
Ummah 0.0179 
* * 
40 
* 
Create ideal civilizati
on via Islam 0.0082 
Muslims oppress true 
Muslims 0.0233 
Obtain weapons 
0.0179 
* * 
41 
* * 
Establish Islamic 
Caliphate 0.0233 
Apostasy 0.0119 * * 
42 * * Tawhid 0.0233 Christianity 0.0119 * * 
43 * * Human rights 0.0116 Materialism 0.0119 * * 
44 * * Jahiliyyah 0.0116 Socialism 0.0119 * * 
45 
* * 
Blasphemy 0.0116 United Nations 
0.0119 
* * 
46 
* * 
Crime 0.0116 Islamic Instruction 
0.0119 
* * 
47 * * Satan 0.0116 Punishment 0.0119 * * 
48 
* * 
Generate Religious 
Hatred 0.0116 
Promote the Quran 
0.0119 
* * 
49 
* * 
Promote the Quran 
0.0116 
Tawhid 0.0119 * * 
50 
* * 
Return to Golden 
Age 0.0116 
Democracy 0.0060 * * 
51 * * * Capitalism 0.0060 * * 
52 * * * Science 0.0060 * * 
53 
* * * 
Boycott Western 
Goods 0.0060 
* * 
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Table 27: Linking Violent neo-Nazi Solutions to Diagnostic Frames 
Rank Rockwell 
(1967) 
Frame/Value 
Pierce 
(1978) 
Frame/Value 
Klassen 
(1981) 
Frame/Value 
Lane 
(1994) 
Frame/Value 
Duke 
(2003) 
Frame/Value 
Chittum 
(1997) 
Frame/Value 
       
1 Blacks 29% Federal 
Government 30% 
Blacks 17% Federal 
Government 50% 
Whites Humiliated 
33% 
Federal Government 
25% 
2 Violence 
Against 
Whites 17% 
Race Traitors 10% Jews 16% Modern Morality 
25% 
White Extinction 33% Violence Against 
Whites 25% 
3 Communism 
10% 
Modern Morality 
5% 
Jewish Influence 
15% 
Race Traitors 25% Holocaust 33% White Oppression 
15% 
4 Jews 10% Jewish Influence 
5% 
Native Americans 
10% 
* * Modern Morality 
10% 
5 Liberalism 
7% 
Racial Pollution 5% Violence Against 
Whites 10% 
* * Native Americans 
9% 
6 Jewish 
Influence 7% 
White Oppression 
5% 
Traditional Religion 
6% 
* * Non whites 
Advance Crime 4% 
7 Modern 
Morality 5% 
Blacks 5% Race Traitors 6% * * Blacks 3% 
8 Non whites 
Advance 
Crime 5% 
Liberalism 5% Racial Pollution 5% * * Racial Integration 
3% 
9 Native 
Americans 
5% 
Communism 4% Communism 2% * * Whites Humiliated 
3% 
10 Federal 
Government 
2% 
Jews 4% Whites Humiliated 
2% 
* * Feminism 1% 
11 Racial 
Pollution 2% 
Violence Against 
Whites 3% 
Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 1% 
* * Liberalism 1% 
12 Injustices are 
Tolerated 2% 
 
White Passivity 3% Non whites Advance 
Crime 1% 
* * White Passivity 1% 
13 * Whites Humiliated 
3% 
Liberalism 1% * * * 
14 * Non whites 
Advance Crime 2% 
Muslims1% * * * 
15 * Materialism 2% Racial Equality 1% * * * 
16 * Injustices are 
Tolerated 2% 
Racial Integration 1% * * * 
17 * Racial Integration 
1% 
Decline of White 
Power 1% 
* * * 
18 * White Women 
Victimized 1% 
White Extinction 1% * * * 
19 * Violation of Racial 
Natural Law 1% 
White Guilt 1% * * * 
20 * Traditional Religion 
1% 
White Oppression 
1% 
* * * 
21 * Muslims 1% * * * * 
22 * Racial Equality 1% * * * * 
23 * Taxation 1% * * * * 
24 * White Extinction 
1% 
* * * * 
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Table 28: Linking Jihadi Violent Solutions to Diagnostic Frames 
RANK Qutb 
(1966) 
 
Frame/Value 
Azzam 
(1984) 
 
Frame/Value 
Bin Laden 
(1996) 
 
Frame/Value 
Zawahiri 
(2001) 
 
Frame/Value 
Maqdisi 
(2009) 
 
Frame/Value 
Al Bari 
(1850) 
 
Frame/Value 
       
1 Islam is 
Polluted 30% 
Muslim Passivity 
29% 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 17% 
United States 
14% 
Kafir 50% Kafir 29% 
2 Jahiliyyah 19% Muslim women 
Victimization 19% 
Non Muslim soldi
ers permitted on M
uslim lands 13% 
Islamic 
Governments 
13% 
Jahiliyyah 
17% 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
18% 
3 Kafir 15% Kafir 14% Kafir 10% Jews 8% Jews 17% Islam is Polluted 
18% 
4 Modern 
Morality 7% 
Muslims Governed 
by Non-Muslims 
11% 
Israel Exists 8% Israel Exists 8% Muslim 
Oppression 
16% 
Islamic 
Governments12% 
5 Jews 7% Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 8% 
Muslim 
Oppression 8% 
Non-Muslim 
Violence against 
Muslims 8% 
* Modern Morality 
6% 
6 Satan 7% Islamic Governments 
4% 
Modern Morality 
6% 
Muslims oppress 
true Muslims 7% 
* Muslim women 
Victimization 6% 
7 Muslim 
Oppression 4% 
Secular Innovations 
4% 
United States 6% Muslim violence 
against true 
Muslims 6% 
* Satan 6% 
8 Islamic 
Governments 
4% 
Christianity 3% Muslim women 
Victimization 6% 
Communism 5% * Non-Muslims 
humiliate Muslims 
5% 
9 Liberalism 4% Jahiliyyah3% Muslims 
Governed by Non-
Muslims 6% 
Secular 
Innovations 4% 
* * 
10 Paganism 4% Muslim Oppression1 Islam is Polluted 
4% 
Kafir 4& * * 
11 * Arab Nationalism 1% Zionism 4% Islam is Polluted 
4% 
* * 
12 * Paganism 1% Non-Muslims 
humiliate Muslims 
4% 
Muslims 
humiliate true 
Muslims 4% 
* * 
13 * Non Muslim soldiers 
permitted on Muslim 
lands 1% 
Islamic 
Governments 2% 
Non Muslim sold
iers permitted on 
Muslim lands 3% 
* * 
14 * * Secular 
Innovations 2% 
Muslims 
Governed by 
Non-Muslims 
2% 
* * 
15 * * Materialism 2% Sharia Ignored 
2% 
* * 
16 * * Muslims oppress 
true Muslims 2% 
Muslim women 
Victimization 2% 
* * 
17 * * Corrupt leaders 
2% 
Muslim 
Oppression 2% 
* * 
18 * * Muslim Passivity 
2% 
Muslim Passivity 
1% 
* * 
19 * * * Modern Morality 
1% 
* * 
20 * * * Modern Ummah 
1% 
* * 
21 * * * Apostasy 1% * * 
22 * * * Capitalism 1% * * 
23 * * * Materialism 1% * * 
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24 * * * Socialism 1% * * 
 
 
 
